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“The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which 
the commodity completes its colonization of social life. It is 
not just that the relationship to commodities is now plain to 
see. Commodities are now all that there is too see; the world 
we see is the world of the commodity.” 
(Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle,  
New York: Zone Books, 1995, p.29) 
 
“I decided that salaries should be determined by a factor that 
averaged the arduousness, tediousness, futility and imbecility 
of a job. The richest people in the world then would be coal 
miners. Injection-moulding machine operators or tenders 
would fly to work in their own planes, and competition for 
such work would be stiff. Having had the experience, I would 
be quite content to be poor.” 
(Luc Santé, “Plastics”, Granta, No. 89, 2005: 164) 
 
“I’ve worked myself up from nothing  
to a situation of extreme poverty.” 
       (Groucho Marx)
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Preface 
 
 
1.  Research Topic and Questions 
 
On  20 April 2000 Sam Namane, chair of the shop-steward committee at 
Kelvinator South Africa (Alrode, East Rand) under provisional liquidation, visited 
the Johannesburg headquarters of the National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa (NUMSA) with a delegation of workers. The purpose of their travel was to 
discuss with union officials possible rescue bids to save the company, which had 
closed down in September 1999, leaving 1,200 employees jobless. It was not an 
uncommon episode in the East Rand, a region that had once been the industrial 
core of the country before a decade of job losses and factory closures hit it. 
Kelvinator, however, had started in 1996 under a visionary leadership which 
praised worker participation in company management, and promised a radiant 
future of quality jobs thanks to expanding demand for its electric appliances in the 
“new South Africa”. Eventually, all rescue bids would flounder and the assets of 
the company, bought by competitor Defy, were moved to a distant rural location 
where only 200 employees were hired.  
 Less than a month before Sam and his comrades visited Johannesburg, the 
South African government had appointed a commission of inquiry, chaired by 
Prof. Viviene Taylor, mandated to elaborate a “comprehensive system of social 
security” to integrate a host of fragmented public and private schemes and 
programmes, and address wide areas of exclusion from social benefits. The 
exercise, the first of its kind in South Africa’s history, followed the dramatic 
announcement, in January, by Minister of Social Development Zola Skweyiya 
that South Africa was facing a “deep social crisis” that could reverse gains made 
after the first democratic elections in 1994. Part of the need for a comprehensive 
social security system, Skweyiya continued, was the past over-reliance on the 
ability of family mechanisms and wage labour to provide for decent standards of 
living. The Taylor Committee Report, released at the end of 2001, revealed indeed 
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massive areas of exclusion from social security benefits, a collapse in the relation 
between monetary “wage” and social “income”, and waged employment’s 
growing inability, which challenged conventional wisdom, to lift citizens out of 
poverty. 
 The two episodes here described ideally synthesize the contours of this 
dissertation and the problems it addresses. This work looks, in particular, at the 
relations between wage labour and social citizenship during the first decade of 
South Africa’s post-apartheid democracy. My interest lies in discussing the ways 
in which workers’ experiences of wage labour as a vehicle of social advancement 
and access to citizenship have changed, and how such changes relate to 
government policy discourse on social citizenship in relation to wage labour. The 
theme is relevant to understanding the South African transition from two main 
angles. First, labour played for South Africa’s racially oppressed population a 
decisive role in political democratization and the demise of apartheid. This role 
was not only limited to wage-related, workplace-based struggles, but it advanced 
visions of social rights and citizenship to complement the democratic expectations 
of the black working class. Second, organized labour provided an important 
constituency and organizational ally to the African National Congress (ANC), 
which in the first democratic elections in 1994 garnered a massive popular 
legitimacy from widespread demands for redress of the massive class and racial 
inequalities inherited from the apartheid past.  
Ten years after the first democratic elections, waged employment’s touted 
importance in reducing poverty and inequality is confronted by a reality that, 
according to official data from Statistics South Africa, sees a 35% unemployment 
rate (including discouraged jobseekers), only one third of the African 
economically active population in full-time jobs, and most jobseekers in their 20s 
and 30s (Africans for the overwhelming majority) that have never been in a 
formal occupation. At the same time, most new jobs are created as “atypical”, 
casual and informal employment with low levels of unionization, scant 
protections, high vulnerability and limited social benefits.  
Has wage labour fulfilled its promise of social emancipation in the “new 
South Africa”? How has this promise been reconfigured in workers’ experiences 
 xiii
and narratives of the employment crisis? What has been of trade unions’ discourse 
of social citizenship and universal social rights as desirable outcomes of the 
expansion and protection of the waged condition? How have the government’s 
social policies responded to the country’s crisis of waged employment? Are there 
alternative social citizenship paradigms emerging from the crisis of work-based 
modes of social inclusion? Are workers’ strategies and discourses contributing to 
the emergence of such alternatives? These are the main questions that have driven 
my research. 
The post-apartheid crisis of waged employment cannot be reduced to 
rising joblessness and exclusion from the labour market, especially among the 
African majority, but it has more broadly to do with deepening insecurity, 
vulnerability and poverty within formal employment. Therefore this dissertation 
looks first at how the links between wage labour and social citizenship are 
redefined in workers’ daily experiences, strategies and discourse. Second, I 
analyse how issues emerging from workers’ grassroots narratives and meanings 
are elaborated in the post-1994 policy discourse on social welfare and social 
security. The two conceptual terms in the title of this dissertation, wage labour 
and social citizenship, define therefore the encounter of two discursive modalities, 
“from below” and “from above”. The appropriateness of this approach resides in 
the fact that the social crisis of wage labour faces entrenched views of social 
citizenship that, both in trade unions’ discourse and in the rhetoric of the former 
liberation movement now in power, has glorified wage labour as the gateway to 
social recognition, respectability and rights.  
 
 
2. Intellectual Origins and Rationale of the Dissertation 
 
The need to find out what happens to social citizenship discourse once its social 
and conceptual underpinning, wage labour, fades away is what ultimately 
motivates my research. In fact, the crisis of established foundations of the concept 
questions the very notion of “social citizenship”. In my initial research proposal I 
normatively defined social citizenship as a linear process of expansion of codified 
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social rights through the action of progressive social actors, namely organized 
labour. I then came to the conclusion that labour’s ability to structure and advance 
demands for broader social citizenship rights can be severely impaired by labour 
market changes and expanding vulnerabilities. In fact labour’s defense of social 
rights can mean protecting the benefits enjoyed by union members which, 
however important in a progressive agenda, could become inadequate to represent 
casualised, atypicals, un-unionised workers and long term unemployed.  
Moreover, the post-apartheid state’s commitment to macroeconomic 
orthodoxy and fiscal discipline made the agenda of universal social rights 
contained in the 1996 Constitution increasingly problematic as a terrain of 
engagement for grassroots social agency. Therefore, as critiques of African “civil 
society” often show (Lemarchand, 1992; Markovitz, 2002) responses from below 
can take the form of “extraverted” survivalist, informal activities that, in their own 
complex and ambiguous way, avoid engaging the state rather than pushing for an 
institutional realization of rights. 
A further intellectual motivation for this work emerged out of my 
dissatisfaction with the ways in which mainstream South African academic 
conversation and policy debates have looked at issues of “poverty”, “inequality” 
and “exclusion” in relation to waged employment. Influential policy-oriented 
analyses (Van der Berg, 1994; May, 2000; Bhorat et al., 2001) have constantly 
argued that access to a waged job is a necessary, albeit not always sufficient, 
condition for effective social inclusion. Often such recommendations are phrased 
in terms that reward industriousness and independence in ethical and moral terms, 
stigmatising welfare “dependency” on similar grounds. As a result, the debate on  
the relations between wage labour, social inclusion and social citizenship is often 
polarized around binary oppositions between categories like “employed” and 
“unemployed” citizens, “typical” and “atypical” workers, “formal” and “informal” 
sectors, social “inclusion” and “exclusion”. The first terms generally represent 
virtue and normality, while the second identify social “problems” that require the 
application of knowledge to identify viable solutions. This mode of argumentation 
has recently acquired authoritative institutional recognition in president Mbeki’s 
view of a “two economies” scenario, where informality and flexibility could 
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become, once properly regulated, new avenues for productive employment and 
job creation for otherwise unemployable workers. As Chapter 8 explains, this 
polarized discursive mode presided over a policy trajectory that during the first 
decade of South Africa’s democracy has invariably made social citizenship 
coincide with labour market insertion and participation, rather than with the 
reduction of labour market dependency. Only recently have these approaches 
started to be questioned inside institutional debates. 
Arguments to criticize a view of social citizenship that unproblematically 
idealises wage labour as the most reliable, honorable and commendable form of 
social insertion are provided by  two trends emerging from international scholarly 
literature. Various authors (Escobar, 1994; Ferguson, 1994; Cooper and Packard, 
1997; Abrahamsen, 2000; Mitchell, 2002) have emphasized the role of expert 
knowledge in the policy process’ use of socio-scientific categories like 
“employment”, “inclusion” and “informality” as a normative device that 
constructs social problems rather than merely reflecting them. Problems 
construction is associated to the definition, usually with strong ethical overtones, 
of ideal subjects, like wage labour, that would arguably provide solutions. 
Critiques of modes of knowledge associated with social policies and state 
practices strip therefore notions of “waged employment” of its aura of 
unquestionable, normative objectivity. The state itself, indeed, is called into 
question as a repository of a “psychic life” (Butler, 1997) made of ideology, 
desires and ethical frameworks. 
The concepts of social citizenship and wage labour, on the other hand, 
have a history characterized by contestastion of meanings and strategies, as I 
explain more in detail in the next chapter. “Social citizenship” has been defined -- 
in a theoretical trajectory that spans the second half of the twentieth century, from 
T.H. Marshall’s (1950) original definition to recent elaborations like G. Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) -- as a “third generation” of rights that complement civil and 
political freedoms. A common element in various definitions of social citizenship 
is decommodification, or the provision of goods and services as a social “income” 
independent of market-related “wage”. Decommodified social income includes 
social security and assistance funded through the fiscal system, but it can also 
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include employer-subsidised benefits like healthcare and retirement. In this work I 
use a strictly operational, non-normative definition of social citizenship, avoiding 
prescriptive characterizations. I therefore define social citizenship as the range and 
coverage of decommodified goods and services funded by employers 
contributions or public expenditures outside individual market transactions.  
From this point of view, while various modes and regimes of social 
citizenship exist, even political and ideological systems that are most favourable to 
“free-market” approaches recognise among their functions the provision of at least a 
limited degree of decommodified social provisions. At the same time, conflicts over 
the definition of social citizenship interrogate in which ways social provisions should 
be regarded as “social rights”. The modern nation-state has tried to legislate such 
rights with an aim at imposing corresponding duties and responsibilities on their 
beneficiaries. Social rights are therefore used to construct social subjects through 
public policies. However, the fact that social “rights” depend for their realization on 
the allocation of power and resources gives juridical formulations a “contingent” 
nature, which is constantly open to claims by social movements aiming to expand 
decommodification. 
“Wage labour” is also a highly contested concept. In capitalist economies it 
formally means “free” labour, whose sale and purchase is regulated by contractual 
arrangements and not by personal coercion. However, as I elaborate in the next 
chapter, the constitution of “free” labour in a capitalist society is shaped and 
permeated by institutions of unfreedom and extra-economic obligations, specifically 
aimed at penalizing defection and refusal of work. This is particularly relevant for 
colonial and postcolonial societies where economic and social alternatives to 
capitalist labour contracts are available and where, as Cooper (1996) notices in the 
African case, struggles of working classes have often taken place against their own 
being reduced to working classes. One of the main terrains of contestation in the 
constitution of wage labour are precisely the linkages to be established between 
labour and social citizenship, the amount of decommodified services to which 
workers feel entitled on the basis of their collective power, the language of liberation 
from market coercion that workers’ struggles and desires enable. The ultimate 
contestation in the definition of wage labour resides precisely in its ambiguous 
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meanings, well captured in classical distinctions like Hannah Arendt’s “work” and 
“activity”, as simultaneously being a form of oppression and exploitation and a 
vehicle for social emancipation, dignified life and self-realisation. 
Therefore, rather than adopting a purely normative view of social 
citizenship, I preferred a use of the concept capable to account for its internal 
contradictions and contestations. I decided to move away from a static, state-
centred view that identifies social citizenship with codified social “rights” and 
“programmes”. I use instead a dynamic approach that sees social citzenship as a 
contested terrain, shaped by the institutions’ attempt to regulate social 
entitlements and recipients, but also by competing demands, desires and agency 
from below. As Amenta (2003) argues in his exhaustive review of the literature, 
the definition of social policy itself becomes increasingly problematic once state 
rationality in devising programmes of resource allocation is questioned by 
privatization, public spending cuts, diversifying social inequalities and the 
appearance of subjects with new needs and demands. On similar grounds, I do not 
look in this work at social citizenship programmes, policy processes or related 
outcomes, but I focus on social citizenship as a discourse produced through the 
interaction of meanings from the institutions and grassroots social actors.  
Policy discourse is not a mere superstructural reflection of compromises 
between interests competing for the allocation of resources. It rather embodies the 
capacity of ideas and knowledge to structure actors’ fields of action (Hall, 1989; 
Berman, 1998; Bourdieu, 1998b). Following Foucault and Zukin and Di Maggio’s 
notion of “cognitive embeddedness”, Somers and Block (2005: 265) argue that 
discourses of welfare and social rights are “ideational causal mechanisms”, where 
theories have the power of “making themselves true”. Ideas and public narratives 
have therefore an independent influence on policy outcomes, and some arguments 
have an “epistemic privilege” based on the power of their internal claim to 
veracity and their imperviousness to empirical challenges.  
In the South African case, a deeply entrenched policy discourse based on 
the centrality of wage labour for social citizenship and inclusion has traditionally 
enjoyed a specific “epistemic privilege”. This is due to the fact that wage labour 
centrality assuaged at the same time state’s and capital’s concerns for social 
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stabilization and labour’s demands for “job creation” in the face of mass 
unemployment and precariousness. The ethical-moral overtones that have 
surrounded wage labour discipline and its resistance to empirical challenges are 
being however dented in a context where not only structural unemployment is not 
receding, but the proliferation of exploitative and unstable occupations 
interrogates wage labour’s ability to enable decent livelihoods. Reasserting under 
these conditions a policy discourse based on the centrality of wage labour, often 
as an alternative to decommodification, becomes therefore increasingly 
problematic.   
Understanding social citizenship and its relations to wage labour as 
terrains of contestation between the agency of the institutions “from above” and 
social claims “from below” allows to de-emphasise the role, quite central in much 
literature on the welfare state, of social knowledge in  normatively constructing 
employment as the optimal form of social inclusion. Conversely, contradictions 
and conflicts that historically shape discourses of social citizenship underline the 
relevance of multiple agencies in constructing meanings of the wage, of the 
demands it entitles to, of how it relates to the provision of decommodified 
services.  
As an alternative to static constructs of a normative and institutional kind, 
I suggest an approach to the relation between social citizenship and wage labour 
as a contested field of signification. Policy discourse can be understood as an 
example of what Jacques Lacan (1977) called chains of signification through 
which subjects are constructed. Therefore, social citizenship’s institutional 
discourse that defines rights, programmes and outcomes is inseparable from 
meanings it attaches to wage labour as a subject in relation to other social subjects 
– unemployed, poor, disabled and so on -- which, lacking access to a stable wage, 
become specific targets of social policy. Waged employment becomes therefore, 
as a subject and object of policy, a “signifier” (langue, in Lacanian terms) that to 
build a signification requires a signified as a “non-overlapping set of the 
concretely pronounced discourse” in the form of the desired effect of policy 
interventions.  
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As a signifier, the idea of wage labour implies related forms of discipline 
constructed in prescriptive terms, as in praising waged employment as a condition 
of independence, probity and respectability. At a “signified” level, however, wage 
labour represents behaviours, proclivities and attitudes that such prescriptive 
terms aim to construct and discipline. Signification, in fact, for Lacan (1977: 137) 
does not refer to a “real” thing. Similarly, the idea of wage labour does not want 
to merely reflect a “pure” knowledge of its subjects, but it rather constructs those 
subjects. Wage labour emerges therefore as an ordering and structuring principle 
through which disorderly, unpredictable living experiences and desires can be 
rationally known and regulated by state institutions. At the same time, wage 
labour discourse is not just a product of institutional rationality; it is also a 
“symptom” of underlying grassroots social worldviews, desires, moral economy 
and meanings. Therefore wage labour is not only a construct of state knowledge 
“from above”, but it is also a self-image “from below” of desires of the self that, 
in Lacanian terms, are apprehended only in relation to desires of the state as the 
“other” which becomes the object of social claims.  
As Zizek (2000) elaborates, processes through which subjects express their 
desires in the language of the institutions never eliminate a “leftover” of desire 
that is not exhausted in state definitions of the subject itself. This “leftover” is 
what ultimately enables the subject to open new political possibilities and raise 
new claims, even if it cannot in itself represent the subject as totally autonomous 
from state constructions of citizenship. The dilemma that social agency faces in 
relation to wage labour and social citizenship discourses is that it is characterized 
by an emptiness of signification that wage labour can only partially fill. Defining 
social citizenship as a contested field of signification has ultimately to do with the 
fact that wage labour as an incomplete signifier that cannot conceal deeper, 
unruly, unpredictable demands and desires.  
The importance of looking at the labour-citizenship nexus not merely as 
defined in economic or institutional terms but also as shaped by meanings “from 
below” has, on the other hand, long been emphasized in labour studies. Sabel’s 
(1982) notion of “worldviews” underlines how wage labour’s imageries, demands 
and strategies are shaped by broader normative frameworks and regulatory ideas 
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which operate in the everyday life and  include extra-workplace issues of fairness, 
morality, respectability, community viability and household reproduction. In 
arguing for the relevance of “race” within such regulatory ideas, Robin Kelley 
(1994: 9) argues: 
 
Writing ‘history from below’ that emphasizes the infrapolitics of the 
black working class requires that we substantially redefine politics. 
Too often politics is defined by how people participate rather than 
why (…). By shifting our focus to what motivated disenfranchised 
black working people to struggle and what strategies they developed, 
we may discover that their participation in ‘mainstream’ politics (…) 
grew out of the very circumstances, experiences, and memories that 
impelled many to steal from their employer, join a mutual benefit 
association, or spit in a bus driver’s face. In other words, I am 
rejecting the tendency to dichotomize people’s lives, to assume that 
clear-cut ‘political’ motivations exist separately from issues of 
economic well-being, safety, pleasure, cultural expression, sexuality, 
freedom of mobility, and other facets of daily life [own emphasis]. 
 
As I explain in Chapters 2 and 3, placing wage labour at the center of discourse of 
social inclusion is a long-standing characteristic of state knowledge and policy in 
the South African case. The continued insistence by the post-apartheid 
government and its left allies on unemployment as the main challenge to social 
citizenship, and on “job creation” as its solution, is framed in unmistakably 
normative and ethical arguments. President Mandela, himself a figure enjoying all 
the  authoritativeness needed to convey a disciplining “patriotic” discourse, set the 
tone while  presenting, in 1996, the conservative Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. In his words wage labour’s promise of 
development should not enable expectations of “delivery” from the government, 
but it is aimed at building “good”, responsible and disciplined citizens. In 
promising job creation to boost families’ “self-esteem” and combat 
“helplessness”, Mandela also defined attracting prospective investors as a duty of 
good citizenship. Wage labour’s promise implied at the same time 
 
to exercise moderation in wage and salary increments (…) to invest in 
greater capital injections and thus create possibilities for hundreds of 
thousands of people to be absorbed into the mainstream of the 
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economy. We should all frankly acknowledge that there will be 
sacrifice1. 
 
The reassertion of wage labour discipline in post-apartheid South Africa, however, 
takes place in a context where wage labour is changing in ways that deepen 
structural unemployment and expand labour market vulnerabilities. The introduction 
by the ANC government of policies based on public spending containment and 
market-based approaches to service delivery, which increase commodification of 
social goods and services, contribute to strain monetary wages, further revealing 
their inadequacies. Advocating on pedagogical grounds disciplined selves defined by 
productive employment, while introducing policies that constrain the ability of 
wages to actually provide decent lives is therefore a contradiction in the ANC’s 
mode of governance. The democratic government’s reproposition of wage labour 
discipline is, however, not merely a matter of ideology. It rather resumes and 
refashions policy traditions that during the twentieth century have emphasized 
waged employment in alternative to decommodification, as the core of social 
citizenship.It also reflects the power of the image of post-apartheid “free labour” as a 
legitimating myth amongst left constituencies. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Research Strategy 
 
The methodology and research strategy that I have adopted for this work respond 
to my definition of social citizenship as a contested terrain shaped by the 
encounter of discourse and narratives “from above” and “from below”. Empirical 
materials I have used can be divided into workplace- and policy-related. Policy-
related materials include archival and documentary sources and interviews with 
strategic informants in government departments, academic and political 
institutions and programmes that are engaged in the design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of social policies. Informants include trade union 
officials acting in a policy capacity, government-based researchers, academics 
                                                
1 Cit. in Cohen, T., “Mandela Says Sacrifice is a Part of ‘New Patriotism’”, Business Day, 21 June 
1996. 
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involved in policy processes, officials in bargaining institutions like the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and policy-related 
functionaries in the government departments of Social Development (formerly 
Welfare and Population Development), Labour, Health and Housing.  
I have focused both the content of interviews and documentary search on 
programmes (unemployment insurance, social security, state pensions, social 
healthcare, housing subsidies) and policy processes (especially the 1997 White 
Paper on Welfare, the 1998 Jobs Summit and the 2001 governmental inquiry into 
comprehensive social security) whose policy objects have a direct bearing on the 
question of decommodification.  
Subsequently, I have looked at workers’ changing meanings of waged 
employment in relation to access to social citizenship and broader visions of 
social stability and emancipation. In this regard I have focused on two specific 
case studies, where I have conducted semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 
different groups of workers. My adoption of a case study research strategy 
recognized that the process through which workers construct narratives and 
meanings of work is socially situated in localities that are also been shaped by 
worker solidarities and struggles, and therefore reinforce grassroots discourse. 
Following De Certeau’s (1984: 115) suggestion that “narrative structures have the 
status of spatial syntaxes”, worker narratives are not disembodied and 
interchangeable but refer to the ways meanings “inhabit” spatial practices, 
physical workplaces, residential communities. 
 The first case I consider refers to manufacturing industry in the East Rand. 
The relevance of this region is due to the fact that it constitutes South Africa’s 
historical manufacturing core, but during the 1990s it has undergone dramatic 
processes of industrial restructuring following rapid market liberalization. Job 
losses and extensive casualisation make therefore the East Rand a privileged place 
of observation for grassroots elaborations of changes in waged employment and 
its related meanings of stability and social advancement. I have deliberately 
chosen to focus on traditional manufacturing sectors, which had once benefited 
from state protection under apartheid, and unionized blue-collar workers as 
realities that are most dramatically, rapidly and comprehensively affected by 
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industrial restructuring, downsizing and retrenchments. My research looks at 
companies in the glass, paper and metal-engineering sectors, in which I have 
selected specific companies in consultation with trade union officials and local 
organisers. I conducted sixty interviews with workers in three metal-engineering 
plants and a further 80 in two glass packaging and two paper companies. I have 
also administered questionnaires on changes in production and employment 
conditions with shop-stewards and managers in three further glass and three paper 
companies.  
 My second case study focuses on a process of similarly rapid 
organizational change, but taking place in the public sector, among the employees 
in the waste and roads departments of the Greater Johannesburg Municipal 
Council (GJMC) under the restructuring exercise known as “iGoli 2002”. This 
latter is a process of corporatisation and privatisation of municipal service 
delivery which questions patterns of occupational stability and access to benefits 
that specifically characterize public employment. I have conducted, in particular, 
interviews with 40 workers in each department, plus two pilot group discussions, 
and conversations with depot and municipal managers.  
Workplace interviews have taken place between July 1999 and April 2000. 
In total, I have interviewed 220 workers, 209 of which African, trying to represent  
stratifications in terms of age, gender, occupation and nature of contracts of 
employment. The duration of interviews ranged from 45 to 90 minutes, and they 
were usually conducted in English, using other workers as interpreters when 
needed. Finally, interviews have largely taken place on company premises, 
usually inside facilities used for union activities. Approximately 15% of 
interviews, all of them with East Rand workers, have taken place in respondents’ 
homes. The representivity of my sample is, however, statistically unreliable as I 
have preferred qualitative interviewing over survey analysis, and the sample was 
constructed in non-probability ways. The sample was identified with a “snowball” 
procedure, in which I first contacted shop-stewards through union organizers and 
then respondents were arranged by shop-stewards depending on time availability. 
Finally, managers in both cases were asked to provide information on workplace 
changes in terms of restructuring, technological innovation, retrenchments, 
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subcontracting of operations and variations in “non-standard” employment (such 
as casuals, temporary workers, labour brokers).  
 I have arranged the selection of specific workplaces, and access thereof, in 
consultation with various union organizations, namely the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), the Chemical, Energy, Print, Paper, 
Wood and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) and the South African and 
Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU). Contacts with the unions was greatly 
facilitated by my employment at the University of the Witwatersrand and 
membership in the Sociology of Work Unit (SWOP), a research organization with 
a remarkable tradition of labour-orientated analysis. In return for access to shop 
stewards and company structures, I have provided research spin-offs for the 
unions, especially SAMWU through my participation in the Municipal Services 
Project.  
The choice of my two case studies was determined by their similarities and 
differences, which allowed to identify continuities and discontinuities in the ways 
in which workers respond to changes in employment and its shifting social 
meanings. In both cases, in fact, waged employment and unionization have deeply 
shaped collective solidarity and meanings of socio-political emancipation in the 
transition from apartheid to democracy. The experience of wage labour was in fact 
in both cases co-terminous with resistance to exploitative relations, precarious 
forms of work, managerial despotism and racialised workplace authoritarianism. 
Such features have in particular shaped South Africa’s African working class as a 
subject deprived of citizenship, which in both my case studies was the product of 
state racism, residential and workplace segregation and the experience of 
migrancy under conditions of bureaucratic coercion. Through unionization and 
workplace organization wage labour could, conversely, become a repository of 
citizenship claims and collective power rooted in workers’ democratic imagery. 
Restructuring, retrenchments and casualisation under late apartheid and the first 
decade of democracy question, however, labour’s early social imageries and 
expectations for social rights. These processes induce the replacement of cohesive 
workers’ identities with a diversified range of coping strategies and responses 
along the workplace-community continuum. The comparison between private and 
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public workplaces further enables to capture such diversity by amplifying the 
range of its manifestations. 
 My workplace interviews required a basic set of information on individual 
biographies, wage levels, access to social provisions, and the relationships 
between wages, benefits, social provisions and household expenditures. In 
particular, I have looked at changes in employer-funded retirement benefits and 
healthcare, dwelling types and expenditures, use and access of public services, 
levels of commodification in national and municipal services, wage distribution to 
unemployed relatives and extended families, and the amount and types of family 
expenses. Interviews are mostly focused, however, on changing workers’ 
meanings of their jobs in relation to social citizenship and social advancement. I 
first addressed perceptions of workplace- and job-related problems (permanence 
of factory authoritarianism, sense of exploitation, persistence of racial hierarchies) 
to assess respondents’ sense of fulfillment, realization and future prospects on the 
job.  
Impacts of restructuring, prospects of job losses, growing casualisation 
highlight respondents’ feelings of insecurity and how they affect occupational 
self-perceptions and prospects. I then looked at changing views of how adequate 
monetary wages are in satisfying household needs, with the associated shifts in 
perceptions of individual and household quality of life. My aim was to elaborate 
how commodification in workers’ everyday lives is subjectively related to the 
changing nature of work. I have subsequently addressed alternative strategies used 
to cope with changing subjective experiences of wage labour, in particular in 
those cases where restructuring and growing vulnerability are most adversely felt 
and lead to relying on community-based support mechanisms and individualized 
self-entrepreneurial strategies. Finally, I have discussed respondents’ political 
meanings and responses to changes in wage labour in relation to their social 
citizenship claims. This refers to questions on the sources of organized, collective 
power and participation (trade unions, associational life, political participation) 
that potentially enable workers to negotiate and contest the wage-citizenship 
nexus. Interviews have also focused on the respondents’ changing perception of 
government delivery and potential for public interventions, to evaluate to what 
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extent a rights-based discourse of decommodification is emerging in response to 
changes in the relationships between wage labour and access to social citizenship. 
 Even if I have always introduced myself as an independent researcher 
working on a doctoral dissertation, the fact that my access was facilitated by local 
union organizations has probably influenced workers’ verbalization of narratives 
and perceptions. In fact, the urgency of changes, the growing occupational 
insecurity and the disorientation in organized responses emphasized the 
respondents’ needs to elaborate their experiences in ways that underlined the 
“traumatic” impact of recent adverse changes. This was particularly the case with 
GJMC employees, for which the rapid implementation of a restructuring plan 
whose outlines were largely unknown at the time of the interviews was a decisive 
challenge to time-honoured practices that characterized conditions of employment 
in the public sector as relatively more stable and protected than in the private one.  
 The way workers elaborate meanings with the purpose of responding to 
challenges of recent changes highlight a general problem with qualitative research 
and its claim to objectivity and empirical representivity. Mindful of methological 
debates between proponents of “grounded theory” and “extended case method” 
(Burawoy, 1991b; Corbin and Strauss, 1998), I addressed this problem by 
maintaining throughout my fieldwork a combination of inductive and deductive 
approaches. On one hand I have related to my respondents with a basic set of 
questions in mind derived from a theoretical problem, the relationship between 
wage labour and social citizenship, that is not self-evident in respondents’ 
experiential world. To avoid making respondents mere objects of knowledge, 
similarly to what I criticize in expert policy discourse, I have paid specific 
attention to what Michael Burawoy (1991a) discusses as reflexivity and 
theoretical reconstruction in his discussion of ethnographic research practice. 
According to him, fieldwork produces its own theory and claims to generalization, 
rather than merely provide materials to be evaluated at the end on the basis of 
predefined interpretative frames. At the same time, the focus on processes of 
signification in my definition of social citizenship emphasizes the explanatory 
power of workers’ narratives as a plane of reality that, albeit symptomatic of the 
need to rationalize social existence, does not presuppose reference to a pre-
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conceived, theory-laden objective reality as a criterion of validation (White, 
1990). Questions, themes and problems touched in my interviews have been 
modified as a result of the interviewing process itself instead of, as in grounded 
theory approaches, being functional to coding tags premised on the possibility of 
identifying causative interactions. In this sense, workers’ own redefinitions of 
experiences and meanings in response to contingent perceptions and states of 
mind become epistemologically relevant as sources of knowledge and objectivity.  
Finally, the non-probability nature of my sample and the open-endedness of 
interviews refuse statistical inference as a superior validation of findings. 
Following Burawoy’s (1991b: 281) suggestion that case analysis aims at 
“societal”, rather than “statistical” significance, I did not point at predictions 
based on causative relations between changes in wage labour and responses in 
terms of social citizenship discourse. Rather, both transformations of wage labour 
and workers’ social citizenship imagery are at the centre of processes of 
production of meanings that are highly respondent to contingent elements, 
situational factors, value systems and individual biographies. The “societal” 
significance of my study resides therefore in a mode of plausibility that emerges 
out of internal patterns of consistency and divergence in the meanings provided by 
respondents, rather than in a quest for objectivity to “explain” respondents’ 
meanings and strategies. In this sense, consistency and “typicality” was balanced 
with a positive appreciation of individualized “anomalies”. These latter, in fact, 
emphasize gaps and loopholes in existing generalizations, policy frameworks and 
theories, becoming therefore the basis of critical counter-theories (Burawoy, 
1991b). 
Therefore, both the emergence of similar elaborations and perceptions and 
their diversification contribute to establish the linkage between wage labour and 
social citizenship in workers’ narratives and discourses. Meanings are social facts 
embedded in respondents’ reflexivity and stimulated by the interview situation, 
influenced as this may be by the knowledge effect of the interviewer’s “pre-
dialogical” problem grid (Maso, 1996; Rapley, 2001; Mauthner and Doucet, 
2003).  
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 My choice of a qualitative approach also responds to limitations in 
mainstream analyses of unemployment, poverty and inequality in South Africa. 
During the first decade of democracy, a host of statistical analyses, both surveys 
and panel studies, have been produced, which enhance a nuanced, multi-
dimensional understanding of social problems. It is here sufficient to mention the 
1993 SALDRU-World Bank report on poverty and inequality, the 1993 KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study, the 2001 “Mesebetsi Labour Force Study” 
conducted by the Norwegian agency for international development (FAFO), and 
the official Labour Force Surveys by Statistics South Africa. It is now possible to 
produce highly sophisticated explanations of determinants of poverty supported 
by interrelated data series that account for multifaceted overlaps of income, race, 
gender, education and location.  
 Policy-orientated statistical analyses aimed at shaping knowledge of social 
processes functional to viable policy solutions, however, tend to reproduce the 
already mentioned dualistic mode of conceptualization, which leads to waged 
employment being unproblematically idealized as the basis of social citizenship, 
inclusion and responsibility. This approach is at risk of marginalizing the need for 
a critical understanding focused on internal contradictions and conflicts 
underlying notions of “employment”, “wage”, “poverty” and “inclusion”. The 
same can be said about grounded theory’s sometimes purported concern with 
identifying “transferable” conclusions as a tool for social advocacy (Chritcher, 
Waddington and Dicks, 1999). As Jacques Ranciere (2004: 169) warns, not only 
does social science put at the service of policy solutions create its own objects of 
analysis, for example identifying problems with specific groups like “the poor” 
and the “unemployed”. In fact, sociological facts as a selection of relevant 
statistical figures also produce their own interpretation out of the value-based 
identification of relevant variables. For Ranciere this outcome is the product of 
fixed, static representations of “the poor” as acting in accordance with clear-cut 
options (for example, job-seeking behaviour versus welfare dependency) that 
minimize and contain unpredictability and complexities in underlying modes of 
signification. Therefore, the ways in which contested signification interrogates 
structured social inequalities and power relations is obscured: 
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The justice of statistics continuously dissolves the sociological object, 
producing in short its own doxa – demystification, which returns pure 
ideas to the impure inertia of domination. Wherever it goes, sociology 
finds itself preceded by its shadow or its simulacrum: the 
approximation of its conclusions, which are supported by the statistics 
of its domain (Ranciere, 2004: 169; own emphasis). 
 
Significational conflicts and contradictions, on the other hand, emerge clearly 
once the researcher’s attention move from “measuring” respondents lives towards 
the meanings they attach to them.  
Similar concerns were quite present in apartheid-age radical critical 
research that emphasized the relevance of ethnography and case analyses as a 
mode of social inquiry that was skeptical of the disempowering effects of 
statistical surveys as a mode of knowledge ultimately dependent on expert 
validation (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Recent developments in research 
methodology on welfare, especially from feminist authors, emphasise the need to 
critically depart from institutionally formulated knowledge of social subjects and 
problems and re-evaluate the subjectivity and agency of recipients. This is shaped 
by the intersection of institutional definitions and experiences of power, 
“differential vulnerability” and coping strategies, all acting as intermediate 
concepts, defined along lines of gender, race and household, situated between the 
individual and socio-political institutions (Williams, Popay and Oakley, 1999). 
Therefore, the provision of rights and entitlements that realize normative social 
citizenship frameworks does not follow a linear path from providers to recipients 
that are fixed in institutionalized group identities. As the nature and content of 
identities fluctuates  in response to social experiences, entitlements are also 
contested based on changing configurations and significations of grassroots 
discourses of rights and power. In the final analysis, focusing on signification and 
subjectivity questions the pretense by the state to be the source of social 
citizenship on the basis of its universalising rights discourse. As I elaborate in the 
next chapter, identity-based social claim-making is contradictory in the sense that 
it questions present allocations of rights while recognizing the state’s ultimate 
prerogative to validate identities and claims. This contradiction is however part of 
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the historical trajectory of social citizenship itself. Focusing on the state would, 
conversely, mutilate the understanding of the concept reducing it to the sphere of 
governance and eluding its aspects as a social movement shaped by everyday 
struggles for signification of rights and power. 
 
 
4. Outline of Chapters 
 
This study is structured into eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides a review of scholarly 
literature on the relationships between wage labour and social citizenship theory. It 
focuses on the emergence of such relationships within attempts by democratic 
capitalist states to provide solutions to the “social question” raised by demands and 
claims from the organised working class. On the basis of a critical assessment of 
twentieth century social welfare policy as premised on decommodified social 
entitlements, the chapter also looks at the transfer of the labour-citizenship 
relationship in colonial and postcolonial societies, with the attendant, specific 
complexities related to the contested nature of waged employment and the 
ambiguities in Western rights-based discourses. The chapter emphasises how social 
citizenship rhetoric is deployed to enforce social discipline based on waged 
employment, which becomes stronger in a context of welfare state crisis and 
downsizing. Grassroots agencies and struggles, however, variously subvert wage 
labour disciplinary discourse by raising conflicting claims to social rights. 
 Chapter 2 is a historical overview of the wage labour-social citizenship 
linkages in South African social policy-making from the early twentieth century 
racial segregationist state to apartheid and its crisis. Contrary to conventional views 
that see racial social policies as a decommodified welfare state for whites only, I 
argue that the nature of South African social citizenship discourse has always been 
extremely commodified, with a residual impact of public service provisions. The 
protection of white privilege, in fact, largely relied on workplace- and education-
based entitlements that reinforced wage labour discipline. The crisis of the apartheid 
and the gradual deracialisation of South Africa’s social policies ushered in an 
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ideological discourse celebrating individualised, market solutions to problems of 
social inclusion and citizenship. 
 Chapter 3 looks at how the wage labour-social citizenship nexus has been 
politically debated and institutionally reconfigured in the transition to the post-1994 
democratic dispensation. In particular I emphasise the tensions between 
constitutional formulations of social rights as fully universal and deracialised, and 
the constraints created to the realisation of such rights by the alignment of the ANC-
led government with the tenets of macroeconomic orthodoxy and fiscal discipline. 
The resulting praise for state expenditure containment is here linked to the reduction 
of state responsibilities in redistribution and decommodification of social provisions. 
The advserse impacts of commodification are amplified by labour market and 
employment changes that, while witnessing the deepening of structural 
unemployment, bring to the fore new areas of “atypical” jobs, precarious 
employment, working class poverty and social vulnerability.  
Chapter 4 and 5 start introducing the empirical results of my case studies. 
Chapter 4 deals with the transformations of wage labour faced by the industrial 
working class on the East Rand by focusing on processes and structures of industrial 
change. Economic liberalisation has accompanied dynamics of industrial 
restructuring that have led to widespread job losses and deindustrialisation in what 
once was not only the core of South African large scale manufacturing, but also a 
bulwark of worker solidarity, trade union organisation and social citizenship 
discourse. The crisis of waged employment on the East Rand, in particular, marks 
the decline of a mode of union engagement, “social movement unionism”, 
previously strongly associated with demands for social rights and decommodified 
livelihoods. 
Chapter 5 discusses challenges to established meanings of waged 
employment in my second case study, GJMC employees facing the “iGoli 2002” 
project of restructuring of the Johannesburg municipality. This is a segment of the 
South African working class for which wage labour has  embodied a specific 
promise of emancipation from an exploitative, authoritarian workplace regime 
rooted in bureaucratically controlled migrant labour, dispersal of production sites 
and managerial despotism. Unionisation was here conducive to overcoming 
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vulnerability and disempowerment and building an image of waged work as the 
basis of fair conditions, relatively generous benefits and expectations of social rights. 
Inspired by a managerialist, neoliberalised view of service delivery, “iGoli 2002” is a 
challenge that can potentially threaten many of these gains, introducing a new era of 
market-regulated economic insecurity. 
Chapter 6 analyses workplace-based responses in the two cases to 
transformations of wage labour that question its promise of social emancipation and 
citizenship. I in particular argue that in both cases workplace life remains enmeshed 
in patterns of continuities and change. While confirming the nature of production as 
a territory shaped by managerial authoritarianism and racialised practices of 
domination, these patterns witness deepening feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and 
exploitation as a result of recent restructuring and job losses. The workplace emerges 
here, therefore, as a terrain where disempowerment, disillusionment and betrayal of 
wage labour’s emancipatory promises are generally perceived. It is also a locale 
where, however, no coherent, widespread response to the crisis in meanings of wage 
labour are emerging, and worker practices are highly differentiated across strategies 
of collective claim-making, reliance on extra-workplace networks and individual 
survivalist self-entrepreneurship.  
Chapter 6 moves the discussion of workers’ responses to the crisis of wage 
labour towards the level of politics and community life. The African township is a 
residential space where perceptions of vulnerability at work are both amplified and 
projected onto visions of a collapsing social order. Rising unemployment, a 
perceived sense of individual instability and deepening commodification are 
combined to question the ability of monetary wages to provide dignified personal 
and family existences. Worker responses to these realities are, however, highly 
fragmented. A rights-based and social movement-orientated radical discourse of 
decommodification is expressed only by a minority of respondents. The majority, 
especially male, display visions that in very complex ways recognise the collapse of 
wage labour while still reasserting it as the cornerstone of a social order imbued with 
conservative imagery premised on masculinity, respectability, age hierarchies and 
gendered responsibility. In ways that are often overtly contradictory, demands for 
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“job creation” remain the most widespread expectation of government intervention, 
despite the perceived crisis of jobs as conditions for a decent existence. 
Chapter 8 focuses on how post-apartheid policy debates and programmes 
elaborate on, when not directly responding to, themes emerging from grassroots 
perceptions of the crisis in the relationships between wage labour and social 
citizenship. Initiatives in social security reform from 1994 to 2001, in particular, 
respond to the crisis of wage labour as a material condition by aggressively 
reasserting it as the main avenue for social citizenship and inclusion. This is often 
combined to a stigmatising deprecation of “dependency” on welfare grants. 
Simultaneously, the policy discourse of post-apartheid South Africa marginalizes 
options of decommodification and redistribution while selectively and rhetorically 
paying homage to popular demands for “job creation”, which is ultimately also 
delegated to market-based mechanisms. Only in recent times, especially with 
debates surrounding the 2001 report of the Taylor committee on comprehensive 
social security, have such orientations started to be challenged by views 
advocating forms of decommodified universal social income as a clear alternative 
to labour market dependency. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Debating the Work-Citizenship Nexus: Wage Labour Discipline and 
Contested Signification 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews literature that refers to theoretical and scholarly debates on 
social citizenship in relation to waged employment, both in industrialized 
capitalism and in the passage from colonialism to postcoloniality in the 
“developing world”. Common to the different perspectives discussed here is the 
perception that wage labour and working class organization confront the nation-
state with a “social question” requiring specific policy interventions, ideological 
discourse and definitions of rights and responsibilities. The idea of “social 
citizenship” synthesises  these aspects with an aim of making wage labour a 
condition for social inclusion to defuse the most radical implications of its 
demands. Different policy frameworks, ranging from European and North 
American welfare state experiments to postcolonial developmentalist and 
nationalist regimes, have regulated wage labour not only as a social actor but as a 
set of disciplinary imperatives for productive membership of society. In particular, 
the extent and depth of “decommodified” social provisions, delivered outside 
market mechanisms, remains an object of debate and contestation. The 
relationships between decommodified rights, wage labour and social citizenship 
are indeed at the heart of my definition of social citizenship as a “contested field 
of signification”.  
At the same time, contested meanings of social citizenship reveal the 
contradictions that surround wage labour as an object of state knowledge and 
regulation. From one hand wage labour is the repository of antagonistic claims 
and identities, from the other it becomes a source of obligations and morality 
around which the state conceptualizes responsible citizenship. The notion of 
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“rights” when applied to social citizenship is likewise ridden with ambiguities. On 
one hand, rights-based discourses underlie the universalist phrasing of protections 
and guarantees in the modern nation-state, on the other the ways socio-economic 
rights are implemented depend on  resource constraints and on the identification 
of specific target populations, which produces differentiation, inequalities and 
hierarchies. The problematic, conflicted nature of the work-citizenship nexus 
reveals, in the final analysis, both the inevitability and the ultimate inadequacy of 
a mode of  sovereignty that operates through the production and regulation of 
social subjects and identities. The final sections of this chapter connects general 
conceptualizations of the work-citizenship nexus to South African debates on 
social citizenship and social inclusion. 
 
 
1.2 Wage Labour, the State and the Rise of the “Social Question” in Western 
Industrial Capitalism 
 
The emergence of “social citizenship” in scholarly and policy debates is 
inextricably linked to the social processes that between the nineteenth and the 
twentieth century have constituted and reshaped wage labour as a collective 
identity and a political actor (Bendix, 1964; Titmuss, 1968; Flora and 
Heidenheimer, 1981; Alber, 1982; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Baldwin, 1990; Kolberg, 
1992; Koslowski and Follesdal, 1997). The emergence of the factory proletariat 
challenged capitalist production and the nation-state, fostering a redefinition of 
notions of poverty and deprivation. Gradually moving away from explanations 
focused on the individual’s moral weaknesses, behavioural deficiencies or lack of 
adaptation to the order of the market, poverty was identified as a social problem 
coterminous with specific social groups whose reproduction and living standards 
became the object of state regulation. Karl Polanyi’s (1944) classic account of the 
“double movement”, where policies of market regulation counterbalance the 
inherently destructive effects of rapidly liberalizing markets, identified in the 
commodification of land and labour as productive factors the cause of 
capitalism’s socially disintegrative impacts. Self-destruction proceeded in this 
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argument out of the market’s internal logic, more than from the conscious 
articulation of anti-systemic social subjects and political organizations. The fact 
that in the late-nineteenth century many European states started to intervene in the 
market to control social conflicts and anti-capitalist politics signals the emergence 
of the “social question”. Market regulation was then justified in socio-political, 
apart from merely economic, terms. For Fox-Piven and Cloward (1993) the rise of 
modern forms of social relief was tied to an institutional conceptualization of 
social problems that linked poverty and unemployment to the threat of social 
unrest.  
Emerging social policies of the industrialised capitalist states focused on 
measures (unemployment and health insurance, limits to working time and age, 
provisions for work-related accidents) aimed at altering the distribution of 
economic resources to contain possible anti-systemic opposition by working class 
organisations that were demanding representation in political institutions. The 
recognition that poverty was the result of market and production dynamics 
independent from the individual’s will and behaviour was there coupled to the use 
of the social sciences as expert knowledge (Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1996). A 
process of “secularisation” (Koselleck, 1985; Elias, 1998) of social assistance, 
therefore, moved away from the moral discourse of charitable organisations and 
local volunteer associations. Perspectives influenced by the work of Michel 
Foucault use the expression “the social” to characterize this new area of state 
intervention (Foucault, 2002; Donzelot, 1979; Steinmetz, 1993; Procacci, 1993). 
The “social” means here that  the life of the national population (including health 
conditions, reproductive habits, subsistence levels) becomes the priority target of 
public policies in a mode of sovereignty termed “biopower”. Moreover, social 
policies build knowledge of their subjects via procedures and practices of 
“governmentality” which construct those subjects into statistical abstractions to 
ensure policies predictability and replicability.  
According to Steinmetz, the “social” is not reducible to static institutional 
constructs but is an arena of “needs, grievances and conflicts” whereby “insofar as 
the social represented a threat to order — the order of the state and the capitalist 
economy — it posed the “social question” or, rather, a series of social questions” 
 4
(Steinmetz, 1993: 2). Therefore for him the goal of governmentality (or, in his 
words, “regulation”) is external to the concept itself and recalls Foucault’s notion 
of “discipline” as interventions not only aimed at delivering tangible provisions 
but also focused on shaping behaviours, dispositions and expectations. 
 Early theorizations of the “social question” in Germany, the country with 
the most advanced nineteenth century experimentations (Von Stein, 1986; Hintze, 
1980), saw the rise of the “science of administration” as a specific body of 
knowledge that combined the “science of finances” (finanzwissenschaft), or the 
allocation of economic resources, with the “science of police” 
(polizeiwissenschaft) as means to control the “social movement” (soziale 
bewegung). The state was therefore simultaneously concerned with the socio-
economic improvement of the body politic and with its moral soundness. The idea 
of the “social state” (Gozzi, 2003) embodied therefore the policy translation of 
pre-existing ethical and disciplinary functions of sovereignty to deal with working 
class mass politics and extended techniques of population control. 
 As a result of  the development and differentiation of national systems of 
social security and social assistance, the meaning of wage labour changed from 
being a target of social control to becoming a necessary requisite for the access to 
many social provisions. Work was therefore invested with the responsibility to act as 
a conduit for ethical behaviour and discipline. Public social provisions and 
employer-subsidised benefits came to depend on a distinction among the poor 
between “deserving” (i.e. available to seek and accept employment) and 
“undeserving” (i.e. lacking the fibre, resolve and discipline to enter the labour 
market). Therefore, the state has tended to restructure the realm of social rights, 
imposing tighter requirements and more stringent criteria any time the demands and 
struggles of labour and social movements raised the possibility of benefits becoming 
a decent form of income, weakening work discipline as the central vehicle of social 
inclusion (Fox-Piven and Cloward, 1978, 1993; Domhoff, 1990; Jacoby, 1998; Katz, 
2002). 
The insertion of (especially male) workers in waged employment came to be 
praised in official discourse as promoting values of responsibility, initiative, probity, 
care for the family. The twentieth century trajectory from the “social” state to the 
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welfare state in Europe and North America is therefore characterised by the 
emergence of wage labour as the social underpinning and the disciplinary principle 
for the access to social benefits. Social security benefits enabled by “productivity 
deals” and  mass production allowed to make workers’ struggles conducive to 
capitalist development (Negri, 1988; De Angelis, 2000). At the same time, state 
theory recognised the systemic importance of class integration policies for political 
stability by removing social provisions from the realm of paternalist delivery from 
above, as in Germany’s “Bismarckian” welfare, and developing a language of 
“rights”. The welfare state came therefore to represent a “third generation” of 
citizenship, social citizenship, that integrated civil and political rights in the 
constitutional discourse of the democratic-capitalist state (Baldwin, 1990: 51).  
At the same time, social rights and citizenship mirrored the growing 
institutionalisation of working class organisations within political systems and 
organs of collective bargaining, in ways that overcome traditional liberal-democratic 
suspicions for intermediate interest organizations between the state and the 
individual (Lehmbruch, 1979; Berger, 1981; Rose, 1990). For Juergen Habermas 
(1983), the extension of social rights is part of the public sphere’s response to the 
unbridled forces of commodification of life unleashed by the worldwide expansion 
of capitalism. In this line of argument the expansion of the “economic subsystem” 
with its competitive and instrumental rationality invaded a social “lifeworld” 
regulated by communicative action. Therefore capitalist crises become immediate 
threats to the socio-political order and the welfare state addresses capital’s 
legitimation crises, extending the realm of the “political” from formal juridical 
norms to the control of social conflict. While political and civil citizenship still 
defined the state as an external normative source for positive and negative freedoms, 
social citizenship represents the institutional recognition of the destructive 
consequences of commodified social relations. Habermas contends, in fact, that: 
 
The social-welfare model emerged from the reformist critique of 
bourgeois formal law. According to this model, an economic society 
institutionalized in the form of private law (above all through property 
rights and contractual freedom) was separated from the sphere of the 
common good, the state, and left to the spontaneous working of market 
mechanisms (...). Under the conditions of an organized capitalism 
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dependent on the government's provision of public infrastructure and 
planning, and with a growing inequality in economic power, assets and 
social situations (...) the universal right to equal individual liberties 
could no longer be guaranteed through the negative status of the legal 
subject. Rather, it proved necessary (...) to introduce a new category of 
basic rights grounding claims to a more just distribution of social 
wealth" (Habermas, 1996: 400-402). 
 
This analysis, however, fails to address the problem, raised by Foucault (1978), of 
the role of the  “public sphere” and “lifeworld” not simply as opposing but as 
reproducing power relations that construct the individual as an active, willing 
participant in its own subordination and self-discipline.  
Other arguments have noticed the importance of policies of economic 
equality for the purpose of democratic stability (Boix, 2003), while critics underline 
that social citizenship’s contribution to political stability conceals underlying 
market-based inequality and oppression (Sousa Santos, 1995: 415). Contradictions 
and ambiguities mark therefore the notion of “social citizenship”. Social rights’ 
emphasis on ensuring stability and containing worker militancy, in fact, reflects an 
unresolved tension between the recognition of workers’ power to determine 
meaningful socio-economic changes and their rights to mere social insertion 
(Pedersen, 1993; Turner, 1993; Bonker and Wollmann, 1996). 
Across highly diversified national contexts, the extension of social 
citizenship rights contains various forms of decommodification, or the access to 
social goods, services and provisions (such as education, healthcare, retirement 
benefits, unemployment insurance, municipal utilities, housing, transport) funded 
through public spending in ways that minimize individual dependency on the market 
(Lister, 2001). The concept of decommodification determines a conceptual 
distinction between “wage” and “income”. The former refers in fact to a monetary 
transaction to remunerate productive performances. The latter includes also transfers 
of a non-commodity, and often non-monetary nature, such as social grants and 
employers’ contributions. Therefore, the difference between wage and income 
depends on the extent of decommodified components in individual livelihoods.  
T.H. Marshall’s classical theorization regarded the access to decommodified 
social rights as a condition for the effective enjoyment of civil and political 
 7
citizenship premised on inter-generational and inter-class solidarity. For him social 
rights included: 
 
The whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and 
security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live 
the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in 
society (Marshall, 1950: 11). 
 
At the same time, the policy discourse of social rights, as elaborated by experts and 
policy-makers, showed a remarkable flexibility. The state’s conceptualisation of the 
social question was in fact functional to different policy aims depending on different 
ideological paradigms and power relations (Hall, 1989). Therefore in Britain, for 
example, Keynesian job creation policies were initially supported to limit 
government intervention. In post-depression USA they led, instead, to a substantial 
expansion of government spending (Weir, 1989), even if anti-poverty policies 
remained based on a philanthropy-based approach that focused on behavioural and 
cultural disfunctions at the level of the individual and the community (O’Connor, 
2001; Fraser and Gordon, 1998).  
Direct state intervention within Keynesian full employment policies, as 
witnessed in the American “New Deal” and European post-war reconstruction, 
however, identified waged work as the main vehicle for participation in the financing 
and enjoyment of social provisions. The restructuring of the British social security 
system recommended by the Beveridge (1942) Report combined universal social 
insurance and pay-as-you-go financing from the working population. Mezzadra 
(2002) argues that decommodification was not the goal of Marshall’s view of 
citizenship, but it acted as a device to engender in the citizen a sense of responsibility 
and sacrifice, enforcing the ethical imperative to, and the psychological acceptance 
of, hard work. At the same time, Marshall used work ethic to oppose worker 
militancy. Therefore, a universal discourse based on citizenship “status” defused the 
potentially disruptive consequences originating from the inherent inequality of the 
market-based employment “contract”. 
 The centrality of wage labour discipline in theories of social citizenship led 
various authors to regard the “constitutionalisation” of wage labour as a defining 
feature of Western democracies (Offe, 1984; Baldwin, 1990; Twine, 1994, pp. 103–
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04). In fact, in these cases the role of labour parties and trade unions has been 
constitutionally protected and institutionally recognized within structures and 
procedures of class co-operation and compromise. The role of the welfare state in 
constitutionalising wage labour defines therefore social policy not merely as an 
extra-economic function primarily concerned with counterbalancing market failures. 
Rather, the realm of social welfare becomes an integral part of the functions of 
increasing economic output, as hinted at in Henri Lefebvre’s (1977) concept of “state 
mode of production”. Hardt and Negri (1996: 211), instead, argue that the 
“constitutionalisation” of labour is a contradictory process: from one side it invests 
labour with a disciplining ideology of participation, technocracy, "responsible 
governance" and compromise. On the other hand, however, social rights and the 
"social wage" provide a common horizon for workplace and community resistance. 
Changing meanings of work in left discourses turned labour from a 
manifestation of oppression into a condition for emancipation. Work ethic was re-
evaluated as a basis for social compacts in forms that Walter Benjamin (1969: 253-
264) stigmatized in his famous eleventh “thesis on the philosophy of history”. The 
question of labour constitutionalisation through corporatist organs of decision-
making, collective bargaining and employment-based legislation for social 
provisions has been at centre of debates on the ill-fated experiment of the Soziale 
Rechtstaat (social State of rights) in Germany’s Weimar Republic (Heller, 1987; 
Smend, 1988; Preuss, 2001; Dyzenhaus, 2001; Mezzadra, 1999; Jacobson and 
Schlink, 2001). The Weimar state is here regarded as an attempt to build juridical 
and ideological foundations for a historic compromise between socialism and 
capitalism, based on  the common goal of harnessing workers’ organization and 
militancy for the purpose of strengthening state institutions and improve 
productivity. At the same time, Hong (1998) identifies precisely the uneasy 
coexistence of social citizenship discourse, bureaucratic rationality and productivist 
modernization as one of the main causes for the authoritarian involution of the 
Weimar case. 
Welfare rights and collective bargaining have become crucial determinants of 
worker identities. Not only was working class organization decisive in establishing 
social citizenship rights, but social provisions themselves helped to define an 
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ideology where waged labour is detached from mere exploitation and represents in 
workers’ imageries an expression of progress, patriotism, consumerism and 
emancipation – in short of becoming citizens -- which recursively reinforce work 
ethic and factory discipline. Conversely, according to Seidman (1991), it is among 
the workers for which the work-citizenship link is feebler and jobs are more 
meaningless – the unemployed, casuals, low-wage employees in deskilled 
occupations – that everyday resistance against wage labour takes place, targeting 
both the factory order (through absenteeism, slowdown, sabotage, disobedience) and 
social services (through welfare deception and cheating). In general, however, social 
benefits provided a counterweight to “the permeation of daily life by the values and 
routines of work, a state of things summarized in the term ‘the tyranny of work over 
life’” (Joyce, 1980: 125). At the same time social security acted in continuity with 
managerial paternalism and employer-subsidised services, for example housing, 
aimed at producing a close identification between workplace and community (Joyce, 
1980) and forms of “company patriotism” akin to those emerging in Chapter 4 and 5 
of this work. Such practices, however, require some employment and career 
stability, which tend to separate long-term, formally employed male workers from 
casuals and informal employees, especially female. These latter’s appearance on the 
labour market tends, conversely, to disrupt this pattern of relationships. In the final 
analysis, therefore, the capacity of social benefits to influence worker identities and 
behaviours depends on the outcome of power relations and contestation over the 
ability of social security to enforce wage discipline or, conversely, to enable more 
radical grassroots demands.  
For Michele Lamont (2000: 3) social benefits provide workers with moral 
standards as “alternatives to economic definition of success”, whereby “national 
welfare systems reveal implicit rules about conceptions of merit and social 
citizenship that vary across societies” (Lamont, 2000: 9). In this sense, the 
relationship between worker identities and social citizenship is recursive in so far 
this latter is shaped by workers’ cultural repertoires, solidarity and moral economy. 
Welfare mechanisms, however, also help concealing the role of market relations and 
capitalist exploitation, while building identity boundaries that separate workers from 
unemployed and the poor and, in some cases, white from non-white workers. Labour 
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market policies and social provisions facilitated workers’ acceptance of capitalist 
control of production (Hardt and Negri, 1996), also thanks to the role of trade unions 
(Boreham, Hall and Leet, 1996; Lavalette and Mooney, 2000) and socialist parties 
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Hicks, 1999) in shaping welfare state 
policies. Complementary to this point, the “varieties of capitalism” approach (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Mares, 2003) sees the emergence of welfare states as the product 
of employers’ initiative, rather than as exclusively based on advancing workers’ 
rights and power. This view sees progressive social policies as conducive to 
improving the performance of labour markets -- especially when high skill levels and 
firm loyalty are needed -- and as a competitive edge for “coordinated” over “liberal” 
(market- or hierarchies-based) market economies.  
Discussing the interaction between wage labour and social citizenship, 
Mezzadra and Ricciardi (1997) convincingly argue that, through 
constitutionalisation, corporatism and collective bargaining, social subjects are not 
only represented, but also constituted, and labour’s radical demands are disciplined 
in the very moment they are given voice within institutions of compromise and 
moderation. According to Fox Piven (2001) welfare policies are as much concerned 
with creating an employable labour force as they are with providing relief to the 
unemployed. Welfare entitlements themselves, in fact, can have criteria and stigma 
attached to encourage labour market participation and work discipline. A mode of 
operation of welfare as a disciplinary device has to do with state regulation of the 
linkages between production and reproduction. An example is provided by the ways 
in which single mothers are stigmatized under “welfare queen” stereotypes in 
discourses of welfare reform in the United States. According to this image, the 
alleged exploitation of welfare transfers by single mothers leads to their being 
depicted with the mark of moral turpitude associated with lax sexuality and 
unregulated, out-of-wedlock reproduction. The institutionalization of family 
ideology and state control of the female body are here therefore contiguous to the 
enforcement of wage labour discipline to construct gender inequalities. 
Tensions and contradictions that shape social policies in relation to wage 
labour resurface in Gosta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal analysis of the “three 
worlds” of welfare in Western capitalism. The main merit of Esping-Andersen’s 
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work is to provide an operational definition of social welfare based on the extent and 
forms of decommodification, which enables him to build a comparison between 
different welfare states, grouped in three ideal-typical “welfare regimes”. For 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 22) decommodification 
 
occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a 
person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. The 
mere presence of social assistance or insurance may not necessarily 
bring about significant de-commodification if they do not substantially 
emancipate individuals from market dependence (…). There is no doubt 
that de-commodification has been a hugely contested issue in welfare 
state development. For labour, it has always been a priority (…). 
Decommodification strengthens the worker and weakens the absolute 
authority of employers. It is for exactly this reason that employers 
always opposed de-commodification. 
 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism constructs a comparison 
between different welfare states based on their “decommodification score” calculated 
according to criteria that include rules for eligibility to benefits, levels of income 
replacement and the range of benefits provided. Country scores are calculated as the 
sum of scores for sickness, retirement and unemployment benefits, and they define 
the range of decommodified coverage. Observed regularities and variations are linked 
to socio-institutional factors related to party politics, class alliances, policy path 
dependency and the strength of labour organizations.  
Esping-Andersen and others (Goodin et al., 1999) identify three welfare 
regimes. First, liberal welfare states (predominant in English-speaking countries like 
Australia, Great Britain and the United States) are characterised by means tested 
provisions, modest universal transfers and social insurance targeted at low-income 
earners. This mode of delivery is therefore residual in nature, entitlements carry 
significant stigma and the overall policy rationale has to do more with addressing 
“basic needs” than with increasing social equality. Second, corporatist welfare states 
(as in continental European countries like France, Germany and Italy) link 
entitlements and provisions to occupational status, and negotiations betweens 
powerful organizations representing social interests (mainly capital and labour) have 
a decisive impact on policy formulation. Benefits are here attached to employment, 
redistribution of resources is limited and the role of the state is mainly to stimulate 
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and coordinate societal bargaining. Third, socialdemocratic welfare states, namely the 
Scandinavian cases (Greve, 1996), have a high level of decommodification, the 
allocation of social benefits is universal and citizenship, rather than labour market 
positions, is the decisive criterion for access to social provisions. The system is 
therefore geared to social equality and generalised provision of services. 
 The hugely influential “welfare regimes” categorization confirms that 
discourses and policies of social citizenship are not merely about institutional design 
of programmes but they are inseparable from constructing and conceptualising their 
own subjects as “deserving” recipients. Esping-Andersen’s three welfare “worlds” are 
respectively focused on specific areas of disadvantage (need-based provisions), broad 
occupational groups (work-based provisions) and the totality of the population 
(citizenship-based provisions). At the same time, institutional practices of 
individualisation, selectivism or universalism are decisively shaped by the interaction 
between welfare states and labour market policy. In Esping-Andersen as well, 
therefore, social welfare arrangements are essentially responsive to the position of 
wage labour in society, not only as a material condition, but as a normative idea.  
The embeddedness of welfare states in labour markets and production regimes 
is, on the other hand, shared also by other typologies of welfare states, often in overt 
criticism of Esping-Andersen (Castles 2004). Huber and Stephens’ (2001) attempt to 
build comparisons based on “power constellations theory” emphasises the 
interactions between institutions, class forces and extra-workplace social subjects. 
They end up, however, in emphasising connection to production organization and the 
rise of unemployment as decisive factors in, respectively, permanence and change of 
welfare states. Therefore, as Janoski (1998: 22) quite pertinently argues, views of 
welfare states that focus only on the  expansion of decommodification are flawed 
because their focus on employment-based social provisions fails to account for how 
they actually recommodify by requiring the recipients’ insertion in waged 
employment. Moreover, understanding decommodification only as the product of 
institutional and policy interventions is probably reductive. In fact, the meaning of 
commodities, including social goods, and demands for their decommodification 
depend also on the ways in which they are recontextualised as “use values” within 
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social discourses of rights, customs, morals and “good life” (Appadurai, 1986; 
Baudrillard, 1998; Canclini, 2001; Sayer, 2003). 
 Esping-Andersen’s work represents a useful and powerful comparative 
approach based on a  notion of “decommodification” that is empirically clear enough 
not to be a merely normative or ideological concept, and it is at the same time 
complex enough to take into account a variety of social, institutional and historical 
factors. The usefulness of the concept is enhanced by the possibilities it offers to 
extend comparisons to non-Western societies, therefore counterbalancing the 
Eurocentric bias implicit in the welfare state concept. Equally persuasive are, 
however, many criticisms to the “three worlds” approach, based on its bias in favour 
of institutional interventions, its definition of decommodified provisions narrowly 
focused on the workplace to the exclusion of decommodified services in society at 
large (as in health, housing and education), and its lack of attention for the role of 
social conflicts and movements2 (Turner, 1986; Alber, 1995).  
In particular, the criticism addressed by Hans-Juergen Krahl (1972) to 
Habermas’s view of social citizenship -- that it arbitrarily separates the sphere of 
work and production from a “lifeworld” to which work is connected by forms of 
solidarity, resistance and communication – can also be addressed to Esping-
Andersen. His neglect of the relations between production and reproduction have 
been particularly chastised by gender-based analysis emphasizing how unequal 
sexual division of labour and the unpaid household-based work of reproduction have 
a decisive impact in shaping production regimes, commodification and women’s 
subordinate employment status (Weir, Orloff and Skocpol, 1988; Sainsbury, 1991; 
O’Connor, 1993; Dalla Costa and Dalla Costa, 1993; Skocpol, 1995; O’Connor, 
Orloff and Shaver, 1999). Such critiques are more generally addressed at the 
assumptive logic of Marshallian citizenship, which defines as beneficiaries gender-
neutral working individuals, overlooking female subordination on the job and in the 
family (Pateman, 1989: Jenson and Mahon, 1993). 
 Other authors emphasise that collective identities, social conflicts and ethical 
worldviews lead to a diversification of subjective strategies and demands that greatly 
contribute to welfare states’ variability and differentiation. Therefore welfare 
                                                
2 Esping-Andersen (1990: 138) leaves to “new breakthroughs” the task of investigating the impact 
of these broader social forces and dynamics. 
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regimes often function on the basis of contingent, pragmatic adaptation rather than of 
programmatic planning. Oldfield (1990) argues that social citizenship should be 
intended as a social processes and practice, and not merely as a social status. Danilo 
Zolo (1994: 29-31) goes further to challenge conventional definitions of social rights 
as institutional constructs. For him it is actually imprecise to talk of “social rights”, 
since they differ from civil and political rights insofar they do not depend on a 
codified, predictable and juridically enforceable implementation. More appropriate 
would be to talk of “social services” as “conditional opportunities”, whose 
translation into practice depends on the interplay of social forces with different 
expectations on the allocation of market-generated resources. “Social rights” in this 
view become the universalist ideological discourse with which the state establishes 
contingent codifications of social services that to various degrees sanction existing 
exclusions, inequalities and limits to access.  
 Approaching social citizenship as a contested terrain, a “field of 
signification” shaped by institutional discourses and strategies of rights and demands 
from below reveals the fragility of decommodification itself, whose boundaries are 
shaped by the reconfiguration of social subjects and expectations. If 
commodification is central to twentieth-century definitions of social citizenship, it is 
all the more so in shaping its problems and conflicts. The struggle to signify social 
citizenship ultimately combines a contradictory movement of non reconciled forces. 
On one side the state tries to establish wage labour discipline as a condition of social 
inclusion, to which decommodified benefits are to a large extent subordinated. On 
the other side, demands from below try to expand the arena of social rights based on 
the assumption that decommodification minimises market dependency and provides 
a partial alternative to wage labour. The ambiguities surrounding social citizenship 
are ultimately at the core of critiques to the concept explored in the next section.  
 
 
1.3 Radical Critiques to Social Citizenship as a Governmental Practice 
 
The historical trajectory of the European and North American welfare states 
established an interaction between social citizenship and wage labour discipline that 
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was reciprocally constitutive, in the sense that they were mutually reinforced in their 
conceptual coupling by policies of social rights premised on labour markets. At the 
same time, this interaction is at the heart of unresolved contradictions in the notion 
of social citizenship advanced by the governmentality project of the Western 
capitalist state. In fact, on one hand such a notion demands a universalist discourse 
of social rights, while on the other hand material forms of inequality, domination and 
conflict underpin the ways in which those rights are realized. Therefore, social 
welfare policies are as much about the management and reproduction of exclusion as 
they aim to increase social inclusion.  
The combination of inclusion and exclusion as prerogatives of state 
sovereignty is discussed in Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) account of the state’s role in 
governing the “bare life” of its population to transform it into “good life”. In his 
view, “life” is the ultimate object of state policies, whereby “the production of a 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (Agamben, 1998: 6, 
own emphasis). “Biopolitics” here refers specifically to interventions that, with the 
stated aim of promoting the population’s health and well being, “politicize” the 
reproduction of life, internalizing its biological development and bringing it into the 
realm of state knowledge and power: 
 
The sovereign decides not the licit and illicit but the originary inclusion 
of the living in the sphere of law or, in the words of Schmitt, ‘the 
normal structuring of life relations’ (Agamben, 1998: 26). 
 
However, following Carl Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as the power to decide 
over “states of exception” (whereby “exception is the structure of sovereignty”), 
Agamben (1998: 28) argues that having reduced life to a field of policy enables the 
state to constantly shift and redefine the borders between inclusion and exclusion. 
These observations seem particularly pertinent to the ways in which specific groups 
and “risk populations” are defined as targets of particular policies, or of the way in 
which entitlements to social provisions are constantly redefined according to 
macroeconomic compatibilities decided in technocratic forms. Moreover, the 
extension of “social citizenship rights” is a contradictory process that at the same 
time extends a “norm” by continuously defining “exceptions”.  
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 Radical critics of state “governmentality” have emphasised how institutional 
universalist discourses of social rights are used to contain and channel a “multitude” 
of social existences, experiences and demands within unified images of “the nation” 
and “the people” (Ranciere, 2002 and 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2000; Virno, 2004). 
From this point of view, socialist emphases on an equally unified, homogenous 
“class” mirror and reinforce those very institutional practices. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari (1984) the link between wage labour discipline, state institutions and 
the construction of subjective rights is part of dynamics of “territorialisation” and 
“deterritorialisation” through which subjects’ obligations and forms of control are 
juridically constituted and placed in radical opposition to their own desires. The 
construction of social rights is therefore accompanied by the establishment of 
responsibilities through which collective subjects are constituted under an illusion of 
autonomy. The welfare state, in particular, operates as a mode of 
“reterritorialisation” of workers’ desires by internalizing the sense of responsibility, 
moderation and control required to enjoy social citizenship rights (Guattari, 1984; 
Watson, 1999). 
Other authors have emphasized how the operation of social rights discourse 
as a mode of containment and structuration of grassroots subjectivities is produced 
by expert knowledge as a separate layer of policy-making. At this level, the “social 
question” is conceptualized, its subjects are defined and the rationale for related state 
interventions is elaborated (Ashforth, 1990; Escobar, 1994; Ferguson, 1994; 
Mitchell, 2002). According to Timothy Mitchell (2002: 118), the role of expert 
knowledge confers to social policies a “state effect” which does not merely reflect 
social relations, but rather “formats” them, reformulating their complexity into 
identifiable problems with discernible causes and arguable solutions. For some 
authors the role of expert knowledge in policy making is not merely ancillary to 
powerful economic interests, but it is a specific and autonomous site of power with a 
unique capacity to elaborate challenges from below and define systematic responses 
(Skocpol and Rueschemeyer, 1996; Wittrock and Wagner, 1996). Similarly to 
Bourdieu’s (1998a) notion of “state nobility”, policy-making “experts” are not 
coterminous with bureaucratic apparatuses, but they are social groups that 
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autonomously produce discourses capable to conceal and “mis-recognise” the 
operation of the market in shaping economic inequalities. 
It has also been emphasized how expert knowledge at work conceptualizes 
social problems by drawing from “natural” and “social” sciences in varying 
combinations. According to Hong (2005), modern welfare’s strategy of 
governmentality relies specifically on a discourse of difference through which social 
subjects are produced as beneficiaries and targets of government interventions. In 
this sense the evolution of social citizenship discourse represents a departure from 
earlier social policies where “poor” and “marginals” could be considered as 
deviations to be reintegrated within “normal”  full-time employment. Instead, the 
growing differentiation of labour markets and the rise of mass joblessness make full 
employment disappear as the “norm”. As a consequence, welfare policy is no longer 
concerned with the “modern” aim of building social cohesion, but has more to do 
with the “postmodern” function of regulating difference. At the same time social 
differences as produced by differential labour market positions are “naturalized” as 
state policies categorize their subjects-targets on the basis of their capacity to 
compete. The naturalization of the social operated by social welfare discourse is 
ultimately based on claims to scientific objectivity that underpin policy 
recommendations according to a “hybrid” (Latour, 2001) mode of knowledge where 
the border between “hard” and “soft” sciences tends to disappear and the relevance 
of specific socio-economic interests and ideologies is concealed.  
 State governmentality and expert knowledge ultimately define the recipients 
of social programmes with objectifying terms as “poor”, “marginalized”, 
“disadvantaged”, “disabled”. The universality of rights therefore becomes 
inseparable from the capacity of such subjects to claim rights based on the category 
of entitlements in which they have been inserted. At the same time, however, this 
carries important consequences for rights-based discourses and strategies “from 
below”. In fact, demanding social rights on the basis of categories constructed 
through state governmentality ultimately reinforces the very fragmentation, 
subordination and inequality that governmentality itself presides upon. Wendy 
Brown (2002: 430) aptly summarises the dilemmas facing social rights discourse: 
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Rights secure our standing as individuals even if they obscure the 
treacherous ways that standing is achieved and regulated; they must be 
specific and concrete to reveal and redress (…) subordination, yet 
potentially entrench our subordination through that specificity (…); they 
emancipate us to pursue other political ends while subordinating those 
political ends to liberal discourse. 
 
 
Therefore the paradox of universal citizenship rights, according to Brown, has to do 
with the fact that they ultimately reinforce power relations that produce social 
subjects as objects of policy interventions, hence the dilemma: “What happens when 
we understand individual rights as a form of protection against certain social powers 
of which the ostensibly protected individual is actually an effect?” (Brown, 1995: 
115). The mode of operation of such an “effect” recalls Foucault’s discussion of 
governmentality as structuring the citizen’s field of action (2001), which illustrates 
the role of macroeconomic policy constraints and viability in containing “excessive” 
social demands and expectations. 
As an “effect” of state sovereignty, social citizenship fits Slavoj Zizek’s (1997; 
2000: 171-243) concept of “subjectivization” as the construction of society as a 
totality that comprehends all possible antagonisms and where the recognition of rights 
takes place in ways that those rights cannot be used to cause fundamental social 
changes (Boucher, 2002). The construction of social citizenship as a mode of 
disempowerment and deprivation reduces therefore the demand for social rights to, as 
Zizek (1993: 211) puts it, a “hysterical demand for a new master”. Recent scholarly 
controversies on “recognition” and “redistribution” (Honneth, 2001) have reflected 
such problems in trying to devise political strategies of rights that overcome 
established social inequalities. Arguments underlining the specific importance of 
recognition of identities and the politicisation of differences (Young, 2002) have 
opposed approaches based on the priority to mobilise for redistributive policies to 
tackle “structured inequalities” (Fraser, 1997). At the same time, the relationship 
between claims to rights and policy constructions of entitlements and target 
populations is of a recursive nature, insofar demands from rights from particular 
social positions can enable political radicalism and expectations for structural change. 
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Partha Chatterjee (2004: 59-60) stresses this point in his analysis of the politics of 
community movements in Kolkata, India: 
 
Refugees, landless people, day laborers, homestead, below the poverty 
line – are all demographic categories of governmentality. That is the 
ground on which they define their claims (…). [But], alongside its 
reference to the government’s obligation to look after poor and 
underprivileged population groups, the association was also appealing 
to the moral rhetoric of a community striving to build a decent social 
life under extremely harsh conditions (…). The categories of 
governmentality were being invested with the imaginative possibilities 
of community, including its capacity to (…) produce a new, even if 
somewhat hesitant, rhetoric of political claims. These claims are 
irreducibly political. They could only be made on a political terrain, 
where rules may be bent or stretched, and not on the terrain of 
established law or administrative procedure. 
 
Social citizenship, therefore, contains simultaneously an ideal of emancipation and a 
political practice of subjection. Etienne Balibar (1994) explains the uneasy 
coexistence of these two terms as internal to the “citizen-subject” as the form of 
political subjectivity that in modernity replaces pre-existing  subjection to absolute 
state power. At the same time, ideology and discourse in social citizenship do not 
play merely a “super-structural” role, but they are factors enabling struggles and new 
political possibilities through everyday contestation of hegemonic discourses 
(Baynes, 2000; Lefebvre, 2002).  
Recalling Agamben’s definition of sovereignty as power over “bare life”, 
therefore, the interplay of inclusion and exclusion, norm and exception in the modern 
discourse of social citizenship  enables conflicts over the meanings and extents of 
rights, and over the allocation of the related resources. As Agamben (1998: 9) argues, 
“bare life” is both subject and object of political conflicts, and it is both the place of 
state power and of emancipation from it. Following the definition introduced in the 
Preface, therefore, social citizenship is not to be reduced to a normative ideal, a 
juridical codification of rights or a combination of social programmes, but it is rather 
a contested field of signification. The contradictions that constitute the concept of 
social citizenship – as enabling claims for universal rights only on the basis of 
particular, bounded subject positions defined by state governmentality – is closely 
related to the centrality of waged employment and work ethics as criteria for access to 
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services. These contradictions are not, moreover, simply a matter of state and 
citizenship theory, but they are translated into concrete material inequalities. Critical 
analyses of the welfare state have, in fact, emphasized how changing institutional 
definitions of entitlements shape subordination and inequality across race and gender 
lines. 
 Reflecting on the trajectory of the labour-citizenship link in American 
society, Evelyn Nakano-Glenn (2002) elaborates on the theme of social 
citizenship as a boundary between inclusion and exclusion. She argues that the 
interaction between social citizenship and labour to differentiate benefits in 
relation to individuals’ wages provides an arena “in which groups have contested 
their exclusion, oppression and exploitation” (Nakano-Glenn, 2002: 1). She sees 
the development of a discourse of citizenship as coterminous with the expansion 
between the nineteenth and the twentieth century of the ideology of “free labour”, 
juridically unbounded and regulated by contract. The combination of citizenship 
rights and “free labour” ideologies has in her view acted to promote a view of the 
“citizen worker” as white and male, whose ethical paradigms made hard work 
coterminous with responsible membership of the community. At the same time, 
the elimination of “unfree”, non contractual forms of labour in the process of 
industrialization refashioned, rather than superseding racial and gender 
inequalities. In fact, a growing separation between production and household 
made waged work the repository of both citizenship claims and masculine identity 
(Willis, 1979).  
At the same time, however, racial subordination in the “free” labour 
market was reinforced by the lack of consideration for household care functions of 
black women, more easily considered as employable in low-skill, low-wage, 
precarious positions. “Free labour”, moreover, maintained strong elements of 
coercion as part of the enforcement of work ethic, to which social provisions 
became functional, for example through punitive means-tested allocations and 
laws against vagrancy, “idleness” and similar threats to productive employment 
and “economic independence” (Nakano-Glenn, 2002: 89; Montgomery, 1993; 
Steinfeld, 2001). Not only was workers’ citizenship enmeshed in socio-economic 
coercion, but the racialised nature of the labour-citizenship nexus in American 
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capitalism facilitated the spread of ideas of upward social mobility linked to 
occupational advancement. The resulting “populist sense of common interest” 
(Martinot, 2003: 86) between white labour and capital contributed to entrench 
white racism as a “ruling class social control formation” (Allen, 1994). In ways 
that are relevant to the South African case, in racialised societies citizenship rights 
were among the factors that enabled white workers to shape their claims and 
identities in racial terms (Roediger, 1999; Brattain, 2001). They also marginalized 
by the same token casual workers (especially females), immigrants and non-white 
workers (Davis, 1984; Davies, 1994). Twentieth century white working class 
politics in the USA remained shaped by these factors, especially in political 
orientations towards conservatism or populism, combined to a strongly 
productivist and “patriotic” approach to industrial unionism (Cohen, 1990).  
With the expansion of US federal government provisions, racial 
inequalities produced by the work-citizenship nexus, more than by differential 
access to welfare per se (Wilson, 1990), also contributed to emphasise the stigma 
attached to non-working black welfare recipients. For them --  subordinated as 
they were on the labour market and destined to low-wage, unstable occupations --  
receiving welfare benefits was therefore easily presented as a hallmark of 
idleness, immorality, crime, family decay, which converge in shaping the 
“underclass” stereotype (Katz, 1990; Quadagno, 1994; Gans 1996; Sugrue, 1996; 
Lieberman, 1998). In fact, as Linda Gordon (1995) argued, provisions that were 
relatively less racialised, like the Social Security Administration, were more 
directly and predictably linked to labour market status through payroll deductions. 
In this case, therefore, social insurance reinforced the white male breadwinner 
role, while women’s household work was the target of more residual forms of 
social assistance. The growing orientation of social assistance towards 
“disfunctional” families of lone mothers with dependent children further fed 
stigmatization and the “underclass” stereotype. 
 
 
1.4 Work and Welfare under Neoliberal Globalisation 
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Scholarly debates on globalisation have focused on the impact on welfare states of 
market liberalization and the restructuring of production in ways that, once again, 
stress the interconnectedness of labour market changes, shifting social positions of 
waged work, and the reconfiguration of access to public social provisions 
(Harvey, 1989; Taylor-Gooby, 1991; Castel, 1995; Mittelman, 1999; Mishra, 
1999). While domestic demand loses relevance compared to outward-looking 
investment, and capital mobility increases, old welfarist compacts based on job 
creation, state- and employer-subsidised reproduction, productivity and 
consumerism come to be seen by capital as onerous fiscal burdens to be rolled 
back (Teeple, 1995; Kuttner, 1997; Swank, 2001; Genschel, 2002). Saskia Sassen 
(1996) goes as far as to talk of “denationalization of juridical systems” as the 
“dissolution of state sovereignty”. Therefore, trade unions and organs of societal 
bargaining become increasingly powerless in negotiating the allocation of the 
social surplus. 
The quest for economic competitiveness, in a context where the private 
enterprise is assumed as the main engine of growth, is often conceptualized as 
reducing the state’s fiscal capacity, and as fostering restructuring of production 
leading to new labour market segmentations and the expansion of employment 
flexibility. The instability of “atypical” forms of employment in dispersed, often 
un-unionized labour processes also contributes to the unions’ loss of 
representation and power (Moody, 1997; Bauman, 1998; Standing, 1999). The 
rise of contingent, part-time or self-employed work has been conceptualized by 
some as the product of a new, knowledge-based economy which subcontracts and 
decentralizes low-skill operations and stratifies labour markets making the 
position of traditional blue collar social security recipients unstable and threatened 
by individualized bargaining over social benefits (Harrison, 1994; Pena, 1997; 
Peck and Theodore, 1998; Heery and Salmon, 2000; Benner, 2002). These 
patterns have been found both at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among 
layers of professionals and technicians, and at the bottom, where declining living 
standards of casualised employees are combined with lack of access to 
employment-based benefits. Therefore, the growth hyper-commodified working 
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class poverty is often seen as a result (Standing, 1997; Heady, 1997; Rosenberg 
and Lapidus, 1999; Head, 2003; Shipler, 2004).  
Across the occupational ladder, wage labour discipline is reconfigured in the 
direction of hollowing out a predictable link between work and social provisions, 
rewarding individual calculation in managing finite monetary resources 
(Muckenberger, 1989)3. Moreover, workers’ identities and solidarity are faced 
with the uncertainty deriving from the erosion of the nexus between work and 
social inclusion (Beck, 1999; Sennett, 2000). To connect to Guattari’s view of the 
work-citizenship nexus as enabling shifting forms of control, it could be argued 
that flexible employment supersedes old, welfarist forms of “territorialisation” of 
workers’ lives. Central in the process is the rise -- at both ends of the labour 
market hierarchy, from call centers to computer analysts -- of “immaterial” 
workers, operating on the basis of cognitive skills, affects, emotions and symbols. 
For these, the distinction between “working time” an “life time” becomes blurred 
and overlapping. In this view, flexible employment “deterritorialises” production, 
which is pushed outside the boundaries of the large factory, and workers’ 
expressions of autonomy and boundlessness at work are coterminous with 
internalized and individualized social control and discipline (Guattari, 1984; Hardt 
and Negri, 2000). As Guattari puts it: 
 
It's a matter of creating systemic poles that guarantee that the functions 
of desire, functions of rupture of balance will manifest themselves the 
least possible. What is the best procedure? Much better than guilt is 
systematic endangering: you're sitting in a place, you might have a tiny 
functionary's job, you might be a top-level manager; that's not 
important. It's absolutely necessary that you are convinced that, at any 
moment, you could be thrown out of this job. That concerns the non-
guarantees of welfare as well as the super-guarantees of the salaried 
professions (…). You are not guaranteed; you are not guaranteed by a 
connection, by a territory, by a profession, by a corporation; you are 
essentially endangered because you depend on this system which, from 
                                                
3 A commonly discussed topic in this regard is the transition in employer-funded retirement 
benefits from “defined benefits” schemes, whose rate of benefits is defined by the schemes’ rule 
and employers are liable to cover shortfalls, to “defined contributions” ones, where employers’ 
liability towards the scheme is limited and final benefits increasingly depend on the fund’s returns 
on financial markets and portfolio investment (Clark, 2003). While this issue is generally debated 
in industrialised countries, it is also quite relevant to the South African case, as analysed in 
Chapter 7.  
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one day to the next, as a function of some requirement of production or 
simply some requirement of power or social control, might say to you: 
now, it's over (…), [you are] no longer functioning in the register of 
functions we agree to promote for the production of subjectivity. So it's 
that kind of instrument, I believe, that gives this power to integrated 
world capitalism (cit. in Stivale, 1993). 
 
Catherine Newman (1999) suggests that in cases of high employment uncertainty 
and vulnerability coupled to welfare erosion, work ethic can actually reproduce 
working poverty by inducing workers to accept low-wage jobs as alternatives to 
shrinking social assistance. De Angelis (2002) concludes by contending that 
generalized insecurity combined with increasing dependence on market relations 
has the effect of enforcing individual self-discipline in a drive for employability. 
Thus the totality of human activities become functional to labour market insertion.  
Hardt and Negri (2000: 45), however, warn against regarding “national” and 
“global” as normatively antithetical terms, whereby the former allegedly coincides 
with job creation and the welfare state and the latter with jobless growth and 
market discipline. Rather, for them “national” and “global” are moments in a 
“regime of the production of identity and difference, or really of homogeneization 
and heterogeneization”. This is defined by a complex interaction between global 
market regulation and localized patterns of social control and competitive 
valorization supported by the reconfiguration of the state. Similarly, for various 
authors “typical” and “atypical” work should not be regarded as starkly alternative, 
clearly delimited realities (Felstead and Jewson, 1999). Rather, flexibility and 
decentralization of production could still to a large extent be seen as part of a broad 
process of “informalisation” (Meagher, 1995; Crichlow, 2000) driven by the 
restructuring of the formal sector of the economy, rather than as the emergence of a 
separate sphere of production.  
Different forms of access to social provisions can still provide different 
protections to workers undergoing the transition to flexible employment, especially 
women looking for extra-household jobs to compensate for declining family income 
(Yeandle, 1999). Some scholars talk indeed of a resilience of welfare states 
(Fligstein, 1998; Pierson, 1998; van Kersbergen, 2000), at least in terms of 
quantitative indicators of expenditures. In the face of flexible labour markets, 
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however, state prerogatives are no longer aimed at increasing social equality but at 
equalizing competitive chances by linking social services to the provision of skills 
and “employability”. Other authors refuse to see in the flexibilisation of labour 
markets only the hallmark of capitalist domination and utter disempowerment of the 
workers. Rather, contractual and working time flexibility is sometimes seen as a new 
arena of contestation where workers retain their agency and try to maximize their 
“libertarian dispositions” (Gill, 2001) in the absence of strict factory regimentation. 
Attempts to adapt to changing employment conditions could be enhanced by 
personal independence, mobility and alternative income sources as tools to resist 
managerial control. 
Over the past three decades, public spending and labour market shifts have 
provided the socio-economic background to a conservative offensive against 
“entitlement-centred” views of the welfare state. These arguments are based on 
welfare’s inability to address a widening variety of needs and demands from an 
increasingly diversified working population. Critics often use these demands to 
underline the welfare states’ biases in favour of long-term, formal, unionized 
employees. Therefore, conservative opposition to welfare adopts to some extent a 
language of self-realization and emancipation on behalf of “flexible” labouring 
subjects left uncovered by old models of social citizenship (White, 2000; Schmidt, 
2002; Haylett, 2003a). As a response, more flexible modes of service provisions 
are often advocated, which combine varying degrees of privatization and re-
commodification (for example by increasing users’ co-payments), a re-evaluation 
of the role of volunteerism and the “third sector”, and public-private partnerships: 
 
The major attack on the welfare state comes from those who advocate 
a shift to strict reliance on markets. Underpinning this attack 
theoretically is an essentialized notion of sovereign individuals or 
families as rational, selfcontained monads. More importantly, this 
attack is based on the highly problematic dichotomy of state and 
economy (Steinmetz, 1993: 1). 
 
In this changed context the already mentioned “post-modernisation” of social 
citizenship (Hong, 2005) is fully deployed, through social policies that, instead of 
enforcing full-time employment as a universal “norm”, try to promote wage 
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labour and work ethic by calibrating and fine-tuning social policies and provisions 
focused on a multiplicity of social groups. The internalization of difference in 
social citizenship discourse is accompanied to the renewed emphasis on the role 
of the individual competing on the market within increasingly commodified and 
privatized relations. The underlying policy logic is characterized as: 
 
withdrawal of direct, state involvement in favour of self-government 
through the internalization of [these] pedagogical and disciplinary 
structures that lie behind the pleonastic denomination of this new 
regime as “liberal” governmentality” (Hong, 2005: 150). 
 
Neoliberal governmentality emphasises the role of market relations in disciplining 
individuals, towards which public provisions are supposed to play an increasingly 
residual, “enabling” and supportive role. Therefore welfare services are argued to 
become more selective, and their administration more attuned to individual income 
and behaviours, rather than to general standards defined a priori. The emphasis 
therefore is no longer on regulating “the social” as an ontological foundation of 
citizenship, but on supporting private economic activity (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989; 
Gilbert, 2002). As a result, wage labour discipline ceases to be exclusively 
produced through work ethic attached to broadly constructed social subjects, but it 
is the result of individual self-responsibility. Finally, decommodification loses its 
salience in public services that are increasingly eroded and become functional to 
inserting the individual in the labour market, rather than minimizing its 
dependence upon it. 
 Individualization of access and commodification of social provisions 
deepen the already noticed contradiction in social citizenship between the 
codification of universal rights and the particularized, even atomized, 
circumstances to which rights are applied. This contradiction, which Steinmetz 
(1993: 38) following Foucault defines between collective “security” and 
individual “discipline”, leads to a situation in which state sovereignty can exercise 
diminishing claims to social inclusion, redirecting its scope of action towards the 
containment and organization of social exclusion.  
Part of the ideological offensive against the welfare state is, in fact, an 
attempt to build an alternative social citizenship discourse (Crouch, Eder and 
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Tambini, 2001), whereby stable waged work is no longer a defining element 
(Appay and Thebaud-Mony, 1998). Communitarian and multicultural critiques to 
Marshallian social citizenship had stigmatized its static view of the employment-
entitlements relation, which is incapable to represent social differences and 
disables citizens’ participation to community life (Kymlicka, 1998). Moreover, 
the demand for citizenship emerging from transnational migrancy challenges 
state- and nation-centric definitions of social rights (Soysal, 1994; Ong, 1999; 
Ngai, 2003; Papastergiadis, 2000). Conversely, in alternative social citizenship 
discourses “entitlements” tend to be replaced with “responsibility” and protected 
“employment” with “employability” (Giddens, 1995; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). 
For some advocates of “postmodern” welfare discourse, competition and 
individualism are the antidotes to the “authoritarianism”, state-centrism and 
productivist bias of the old welfare state (Leonard, 1997; Goodin, 2001).  
New welfare models, sometimes described as a shift from “welfare state” 
to a plural “welfare society”, redefine the state’s role as providing opportunities 
for the private sector and civil society associations to participate in flexible, 
adaptable configurations of service delivery that could cover also previously 
unprotected sectors (Archibugi, 1996; Spicker, 1997). At the same time 
universalism is downscaled and means testing is aimed at ensuring that 
individuals with adequate assets do not “depend” on welfare. Finally, “social 
inclusion” replaces “social equality” as a policy rationale (Alcock and Pearson, 
1999; Powell, 2002). However, welfare restructuring in this case is not merely the 
result of acceptance of labour market changes, growing flexibility and the 
curtailment of the redistributive role of public expenditures (Bonoli, George and 
Taylor-Gooby, 2000; Navarro, 2002). Its emphasis on “civil society” in 
opposition to the state mirrors, instead, growing dissatisfaction with classical 
welfare state by subjects and movements pushed towards its margins, like casuals, 
self-employed, low-wage workers, and women inhabiting the uncertain border 
between production and reproduction (Tweedy and Hunt, 1994; Dyer-Witheford, 
2001). 
The linkage between state sovereignty, citizenship and social inclusion, 
which under welfare state was underpinned by the expansion of wage labour in 
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relatively homogenous forms, is facing a crisis that does not mean, however, that 
wage labour is disappearing as a condition for social insertion. Rather, welfare 
downsizing and the individualization of provisions reassert wage labour discipline 
as the central form of inclusion. In fact, welfare services are more closely linked 
to “active labour market policies” finalized at skills formation, re-training and job 
placement. These are supposed to alleviate working life transitions including 
intermittent periods of unemployment and low-wage employment (Dean, 1995; 
Esping-Andersen, 1996). At an often related level, the reassertion of wage labour 
centrality is expressed through a refashioned work ethic where social provisions 
and welfare benefits are used in overtly coercive and punitive ways. As noticed 
for the discourse of welfare reform in the United States, in particular, the meaning 
of welfare provisions is shifting from being a “floor” to being a “ceiling”, while 
access is reshaped by increasing conditionalities and stigma for recipients often 
depicted as morally or behaviourally flawed (Block and Somers, 2003). This 
mode of “naturalization of the social” resumes therefore elements of pre-welfare 
state concepts of the market as producing objective, inevitable inequalities based 
on individual merit and worth. In such approaches, therefore, not only does 
addressing the structural origins of social inequality cease to be a social policy 
priority, but the role of decommodification in social citizenship arrangements is 
severely reduced. 
A common policy and rhetorical device to reassert work ethic and wage 
labour discipline is provided by “welfare to work” programmes also known as 
“workfare” (Peck, 2001; Handler, 2003, 2004; Haylett, 2003b). Workfare 
schemes, which are becoming increasingly widespread in Europe and North 
America, are usually aimed at reducing the amount of claimable benefits for 
recipients of social assistance, limiting their duration and making them 
conditional upon active work-seeking behaviour. The use of social benefits as 
coercion to enter the labour market, rather than to provide decommodified income 
outside the labour market, is liked to the stigmatization of recipients, especially 
lone mothers with children, presented as being encouraged by welfare to be 
morally corrupt and behaviourally undiscplined (Boris, 1999; DeParle, 2004). 
Therefore individual subjectivities are reshaped in terms of their labour market 
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participation. Work is no longer seen as a source of dependency and social 
vulnerability to be cushioned with decommodified services, but it becomes 
synonymous with independence and social stability (Holden, 1999; Williams, 
1999; Simmons, 2004).  
The coercive elements of workfare are particularly emphasized by Loic 
Wacquant (2001), who sees a correspondence between welfare-to-work ideology 
and increasing rates of incarceration and criminalisation of the poor in Western 
societies. For him the end of Keynesian and Marshallian welfare renders obsolete 
older modes of social policy that needed the construction and the targeting of 
territories of social malaise (as in ghetto urban planning). These are replaced by 
the pervasiveness of imprisonment as a specifically coercive modality to promote 
wage labour discipline. According to Bob Jessop (1995, 2002) workfare is not 
merely an experiment contingent upon American debates on welfare reform, but it 
rather configures a new mode of social policy, a “Schumpeterian Workfare State”, 
which replaces the former “Keynesian Welfare State”. Jessop’s analysis tries to 
avoid an explanation of transitions between different social policy regimes as 
mechanically determined by restructuring of production and labour market 
changes. He rather recognizes that institutional practices and discourses are 
endowed with a substantial autonomy in shaping long terms trends and structuring 
policy options. Therefore, on one hand the appearance of a “flexible” labour force 
is compatible with the permanence of “Fordist” production regimes that 
underpinned the old welfare states. On the other hand, de-emphasising the role of 
structural transformation allows this line of inquiry to discuss the enforcement of 
“workfarist” individualized wage labour discipline as produced by diverse and 
concomitant policy tools, where privatization and liberalization coexists with 
organs and procedures for corporatist decision-making. 
The analyses above concur in emphasizing the role of discourse and 
ideology in advancing “workfarist” modes of social citizenship. A powerful target 
of the moralistic utterances in the welfare downsizing movement is the notion of 
welfare “dependency” (Fraser and Gordon, 1994). For conservative critics of 
welfare, “dependency” designates not only a moral and mental state that 
encourages laziness and militates against the virtues of hard work and self-
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initiative. It is also the product of an “entitlement mentality” that reinforces such 
behaviours, therefore betraying welfare’s stated aim of enabling an active and 
participative citizenry. Hirschman (1991) has illustrated the combined impact of 
moral judgement and objectifying evaluation in his discussion of “perversity” as 
reactionary rhetoric. According to his thesis, opposition to a policy programme 
relies on arguing that its implementation perversely and unintentionally produces 
outcomes opposite to its own rationale. Somers and Block (2005) stress the 
“epistemic privilege” of this line of argument in a “market fundamentalist” 
discourse that is able to shape policies around the idea that social assistance is 
ultimately detrimental to the poor, while its denial is an act of compassion and 
solidarity. Niklas Luhmann’s (1990) critique of Marshallian welfare argued, for 
example, that through its self-reproducing growth the welfare state had ended up 
rewarding unemployment, therefore creating the very problem it was supposed to 
solve, “corrupting” in this way free enterprise capitalism. The solution he 
indicates consists in a “change in the cognitive and motivational structure of 
personalities, their perception and their intentions” (Luhmann, 1990: 22) so that 
the poor could be “empowered” to help themselves. 
The welfare dependency argument is linked to an image of society as a 
natural, self-regulating organism ruled by Malthusian laws of scarcity. Poverty is 
therefore constructed as a moral-psychological, rather than socio-economic, 
condition. The substantial dehumanization of the poor in this narrative allows for 
them to be presented as irrational beings that indulge in  consumptive instincts 
that are averse to useful production. The conclusion is usually that providing 
social assistance to the poor fatally leads to their multiplication. The ways in 
which this discourse is formulated in “hard” scientific language contributes to its 
allure and power of persuasion. In the case of workfare as welfare reform, 
therefore, discourse and ideas are important in shaping policies and public 
perceptions through procedures of construction of the subject that in hybrid ways 
combine science and morality, nature and society.  
Once social inclusion is defined in terms of individual behaviour and 
discipline, the lazy, unprincipled poor averse to work, as opposed to the 
industrious “deserving” poor, becomes the negative ideal counterpart to the 
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enforcement of wage labour discipline in society at large. Somers and Block 
(2005: 276) conclude that, once poverty is defined as a moral rather than a social 
condition, the labour market is no longer something purely external, but it 
becomes the object of moral imperatives and obligations. According to Sanford 
Schram (2000), discourses of welfare reforms based on “personal responsibility” 
as taking up paid employment against “dependency” are aimed not only at 
blaming the poor. They rather constitute the poor as a group that becomes 
synonymous with social problems in ways that deflect attention away from the 
socioeconomic system and macroeconomic policies. The power of institutional 
discourse and narratives of social subjectivity to shape public policies and 
perceptions is aptly summarized in Schram’s concept of “psychic life of welfare”: 
 
Each social welfare entitlement has its own psychic life. The psychic 
life of welfare, for instance, is tied to aligning its practice with the 
dominant norms of work and family, as welfare reform repeatedly 
does. Welfare must of necessity continually distinguish itself from the 
specter of the other – the ‘bad welfare’, we might say – that haunts it. 
Welfare must continually prevent itself from appearing to pose a 
threat to the dominant norms of work and family. It must continually 
prove itself to be the ‘good welfare’ that promotes work and family 
norms, or it will lose legitimacy and disentitlement politics will 
accelerate (Schram, 2000: 160). 
 
Here again, therefore, the juridical codification of social rights is inadequate to 
define social citizenship arrangements. The meanings of welfare and entitlements 
are rather defined as the outcome of struggles for signification, whereby 
competing social and institutional subjects try to assert and legitimize their claims.  
The re-imposition of wage labour discipline as a mode of access to 
benefits is challenged by scholars that defend the relevance of decommodification 
in the idea of “basic income” or “citizenship income”. While the workfarist 
discourse expunges the theme of decommodification from social policy agendas, 
supporters of “basic” or “citizenship” income want to reinsert decommodification 
also in the changed welfare and labour market conditions of globalised capitalism. 
They do not advocate, however, a return to old modes of welfarism premised on 
unified labouring subjects, even if they rescue the idea of providing income as a 
way to minimize dependency on the labour market. The case for a decommodified 
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income proceeds from the recognition that employment and labour market 
fragmentation under globalisation produce new vulnerabilities and inequalities, 
associated with the increasing likelihood for an individual to frequently change 
employment. Under these conditions, wage labour per se cannot provide an 
adequate guarantee and protection of living standards and basic social security. 
Therefore, demands for basic decommodified income generally have in common 
the fact that they define income provisions as universal and not related to means 
test and other stigmatizing measures. 
 Debates on universal decommodified income, however, show different 
understandings of the relations between income, wage and the labour market, 
which can roughly account for the different concepts of “basic income” and 
“citizenship income”. Supporters of basic income (Van Parijs, 1995; Gorz, 1999; 
Widerquist, 1999; Standing, 2002) argue that it would lead to an effective “right 
to work”, for which basic income is seen as a “necessary precondition” (Standing, 
2002) as opposed to a mere responsibility to labour. The distinction between 
“work” and “labour” allows this current to underline the importance of basic 
income as enabling “decent employment”, especially by relieving the individual 
of the economic compulsion of having to adapt to degrading, exploitative jobs. 
Critical of the idea of active labour market policies and of direct public job 
creating interventions, these authors share a “Polanyian” view of basic income as 
“justifying” capitalism, saving it from its own excesses (Van Parijs, 1995; 
Widerquist, 1999).  
These views, however, ultimately do not challenge the centrality of wage 
labour as the main vehicle of social citizenship. They rather invest waged work 
with a new ethical discourse of “decency” and “self-realisation” as opposed to 
mere “duty” and “responsibility”, and see decommodified income as a support 
measure for the individual to weather the uncertainties of flexible employment. 
 Other authors (Offe, 1997; Fumagalli, 2000; Hardt and Negri, 2000: 401-
403; Suplicy, 2002) advocate universal, decommodified cash transfers as a 
“guaranteed income” in response to what they consider a profound, structural 
crisis of waged employment in providing for social inclusion and a dignified 
existence. In Offe’s (1997: 82) argument, there is a stark contradiction between 
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the collapse of the “centrality of the labour contract” as the basis for social order 
and its persistent centrality in individual lives. Unemployment and precarious 
employment define a scenario of vulnerability as “shakiness and harmful 
unpredictability, as well as the lack of social recognition and appreciation that is 
associated with this condition” (Offe, 1997: 82), for which the labour contract 
fails to provide adequate income and social protection. Offe’s argument focuses in 
particular on “precariousness of subsistence”, as distinct from mere 
“precariousness of work”, as seen in expanding areas of working poor in the 
United States and “unprotected workers “ in Europe. While it could still be 
functional to insertion into waged employment, a “citizenship income”, however, 
essentially recognizes the permanent, structural nature of non-employment as the 
existential condition of large sections of the working-age population.  
In this view unemployment is therefore no longer defined exclusively as a 
problem (Offe, 1997: 93) but as an opportunity to explore different modes of 
utilizing time. Forms of citizenship income would therefore liberate individuals 
from waged work and labour market dependency (Dinerstein and Neary, 2002; 
Holloway, 2002). The impact of citizenship income in “reducing the volume of 
work” (Offe, 1997: 93) would be strengthened by a concomitant, generalized 
reduction in average working times, to allow human activities to re-evaluate the 
dimension of leisure in opposition to work ethic, wage discipline and self-
sacrifice.   
 Debates on decommodified income confirm that social citizenship rights 
are a terrain of contestation and conflict shaped by the crisis of former regulative 
ideas based on stable waged employment. They also show the importance of new 
identities emerging from labour markets restructuring and flexibility as challenges 
to mere institutional and policy views of social provisions. What these debates 
ultimately highlight is the need for a dynamic view that sees social citizenship as 
the product of agency and shifting power relations, rather than exhausting it into 
state governmentality and the rights-based discourses it enables. The following 
section will expand on the theme of social citizenship as a contested terrain by 
focusing in particular on literature dealing with the problems and ambiguities that 
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shape the work-citizenship nexus in non-Western societies and in the South 
African case. 
 
 
1.5 Work and Social Citizenship in Colonial and Postcolonial Modernity 
 
The literature discussed in the previous sections validates an understanding of 
social citizenship as a “contested field of signification” based on a specific 
historical trajectory, that of the Western democratic capitalist state. There, 
contestation revolved around the meanings of contractually free wage labour in 
relation to demands for social provisions, redistribution, decommodification. The 
constitution of labour as “free” in Western capitalism, however, is closely related 
to the forms of domination and unfreedom that European colonialism imposed on 
its subjected territories. At the same time, colonial expansion was part, in terms of 
access to land and resources through the subjugation of non-European societies, of 
responses by European states to their own “social question” (Wehler, 1969). 
Moreover, the nascent ideology of citizenship in the European nation-state was 
reinforced by an “imperial” dimension which placed the white working class, 
together with its own employers, at the top of a racial hierarchy of rights and 
duties as part of colonialism’s mode of knowledge and governmentality (Conklin, 
1999; Stepan, 2000; Thompson, 2000). The specific significance of wage labour 
in defining the “social question” in the colonial and postcolonial world is 
therefore of decisive importance for the applicability to such contexts of a notion 
of social citizenship that would otherwise be marked by the Eurocentric bias of its 
theoretical and historical trajectory. 
 One of the main social legacies of colonialism is the emergence of wage 
labour out of authoritarian political systems and coercive social institutions. Wage 
labour could be the subject and object of citizenship claims in highly 
contradictory ways. Studies of European colonial states in Africa, in particular, 
have emphasized how the enforcement and control of labour was a decisive 
challenge for administrative apparatuses faced with grassroots African resistance 
to proletarianisation. Economic and political coercion have initially defined forced 
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labour as the mode of insertion of African workers in colonial modernity, in a 
context where colonial administrators’ aims were to limit “free labour” and the 
related danger of class consciousness (Cooper, 1989; Brass, 1997). Limited 
proletarianisation in the urban centers was circumscribed by the maintenance of 
despotic forms of labour control aided by “traditional” authorities and customary 
law in the rural areas (Mamdani, 1996). The universalizing discourse of 
citizenship that was emerging in the European metropolises, therefore, starkly 
contrasted with colonial modes of government that promoted differentiation and 
hierarchies in the categorization of colonial subjects’ positions and claims 
(Benton, 2002; Silver, 2003: 20-25). At the same time, coercion was functional at 
preventing workers’ resistance, which expressed itself mainly through strategies 
of defection and escape (Moulier-Boutang, 1998).  
Late colonialism, however, witnessed a renewed importance of the colony 
as a site of production and investment, with the attendant processes of 
urbanization and proletarianization. Combined to African resistance to forced 
labour and demands for more dignified working conditions (Berman, 1991; 
Isaacman, 1996; Fall, 2002), these processes led to a substantial inversion in 
European attitudes towards African wage labour. From being considered an 
undesirable social phenomenon, wage labour became first an unavoidable 
problem and then the basis for an attempted discourse of social reform based on 
limited citizenship rights. As a result, work ethic and wage discipline came to be 
praised as vehicles of a modernization process that remained defined from above, 
in the absence of effective citizenship and political democracy. The rhetorical and 
ideological usage of wage labour, which under colonialism remained however 
defined by rules and institutions of unfreedom, relied therefore on its purported 
“civilisational” aim, which remained nonetheless compatible with political 
domination, juridical coercion, paternalism and racism (Stoler, 1985; Prakash, 
1990). Coercion, via the imposition of anti-vagrancy laws and prohibitions on 
change of employment, was ultimately needed to tie workers to their workplace. 
Loyalty for capitalist labour discipline could not, in fact, be elicited as long as a 
hegemonic discourse based on effective citizenship rights remained absent (Guha, 
1997). 
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 Social reforms in the late African colonial state was exemplified by 
legislative measures like the introduction of the “Labour Code” in the French 
colonies during the 1930s and by the 1940 Colonial Welfare and Development 
Act in the British ones. These tried to regulate and control the formation of 
African working classes in ways that were not merely coercive, but which tried to 
provide social protections akin to developing notions of “fair labour standards” to 
promote work ethic and responsibility. In this way it was hoped that new 
legitimacy could be provided to the wage form to overcome Africans’ 
recalcitrance and resistance to proletarianisation. The “stabilization” of the 
African urban population within wage relations was central in the nascent 
discourse of “development” (Escobar, 1994) as the modern version of Europe’s 
“civilizing mission”. Development posed moral and ethical requirements on its 
subjects in the drive to self-sustained economic growth based on endogenous 
production.  
Whereas the early colonial state had deprecated workers’ escape from rural 
forced labour as a sign of uprootedness, anomie and abandonment of traditional 
ways of life, the late colonial discourse produced a mythical narrative of 
modernity based on the linkage between wage labour and urbanization (Ferguson, 
1999). According to Cooper (1996: 14), colonial officials 
 
wanted Africa to have a working class, to separate an identifiable 
group of people from the backwardness of rural Africa (…)  and over 
time make them into a predictable and productive collectivity. 
 
It is therefore in colonial times that the “promise” of wage labour in terms of 
modernization and emancipation, which was due to leave a profound imprint on 
the “developmentalist” discourse of post-colonial independent states, was first 
elaborated. 
These shifts in discursive and policy emphases are evident in late colonial 
policy discourse. For the 1933 Davis (1933: 52) commission of inquiry into 
Zambian copper mining, minework represented for the “native” the “breakdown 
of his inertia, isolation, lack of ambition and contentment with traditional life”. 
Wage labour was here conceptualized as the harbinger of European notions of 
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citizenry premised upon “the true inwardness of the White man’s moral system” 
(Davis, 1933: 126). That moral system was then summarized as connecting work 
ethic and scientific knowledge as modes of naturalization of society:  
 
Labour in industry, on the mines and more especially on the farms of 
local White settlers, together with the White man’s system of 
medicine and hygiene, has taught the Native something of the 
consistency and regularity of the laws of Nature, and thus indirectly, 
but effectively, is undermining the former magical and superstitious 
practices of village life (Davis, 1933: 126). 
 
In Mamdani’s influential analysis, wage labour discipline and guarantees are part 
of the establishment of a “bifurcated” mode of citizenship, whereby urbanized 
Africans acquired individual rights and obligations, prelude to postcolonial 
citizenship and whereby rural residents remained in a status of “subjects”, coerced 
into unfree labour and ruled through customary law by “traditional” authorities.  
It is to be noticed, however, that the citizenship discourse of the late 
colonial state mirrored and reproduced the contradictions already noticed in the 
ideologies of social citizenship in Europe. In fact, the limited extension of social 
rights, despite the fact that they were propagated in the name of universalist 
values, remained functional to categorising, dividing and hierarchizing subject 
populations, reproducing for a minority work ethic and wage discipline as 
historical baggage of “modernity”. At the same time the juridical constructs with 
which colonial governmentality had tried to define wage labour as a stabilized 
“modern” urban reality in opposition to “traditional” rural society were actively 
challenged and subverted from below. Uncontrolled dynamics of migration led to 
the growth of urban populations of “squatters” and casual, informal, self-
employed workers in search of opportunities but reluctant to be disciplined under 
permanent wage relations, and therefore easily categorized under the stereotype of 
“dangerous classes”.  
Much historical research has shown how the articulation from below of 
flexible labour strategies represented a major problem of social control for the 
hierarchical order theorized by the colonial state (Cooper, 1987; Sikainga, 1996; 
Etoughé-Efé, 2000; Fanthorpe, 2001; Burton, 2005). As Simone (2004) remarks, 
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the ultimate inability of the African urban form, initially conceived for the 
purpose of political and administrative domination, to “orderly” control the 
reproduction of wage labour greatly facilitated the “repositioning” of residents’ 
life strategies across a plurality of practices. Wage labour provided, therefore, 
only one of many forms of social reproduction and ways of “doing things”. 
“Undisciplined” practices of social reproduction profoundly affected the discourse 
and imagery of trade union organizing as well. Studies of African and “third 
world” labour movements show indeed that the wage relation shaped specific 
worker discourses of citizenship and solidarity to which work provided the 
foundation of a social and moral order imbued with modernizing ideals and a 
strong sense of masculinity (Fernandes, 1997; Lindsay, 2003). As Carolyn Brown 
(2003) argues, colonial production regimes came to resemble metropolitan ones, 
which facilitated the circulation of ideas of fairness at work premised on the male 
breadwinners’ family responsibilities. At the same time, however, racialised 
inequalities that symbolically categorized Africans as “labourers”, rather than 
“working men” endowed with legitimate citizenship claims, left worker strategies 
open to the influence of extra-workplace identities, norms and demands. 
Higginson (1989) underlines how the concept of “wage” as perceived by 
Congolese miners was ridden with ambiguities, coming to symbolize at the same 
time an inherently evil form of “barren wealth” and a terrain of contestation for a 
more dignified life. 
The interplay between “imperial” working class formation and local 
specificities in struggles and mobilization ultimately provides a decisive criticism 
to the idea of a linear process of African “proletarianisation” leading to the pre-
eminence of class consciousness in determining workers’ demands. Instead, as 
Chakrabarty (1988, 2000) shows, workers exploited the contradictions between 
citizenship ideals and work practices – which were inherent to the “translation” of 
capitalist relations into local contexts -- by drawing from multiple, often 
contradictory, sources of consciousness to stake their claims. Far from accepting 
the citizenship discourse proposed by the colonial state and westernized elites as 
an unproblematic goal, the subaltern have creatively appropriated and re-
elaborated it, contesting from below its modes of signification (Perry, 1999; 
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Young, 2001). This point, which characterizes the “postcolonial studies” 
approach, underlines that “free” wage labour and the working class act mainly as 
capital’s normative ideas, “imaginary projects” (Cooper, 1996: 14) and 
“disciplinary abstractions”. Their realization, however, far from mechanically 
leading to radically new collective identities, is actively resisted by practices that 
combine citizenship claims with local ethnic, religious and community affiliations 
(Brandell, 1993; Guy and Thabane, 1993).  
Emphasising the importance of grassroots practices, Frederick Cooper 
(2005) convincingly refutes Mamdani’s “bifurcated citizenship” argument by 
showing how the contradictions of colonialism’s social reform agenda, which 
were heightened by political despotism and lack of citizenship rights, enabled 
African urban and rural strata alike to use the discourse of social reform to claim 
political and civil rights. Cooper’s notion of citizenship discourse as “claim 
making” shows how policies of social control and political subjectivation of the 
colonial and post-colonial state were recursively shaped by agency and struggles 
from below. The value of this approach, which eschews top-down narratives of 
“development” and  “nation building” as much as an unproblematic idealization 
of grassroots spontaneity, resides in the fact that it specifically focuses on the 
relevance of wage labour as a protagonist of colonial and postcolonial modernity 
in the explanation of Africa’s socio-political development. The relations between 
wage labour and citizenship discourses are usually neglected in African studies 
due to numerical limits of the formal waged population, its lack of organized 
power, or its subordination to nationalist agendas. Cooper (1996), instead, 
identifies the nexus between waged work and citizenship as a crucial terrain of 
contestation around which the colonial project tried to move beyond coercion and 
gain legitimation by using “free” labour and scientific knowledge. Reorientations 
in colonial policies were however influenced by the self-organisation and struggle 
of emerging African unions. In the process these latter used institutional spaces 
and the contradictions of colonial citizenship discourse – namely the gap between 
universal civilizing rhetoric and the practice of political authoritarianism -- to 
politicize their claims in ways that in the final analysis proved incompatible with 
the permanence of colonial domination. 
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The idea of “colonial welfare” provided a further terrain of contestation in 
the linkage that it tried to establish between wage labour and social protection. 
Based on a combination of economic development and urban stabilization, 
colonial welfare policies represented the first attempt to transfer to subjugated 
societies the social citizenship discourse that was emerging in the metropolis 
(Lewis, 2000). Limited resources, lack of political legitimacy and a predominant 
focus on the stabilization of “respectable” urbanized wage labour (Scarnecchia, 
2000) made colonial welfare a mechanism for social control substantially 
deprived of decommodifying or redistributive ambitions. As an alternative, it 
rather emphasized “community development”, prescriptions of moral behaviour, 
self-help and the promotion of work ethic (Lewis, 2000; Jebb, 2002; Lambert and 
Lester, 2004; Eckert, 2004). Limited social services, healthcare provisions and 
family allowances were tightly attached to waged employment (Cooper, 1989: 
745). At the same time, however, the associational life encouraged by colonial 
welfare policies, and the limited amount of services delivered, eventually became 
in many cases contested sites of working class organization and politicization 
(Lewis, 2000: 104-105; Noyoo, 2000).  
 African transitions towards postcolonial independent nation-states 
promised to liberate wage labour from the grip of political despotism. At the 
ideological, administrative and juridical levels, however, the continuities with the 
colonial past are significant. The developmentalist ideology of the late colonial 
state was adopted by new independent governments and refashioned to serve the 
purpose of nation-building. To some extent state-driven development policies and 
infrastructural investment provided working class organizations with 
opportunities for expansion and solidarity (Breman, 1999; Koo, 2001; Sikainga, 
2002). At the same time, however, the nationalist-developmentalist discourse 
largely remained the precinct of political elites that used it to impose unity over 
and above different social interests, retaining a strong suspicion for autonomous 
social subjects that could make claims (Chatterjee, 1994; Cooper, 1996).  
Conversely, scarcity of resources and the limited numbers of the waged 
working population greatly constrained the extent and coverage of post-colonial 
social assistance and social security policies. Indeed, administrators trained in the 
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“self-help”, work ethic and community development discourse of the former 
colonial state and international organizations, did not particularly emphasise 
redistribution and decommodification (De Mesa and Montecinos, 1999; 
Adejumobi, 2001; Kurtz, 2002). Rather, citizenship discourses in developmental 
regimes often reinforced social hierarchies whereby, as it has been observed in the 
Brazilian case (Goirand, 2003: 230), “citizens were those who could be found in 
one of the jobs recognized and defined by the law”, while informal workers were 
considered “pre-citizens” and the poor “non-citizens”. Democratic themes were, 
on the other hand, used to legitimize technocratic policy-making and enforce 
social discipline and moderation, rather than enabling arenas of contestation over 
social policies (Moore, 1995; Abrahamsen, 2000). As Ferguson (1994: 256) 
observes: 
 
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and 
by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and 
oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of ‘development’ is the 
principal means through which the question of poverty is de-
politicized (…). 
 
According to Cooper (1989: 758-759) decolonisation was the result of the 
inability of the colonial state to deal with its “social question” through a “self-
reproducing working class” that could be the basis of productivity deals and social 
citizenship arrangements. Decolonization, therefore, removed the West from “the 
social consequences of economic processes” (Cooper, 1989: 758). Dealing with 
these consequences were left to weak institutions and minimal state intervention. 
From the 1970s onwards concepts like “wage moderation”, “basic needs” and 
“safety nets” became fashionable and useful for postcolonial elites which 
followed the advice of the ILO, the IMF and the World Bank. Alternative 
approaches focused on increasing “capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2000; Dreze and 
Sen, 2002) privilege public intervention especially in health and education seen as 
ways, within the formal and informal economy, to contain a culture of fixed 
“entitlements” as protections from risk.  
The developmentalist discourse coupled with reduced social spending 
allowed postcolonial governments to contain and thwart the demands for social 
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provisions and quality of life that the struggles against colonialism had brought to 
the fore. Moreover, the downscaling of state social policy was justified by the 
articulation between formal systems of social security and local “informal” 
welfare networks based on micro-credit, small scale health projects, community 
and kin relations of reciprocity and income pooling (Matsetela et al., 1980; 
D’Haeseleer and Berghman, 2003). As David Webster (1984) noticed, however, 
the “traditionalist” emphasis often placed on informal welfare belies their 
interconnectedness with “modern” social dynamics like rising joblessness, 
retrenchments and downsizing in the “formal” economy. Under 1980s and 1990s 
structural adjustment policies, self-help was moreover functional to a rhetoric of 
entrepreneurship and civil society participation that justified further social 
spending cutbacks. 
Finally, the social citizenship discourse of independent African states 
heavily relied on nationalist mythologies, which Balandier (1967) quite 
poignantly calls “a new deal of the emotions”, that complemented approaches to 
the “social question” derived from Western knowledge and modes of 
governmentality. As Cooper (1996: 5) summarises it, Africa’s “imported future”, 
based on European expert’s views of waged labour as a central tool of social 
inclusion, prevailed over the “observed present” that made the waged working 
class a frail, complex and highly contradictory concept. Coronil (1997) argues that 
the nationalist-developmentalist project was specifically powerful precisely 
because it “magically” combined a modernizing scientific discourse of control 
over nature with the quasi-religious appeal of “the nation” as embodied in the 
ability of its leaders to “deliver”. Goswami (2004) and Mbembe (2001) add that 
nationalism’s view of a homogenous national body was also remarkably capable 
to accommodate social multiplicity and unevenness, also through rhetoric that, for 
the first time, celebrated the dignity, desires and self-activity of the “poorest of the 
poor”.  
As a result, trade unions and working class politics were caught in a 
tension between siding with nationalist regimes and assume “responsibility for a 
well-disciplined and productive labor force” (Stoler, 1985: 12; Adesina, 1992), or 
follow the path inaugurated under colonialism to politicize wage issues and turn 
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them into broader demands for change supported by community solidarity 
(Cohen, 1980; Von Freyhold, 1987; Herold, 1994; Koo, 2001). Contributing to the 
vulnerability of labour movements is also the fact that state ideologies often 
present union members as a relatively privileged minority due to their access to a 
monetary wage, which implies additional requests for discipline and self-sacrifice 
in the name of national development.  
In the final analysis, as Cooper (1989) observes, post-coloniality 
accomplished the colonial utopia of “free labour” regulated by “free market” 
relations on a global level, but within the political framework of authoritarian 
states that eschewed redistribution and social equality. The postcolonial link 
between work and social citizenship used therefore wage labour as a device for 
discipline and social control, often aided by corporatist institutions (Collier and 
Collier, 1991; Fashoyin, 1990; Weyland, 1996; Heller, 1999). At the same time, 
governmental practices enforced all kinds of gender, class, regional, linguistic and 
ethnic hierarchies (Solinger, 1999; Davila, 2003) while paying homage to a 
universalist discourse of citizenship, social cohesion and national solidarity. 
 Recent analyses on the crisis of postcolonial developmentalism and nation-
state sovereignty under globalisation and neoliberal structural adjustments have 
addressed the extent to which commodification and the decline in formal 
employment affect the work-social citizenship nexus. Ian Gough (2003) suggests 
that “decommodification” is a useless concept in evaluating social policies in 
developing countries, since social and labour relations are here commodified only 
to a limited extent in the first place. Commodification, however, is not a merely 
economic concept, it rather reveals underlying power relations related with the 
subordination of everyday livelihoods to the commodity form and wage 
discipline. Many analyses of neo-liberalising Africa recognize, therefore, that 
structural adjustment programmes have led to increasing income insecurity, 
decline of waged employment, increasing commodification due to the 
introduction of user payments for services, informalisation of work leading to 
multiple occupations and other “self-exploitation” strategies, and reliance on 
family networks as survivalist alternatives to the state’s inability to provide social 
goods (Paratian and Dasgupta, 2004). Conversely, neoliberal transitions in 
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developing countries have particularly weakened labour movements, especially in 
those cases where trade unions retained strong links with nationalist regimes that 
now use their political influence to justify restructuring, retrenchments and wage 
cuts. These processes have, moreover, contributed to labour market fragmentation 
and precariousness, which have led to de-unionisation and further erosions of 
labour’s ability to speak on behalf of broader citizenship demands (Ecthemendy, 
2001; Cocco, 2001). 
Social movements and struggles of the poor are often seen as articulating 
defensive strategies mainly by negotiating and re-evaluating the progressive, 
transformative content of the nationalist project itself (Cheah, 2003). In doing so, 
poor peoples’ movements can exploit the contradictions between the 
developmentalist promise of social emancipation and its practice of 
marginalization of the jobless, in order to reclaim a public sphere of rights and 
powers that transcend institutional codifications (Goirand, 2003; Alvarez, 
Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). As Shivji (1999) argues, political authoritarianism 
in the developmental state reflects an inability to legitimize a universalist rights-
based discourse, which therefore becomes a powerful weapon of opposition. 
According to Mbembe (2001), the African state’s institutional weakness in 
constructing social subjects makes “power” a diffuse, non-institutionalised social 
construct operating through the everyday overlap of “desires, passions and 
fantasies” that provide a vocabulary for domination and resistance. The 
proliferation of multiple, unassimilable social practices and discourses as the 
“nonhegemonic limit to the hegemonic thought” (Williams, 2002: 11) of the 
nation as coherent, undifferentiated unity ultimately makes the postcolonial 
signification of “wage labour” and “citizenship” a terrain of contestation.  
 Over the past decade, scholarly debates have started locating the transition 
from apartheid to democracy in South Africa within the broader African 
postcolonial context (Mamdani, 1996: 218-284). This shift has challenged 
“exceptionalist” views of South African development based, among other things, 
on the country’s high level of industrialization and the size and importance of its 
industrial working class. Conversely, sociological studies of the crisis and 
collapse of apartheid have underlined the relevance of black workers’ struggles, in 
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alliance with civil society organizations and social movements, to shape demands 
and languages of citizenship. Gay Seidman (1994) shows, in particular, how the 
authoritarianism of the racist state facilitated a process of politicization of 
workplace-based, wage-related struggles. These eventually evolved towards 
claims and demands for civil, political and social citizenship as integral to the 
image of a new democracy. The politicization of demands arising from the 
encounter between labour and social opposition to apartheid is captured in the 
concept, discussed in Chapter 3, of “social movement unionism” (Lambert and 
Webster, 1988; Seidman, 1994; Von Holdt, 2002). This expression signifies the 
ability of waged workers to advance political liberation by transcending the 
boundaries of production and the wage relation. In fact, the relevance of issues of 
reproduction and quality of life for South African labour struggles (Beittel, 1992) 
was translated into demands for decommodified social provisions, especially in 
the sphere of housing, transport, municipal services and employer-subsidised 
benefits.  
Halisi (1999: 46) argues that labour’s attitude to nationalist politics in South 
Africa was not characterized by mere “deference and dominance”, but it was an 
issue of contestation within the labour movement itself over how to structure a 
discourse of citizenship that remained multilayered and stratified due to the ways 
in which racial domination and class oppression were experienced as distinct, but 
deeply connected and mutually reinforcing realities.  
Labour movement’s importance as opponent to apartheid and, in alliance 
with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) after the 1994 democratic 
elections, as an actor in societal bargaining and policy-making institutions, also 
impacted on the state’s mode to deal with South Africa’s “social question”. 
Apartheid governmentality embodied specific forms of “rule of experts” whereby 
technical expertise and scientific discourse constituted social subjects and social 
problems as passive objects of institutional power and knowledge (Ashforth, 
1990). The process of post-1990 negotiated democratization, however, 
interrogated the capacity of the new state form to formulate policies through the 
intermediation of conflicting social interests (Adam, Moodley and van Zyl 
Slabbert, 1997; Webster and Buhlungu, 1998; Maree, 1998; Adler and Webster, 
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1999). Radical critics (Bond, 1999; Marais, 2001) argue, however, that the 
possibilities for societal bargaining to achieve meaningful policies of 
redistribution and decommodification are severely constrained by the ANC 
government’s “non negotiable” adoption of a neoliberal, market-based framework 
to economic growth and social development.  
Sampie Terreblanche (2002: 38) contends that South African 
democratization coincided with a “reshuffling” of political and economic power 
relations that created a new “distributional” coalition of the old white and the new 
black elites. Gumede (2005) adds that, especially with the rise of Thabo Mbeki  to 
power in 1999, the predominance of elite-based macroeconomic orthodoxy has 
led to a reassertion of technocratic discourse and the foreclosure of meaningful 
spaces of political debate, mirroring the concentration of power at the executive 
level. At the same time, technocratic and expert-driven policy making reveals 
continuities with the past in presenting the poor as undifferentiated, unwilling 
carriers of a social disease that, without questioning broader social power 
relations, requires targeted policies, morals, knowledge and forms of self-
discipline (Kistner, 2003). To confirm the already noticed ambiguities in rights-
based discourse, therefore, the universal entitlements contained in the post-
apartheid Constitution define, as Chipkin (2003) puts it, only citizens “in right”, 
which to become citizens “in practice”, actually capable of claiming rights, have 
to undergo through a disciplining process that leads to duties and responsibilities 
based on ethics of self-sufficiency and productive contribution to society. 
Neoliberalism and technocratic policy-making have led for some analysts 
(Kalati and Manor, 1999; Buhlungu, 2002; Zuern, 2004) to a “depoliticisation” of 
social inequality concomitant with civil society “demobilization” in a context of 
widespread poverty, rampant HIV-AIDS epidemics and spiraling unemployment. 
These developments connect the ANC government to the contradictions in post-
colonial nationalist and developmentalist projects (Jensen, 2001). In particular a 
gap is often observed between the promise for greater equality and the actual 
disempowerment and marginalisation of its intended beneficiaries: 
 
In South Africa (…) there is no immediate sense among elites that 
social and political unrest poses threats. Politics, for the present, has 
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demobilized the poor – or rather it has mobilized them for electoral 
purposes while containing pressures for social transformation. But 
transformation has been promised – indeed, oversold – by the ANC. 
That party therefore finds itself playing incompatible roles, 
simultaneously promising transformation and containing pressure for 
transformation while it seeks to tackle poverty through the pursuit of 
economic growth (Kalati and Manor, 1999: 118). 
 
Scholarly debates on South Africa’s “social question”, which is generally defined 
in terms of poverty, inequality and unemployment, bring to the fore the relevance 
of interactions between wage labour and decommodification in defining the post-
apartheid social citizenship arrangement. While Chapter 3 discusses this aspect in 
detail, two broad theoretical perspectives dealing with it are worth being 
introduced here. On one hand there are analyses that represent poverty and 
inequality in post-apartheid South Africa in substantially dualistic terms. Here, the 
lack of social inclusion is identified with unemployment and underemployment 
while, conversely, labour market participation and access to waged employment 
are seen as the main avenues for social insertion. Within this perspective, some 
authors (May, 2000) recognize the relevance of social transfers as specific forms of 
support for the long term unemployed. Even if they do not elaborate on the theme 
of decommodification, they prioritize cash transfers over labour market policies 
and job creation.  
Other authors (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997a, 1997b, 2001a, 2001b; 
Terreblanche, 1998a; Nattrass, 2000; Van der Berg, 2001b; Seekings and Nattrass, 
2002; Seekings, 2000b and 2003b) argue that the dualistic nature of South African 
society means that employment-based divides prevail over other forms of social 
polarization. For Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings, in particular, post-apartheid 
social inequality is changing from being based on race to being determined by 
class. The meaning of “class” in their analysis is defined by income and status 
differential, rather than by relations to the means of production. Therefore the main 
class divide they focus on is between “upper-middle classes”, which include the 
formally employed, and “the poor”, unemployed and underemployed:  
 
The excluded are no longer defined in racial terms, although almost 
all are black. Now, the excluded are the unemployed. The new faulty 
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line in the labour markets and in the provision of welfare is between 
those citizens with employment and the many without (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 1997a: 464). 
 
Therefore, they continue, “the urban industrial working class does not represent the 
poor (…). Only a small proportion of South Africa’s poor sell their labour power at 
all” (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997a: 466).  
Chapters 6 and 7 of this work refute these claims on empirical grounds. For 
the moment, it is worth examining their implications in terms of social citizenship 
discourse. Nattrass and Seekings in fact recognize that historically social security 
in South Africa has been strictly linked to individual labour market positions, 
determining wide areas of exclusion for the long-term unemployed to the point that 
“social citizenship (…) exists in only a minimal form in South Africa” (Nattrass 
and Seekings, 1997a). Moreover, the commodifying effect of this situation is 
amplified by the fact that most public spending in South Africa is addressed to 
education and training, sectors with a direct labour market orientation. Their 
conclusion is that social security contributes therefore to define the waged working 
class as a “semi-privileged” (Seekings and Nattrass, 2002: 4) social layer. 
Moreover, high unionization and collective bargaining allegedly reinforce the 
position of waged workers at the cost of making job creation exceedingly 
expensive, worsening the conditions of the poor. Therefore, the opposition 
between workers and unemployed replaces in this scenario the antagonism 
between labour and capital as the main determinant of class conflict.  
Instead of suggesting, as a solution to social inequalities, measures of 
redistribution to extend universal decommodified social provisions to the poor, 
however, Nattrass and Seekings advocate public spending constraints and the 
creation of conditions favourable to the expansion of low-wage occupations. For 
them state action should be reorientated towards facilitating the poor’s sale of their 
labour power, also through the relaxation of collective bargaining regulations for 
small and medium enterprises (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997b; Nattrass, 2000). 
Employment growth and wage discipline, even at the most exploitative conditions, 
are therefore asserted as the sole vehicle for social citizenship. The alternative of 
providing decommodified services and income, they conclude, “is not an option” 
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(Nattrass and Seekings, 1997a: 475). Finally, after identifying working class wages 
and protections as the main cause of poverty in South Africa, Nattrass and 
Seekings suggest that waged workers should pay to improve the poor’s living 
standards, with the explicit aims of containing redistributive policies and 
minimising the obligations of the socio-economic elites. Despite their emphasis on 
egalitarianism and the need of the “very poor”, Nattrass and Seekings’ conclusion 
is that South Africa can only afford a loose definition of social citizenship, made 
coincidental with a “labour absorbing growth path” (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997b) 
that praises the inclusive potential of employment at whatever condition: 
 
The best that a labour-surplus economy such as SA can aspire to is an 
American-style welfare state regime with a very inegalitarian labour 
market, where the state provides minimal and stringently means-
tested public welfare (Nattrass and Seekings, 1997a: 476). 
 
It is also to be noticed how this line of argument, based on presenting the 
curtailment of public social provisions as a compassionate act towards the poor, 
legitimizes itself through a paternalistic celebration of the poor’s pragmatism, 
patience and moderation. These are seen as conducive to accepting work 
discipline at extremely low wages, in opposition to workers’ “selfish preference 
for higher wages”, presented as conservative and anti-poor (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001a).  
 Rejecting notions of a polarized socio-economic dualism in post-apartheid 
society (Lund, 2002), a different perspective regards the labour market, and the 
proliferation of low-wage jobs, as part of the problem of poverty and inequality, 
rather than unproblematically regarding it as its main solution. These views are 
therefore also skeptical of the centrality of economic growth in enforcing among 
the poor patience and discipline in making social citizenship claims (Meth, 2003a; 
Meth and Dias, 2004). Moreover, they also argue that dualistic discourses define 
“poverty” as a decontextualised object of policy interventions, constructed in 
moral-behavioural terms under the pretext of “scientific” statistical measuring. 
The dualism thesis, therefore, elides the need for interventions at the level of 
structured distribution of social resources and ends up placing the blame for social 
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dislocation exclusively on the poor and the workers, upon which the related 
sacrifices also fall (Ballard, 2004).  
Proponents of the concept of “chronic poverty” (Aliber, 2003; Du Toit, 
2004b) argue that poverty is a product of deprivation along a set of interrelated 
dimensions (income, assets, capabilities) which are mutually reinforcing. Rather 
than seeing “inclusion” and “exclusion” as the opposite polarities of a dualistic 
framework, they look at the borders between them as blurring and overlapping. In 
this sense, “exclusion” is not merely coincidental with lack of a formal waged 
employment, but it also includes working poor whose low wage jobs do not allow 
access to incomes above mere survival. Therefore, this current considers 
exclusion as a subaltern, precarious, vulnerable form of inclusion, rather than 
normatively separating the two. Not only is the creation of low wage employment 
an ineffective way to address poverty and expand social citizenship, but wage 
labour is here explicitly criticized as a factor reproducing deprivation through a 
gradual decoupling of “wage” and income”.  
Policy recommendations that follow from this line of inquiry refuse using 
targeted “social safety nets” as an alternative to redistribution, and advocate the 
introduction of cash transfers and other forms of decommodified income 
independently from the employment status of the recipients (Meth, 2003b; 
Samson et al. 2004). Social provisions are therefore to a large extent seen here as 
protection from, rather than inducement towards, the labour market. 
 The approaches summarized above are undoubtedly useful to problematise 
the position of wage labour in relation to social citizenship in post-apartheid South 
Africa, beyond mere ideological polarizations and equivalences that see the 
formally employed as “privileged” tout court and as the oppressors of the 
unemployed and informally employed poor. Views that look at  “chronic poverty” 
and working poverty, however, still tend to regard decommodified income 
transfers as temporary relief measures (Meth, 2003b) or “developmental” 
interventions enabling labour market participation (Samson et al., 2004). 
Therefore they do not go as far as suggesting income decommodification as a 
systematic response to a structural crisis of waged employment and as a vehicle 
for a dignified life. In conclusion, it is therefore important to indicate that South 
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Africa’s intellectual consensus reveals a marked preference for wage labour 
centrality and discipline as modes of social inclusion. Different opinions exist, 
however, as to the arguable extent and role of decommodified social provisions. 
Chapter 3 and, especially, Chapter 8 will develop these issues by relating them to 
the emerging social policy discourse of post-apartheid democracy and its internal 
contestations.  
 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Theories and debates analysed in this chapter show that the concept of social 
citizenship is deeply affected by the contradictions and contestations shaping the 
“social” it tries to regulate. Struggles around wage labour in relation to social 
provisions and entitlements are a crucial factor from this point of view. At the 
same time, the reconfiguration and diversification in the meanings of “wage 
labour” also reshape its contradictory interactions with social subjects, claims and 
state governmentality responses. 
 For these reason, a concept of social citizenship that relies on formal 
enunciations, institutional interventions and constitutional codifications of rights 
is seriously inadequate and in need of a more dynamic, complex understanding. 
This chapter supports a notion of social citizenship as produced by contestations 
between meanings and claims from below and state attempts at regulating them 
within juridical, ethical and disciplinary forms. The universalist discourse of 
rights is in this process “stretched” by new social claims and reveals its 
functionality to social inequality. Therefore, social citizenship can be seen as a 
movement to advance non-market based social provisions within, outside or 
against state institutionality.  
Social citizenship is a terrain of contestation not only in terms of content 
of social policies and programmes, as for example in debates over the relationship 
between social insurance and social assistance, the role of redistribution, the 
advisability of selective or universal approaches. It is also, and especially, a field 
of contested signification over the meanings of social rights. The importance of 
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wage labour in this regard resides in the fact that within state governmentality  it 
acts as a moral-behavioural construct, an indication of “virtuous” political 
belonging, a mode to categorise “good” and “bad” citizens. In the postcolonial 
world, the disciplinary impact of wage labour is also reinforced by its location 
within elite discourses of “development” and “nation building”. Conversely, 
supporters of decommodified forms of social “income” as distinct and separate 
from monetary “wage” tend to signify social citizenship as not primarily 
depending on wage labour and its related forms of discipline and control. These 
debates seem of particular importance in contexts where, in the North and the 
South alike, work is being transformed in ways that do not seem to promote social 
inclusion and dignified jobs. The urgency of debating the work-citizenship nexus, 
therefore, arises directly from the inability of wage labour to fulfill its own 
promises of social emancipation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Work and Social Citizenship in South Africa: From the Racial State to 
National Liberation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The historical trajectory of wage labour and its relations to social policy in 
African colonial and postcolonial modernity surfaced in peculiar forms in the 
South African case, which have alerted scholars to the specificities related to this 
country’s processes of working-class formation. In particular, institutionalized 
racial segregation and coercive labour control, in a context of lack of political 
citizenship rights, have shaped state policies of reproduction and stabilization of 
the black working class well after the wave of decolonization that started 
sweeping the continent in the 1960s. While gradually accepting, and trying to 
control, African working class urbanization, apartheid’s labour and spatial 
policies defined social engineering interventions that deferred the establishment of 
a formally “free” wage labour system. The white minority governments’ failure in 
this regard mirror, therefore, the quandary of labour reforms in African colonial 
states as mentioned in the previous chapter. In the final analysis, the persistent 
limitations political citizenship for the majority in South Africa made it 
impossible to legitimise changes from above in workplace and wage relations.  
The dilemma of the labour and urban reforms introduced in the 1970s was 
precisely that they were not able to stem a tide of working class militancy that was 
on the verge of using its newly gained strength in the workplace to demand a 
more far-reaching political and social change. As a result of the permanence of an 
illegitimate racialised political order, wage labour was ultimately unable to 
provide the basis for a discipline based on work ethic. To this outcome also 
contributed the fact that linkages between waged work and social citizenship 
rights in South Africa have always been historically weak due to residual and 
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selective social welfare and policy models in operation also for the politically 
enfranchised white minority. Wage labour as a terrain of access to social rights 
and citizenship in South Africa was therefore constrained both by the differential 
forms of reproduction of labour along racial lines, and by commodified social 
services that eschewed universalist approaches. The conjunction of such factors 
explains a reality in which, as Trapido (1971: 313) put it, “South Africa has not 
incorporated the major part of its working class into its social and political 
institutions”, despite its significant levels of industrialization, which made the task 
far more urgent for its political elites than what it was in the rest of the continent.  
The incorporation of strata of black working class became, indeed, evident 
as a priority in the “insider” vs “outsider” policy discourse that characterized late 
apartheid reforms, but it ultimately floundered in the face of renewed black 
worker insurgency. It was precisely the resumption of working class activism and 
organization during the 1970s that placed the linkage between work and 
citizenship rights at the centre of the agenda of opposition to the racial state. The 
struggles of the resurgent black independent trade unions articulated demands 
which, faced with the limitations of the workplace as a site of contestation, were 
gradually orientated towards broad social and political change, especially once 
they connected with the social movements and township insurgencies of the 
1980s. Emerged from a strong emphasis on workplace conditions and 
improvements within the wage relation, the struggles of South Africa’s black 
working class eventually developed a discourse of citizenship based on the social 
and political rights that were expected in a future democratic society. The demand 
for social citizenship, inclusion and equality, in particular, related to wage labour 
in complex ways: on one hand wage labour was the foundation of struggles for 
social citizenship rights, on the other hand the extension of social rights required 
the transcendence of the workplace and a refusal of confining the realization of 
such rights to the wage relation. While wage labour enabled a new discourse of 
universal social citizenship rights, the exclusive reliance on struggles waged 
within the wage relation came to be seen as increasingly inadequate to attain such 
rights.  
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The linkage between wage labour and a universalist discourse of socio-
political rights proved ultimately unmanageable for an apartheid state whose 
attempts to “liberalise” labour regulation were defeated by the ultimately 
intractable contradiction produced by its lack of political legitimacy. The post-
1994 ANC government, conversely, enjoyed a massive legitimacy as the basis for 
its own policies of transition to formally “free” labour relations. The next chapter 
will deal with how the new dispensation responded to the socio-economic 
expectations raised by the black working class in the struggle against apartheid. 
This one specifically emphasizes linkages between wage labour and struggles for 
social citizenship rights, and introduces the ways in which such links are 
challenged by a transition that combines political democratization and 
macroeconomic liberalization. 
 
 
2.2 “Schooling Bodies to Hard Work”: Commodification, Work Ethic and 
Wage Labour Discipline in the Formation of a Racialised Welfare System 
 
The development of an industrial capitalist economy in South Africa was marked 
by unevenness and asymmetries that shaped the pace and dynamics of formation 
of the black waged working class, while reinforcing patterns of racial inequality in 
the access to welfare and social security. The delayed, slow and incomplete 
expansion of mass production, in particular, has been emphasized as the result of 
the constraints imposed on domestic capital formation by limited and racially 
segmented markets. Domestic demand was shaped by institutional and policy 
interventions based on racialised labour market regulations that confined black 
workers to a subordinate, poorly remunerated, socially vulnerable position. At the 
same time, a racialised system of welfare provision and urban residential rights 
largely confined redistributive policies to the white population, thereby placing 
further constraints on linkages between mass production and mass consumption 
that supported the “social contract” between the state and the industrial working 
class in mature “Fordist” experiments (Lipietz, 1987; Hall, 1988; Marglin and 
Schor, 1993). Conversely, the permanence in South Africa of a “racial”, relatively 
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undeveloped, form of Fordism (Gelb, 1991; Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) facilitated 
the resilience of modalities of production that privileged small scale, made-to-
order and “jobbing” production over the large factory (Webster, 1985; Kraak, 
1987; Black and Stanwix, 1987; Verhoef, 1998), an element that will play an 
important role in the discussion of changes in wage labour in my East Rand case 
studies. 
 In early analyses (O’Meara, 1983; Lewis, 1984), a significant process of 
African proletarianisation took place starting from the 1930s-1940s based on the 
mechanization and deskilling of production processes. Peter Alexander (2000) 
convincingly responds that the African workers’ entry in manufacturing waged 
employment was slow, uneven, limited by small capital formation and greatly 
facilitated by contingent factors like the expansion of industrial production during 
World War II. The most important avenue to African proletarianization was, 
instead, provided until the middle of the twentieth century by cheap, migrant 
labour in the mining and agricultural sectors, with particularly coercive forms of 
labour recruitment and exploitation (Legassick, 1974b; Lacey, 1981; Cruch, 
Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991). Here, social isolation hampered the development of 
trade unionism and of a discourse of rights based on wage labour.  
In this perspective, migrancy and different demands for labour by various 
capitalist sectors stratified the South African working class not only along racial 
lines, but also according to locality, juridical forms and gender. At the same time, 
this view allows to explain diversified entrepreneurial strategies, and the 
preference by most mechanized, semi-skilled manufacturing sectors for the 
stabilization of a limited portion of the African working class within the urban 
waged economy. The diversification in capitalist strategies connects at the same 
time with the important role played under “import substitution industrialization” 
(Kaplan, 1976; Nattrass, 1981; Archer, 1989) by a “paternalist” ideology 
(Bozzoli, 1985; Duncan, 1995) that, in accordance with a typical theme in the 
colonial discourse of labour reform, saw welfare policies as tools to stratify and 
divide the African population.  
In this regard, therefore, the development of social policies under successive 
forms of racial state cannot be simply defined as functional to the establishment of 
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a “racialised welfare”, entirely finalized at strengthening colour divides and 
essentially based on absolutely separate and incompatible principles for blacks 
and whites. The South African case, rather, confirms conclusions in the literature 
on “colonial welfare” discussed in Chapter 1, which emphasise how colonial 
states in Africa combined the establishment of racialised hierarchies with a 
discourse of selective and subordinate inclusion of limited strata of the subject 
populations within urban settings. Therefore, social and welfare policies acted not 
only to define racial boundaries for the access to social provisions, but they also 
defined a shifting, mobile area of subaltern inclusion within wage labour of 
portions of the colonized societies. In this sense, the development of modern 
social policies during the twentieth century updated and reformulated solutions to 
a long-standing problem facing the South African state, that of controlling the 
proletarianisation of the African population by physically and juridically binding 
it to the specific requirements of different types of production (Etherington, 1979; 
Harries, 19874). 
Despite the fact that such “portions” of African wage labour lived under 
specifically oppressive forms of political domination, denial of rights and socio-
economic exploitation, the social policy ideologies addressed to them did not 
fundamentally differ from those aimed at the white working class. The two most 
important, and interrelated, components underpinning social welfare discourse 
throughout wage labour formation in South Africa were provided by work ethic 
and commodification. The former had been identified since the earliest stages of 
capitalist development as a terrain of contestation, for example over the meaning 
of working time and the length of the working day (Atkins, 1988, 1994), or with 
regard to Africans’ attempt to resist wage labour through independent agricultural 
production (Bundy, 1988; Hemson, 1995). Commodification, instead, took the 
form of an enduring institutional aversion to state-driven redistributive policies of 
social provisions (Terreblanche, 2002). The 1932 Native Economic Commission 
(Holloway Commission) provided the most accurate systematization of the policy 
                                                
4
 Harries in particular shows how since the early development of capitalism in the Nineteenth 
century policies like the “pass laws” were not aimed at controlling the pace and of African 
proletarianisation, but they were aimed at enforcing wage labour discipline by coercively linking 
workers to specific production processes. 
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problems surrounding the reproduction of an African waged proletariat within 
differential labour processes and regimes. A mix of inducements and coercion was 
designed to bind African workers to their work, which relied heavily on moral 
discourse rather than higher wages, which could shift fluxes of labour away from 
mines and farms and towards the cities. In the words of the Commission: 
 
When the raw Native has enough for his wants he stops working and 
enjoys his leisure (…). He must learn to school his body to hard work, 
which is not only a condition for his advance in civilization, but of his 
final survival in a civilized environment” (cit. in Ashforth, 1990: 84-
85) 
 
The conjunction of work ethic and commodification, therefore, defined wage 
labour not only as a juridical and economic status, but also as a disciplinary 
mechanism at the level of psychology and morality, based on which social 
insertion depends essentially on individual industriousness and effort. At the same 
time, however, it should be emphasized that social welfare under apartheid was a 
set of policies and institutions aimed primarily, albeit not exclusively, at 
reinforcing racial hierarchies. Therefore the discourse of social insertion based on 
work ethic and commodification defined a set of social provisions that for most of 
the twentieth century privileged specifically the white population (Grundlingh, 
1999). In this sense, Alexander’s (2000) argument overestimates the potentials for 
non-racial class solidarity by underestimating the role of welfare and social 
security policies in dividing South African workers along racial lines.  
Conversely, many recent analyses have emphasized the modes of operation 
of the linkage between work ethic and commodification in the development of 
“whites only” social security policies during Segregation and Apartheid. The 
crucial role played by commodified access to social provisions underlines that the 
confinement of redistributive policies to residual and targeted interventions is a 
constant in the development of welfare and social security policies in South 
Africa. According to Hermann Giliomee (1992) “The white elite did not define 
poverty in terms of physical or economic data, but relationally – how a white 
person by virtue of being white ought to live in comparison to non-whites”. The 
early development of social welfare legislation in South Africa was addressed at 
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“poor whites”, predominantly Afrikaner, who rapidly urbanised during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century. Attempts to design policies for this group, 
continues Giliomee, were influenced by neoclassical theories advocating “free 
markets, low trade barriers and balanced budgets” (Giliomee, 1992: 615-616). As 
a result, perceptions of poverty and related policies identified by white 
governments, starting with the 1908 Transvaal Indigency Commission through 
various commissions of inquiry, remained suspicious of fiscally-funded solutions, 
and underlined instead the role of the workplace as the vehicle for social inclusion 
at “civilized” standards for whites. The social policy discourse of the racist state, 
therefore, placed a specific importance on job creation and protection of white 
employment and wages on one hand, and on compulsory education and training 
on the other (Terreblanche, 2002: 270-275; Nattrass and Seekings, 2000).  
White workers’ dependence on the state as a source of social citizenship 
based on the protection of racial status deepened after the 1922 “Rand revolt” and 
the formation of the “Pact” government as a coalition between the Labour Party 
and the National Party in 1924, to the point that, according to Margaret 
Ballinger’s liberal critique, state policies to address “poor whiteism” became in 
this period “the formative force in standardizing relationships of black and white 
in this country” (cit. in Giliomee, 1992: 630). White working class incorporation 
saw the strengthening of the role of job creation and work ethic under the Pact’s 
“civilized labour” policies and with the creation of state conglomerates ISCOR 
and ESKOM, in a new climate of industrial protectionism and import-substitution 
industrialization. The centrality of wage labour in the social citizenship discourse 
of the segregationist state translated into an accentuated legislative activism that 
saw the adoption of laws that limited trade union and collective bargaining rights 
for Africans (the 1924 Industrial Concilitation Act, passed before the “Pact”’s rise 
to power), legalized “colour bars” that limited African advancement to skilled 
trades (Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926), built a bureaucratic system to 
set African wages (Wage Act of 1925), and systematized “native reserves” and 
pass systems in the reproduction, channeling and residential control of cheap 
African labour (Native Administration Act of 1927). White working class support 
was recruited through policies that defined the juridically subordinated status of 
 60
African labour (Yudelman, 1984). According to Martin Chanock (2001: 407), 
highly regulated forms of unfree labour based on colour bars “made politically 
possible the continued dominance of market ideology in other sectors”, which 
included the limitation of state’s responsibilities in the provision of social services 
once its obligations towards the white working class were fulfilled by racially-
defined protections of white waged employment. At the same time, work ethic 
was used as a disciplining tool with regard to the African population itself, 
towards which a culturalist, pseudo-scientific discourse of colonial modernization 
was addressed, which blamed poverty on alleged agricultural “stagnation” due to 
inappropriate African farming practices (Wylie, 2001).  
Before the 1930s labour legislation was the main area of state social policy 
interventions. Social security and unemployment assistance saw a comparatively 
limited legislative production. The 1914 Workmen’s Compensation Act covered 
also African workers (Duncan, 1995: 74), and whites-only maternity benefits were 
included in the 1918 Factories Act. Between 1919 and 1946 retirement benefits 
were almost entirely based on industry-based insurance schemes, which were 
dominated by craft unions (the printing and paper scheme being the most 
prominent example) and covered a minority of the white working class itself (Van 
der Berg, 1997). State old-age pensions were introduced only in 1928 (Pollak, 
1981; Meth and Piper, 1984). 
Also with regard to housing, the early racial state did not privilege an 
approach based on decommodified social provisions (Roos, 2002), despite the 
1920 Housing Act had established a Central Housing Board (CHB) to subsidise 
white municipal housing as a response to sprawling poor whites’ slums. The 
CHB’s scope was however limited by scarce resources, therefore the aim of 
“civilizing” white living standards in urban areas came to rely more, following the 
1923 and 1927 Urban Areas Acts, on repressive policies of slum clearance aimed 
at removing blacks from low-income urban communities designated as “white”. 
Only in the 1930s, following the great depression and the continuous migration to 
the cities of poor whites with protected jobs, the provision of public housing 
became a social policy issue. State financing for new houses in subeconomic 
schemes, which replaced slum clearance policies, however, overwhelmingly 
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benefited whites and reinforced coercive black evictions and relocations (Parnell, 
1992; Duncan, 1995: 74-75).  
In the sphere of healthcare, the Public Health Act adopted in 1919 and in 
force, through various amendments, until 1977 defined a normative framework 
that combined a heavily decentralized approach (for example by delegating the 
management of hospital care to the provinces) with a markedly entrepreneurial 
and commodified definition of healthcare delivery, deferent to the requests for 
“autonomy” coming from the medical profession and charitable associations 
(Union of S.A., 1936). The role of the state was initially limited to residual, 
emergency-based interventions. State provision of healthcare for whites was 
tightly linked to wage labour and worked in an indirect way through medical 
schemes, especially in state-owned enterprises that were integral to the expansion 
and protection of white employment (Pillay, 1995: 20-44; Jeeves, 2001; Packard, 
1989: 126-158). 
The 1930s mark the beginning of a phase characterized by a more 
systematic implementation of expert knowledge in the definition of social policy 
options (Ashforth, 1990). Stimulated by the government of purportedly Keynesian 
sympathizer, Jan Smuts, social engineering and the use of scientific inquiry come 
to play a pronounced role in addressing poverty (Giliomee, 1992: 641). A 
changing socio-economic context saw first the impact of the global depression on 
“poor whites” and then industrial growth and renewed African urbanization in the 
wake of the post-1934 gold price boom and wartime manufacturing effort. Job 
creation policies in state-supported programmes of industrialization used revenues 
generated by rising mining profits and remained at the core of South Africa’s 
social policy discourse under the United Party-led “fusion” government 
(Terreblanche, 2002: 276). The need for the state to control, channel and 
“stabilize” African working class formation led, however, also to intellectual 
positions whose paternalist rhetoric (Bozzoli, 2004: 41-50) echoed that of 
“reform” in colonial welfare and labour law. Accordingly, the mobile boundaries 
of public social provisions and social insurance had to be expanded in an inclusive 
direction. The selective incorporation of strata of African urban employment was 
suggested as part of a limited “social contract” whereby wage labour discipline 
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could be rewarded with some social protection even in the absence of civil and 
political citizenship rights. Such positions were at the centre of contestations 
between sectors of the late segregationist state and powerful capitalist interests, 
and provided crucial issues on which the 1948 election was fought (Posel, 1991). 
In general, the positions of those advocating limited social protection as a 
correlate for wage labour discipline and stabilization of the African working class 
were defeated or marginalized, and solutions adopted well into the 1970s tended 
rather to reassert the commodified and residual character of South Africa’s 
racialised welfare system, while repression and bureaucratic coercion continued to 
play a central role in enforcing wage labour discipline. 
In 1934, the first Carnegie Commission of Inquiry into Poverty in South 
Africa activated, as it would do the second one in 1984, a connection between 
international discourses on the “social question” and local networks of 
knowledge, which allowed for an expansion of intellectual debates around social 
policy agendas (Bell, 2002). Inspired by the work of E.G. Malherbe, mainly 
preoccupied with “poor whiteism” as a “menace to the self-preservation and 
prestige of the white people” (cit. in Giliomee, 1992: 642), the commission’s final 
report ended up recognizing that black poverty was as acute and urgent as white 
one, even if it maintained a racialised approach in suggesting that a focus on 
improving white living standards would have benefited all South Africans. 
According to critics, the policies advocated by the Commission widened the 
chasm between whites and blacks both economically and juridically (Wilson and 
Ramphele, 1989: 145, 296). White poverty was blamed on the lack of “ambition, 
thrift, morals, industriousness, education, temperament” (Giliomee, 1992: 644), 
qualities conducive to “civilized” standards of living in a competitive economic 
environment and without which whites plunged below the level they were 
supposed to occupy in relation to the “natives”.  
The Commission’s emphasis on individual behaviour and morality was, 
however, counterbalanced by a departure from Darwinist images of poverty as 
based on the poor’s inherent defects that ruled out the possibility of social policy 
interventions. The recognition that poverty was also the product of economic 
conditions beyond the control of the individual translated into a predominant 
 63
emphasis on education and training within the state’s policy armoury (Freund, 
1992: xx), coupled with stern warnings against dangers of “dependency” on 
public expenditures depicted in pathological terms (Giliomee, 1992: 646; Iliffe, 
1987: 120-121). Therefore, the Commission’s recommendations ended up, 
through an innovative articulation of personal responsibility and upgrade of 
rightful employment and the avoidance of decommodification, in reasserting the 
centrality of wage labour and related forms of discipline in the social policy 
discourse of the South African state. Some researchers went as far as supporting a 
greater labour market competition between black and white workers, and the 
commission in general regarded racial job reservations as a temporary 
phenomenon. 
The most far-reaching conclusions of the Carnegie Commission did not 
make substantial headways in terms of policy-making during the following 
decade. Nonetheless, the approach adopted by the Report exemplifies an 
intellectual consensus which regarded labour market policies, and the extension 
and protection of wage labour for whites and, to some extent, “coloured” workers, 
as replacing policies emphasizing assistance and social security. A specialized 
bureaucracy in charge of social protection (later to become the Department of 
Welfare) was established only in 1933, tellingly under the authority of the 
Department of Labour. Conversely, this wage labour-centred approach to South 
Africa’s “social question” departed from the rising emphasis in the United 
Kingdom and across the Empire on Beveridge’s idea of “deliberate social action” 
to minimize people’s dependence on labour market changes and  
decommodification to support the unemployed (Silburn, 1995).  
The success of the South African approach, spurred by rapid economic 
growth, to protecting white employment and wages was evident in the fact that 
between 1932 and 1936, immediately before the wartime boom, industry 
employment rose by 14 per cent per annuum, with an overall unemployment rate 
of less than 3 per cent among white and “coloured” workers, and a ratio of black-
to-white workers that declined by 20% during the “Pact” and “Fusion” 
governments (Nattrass and Seekings, 2000: 7; Davies, Kaplan, Morris and 
O’Meara, 1976). At the same time education remained by far the biggest item in 
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public social expenditures, so that, as Nattrass and Seekings (2000: 9) explain, the 
main beneficiaries of the racialised, employment-based system of social 
protection were white households with a well-paid male breadwinner. Conversely, 
assistance for working mothers was non-existent, and non-education expenses 
were strictly means-tested and targeted at white workers that fell through the 
cracks of the labour market. Only between 1936 and 1937 were disability, 
blindness and child maintenance grants, limited to whites and “coloureds”, 
introduced for the first time.  
Decommodication and redistribution came, however, to occupy an important 
role in political contestation within the white establishment in the years before the 
1948 elections. A new effort to redesign the borders of state-supported social 
inclusion, in a context of accelerated industrialization and African 
proletarianization, saw the publication in September of 1943 of the report of a 
government-appointed committee on social security, under the oversight of 
Minister of Social Welfare J.H. Hofmeyr, which was evidently tributary to 
Beveridge’s terminology and themes (Seekings, 2000c, 2003a). The report 
adopted a notion of social security as protection from risk, which remained 
however largely confined to “non productive periods of life” like childhood, 
sickness, disability, temporary unemployment and retirement (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2000: 11; Union of S.A., 1944a). Therefore, the centrality of 
employment in social inclusion was confirmed. The 1943 report, however, tried to 
push the boundaries of social inclusiveness by proposing for the first time 
elements of universalism, including means-tested, non-contributory state old-age 
pensions, to be combined to a range of contributory unemployment and social 
security benefits. Urbanised Africans were largely supposed to enjoy the coverage 
of contributory social safety nets, while for the first time non-contributory social 
assistance was devised for the rural areas. In any case, benefits for Africans were 
calculated at lower rates based on assumptions on their allegedly more frugal 
needs. In this way, race was reconfigured under the guise of scientific 
measurement of cultural criteria and locational living standards. 
The ideas of the 1943 Report were subsequently rejected by a 1945 White 
Paper on Social Security in their most far-reaching parts concerning the proposed 
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comprehensive non-contributory scheme (Duncan, 1995: 79). The 1944 Pension 
Laws Amendment Act, however, covered for the first time Africans under pension 
legislation (Sagner, 2000: 535-541; Human Awareness Programme, 1984; Moller, 
1998; Rycroft, 1988), even if old-age pensions and disability grants were strictly 
means-tested, diversified according to rural and urban areas, and in 1948 they 
ended up covering little more than 200,000 Africans (Iliffe, 1987: 141). The 
scaling-down of proposal for greater social inclusion and the abandonment of 
universalism was, in the final analysis, accompanied by the alternative of 
intensified repression of black working class organizations in the final years of 
Smuts’ government, as witnessed in the suppression of the 1946 African 
mineworkers’ strike. It is quite indicative that in 1943 only 4% of all social 
assistance public expenditure was directed to Africans (Van der Berg, 1997: 487). 
In rejecting proposals for a comprehensive restructuring of the social 
security system, the government heeded widespread concerns and worries across 
the white population, including the working class, big “British” business and the 
Afrikaner middle class (Meth and Piper, 1984: 8). They tended to oppose 
increasing taxation for redistributive policies and were turning towards Afrikaner 
nationalism as a more effective representative of racial privilege. Similarly, the 
debates on the reform of unemployment insurance ended up reinforcing the white 
elite’s consensus around residual measures that forestalled universalism, 
redistribution and decommodification. A system of unemployment insurance had 
been established under the 1937 Unemployment Benefits Act which, covering 
only 88,000 workers and a tiny fraction of high-income Africans, was largely a 
measure against cyclical unemployment (Meth and Piper, 1984). A new 
Unemployment Insurance Act was passed in 1946 as a further product of the 
short-lived reformist impetus brought by the 1943 commission of inquiry. The 
new act, like the old, specifically excluded mineworkers not to jeopardize the 
migrant labour system and to prevent escapes of African labour from the mines to 
the cities (Duncan, 1995: 79). The act, however, covered all permanent urban 
employees, including Africans for which income limits were abolished, reflecting 
the adoption of an “urban stabilization” and expansion of residential rights 
approach in the 1944 report of the Fagan Commission. Even if mineworkers and 
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farmworkers were excluded from the act, white mining and agriculture opposed it 
precisely due to their hostility to the expansion of an African urban labour market 
endowed with basic protections 
Opposition to the act, and to the inclusion of Africans, by white 
constituencies provided one of the most divisive issues during the 1948 election 
campaign. As Meth and Piper (1984) show, white opposition to the act was 
largely voiced in rhetorical arguments that praised work ethic, individual 
responsibility and reduced dependency. These arguments were enabled by the 
employment-based model centred around wage labour that had until then 
characterized South African state discourse of social inclusion. In this sense, J.G. 
Strijdom could quite indicatively argue: 
 
Is it not a fact that natives only work to supply their immediate wants, 
and if you grant them old age benefits and other benefits you would 
only make them lazy? (…) They only work when starvation stares 
them in the face (…). There are a large number of Europeans to 
whom that applies as well (cit. in Meth and Piper, 1984: 9; my 
emphasis). 
 
The suspension of the Act in 1947 preluded to its rewriting by the NP government 
in 1949 in a way that excluded low-wage Africans, putting an end to the late 1940s 
debates on social security reforms. A further, important setback for redistributive, 
partially decommodified forms of social provision took finally place in the sphere 
of health policy. The 1936 Collie Committee (Union of S.A., 1936) had identified 
substantial opposition to a state-funded national healthcare system from employers 
-- which were not against national health insurance per se, but did not want it to be 
fiscally-funded -- the medical profession and private charities -- which wanted to 
retain their autonomy against bureaucratic interference -- and also many white 
workers covered by company medical schemes. The committee had however 
recommended the introduction of a national health insurance system in urban 
areas. The government eventually decided against implementing the committee’s 
recommendations based on their alleged unaffordability (Pillay, 1995: 69-71). A 
new National Health Services Commission was however appointed in 1942 and 
chaired by Henry Gluckman, to investigate the introduction of a national health 
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system in the context of escalating health costs and growing working class support, 
in the context of wartime industrialization, for publicly funded healthcare. African 
trade unions, the African National Congress and the Communist Party were 
particularly vociferous in advocating this kind of policy change (Pillay, 1995: 83-
84; De Beer, 1986: 15-30; Van Rensburg, 2004). The 1945 report of the Gluckman 
Commission tried to define health as a social right provided by the state through a 
centralized system that reduced provincial autonomy. It also proposed a national 
health system financed through tax revenues from employers and employees, with 
a particular emphasis on primary over curative healthcare (Union of S.A., 1944b). 
Once again, however, Smuts refused to implement the Commission’s 
recommendations on grounds of financial unviability and to avoid “differences and 
divisions” (cit. in Pillay, 1995: 77) in his own imperiled political constituency, 
especially mining and agricultural capital, opposed to fiscally funded social 
security schemes. 
The failure of the two most important attempts to introduce elements of 
decommodification and universalism in South Africa’s social welfare system 
during the late 1940s reforms, the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Gluckman 
Commission report, contributed to entrench a policy paradigm centred around 
wage labour discipline and commodification. On the other hand, such a paradigm 
had already been conducive to establishing a discourse of work ethic and 
individual responsibility which was highly functional to ideologies and practices of 
racial discrimination and domination that were profoundly rooted in the sphere of 
work and production. Centering the social policy discourse on the workplace and 
its related racialised privileges was part of a consensus that was ultimately averse 
to universalism, redistribution and decommodification.  
 
2.3 Apartheid Social Engineering and the Coercive Enforcement of Wage 
Labour Discipline  
 
According to Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings (2000), apartheid’s 
“distributional regime” strengthened a South African welfare system where 
“labour market policies were especially important”. In particular, labour 
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regulations and employment-based social provisions retained a crucial role in 
enforcing racially segregated and geographically differentiated access to 
entitlements. State intervention in industrialization and job creation (Nattrass, 
1990 and 1993) and the systematic use of expert knowledge in conceptualizing the 
country’s social issues (Ashforth, 1990) continued to play a decisive role within a 
muted policy environment where incorporationist approaches of the previous 
decade were replaced by an “overtly racialised mode of social engineering” 
(Posel, 2004: 3). In this sense, also the expansion of public expenditure for the 
Africans, notable from the end of the 1940s, and schemes of “betterment” for non-
white residential urban and rural areas were primarily aimed at stabilizing racially 
segregated labour markets, reducing the monetary costs for the reproduction of 
black labour, and denying citizenship rights for the majority.  
The policy priorities of the racial state were no longer related to “poor 
whiteism” as a social question to be addressed through the creation of waged 
employment. Rather the main problem facing social policy became that of a 
mounting African proletarianisation that was partly produced by industrial 
expansion but that to a large extent reflected the collapse of the economic and 
social systems of the rural “bantustans”. Migration to the cities reflected 
grassroots strategies of escape from socio-economic decay and political 
authoritarianism in the countryside, which was particularly pronounced in the 
illegal flow towards the urban areas of  women opposed to patriarchal domination 
and deemed “undesirable” by urban state bureaucracies (Bonner, 1990; Bozzoli, 
1991). Proletarianisation was therefore also intended as a resistance strategy, and 
it became increasingly uncontrollable by employment bureaucracies when it 
started to politicize during escalating urban protests in the 1950s (Marks and 
Trapido, 1987; Wells, 1993). Apartheid social planning displayed a combination 
of increasing repression and pragmatic adaptation whereby the control and 
stabilization of African urbanization, and targeted social services, tended to 
become centerpieces of social policy (Bonner, Delius and Posel, 1993; Robinson, 
1996). Conversely, given that white workers had by then their labour market 
position protected by wage segregation and skills and education privileges, state-
based social provisions became increasingly residual and access was further 
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commodified (Nattrass and Seekings, 2000: 4). As a result, the role of means-
tested social assistance for the long-term unemployed and the elderly, and of 
private provision of medical aid and retirement benefits were reinforced, while 
racially segregated unemployment insurance saw a gradual reduction in the state’s 
funding responsibilities. For example, between 1949 and 1981, state contributions 
to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) were reduced from 50% to 7% (Meth 
and Piper, 1984: 27). 
 Early apartheid social welfare policy foreclosed the limited spaces of 
debate opened during  wartime industrial expansion and rising bargaining power 
for the working class, both black and white. The choice of repressing popular 
organisations, already witnessed in the occasion of the 1946 miners’ strike, was 
extended to the totality of the country’s political space after the passage of the 
1950 Suppression of Communism Act. Repression, at the same time, emphasized 
how proletarianisation and the imposition of wage labour discipline were not 
accepted as natural and objective processes by the African working class. They 
were rather actively contested and resisted through claims around wages, working 
conditions, fairness and respect that were economically fed by the collapse of 
subsistence economy in the “reserves”, as noticed in 1943 by the state-appointed 
Lansdowne Commission (Terreblanche, 2002: 277). They also drew inspiration 
from a “moral economy” (Moodie, 1946) of migrancy that reacted to the decay of 
living conditions in the urban workplaces and in the rural reserves. Rather than 
reproducing the forms of consciousness conceptualized by the policy discourse of 
the racial state -- namely a “modernized” urban proletariat schooled in the ethics 
of waged work vis-à-vis ruralised migrant workers reproduced through pre-
capitalist networks -- African migrancy mobilized a sense of unfairness, injustice 
and outrage to shape resistance and  claims for improved quality of living and 
citizenship rights within urban politics (Beinart, 1987). 
Apartheid’s industrial relations legislation was similarly inspired by the aim 
of containing and repressing the working class militancy. The 1953 Industrial 
Conciliation Act and its 1956 amendment had excluded Africans from the 
definition of “employees”, thereby preventing them from belonging to registered 
unions entitled to collective bargaining rights (Davies, 1978; Lewis, 1981; 
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Lichtenstein, 2004). White unions, on the other hand, relied on collective 
bargaining to strengthen job reservations and prevent Africans’ advancement into 
skilled jobs (Webster, 1985). Finally, a 1952 amendment to the 1945 Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act had systematized the mechanism of ‘influx control’ and the 
division of the urban population between permanent residents and ‘migrants’, 
employed on the basis of fixed-term contracts  through ‘labour bureaux’ and 
threatened with deportation in the event of job loss (Hindson, 1987). The 
promotion of whites in high-wage jobs responded to demands from working-class 
constitutencies, while the system of job and wage discrimination met mining and 
industrial capital’s requirements for cheap African labour. 
Simultaneously, the first significant social policy measure of the new 
government was to exclude, with no parliamentary opposition from the United 
Party earlier in power, Africans from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) 
reformed under the 1946 Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA). The move was, 
once again, couched in an anti-welfarist rhetoric that stigmatized the dangers of 
Africans’ “dependence” on the UIF which, on account of their assumed 
“idleness”, could allegedly weaken work ethic and discipline and therefore lead 
counterproductively to increased unemployment (Meth and Piper, 1984: 17). 
Section 2 of the 1949 Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act excluded from 
benefits all Africans earning less than £15.00 per month, thereby de facto the vast 
majority of them. In fact, while 140,000 Africans claimed unemployment 
insurance before the 1949 amendment, their number dropped to 1,400 afterwards. 
In 1956 the minimum wage to claim benefits was raised to £278 per year, while 
average African wages were £150.47. Only in 1967 did average African wages 
reach the UIF eligibility threshold (Nattrass and Seekings, 2000: 15). As an 
indication of the success in racialising unemployment insurance, while in 1952 
“coloured” and Indian workers claimed more than twice the amount of 
unemployment benefits claimed by whites, by 1954 these latter claimed 60% of 
all benefits (Meth and Piper, 1984: 19). This result was achieved by placing non-
white workers in income groups I to III (the lowest), for which benefits could be 
claimed only in the absence of “suitable alternative employment”, which included 
domestic work, farms and mines, still not covered by the UIA.  
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At the same time, black exclusion from the UIF was paralleled by the 
expansion in the range of payable benefits, which came to include illness lasting 
more than four weeks in 1952, 12 weeks maternity benefits in 1954, and death 
benefits in 1957. As a consequence of the reduction in state contributions, 
however, overall payments exceeded contributions from 1957 to 1981, and the 
benefits-to-contributions ratios steadily declined to the point that by 1980 
claimable illness and maternity benefits were only about a quarter of total 
contributions (Meth and Piper, 1984: 32; Cooper, 1984). The expansion in the 
range of benefits therefore accentuated the largely residual characteristics of the 
unemployment insurance system. According to the Department of Labour, by the 
early 1980s only 0.3% of the subsistence of the unemployed was contributed by 
the UIF. A further contributing factor in the financial crisis of the UIF was later 
given by the establishment of separate funds in the “independent” TBVC 
(Transkei, Boputhatswana, Ciskei and Venda) states, whose unemployment 
insurance funds were funded with contributions almost entirely paid in South 
Africa.  
Similarly, unequal access to state old-age pensions paid to whites and 
Africans widened until the 1970s (Rycroft, 1988), when the maximum value of 
African pensions was approximately 13% that of white ones (for Indians and 
“Coloureds” it was 41% and 47% respectively). In 1958, 60% of all old-age 
pension recipients were Africans, but they received only 19% of the benefits paid 
(Van der Berg, 1997). Moreover, the 1956 Pensions Act, which for the first time 
regulated the private pension funds industry, specifically excluded low-skill, 
mainly black, workers (Van der Berg, 1997: 486). On the other hand, African 
workers were excluded from pension funds also by eligibility requirements in the 
funds’ rules, which prevented membership to contract workers, migrants and 
hourly and weekly paid employees (Human Awareness Programme, 1984). 
Imbalances in the system of retirement benefits are evident in the fact that, by 
1987, unemployed workers depended mainly on state social pensions, including 
maintenance grants, which reached 15% of the economically active population, 
much more than recipients of retirement benefits. These latter, however, were far 
more generous than the former; in fact their amount was 3% of the GDP 
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compared to 1% for social pensions, and they were spread among fewer 
beneficiaries since they reached only one third of the number of social pensions 
recipients (Kruger, 1992: 30). 
The National Party government ultimately chose, as seen with regard to the 
UIF and confirming previously existing policies, to protect the social status of its 
white working class constituencies by defending their employment-related racially 
privileged status, rather than by expanding redistribution and decommodication 
through public expenditures. This contradicts arguments (Seekings, 2003a; Posel, 
2004) that this period saw an expansion of “welfarism”. On the contrary, the 
apartheid state stimulated private entrepreneurship and commodication in crucial 
areas of social provision. The decline in illness benefits paid under the UIF, for 
example, was compensated by the impulse given to private medical schemes. The 
Friendly Societies Act No. 25 of 1956 defined a national system for the 
registration and regulation of products offered by private medical schemes, which 
proliferated also due to employers’ and practitioners’ refusal to amalgamate 
existing schemes. By 1960, 169 schemes covered approximately 370,000 
members with 590,000 dependants, and “all whites in South Africa had shifted 
away from the free services provided by the government” (Masobe and Van den 
Heever, 2002: 8; Rama and McLeod, 2001). These latter were greatly 
impoverished in terms of resources, focused predominantly on primary care, and 
catered for the needs of about 95% of the non-white population (Seedat, 1984; 
Kelly, 1990; Baldwin-Ragaven, De Gruchy and London: 17-49)5. Conversely, in 
1986, only 3.6% of members of private schemes were Africans (Price and 
Tshazibane, 1989).  
The government’s commitment to the privatization of healthcare services, 
which absorbed increasing portions of the country’s health expenditures, was 
ultimately confirmed by its rejection of the recommendations from the 1962 
Snyman Commission, which as a solution to escalating costs had proposed the 
creation of a state-subsidized national medical scheme (Pillay, 1995: 157-158). 
The Health Act No.63 of 1977 reinforced rejected once again the idea of publicly-
                                                
5
 For example, public healthcare expenditure was reduced by 19.6% between 1950 and 1955 
(Pillay, 1995: 120). 
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funded national healthcare, while reinforcing racially segregated healthcare 
provision by largely confining public intervention to primary and preventative 
healthcare (De Beer, Myrdal, Thompson and Zwi, 1983; Pillay, 1995: 170-180). A 
parallel area of increase in public healthcare expenditures were the African 
“homelands”, as part of policies to reinforce spatial segregation and 
counterbalance black urbanization. 
It was to urban planning and housing policy that the apartheid state turned in 
designing policies where social provisions and amenities were specifically linked 
to strategies of social control, labour market stratification and continuous 
imposition of wage discipline. The period of “separate development” was in fact 
accompanied by extensive socio-spatial engineering both in the forms of 
consolidation of segregated rural “bantustans”, which absorbed an increasing 
share of public spending for the African population (Van der Berg, 1997), and as 
restructuring of African urban spaces through the forced movement of populations 
and the construction of new “model township”. These latter were aimed at 
accommodating the expanding African labour contingents that fell inside reshaped 
boundaries of inclusion within urban wage labour (Morris, 1982). In the case of 
the East Rand, examined more closely in Chapter 4, this process led to the 
removal of historic townships like Dukathole (Germiston) and to the 
establishment of KwaThema, Thokoza and Tsakane at the end of the 1950s. The 
role of new urban developments in linking residents to waged employment was 
evident in the ways in which the state considered them, in Hendrik Verwoerd’s 
words, “European-owned property” where “natives” were allowed to live “just 
like labourers on a farm” (cit. in Legassick 1974b: 20). At the same time, the 
policy stressed that it was the employer’s, not the state’s, responsibility to provide 
for the needs of their employees, since using public expenditures to that end 
would have lowered African wages to the point that “too many bantus” would be 
employed (cit. in Legassick, 1974b: 21).  
The “upgraded” African rural areas became the destination, on the other 
hand, of massive deportations of “surplus people” (Platzky and Walker, 1985) 
falling outside the boundaries of subordinate urban inclusion. The socio-economic 
development of the homelands was one of the priorities indicated in the 1956 
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recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, which articulated the 
intellectual discourse of separate development. Forced removals from “white” 
urban areas were greatly facilitated by the 1964 Black Labour Act, which 
punished with deportation also permanent urban residents that refused waged 
employment (Terreblanche, 2002: 322). Besides, under newly introduced 
“administration boards”, some African “homelands” came to incorporate sections 
of urban townships, where new housing developments were encouraged, giving 
migrancy a daily “commuting” meaning that further eroded urban residential 
rights.  
 The relevance of spatial restructuring in relation to social stratification, 
social provisions and wage labour discipline has been in the past at the centre of 
important scholarly debates. Early structuralist positions had explained the impact 
of the system essentially in decoupling production and reproduction, delegating 
the absorption of this latter’s costs to rural economies in the “homelands” and 
allowing therefore a constant flux of “black cheap labour” (Wolpe, 1972; 
Legassick, 1974a). Doug Hindson (1987) rejected this view and argued that 
“influx control” under apartheid was mainly focused on segmenting the urban 
population and limit urban residence entitlements for Africans, rather than on 
shifting costs of reproduction to rural reserves that were by and large in a state of 
economic decay. 
 As Deborah Posel (1983; 1991: 17) indicated, such views obscure the 
extent to which “influx control” was shaped by contestation and worker strategies 
from below, especially related to the refusal of low-wage work by permanently 
urbanized Africans that preferred informal entrepreneurship. A useful 
reassessment of this debate has been recently advanced by Yann Moulier-Boutang 
(1998: 640-644). Emphasizing the state’s need to control workers’ autonomous 
practices, he convincingly argues that Hindson’s “split labour” theory explains the 
effects of “influx control” policies but not their rationale. Such policies were in 
fact respondent to the state’s need to control the escape of workers from highly 
coercive employment in the mines and agriculture towards occupations in the 
cities. In this way, influx control segmented African workers’ rights and social 
provisions by strictly binding them to institutionally segmented labour markets 
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expressions of three coexisting forms of labour control: urban wage labour, semi-
servile employment in mines and agriculture, and “subsistence” economy in the 
“homelands”. At the same time, the existence of the latter two labour markets 
exercised downward pressures on urban wages. Migrant labour kept urban wages 
down not by shifting reproduction costs to the “homelands” but by creating non-
urban labour forces of juridically inferior status and deprived of contractual rights. 
Therefore, rather than being a mechanism to “protect” African urban wages, 
influx control served to generalize African social vulnerability and insecurity 
while strictly tying the enjoyment of limited social provisions to individual 
positions in the labour market. In this sense, by increasing Africans’ labour 
market dependence to access social services, influx control imposed on blacks the 
logic of commodification that privatization and employment protections had 
established for whites. 
Relationships between racialised spatial engineering, social provisions and 
wage labour were redefined in the 1970s-1980s in a context of political and 
economic crisis, renewed worker militancy and perceived shortage of African 
labour in skilled urban manufacturing occupations. Late apartheid urban planning 
was in particular aimed at the promotion of layers of black middle class and 
entrepreneurship while enhancing the residential rights and ownership opportunity 
of the urbanized black working class. The 1977 report of the Riekert commission 
reflected a redefinition of the mechanisms of labour control in the direction of 
increasing regulation by “market forces”, in relation to which the role of the state 
became that of “intervention” rather than direct management of socio-economic 
change (Ashforth, 1990: 205). A new discourse of class differences created by 
economic forces tended to replace that of institutionalized racial hierarchies. As a 
consequence, a new urban policy was advocated which, by linking more closely 
housing to employment, was aimed at restructuring labour control by separating 
urban “insiders” with residential rights from “outsiders”. In this way, the state 
exempted itself from the task of directly regulating fluxes of people but defined its 
role as the codification of “objective”, market-determined relations between 
individuals’ production and reproduction, jobs and houses, wage labour and social 
rights (Ashforth, 1990: 212; Hindson and Lacey, 1983). The strategy of “orderly 
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urbanization” adopted in 1985 by the Department of Constitutional Development 
endorsed this approach based on market regulation of a fully commodified link 
between employment and housing. Indeed, it deepened it by rejecting a strict 
institutional dualism between “insiders” and “outsiders” to advocate a large scale 
privatization and “recommodification” (Mabin and Parnell, 1984) of public 
housing to bolster African ownership in urban areas, including “affordable” 
working class low-income housing at substantially lowered construction standards 
(Cobbett, 1986).  
After 1979, moreover, formerly segregated home loans and land purchase 
subsidies obtainable through the National Housing Commission at sub-economic 
rates became available also for the African population (Kruger, 1992: 10). The 
policy was publicized as a strengthening of individual initiative, self-help and 
responsibility as pillars of a new ethics of ownership expressed in the 1982 report 
of the state-appointed Viljoen Committee (Wilkinson, 1983; Tomlinson, 1990: 
86-90). Crucial was to this end the mobilization of residents’ savings and capital 
to acquire home ownership and pay at market rates for services and utilities run by 
newly appointed Regional Services Councils with extremely limited cross-
subsidization. At the same time, the renewed role of the market in stratifying 
urban populations replaced the old bureaucratized rural-urban divide and pushed 
residents unable to pay for housing bonds and services towards informal 
settlements at the outskirts of cities (Jochelson, 1990; Hendler, Mabin and Parnell, 
1986; Hendler, 1986). 
The trajectory of social policy reforms devised by the late apartheid state, 
therefore, left to the market the task of determining social differentiations along 
class, not only racial, lines. It therefore tended to converge, eventually, around the 
largely privatized, heavily commodified system of social protection applied to 
white South Africa, but with greatly reduced resources for a deeply impoverished 
black majority. This trajectory left important legacies and continuities in the social 
citizenship arrangement and discourse of the post-apartheid state, as discussed, 
respectively, in the next chapter and Chapter 8. It also became during the second 
half of the 1980s the target of renewed opposition by an organized African 
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working class that started to place social citizenship and decommodification at the 
top of its agenda. 
 
 
2.4 The Black Labour Movement and the Re-emergence of Social Citizenship 
Discourse 
 
The resumption of black working class’ struggles and organizing after the 1973 
“Durban strikes” started a process of unionization that over the following two 
decades saw highly localized labour organizations with a strong orientation to the 
workplace and wage-related issues develop into a national movement with a deep-
seated presence at the level of urban communities, a crucial influence on national 
liberation politics and programmes and visions combining the demand for 
political democracy with expectations for fundamental socio-economic change 
and social citizenship rights. In the process, wage labour was transcended as a 
terrain of claims and as a repository of collective identities, and aspirations for 
radical redistribution and decommodification emerged. 
Worker insurgency in the 1970s took place against a background of 
profound socio-economic and political crisis for the apartheid regime. The model 
of import-substitution industrialization had made the economy dependent on 
capital-intensive production and imported technology, while local manufacturing 
was lagging behind in terms both of capital formation and availability of skilled, 
especially black, labour. In a context of declining revenues from the export of 
mineral commodities, a development model heavily geared towards the “mineral-
energy complex” (Fine and Rustomjee, 2000; Bond, 1999) became increasingly 
unstable, while the patterns of consumption proper to “racial Fordism” 
constrained economies of scale needed for local manufacturing investment. To 
address industrialists’ demands for black skilled employment (Lipton, 1986) the 
regime embarked in attempts at deracialisation that were not limited to urban 
residential space, but started looking at the workplace and industrial relations as 
well. New openings in the system of workplace recognition and collective 
bargaining combined with rising militancy connected to declining urban living 
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conditions to provide the re-emerging union movement with a new sense of power 
and possibilities (Friedman, 1987).  
A central role in the rebirth of an independent, democratic union movement 
was played by the organization of migrant workers. Their historical experience 
with urbanization and industrialization was ridden with ambiguities and layered 
discourses, where wage labour came to assume multiple, uneasily coexisting 
meanings (Van Onselen, 1976; Sitas, 1983; Webster, 1985; Moodie, 1994). On 
one hand the waged condition in urban manufacturing had meant an alternative to 
despotic forms of labour control on the mines or in the farms, and to decay and 
impoverishment in the rural “homelands”. Urbanization, industrialization and 
wage labour came to embody an emancipatory promise linked to better income, 
more decent working conditions, larger rewards for hard work. On the other hand, 
however, the process often also proved to be a highly alienating and 
disempowering experience, subject to precarious and unstable forms of contract 
employment, managerial authoritarianism, racism in the workplace and hostility 
by local township residents judged as morally lax and corrupt. Such contradictions 
were often experienced in terms of violation of a moral economy of the 
community, nurtured in discourses of fairness, reciprocity and respect for gender 
and age authority, which retained strong rural undertones. Comaroff and 
Comaroff’s (1987) analyse narratives of alienation among Tswana migrants, “a 
black South African people drawn into the labour market and made to eke out an 
existence out of a combination of small farming and wage work”. They 
persuasively show that workers’ sense of social antagonism was shaped not so 
much by exploitation and oppression within the wage relations, but by the very 
experience of wage labor, seen as reducing and impoverishing the richness of 
meanings attached to human activity. In terms reminiscent of Hannah Arendt’s 
(1958, 1998) classical conceptualization of the subject, they conclude: 
 
Migrants soon produced a sardonic commentary on the lesson of free 
labour. This, as we might expect, was less a narrative of dispossession 
than a symbolic elaboration of the contrast between work and labour. 
For, as Alverson was to observe in Botswana, “wage labour violates 
the very definition of ‘doing’” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1987: 200). 
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Unionising migrant workers was therefore neither an obvious nor a spontaneous 
outcome. It rather required for the unions to assert themselves, through a 
prolonged organizational work in segregated compounds, as the carriers and the 
repositories of an moral economy discourse in alternnative to that embodied by 
authorities rooted in age and ethnicity (Keenan, 1980; Sitas, 1983). 
At the same time, the complexity in forms of consciousness, identity and 
meanings of wage labour articulated inside the new trade union movement sat 
increasingly uncomfortably with the policy discourse of the late apartheid regime. 
This latter tended in fact to make wage labour the main criteria of discrimination 
in the access to social provisions and residence-based rights, within a socio-
political context that was increasingly market-regulated and commodified, but in 
the absence of political democracy. In this sense, South Africa experienced with 
considerable delay the dilemmas that, according to Cooper (1996), affected the 
late colonial state in Africa, namely the ultimate impossibility to introduce 
elements of “free”, contractual labour regulation to sustain wage-based ethics and 
identities in an illegitimate authoritarian context that continued to deny citizenship 
rights for the majority. 
Such contradictions became particularly apparent in the outcomes of the 
reform of the industrial relations system spurred by the publication, in 1979, of 
the report of the Wiehahn Commission, with which the regime had tried to devise 
a not merely repressive response to the spreading of black trade union organizing. 
The report recommended the admission of African trade unions to “registration” 
and to the enjoyment of collective bargaining rights within industry-wide 
institutions and at the workplace level. Echoing a language used in the Riekert 
report, Wiehahn explicitly called for a “free labour” system, or a system of labour 
relations attuned to the requirements of “free enterprise”, and could therefore 
depart from a racialised logic of bureaucratic labour control (Ashforth, 1990: 217-
231). As Ashforth notices, the fundamental weakness of the report resided in the 
fact that in order to advance “freedom” in the industrial relations sphere, this latter 
had to be depoliticised and insulated from a social environment characterized by 
the permanence of racial discrimination presided over by an undemocratic 
political system. Therefore, the aim of expanding “industrial citizenship” was 
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“limited within the broader political strategy of outright political repression, 
influx control and the migrant labour system” (Roux, 1981: 40). The independent 
trade unions, mainly the ones with a strong workplace orientation like those 
organized by the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), 
innovatively related to the openings provided by Wiehahn-inspired legislation and 
used legal recognitions and institutional presence as protections to strengthen 
organizations on the shopfloor (Friedman, 1987). To do so, the unions primarily 
exploited loopholes in a “free labour” discourse whose ultimate inability to tame 
union militancy resided in a construction of universal worker rights in the absence 
of a universalist citizenship arrangement. In the final analysis, the contradiction 
between access to equal citizenship in the workplace and lack of citizenship in the 
broader society opened up a debate inside the union movement, in which the 
workplace and the wage relationship themselves came to be seen as increasingly 
inadequate vehicles for full access to social and political citizenship rights. The 
outcome of such debates saw a strategic reorientation in the union movement from 
a predominant emphasis on production-related issues towards struggles concerned 
with reproduction, social provisions, community services, and political liberation. 
The fact that wage labour ultimately enabled this reorientation did not prevent the 
rise of opinions that became increasingly critical of wage labour as the main focus 
of organization and demands.  
The need to “transcend” wage labour for broader engagements at a political, 
community and reproduction level was at the heart of debates during the 1980s 
between “workerists”, mainly identified with the FOSATU tradition of workplace 
unionism, and “populists”, largely represented by a new generation of union 
organizations that underlined the relevance of community struggles and came 
largely to support the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) after it was 
launched in 1983 (Baskin, 1991: 91-108; Seekings, 2000a; Van Kessel 2001). 
While the workerists emphasized organizational independence from political 
forces over political radicalism, the populists tended to invert this order of 
priorities. The workerist-populist polarization was ultimately superseded, as 
Baskin argues, with the birth in 1985 of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) as the representative of an organizational-ideological middle 
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ground (Bendix and Verster, 1986) which combined a strong orientation to the 
workplace, a priority on the idea of worker-controlled unions and the adoption, in 
1987, of the political programme of the ANC-led national liberation movement. It 
is however to be noticed that before being resolved by new organized structures, 
the dilemmas surrounding relations between the workplace and the broader 
society were transcended on the ground, by the involvement of black trade unions 
in the 1980s township uprisings, which led the leadership of many “workerist” 
unions to support struggles for social services and decommodified social rights. 
 On the other hand, trade unions from the “workerist” tradition were 
definitely not insensitive to issues regarding reproduction, welfare and social 
citizenship. In a context were demands for higher wages were the most immediate 
response to the collapse of workers’ living standards, access to funeral benefits, 
medical aids and retirement benefits had still been identified as priorities already by 
the “wage commissions” that helped organizing independent unions in the early 
1970s6. An inquiry conducted among members of the Metal and Allied Workers’ 
Union (MAWU) in 1975 revealed that the need for unemployment protections, apart 
from higher wages, was one of the main reasons for workers to join7. At the same 
time, the organization of unemployed workers was identified as an early priority by 
“workerist” shopfloor-orientated unions8. Finally, participation in industrial councils 
provided by the 1981 Labour Relations Act was used by some unions to gain 
representation in the boards of industrial pension funds, which allowed them to 
demand investment for housing and social services9. FOSATU unions’ response to 
Wiehahn revealed, ultimately, a deep awareness of the residual and commodified 
nature of social security, and of its role in enforcing wage labour discipline rather 
than minimizing labour market dependence: 
                                                
6
 Isisebenzi, No.3, July 1974, Wits DHP, FOSATU, C.3.19.1.2.3. On the other hand the General 
Factory Workers Benefit Fund, one of the service organisations that helped the first trade unions, 
was required to be registered as a “friendly society” administering funeral schemes under the 1956 
act, while the emerging unions wanted to run benefits themselves ibidem and Secretariat Report to 
the second TUACC Council Meeting, 1 December 1974, Wits DHP, FOSATU Files, B.4.2. In fact, 
trade unions were careful to avoid an image of themselves as benefit societies, while recognising 
the importance of the issue for their members, see TUACC Secretariat Meeting, 31 January 1977, 
Wits DHP, FOSATU, B.4.4. 
7  Isisebenzi, No.2, 1975, Wits DHP, FOSATU, C.3.19.1.2.3. 
8
 Minutes of the Special TUACC Secretariat Meeting, 21 November 1977, Wits DHP, FOSATU, 
B.4.4. 
9
 Umbiko we MAWU, March 1985. 
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[The UIF] is calculated, not to relieve pressure on unemployed Africans, 
but by its malfunctioning, precisely to maintain the pressure in order to 
maintain a vast reserve labour pool. Therefore they will be obliged to 
accept any job at all, no matter how low the wage. the UIF Act, as it 
now operates is part and parcel of the low wages forced labour system 
peculiar to Africans in South Africa10. 
 
At the end of the 1970s, however, the factory and the wage relation, remained for 
the FOSATU unions the main terrain to improve the socio-economic conditions of 
black workers, while community struggles were regarded mainly in a supportive 
role. This was the case, for example, of company boycotts called by “general 
unions” in the Cape Town area that did not find a place in the system of industry-
based collective bargaining devised by Wiehahn, which they rejected.  
The rise of a new group of organisations as part of what became known as 
“community unionism” (Lambert, 1983; Webster, 1987) underlined linkages 
between struggles in the sphere of production and reproduction, in ways that often 
determined conflicts with FOSATU unions. The 1979 strike at Ford in Port 
Elizabeth saw FOSATU affiliate United Automobile Workers Union (UAW) 
engaged in a struggle sparked by the dismissal of a member and local community 
activist. Ford black workers, relatively more educated, stabilised and with a strong 
presence in white collar occupations, saw the community as a natural extension of 
workplace struggles. The response by the UAW leadership, which was influenced 
by a predominantly “coloured” registered FOSATU union, NUMARWOSA, 
rejected community-based alliances fearing that the  union’s internal democracy 
and accountability could be weakened by the more informal and personalised 
mode of organising in “civics” (Southall, 1985). The result was a split in the 
UAW and the beginning of a “community unionism” tradition that shaped union 
struggles throughout the 1980s. 
In East London, new unions acted to a significant extent as community 
organisations, structuring demands and claims of broader communities outside the 
workplace. The birth and rapid growth of the South African and Allied Workers 
                                                
10 Chemical Workers Industrial Union et al., Memorandum Submitted to the Commission of 
Enquiry into Labour Appointed in Terms of General Notice 445 of 1977 in Government Gazette 
5651 of 8th July 1977, p.5, Wits DHP, FOSATU, B.13.2. 
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Union (SAAWU) in the early 1980s took place in a context of intensified 
repression, also organised by the autocratic “homeland” regime in Ciskei, in a 
context of weak union traditions and lack of community organisations. SAAWU’s 
role as a community organisation, and not only as a union mobilising 
communities around workplace struggles, was combined to a priority placed on  
struggles over decommodification and access to social services. As SAAWU put 
it 
 
Transport, rents to be paid, are also worker issues. I see SAAWU as a 
trade union: there's no doubt about it. The problems of the work-place 
go outside the work-place. If you are underpaid it goes at home or the 
community. (cit. in Maree, 1982: 38) 
 
SAAWU’s programme openly advocated “national liberation”, opposed the pass 
laws and challenged  apartheid’s “separate development” and the “homelands” 
system. The union was, consequently, active in organising boycotts of transport 
and services at community level (Swilling, 1984a). It also tried to ground its 
demands, however, in a class-based view of South African society, which tended 
to identify black business owners, for example, as part of the “exploiters” (Davies, 
O’Meara and Dlamini, 1982: 338-339). A strong workplace orientation was 
combined with the organisational relevance of community meetings to provide, as 
SAAWU’s general secretary put it, “magnetism” to the organisation and to 
express a view of the worker as member of the community (Bonnin, Hamilton, 
Morrell and Sitas, 1996: 157-58) which became quite influential during the 1980s. 
It was largely under the impulse of “community unions” operating in the 
Eastern Cape that issues of social security and struggles over reproduction 
translated into active mobilisation across the independent trade unions’ spectrum. 
Such was the case of the 1981 “pension strikes” (Roux, 1981), where FOSATU 
became involved only in specific localities and following the initiative of the 
“community unions” (FOSATU, 1981). The strike was motivated by the 1980 
report of the state-appointed Louw Committee that recommended the 
“compulsory preservation” of pension rights, which meant the prohibition to 
withdraw employees’ contributions at the termination of a relation of 
employment. From the government’s perspective, the move represented an 
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attempt to modernise social security, to stabilise urban African employment and to 
tie social benefits to the length of service. In fact, by the end of the 1970s the vast 
majority of African workers were excluded from company pension schemes due 
to restrictions on contract workers, migrants, hourly and weekly employees. 
Moreover, African workers received approximately one third of the retirement 
benefits accruing to white workers (Friedman, 1987: 255-257; MacShane, Plaut 
and Ward, 1984: 61-62). Finally, 82% of private schemes which admitted 
Africans allowed for the payment of pensions in lump sums at the termination of 
employment, as opposed to their “preservation” for retirement. The possibility to 
withdraw benefits, conversely, provided an important asset to face unemployment 
and assist extended families. In fact, alternative social safety grants were either 
strictly means-tested, like the social pensions or had a very low “free income”, or 
the income level above which payments start to decrease on a Rand-by-Rand basis 
(Roux, 1981; Kruger, 1992). Compulsory “preservation” had been recommended 
by the 1966 report of the Cilliers Committee, which defined withdrawal of 
benefits as “a potential burden on the state” (RSA, 1966: 24).  
In 1976 the Department of Welfare published a report that did not insist on 
preservation and argued for the transferability of pension benefits and the 
introduction of a National Contributory Scheme to cater for the retirement needs 
of workers not covered by pension funds at an estimated 75% final wage 
replacement rate (Human Awareness Programme, 1984). Business opposed the 
plan, denounced as “nationalisation” of the pension industry through a “pay-as-
you-go” system seen as onerous on employers of an ageing workforce. 
Indicatively, the employers opposed transferability because it would have 
weakened the ties between workers and their workplaces (Roux, 1981: 44).  
 The Louw Committee’s recommendations endorsed transferability but 
made preservation de facto compulsory. In this way worker retirement rights were 
closely identified with the wage relation, following the spirit of the Wiehahn 
Commission. In fact, the transferability of benefits introduced an element of 
decommodification in the system by making retirement benefits somehow 
independent from individual employment vicissitudes, but the Committee did not 
provide for prescribed minimum benefits as the unions were demanding (Roux, 
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1981: 50). Besides, the unions saw in the commission’s attempt to reward 
duration in employment a way to undermine state old-age pensions financed 
through the fiscal system. 
 The 1981 “pensions strikes”, which spread especially in Natal and the 
Eastern Cape under the impulse of “community unions”, were not only worker 
struggles to expand retirement benefits and protect decommodified access to an 
income independent from wage employment. They also projected the unions onto 
a political dimension with their demand for increasing worker control over 
pension funds’ boards and decisions to invest in social services for poor 
communities (Bonnin Hamilton Morrell & Sitas 1996: 159; Anon, 1981; Roux, 
1981: 51-52; Morris, 1982). The gap between production and reproduction was 
addressed by a rising tide of struggles in the 1980s, like those on maternity rights 
and benefits (Daphne, 1985; Markham, 1987; Fonn, 1990). In that case as well, 
maternity rights claimable under the UIF (from which agricultural and domestic 
workers were excluded) were highly dependent on the length of service, whereby 
the full 26 weeks of benefits (at approximately 45% of normal earnings) required 
at least three years in employment, which led to discrimination against casual and 
retrenched workers. Unions’ struggles were focused on extending maternal leave 
and ensuring re-employment of the pregnant employee, and they managed to win 
important agreements in the retail, chemical and metal-engineering sectors, where 
in 1986 MAWU won for the first time maternity rights for a whole industry. 
Advances on the production-reproduction border reinforced ideas of the 
union movement as an actor that, developing from, and transcending, the terrain 
of negotiations over wages and working conditions could successfully mobilise 
for broader social rights and political citizenship. A dramatic confirmation came 
with the growing involvement of trade union organisations in community 
uprisings in the 1980s. Initially limited to UDF-aligned unions opposing state 
reforms of national institutions and local governments, such mobilisations 
eventually drew support from the rank-and-file of FOSATU and “workerist” 
unions, whose members often blamed their own leaders for an eccessive 
workplace orientation distanced from broader social struggles (Baskin, 1982; 
Swilling, 1984b; Ruiters, 1985; Cobbett and Cohen, 1988). Through a process 
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characterised by internal conflicts and tensions, FOSATU unions became, in 
particular, protagonists of struggles against rising rents, evictions and relocations 
that in important industrial areas like the East Rand characterised the dynamics of 
commodification of the urban space (Rees, 1983; Chaskalson, Jochelson and 
Seekings, 1987). 
Struggles over housing rights and for municipal services figured 
prominently in the unions’ agendas and discourse during the 1980s. While 
labour’s involvement on this terrain was contested and largely contingent upon 
the specific crisis context of the time, it nonetheless helped in shaping a social 
citizenship discourse where decommodification and opposition to privatisation 
were bridging established divides between production and reproduction, 
workplace and community. Unions’ refusal of the rising state’s emphasis on 
private home ownership, for example, was in a sense aimed at preventing the co-
optation and emasculation of their most urbanised, better paid constituencies11. It 
was also, however, demanding housing and municipal services as rights rather 
than commodities dependent on wage levels. As such, these struggles were 
closely linked to historical trends where boycotts and urban land invasions had 
reclaimed the urban space over and above the narrow confines of wage-based 
“stabilisation” contained in government policies (Stadler, 1979; Cobbett, 1989). 
Trade unions’ concerns with socio-political change and community-based 
alliances defined a new style of union activity, “social movement unionism”, 
which was intended not only as co-operation with social movements and political 
organisations, but as the internalisation of social movements’ demands, 
organisational forms and methods of struggle (Webster, 1987; Waterman, 1993). 
Karl von Holdt (2002) argues that the emergence of social movement unionism in 
                                                
11
 For example, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) adopted a 
pragmatic strategy of “militant negotiations” with regard to the use of pension funds to finance 
low-income housing developments. Home ownership was identified as a potential source of 
divisions among workers and housing was indicated as a right to be provided by a democratic state 
with adequate level of subsidisation of housing needs. At the same time, in view of difficulties of 
access to bank financing, limitations of rental markets and high costs of privatised services, the 
union accepted that “a portion of pension and provident fund assets should be invested in 
community projects provided that such investments do not jeopardize returns to members of the 
fund”, Schreiner, G., Social Security Funds and Housing: A Union View, n.d. (but 1989). See also 
Minutes of the NUMSA Housing/Provident Fund Research Group Meeting Held on 3 September 
1989 in Johannesburg, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 42.3.7.1, and NUMSA Housing Report (1988), 
Wits DHP, PLANACT, 43.3.6.6. 
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South Africa was linked to a specific set of conditions that allowed the 
radicalisation of union struggles and demands based on alliances with diverse 
social actors because the unions themselves were affected by lines of fracture and 
contestation present in society at large, where “premodern”, “non-class” and 
“popular” identities remained important. The politicisation and radicalisation of 
labour demands could work precisely inasmuch the unions themselves were an 
arena of contestation between different meanings of wage labour, social rights and 
community needs. An outcome of the struggles during the 1980s was that from 
such contestations a discourse of social citizenship and decommodification 
emerged to transcend the wage relation as a terrain of social emancipation. 
Integral to this trajectory was the adoption as a rallying cry of COSATU 
campaigns of a notion of “living wage” based on an “emphasis on securing a 
‘social wage’ rather than a narrow focus on increasing the monetary value of take 
home pay” (Pillay, 1995: 208).  
At the same time, however, the politicisation of union identities and 
struggles had contradictory effects on the development of a social rights and 
decommodification agenda. In particular, COSATU’s substitution for the political 
opposition during the state of emergencies and the repression that preceded the 
fall of apartheid, and its political alignment with the ANC following the adoption 
of the “Freedom Charter” as a political document in 1987, led the federation to 
marginalize the development of campaigns on social rights. In fact, already in 
1988 the “living wage campaign” was regarded as lacking connections with 
COSATU’s political struggle, and social demands were marginalised to the level 
of mainly rhetorical enunciations (Obery and Singh, 1988). Conversely, issues 
related to social security, retirement, housing and healthcare were largely 
delegated to workplace- or industry-based collective bargaining, where unions had 
greater chances to make inroads, even if they downscaled the need for broader 
coalitions for social citizenship rights (Lund, 1988). It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that trade unionist Jane Barrett could declare immediately before the 
unbanning of the ANC and the beginning of the post-apartheid transition that “the 
labour movement presently has no coherent social welfare policy” (Barrett, 1989: 
16). The lack of a systematic strategy around demands emerged across labour 
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struggles during the 1980s ultimately revealed the problematic nature of 
COSATU’s political role. The next chapter will further explore this theme by 
looking at how the post-apartheid institutionalization of the union movement 
affected options for a radical discourse of social citizenship 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Social policies and social citizenship discourses of South Africa’s racial state 
revealed in peculiar forms and modalities the permanence in this context of many 
of the dilemmas faced by wage labour in colonial modernity, as discussed in the 
literature analysed in the previous chapter. In particular, wage labour and work 
discipline were identified as constituent mechanisms of social control of the 
African population that functioned across mobile and constantly shifting barriers 
between “urban” and “rural” labour, “stabilized” and “migrant” urban workers, 
“capitalist” forms of production and “precapitalist” modes of reproduction, 
“modern” and “customary” juridical status.  
Discourses of the “customary” and the “traditional”, in particular, 
undergirded an economic reasoning assuming that the reproduction of the 
Africans was provided by the “pre-capitalist” economies of the reserves or took 
place in any case at lower levels of needs. “Culturalist” presuppositions allowed 
therefore to the idea of social inclusion under apartheid “reforms” to function as 
the structuring and organizing of differential levels of exclusion from social 
citizenship rights.  
 Overall, wage labour continued to provide the common foundation for 
highly commodified social welfare systems whose practices and modes of 
operation were nonetheless profoundly diversified along racial and spatial bases. 
The permanence of coercive forms of control of black labour was ultimately 
superseded by attempts at reform that tried to make wage labour the criteria for 
access to social rights. Apart from reinforcing the commodified nature of such 
rights, however, these attempts ultimately confronted the racial state with the 
unsolvable dilemma, identified by Cooper in other African contexts, of having 
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social reforms in a context of lack of democracy and suppression of citizenship 
rights.  
 Such contradictions ultimately fed ideas and practices of labour resistance 
that regarded wage labour as an increasingly inadequate terrain to structure claims 
for social citizenship that accompanied demands for political change. In the final 
analysis, however, the transcendence of the confines of the wage relations and the 
politicization of union struggles had contradictory effects that left the terrain of 
social citizenship discourse contested when the transition to democracy began. On 
one hand, in fact, politicization allowed the unions to shape struggles for social 
rights that traversed the social fabric. On the other hand, however, it prevented 
such struggles from congealing around articulated elaborations of social 
citizenship and radical decommodification. 
South Africa’s black working class, nonetheless, entered the post-apartheid 
transition with a heightened sense of social expectations that structured social 
citizenship imagery. A survey of COSATU members conducted in 1995 revealed 
that, even if most respondents were unaware of the specifics of the new ANC 
government’s policies embodied in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), their demands far outstripped the limited ambit of wages and 
working conditions and “the ability of the capitalist class to deliver” (Ginsburg et 
al., 1995: 71). In particular, “higher wages” did not figure among the top eight 
items that a new democracy was supposed to deliver. These were, instead 
(Ginsburg et al, 1995: 71), “better housing” (90.5%), education (90.2%), 
healthcare (87.2%), safety (85.7%), electricity (84.6%), water (82%), land 
(80.7%) and public transport (79%). Moreover, 72% of respondents declared to be 
prepared to ongoing extra-parliamentary direct action had their expectations not 
been met (Ginsburg et al., 1995: 73). Such findings revealed not only the extent to 
which past struggles had entrenched social citizenship rights at the core of 
workers’ discourses, but also the radicalism that supported such demands and 
expectations. 
While the demand for decommodified social rights emerged as a challenge 
for a post-apartheid government engaged in constructing democratic institutions 
and completing a transition to a fully-fledged capitalist “free labour” system, it 
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also clashed with changing policies and economic realities. Late apartheid had in 
fact witnessed a social policy convergence around commodification and market 
regulation, which hinted at new class divides that cut across racial boundaries. 
Such trends were, moreover, favoured by the paradigm of economic liberalization 
which faced the ANC at the moment of its ascent to power. 
The following chapters will show that, in the face of an employment crisis 
that profoundly and negatively affects discourses of social citizenship premised on 
wage labour,  past policies and ideological paradigms continue to impinge on the 
policy approaches of the new democracy. Not only wage labour discipline and 
work ethic still provide decisive weapons in the new government’s social 
insertion armoury, but they continue to underline the role of commodification as a 
mode of access to social provisions. Current policy discourses that oppose 
“dependency” on welfare “handouts” (Meth, 2004a), accused to create “negative 
incentives”, and emphasize “productive employment” as an antidote echo 
previous emphases on “schooling bodies to hard work” to avoid the “idle 
enjoyment of leisure”. At the same time, they provide arguments for containing 
and downscaling redistributive policies based on refashioned views  according to 
which state pensions’ generosity is to be evaluated depending on the differential 
needs of specific geographical areas.  
Similarly, discourses on social inequality and the role of the state under the 
new democracy resume the aims of late apartheid reforms: to make social 
inequalities legitimate once they are defined not by race but by the objective 
workings of  market forces (Ashforth, 1990: 211). In this regard, the role of the 
state is reconceptualised not as a provider of rights but as a corrective to the 
undesirable effects of the market. Finally, the hyper-commodified, wage-centred 
welfare system inherited from apartheid is taken by some as evidence of the fact 
that social policy in South Africa is structurally ill-equipped to deal with mass 
unemployment and demands for inclusivity. Such conclusions enable 
representations, not deprived of involuntary irony, of the black unionized working 
class as a “privileged” minority that, having “benefited” from past policies, is now 
required to make sacrifices to fund a modicum of social provisions for the largely 
unemployed or underemployed poor (Nattrass and Seekings, 2000). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Wage Labour, Social Vulnerability and Commodification in the Post-
Apartheid Transition  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Integral to the transition from apartheid to a democratic government was a labour 
social imagery that, emerged out of workplace and community struggles during 
the 1970s and 1980s, carried expectations for socio-economic changes and a 
“social wage” to accompany political transformation. Under apartheid, wage 
labour had functioned as a conduit for such expectations in complex and 
multifaceted ways. On one hand, trade unions took part in struggles around 
decommodified housing, services and municipal utilities. On the other hand, a 
climate of intensified repression and the priority of political liberation in the 
programme of the ANC-led mass democratic movement marginalized the 
development of an articulated agenda on changing welfare and social security 
systems. COSATU’s “living wage campaign” was reduced either to rhetorical 
claims or to monetary demands with little connection with the development of a 
broader vision of access to social services. Conversely, the terrain on which the 
unions recorded the most significant advances on the decommodification front 
remained the workplace, with important workers’ gains over issues such as 
provident funds, maternity agreements and housing investment. 
 The lack of a comprehensive labour programme on social security and 
decommodification related, conversely, to a democratic transition that faced the 
legacy of a heavily commodified welfare system which had presided over extreme 
socio-economic inequalities. Moreover, a deep economic crisis was reflected in 
declining employment trends. To the combined impact of such processes was 
added the emergence of new labour market stratifications, actively fostered by late 
apartheid reforms, along skills and income lines, which overlapped and 
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intersected with established racial inequalities. Finally, the fact that the transition 
took the form of negotiations between the old regime and the ANC, in a context of 
economic globalisation and liberalisation endorsed by the ideological hegemony 
of neoliberalism, announced renewed constraints on the capacity of state 
institutions to design policies of redistribution. 
 This chapter provides an overview of the ways in which the links between 
wage labour and social citizenship have been reconfigured during the 1990s. It 
focuses on changes in forms of employment, with particular regard to trends in 
non-standard employment, and on problems raised by labour’s relations with the 
sphere of social provisions. I discuss problems facing organised labour in relation 
to such developments, in terms both of trade unions’ institutional role and of 
shifting discourses of social citizenship and decommodification. Labour market 
changes and the persistent commodification of social provisions lead, in the final 
analysis, to the emergence of new strata of working poor that challenge the 
conceptual polarization of social “inclusion” and “exclusion”. The fact that 
expanding areas of poverty are emerging within formal employment challenge the 
link between wage labour and the discourse of social citizenship that was ushered 
in by trade unions’ resistance to apartheid.  
At the same time, unemployment, commodification and working class 
poverty help to redefine the social imagery of wage labour in a survivalist and 
defensive mode, where priorities on the protection of employment and monetary 
income are increasingly decoupled from the access to social rights. My two cases 
studies introduced in Chapter 4 and 5, and the discussion of changing workers’ 
meanings and perspectives of the work-social citizenship nexus in Chapter 6 and 
7, will provide in-depth, empirical perspectives on the general issues outlined in 
this chapter. 
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3.2 Wage Labour and Social Citizenship in the Policy Context of the 
Democratic Transition 
 
The democratic constitution adopted in 1996 defined socio-economic rights in a 
way that balanced popular expectations and demands for redress of inherited 
inequalities (Greenstein, 1998) with the spirit of policy pragmatism that inspired 
the negotiated transition and the abandonment by the ANC of options of rapid and 
radical social change. In fact, rights pertaining to the sphere of social citizenship 
were included in Chapter 2 (the “Bill of Rights”) of the Constitution, where they 
were given the same relevance as civil and political rights, avoiding a hierarchy 
between them based on liberal doctrine’s grounds (O’Regan, 1998; Van 
Huyssteen, 2000). The realisation of social rights, however -- in particular housing 
(Section 26) and healthcare, food, water and social security (Section 27) -- was 
qualified and subordinated to a principle of “progressive realisation” (Sect.26(2) 
and 27(2)), according to which “the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources” (RSA, 1996).  
In this way, justiciability of socio-economic rights was limited to the 
courts’ ascertaining  “progressive realisation”, which beyond bare subsistence 
remains loosely defined in terms of time frames and provisions. The state can still 
be held accountable for a “tertiary obligation” to actively “protect, promote and 
fulfil” social rights (De Villiers, 1994; Heyns and Brand, 1998; Liebenberg, 
2001), but practical implementation measures are devolved to the budgeting 
process and to policymarkers’ drafting of boundaries of entitlements and social 
inclusion (Du Plessis and Corder, 1994; De Vos, 1997). Subsequent constitutional 
jurisprudence has confirmed the subordination of social rights to policy decisions 
over the allocation of resources and has not placed redistributive obligations on 
the state to enforce an effective enjoyment of such rights. Rejection of the link 
between redistribution, decommodification and social rights was common to 
Constitutional Court decisions that either abstained to interfere with the allocation 
of resources12, or reminded the government to take “reasonable steps” for a 
“progressive realisation” of rights while accepting resources’ scarcity13. 
                                                
12 This was in particular the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), CCT 
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 The democratic constitutional dispensation embodied a universalist 
principle of social citizenship, whose translation into social policies was largely 
left to bargaining institutions based on the centralised, national representation of 
organised social interests. South Africa’s experiment with “democratic 
corporatism” (Baskin, 1993) as the establishment of formalised interactions 
between the state and representatives of business, labour and civil society was 
finalised at building consensus on, among other, social and labour legislation to be 
proposed to Parliament. The National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC), established in 1995, fulfilled such tasks mainly through its 
Labour Market and Development chambers. In tune with the Constitution’s 
orientation, however, negotiations within corporatist-styled institutions related to 
the allocation of economic resources defined by macroeconomic policy 
orientations that are largely external to such institutions.  
The 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, in 
particular, was adopted as a policy document by the Department of Finance and 
became the centrepiece of the government’s growth strategy. GEAR subordinated 
the expansion of public spending and redistributive interventions in the sphere of 
social provisions to targets of inflation reduction and deficit containment, in 
particular a decificit-to-GDP ratio of 3%, regarded as favourable to strengthening 
private investors’ confidence (Michie and Padayachee, 1998; Habib and 
Padayachee, 2000; Goetz, 2000; Mhone, 2003). As Steven Gelb (1998) 
recognised, GEAR’s limitation on public expenditure constrained NEDLAC’s 
ability to bargain over resource allocation and reduced the role of corporatist 
institutions to the definition of technical details of policies largely defined 
externally. Conversely, the chasm between such constraints and broad rank-and-
file expectations, combined to the employers’ pragmatic instrumentalism and 
                                                                                                                                 
32/97, where the applicant’s appeal against a state hospital’s denial of life-saving dialysis 
treatment on grounds of limited resources and priority for patients with greater survival 
probabilities was rejected by the Court. The applicant died of complications associated with other 
conditions. See also Moellendorf (1998). 
13 This was the case of RSA and Others v Grootboom and Others, CCT 11/00, where the Court 
ruled on a matter of housing rights for an informal settlement community. While the Court 
resolved the specific case by issuing an order for basic housing materials that were already offered 
by the government, it also judged the government negligent in enforcing rights to housing. Even if 
it clearly asserted the justiciability of socio-economic rights, the court, however, abstained from a 
judgment that could place specific obligations on the state in terms of resource allocation. See 
Barchiesi and Van Huyssteen (2001), Pieterse and Van Donk (2002) and Wesson (2004). 
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reliance on unilateral restructuring, greatly hindered the ability of corporatist 
institutions to achieve consensus around redistributive policy options (Eidelberg, 
2000; Lawrence, 2000). 
 Limitations to corporatist decision-making indicate that the post-apartheid 
social citizenship arrangement is largely a “hybrid” form that cannot be easily 
categorised on the basis of clear-cut distinctions between “welfare regimes” as the 
one proposed by Esping-Andersen and discussed in Chapter 1. In particular, the 
universalist themes and redistributive aspirations contained in the Constitution 
recognised that democratic political institutions had to be responsive to 
expectations from labour and community struggles for socio-economic changes 
and reduction of inequalities. At the same time, the policy orientations of the new 
government tended to redefine the role of the state in social service delivery in a 
“residual” sense, with a specific emphasis on social assistance targeted to extreme 
poverty, social exclusion and unemployment. Finally, NEDLAC’s role as a 
bargaining institution based on structured representation of socio-economic 
interests introduced elements of corporatist social policy-making that recognised 
the specific status of wage labour as an actor and a vehicle to extend social 
protections.  
 With regard to the universalist principles enshrined in the new 
dispensation, they responded to labour’s entrenched demands, which linked 
access to social provisions to an explicitly redistributive and decommodifying role 
of the state14. As COSATU argued in its opposition to GEAR: 
 
The private sector should not be allowed to escape its commitments to 
redirect investment towards the poor (…). Wealthy South Africans 
are using the policies of nation-building and reconciliation to clamour 
for their privileges to be left untouched. They fail to see that the 
stability of the new democracy cannot be built on squeezing the poor. 
There is one important source of income to assist in creating greater 
equity in society, and that is to tax the wealthy. Indeed, modern fiscal 
policy has developed to achieve this aim (COSATU, 1996). 
 
                                                
14 In a 1991 survey of COSATU shop-stewards, to the question “how should social services be 
provided?” 56% of respondents answered “increased taxes and free social services”, while 44% 
answered “no increase in taxes, individuals pay for services” (Pityana and Orkin, 1992: 68).  
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Conversely, the ANC’s emerging definition of a residual public sector’s role in 
providing access to social security emphasised wage labour as the main 
mechanism of social insertion. It also explicitly minimized the redistributive, 
decommodifying role of the public sector. As Hein Marais (2002) argues, such 
policy shifts emerged well before GEAR, and were part of the ANC’s approach to 
the negotiated transition to democracy.  
Earlier constitutional elaborations by the ANC emphasised the role of the 
government in providing a “guaranteed and expanding floor of economic, social 
and educational rights for everybody” (African National Congress, 1991). At the 
same time, the party supported progressive taxation and service cross-
subsidisation as measures to equalise access, while opposing the privatisation of 
municipal utilities. However, the interaction between economic and social policies 
defined by the “Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa” (African 
National Congress, 1992) had tempered the emphasis on the link between 
universalism, redistribution and state interventionism that characterised the 
ANC’s historic “Freedom Charter” of 1955. In fact, in the 1992 “guidelines” a 
new emphasis emerged on “macro-economic balance, including price stability and 
balance of payments equilibrium” (African Nationa Congress, 1992: D1.3), 
whereby the provision of “attractive and competitively priced goods and services” 
was a responsibility to be shared also by a “dynamic private sector” (African 
National Congress, 1992: D1.5).  
It was therefore within this “mixed economy” geared to macroeconomic 
stability and private sector dynamism that the role of the state in “redistribution 
programmes to meet the basic needs of our people” (African National Congress, 
1992: D1.2.1) was envisioned. At the same time, social welfare services eschewed 
a “hand-out approach” while emphasising the “importance of the family as it is 
understood within the social and cultural norms” (African National Congress, 
1992: I.4). Finally, public provision social safety nets were targeted to areas of 
need where “the ability of the individuals to contribute to society through work or 
other ways is beyond their control” (African National Congress, 1992: I,5).  
Therefore, the wage was confirmed as the main avenue to social insertion 
and to “the right to fair treatment”. Decommodified social services, instead, would 
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proritise, “within the limits of resources”, special needs such as those of victims 
of violence, marginalized youth, rural poor, veterans of the struggle, children and 
elderly in need of community care”. In defining the country’s social security 
system, such forms of social assistance would be separated from “social 
insurance” as based on contributory schemes pertaining to labour legislation and 
human resources development (African National Congress, 1992: I.6). The ANC’s 
elaboration of social citizenship prioritised wage labour as the basis of social 
inclusion and defined the welfare regime in a residualist and commodified 
framework through the radical decoupling of social assistance and insurance 
inside a “familist” ideological discourse. Such orientations were more clearly 
articulated with the government’s economic policies in the process that led to 
GEAR.  
The new government marginalized the recommendations emerging from a 
union-driven research exercise, the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG), 
which placed considerable emphasis on social provisions and redistribution not 
only as means to social inclusion but also as levers of demand-driven “growth 
through redistribution” (Adelzadeh and Padayachee, 1994; Macroeconomic 
Research Group, 1993; Adelzadeh, 1996; Fine and Van Wyk, 1996). On the 
contrary, the ANC government embarked on a conservative revision of its own 
political programme, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 
with which the alliance between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP had won the 
1994 elections.  Originated from COSATU’s demands and campaigns, the RDP 
was the end product of a long process of negotiation and redrafting (Bond, 1999). 
The ability of COSATU and grassroots activist constituencies to contest and 
shape ANC policies declined with the closure of spaces of debate inside the 
Alliance around priorities defined in increasingly technocratic ways (Lodge, 
1999). The final RDP document placed a specific emphasis on “meeting basic 
needs” and “attacking poverty and deprivation” (RSA, 1994a: 2.2.2) within the 
constraints of “affordability”. Deepening the logic contained in the 1992 Policy 
Guidelines, however, the RDP made social insertion primarily the responsibility 
of individual self-activation and initiative. It emphasised the role of the state 
mainly as “creating opportunities for all South Africans to develop their full 
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potential” (RSA, 1994a: 2.2.4.1), underlining “job creation, productivity and 
efficiency, improving conditions of employment, and creating opportunities for all 
to sustain themselves through productive activity” (RSA, 1994a: 2.2.4.2).  
Only subsequently was “better access to basic physical and social services” 
mentioned, while a “social security system and other social safety nets” was 
suggested with specific regard to “the poor, the disabled, the elderly and other 
vulnerable groups” (RSA, 1994a: 2.2.4.4). The poor’s empowerment and control 
over their lives was ultimately made dependent on their “ability to mobilise 
sufficient development resources” which included the role of the state “where 
necessary” (RSA, 1994a: 2.2.3). Replicating earlier ANC enunciations, and in 
remarkable continuity with the policy discourse of the previous regime, the RDP’s 
residualist social welfare logic indicated work ethic and productive employment 
as an antidote to welfare dependency, rather than emphasing the role of 
redistribution and decommodification: 
 
Although a much stronger welfare system is needed to support all the 
vulnerable, the old, the disabled and the sick who currently live in 
poverty, a system of 'handouts' for the unemployed should be 
avoided. All South Africans should have the opportunity to 
participate in the economic life of the country (RSA, 1994a: 2.3.3). 
 
It is to be noticed that in this discourse even the use of fiscal resources to 
strengthen and extend employment-based contributory provisions, such as 
retirement benefits, unemployment insurance and housing finance, is absent. 
Employment was not regarded as an unstable, crisis-ridden, risk-prone reality 
which required a comprehensive system of decommodified provisions, as in 
universalist social citizenship approaches. Rather, wage labour played not only the 
role of socio-economic mechanism of integration, but also that of a disciplinary 
device and a benchmark of social merit.  
In fact, the separation between “assistance” for the poor and the permanently 
unemployed from “insurance” linked to the wage relation allowed the state to 
reduce its welfare obligations by placing a stigma of social marginality on public 
grants’ recipients. A similar logic worked in other areas of delivery, like housing, 
where private financing of low-cost accommodation was prioritised (RSA, 1994a: 
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2.5.15) and state subsidies remained targeted to “the poor” (RSA, 1994a: 2.5.14). 
With regard to healthcare, the RDP proposed a national health system (NHS) 
largely as the unification and coordination of existing public and private schemes. 
The focus of the NHS was indicated in primary health care, while the 
“immediate” provision of free health care in public structures was limited to 
children under six years of age or homeless and, over a longer term, pregnant 
women (RSA, 1994a: 2.12.6). The redress of previous racial and income 
inequalities was not indicated therefore as the responsibility of an expanded 
public sector through generalised access to decommodified healthcare, but as a 
product of shifting resources from curative medicine and hospital services towards 
primary health care (RSA, 1994a: 2.12.11.1).  
The RDP White Paper published in late 1994 (RSA, 1994b), finally, inserted 
the attainment of the RDP’s social goals within priorities of fiscal discipline and 
public deficit containment which would be finally quantified by GEAR as 
objective macroeconomic constraints. In its residualist redesigning of social 
welfare, the government was on the other hand making explicit reference to an 
international neoliberal policy consensus according to which public safety nets 
had at most to serve the purpose of cushioning the social impacts of restructuring 
and job losses caused by economic liberalisation and privatisation. A meeting of 
national and provincial directors general was held on 27 November 1995 to 
discuss the priorities of the “national growth and development strategy” document 
that in mid-1996 served as a de facto prelude to GEAR. In that meeting, deputy 
president Thabo Mbeki, which in August 1995 had been appointed to chair a 
Cabinet committee to co-ordinate economic policy, summarised the work of an 
inter-ministerial “labour market working group” which recommended compliance 
with the Programme of Action adopted at the 1995 World Summit for Sustainable 
Development in Copenhagen. Among the points of the programme the following 
was quoted as a social welfare priority: 
 
Establishing appropriate social safety mechanisms to minimise the 
adverse effects of structural adjustment, stabilisation or reform 
programmes on the workforce, especially the vulnerable, and for 
those who lose their jobs, creating conditions for their re-entry 
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through, inter alia, continuing education and training. (Ministry in the 
Office of the President, 1995). 
 
Tangible policy developments accompanied the conservative re-signification of 
the RDP discourse. Following the policy course outlined in late 1994 and 1995, in 
particular, the government decided in March 1996 to close the RDP Office in the 
Presidency, which had been inaugurated in May 1994 to co-ordinate the funding 
of a series of “presidential lead projects” (Blumenfeld, 1997). According to many 
commentators, the ANC’s social policy trajectory during the transition reflects at 
a discursive and ideological level a shift in the party’s class referents, which saw 
the rise in importance of market forces and African entrepreneurship (Jacobs, 
2001; Marais, 2002; Southall, 2004). The relevance of policies of “black 
economic empowerment”, addressed also to trade unions’ investment companies 
(Naidoo, 1997; Iheduru, 2002), and the aim of creating an African corporate layer 
became stated priorities of President Mbeki after his rise to power in 1999 
(Mbeki, 1999). They also supported the reconfiguration of the role of public 
policies in reducing racial inequalities towards the promotion of individual 
opportunities for market competition. Conversely, this discourse’s silence on the 
structural socio-economic determinants of inherited racial and class inequalities 
(Terreblanche, 2000) enables the government to downscale the relevance of 
redistribution and decommodification.  
 In such a context of economic liberalisation and predominance of market 
forces in shaping social policy paradigms, corporatist policy-making cannot be 
simply regarded as a device introduced by the ANC government to tame and 
emasculate labour militancy within conservative macroeconomic policies, as 
some critics imply (Desai and Habib, 1994; Panitch, 1996; Bond, 1999; Saul, 
2001). In fact, a corporatist approach, initially focused on tripartite negotiations 
between labour, business and the state, was a direct product of labour’s demands 
on socio-economic and industrial restructuring that emerged in the context of 
negotiated political transition. Labour, in particular, had chosen to engage the 
state and business in negotiations aimed at consolidating and expanding gains 
won during apartheid’s final years. In particular, inside COSATU a debate 
emerged on the opportunity to enter tripartite social contracts with a view at 
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ensuring labour’s “strategic” role in inspiring social, economic and workplace 
change (Schreiner, 1991; Copelyn, 1991; Von Holdt and Webster, 1992). Equally 
important was a preoccupation with defending the independence of workers’ 
interests against possible adverse compromises that could be requested by the 
impending ANC government, towards which substantial suspicion existed within 
COSATU (Rakner and Skalnes, 1996: 26; Torres, 2000a)15. Voices on 
COSATU’s left developed a typical “workerist” theme in support of engaging 
with state structures, arguing that it would strengthen unions’ autonomy while 
allowing them to represent the needs of unemployed and vulnerable workers for 
an “active labour market policy” focused on job creation, skills development and 
job placements (Bird and Schreiner, 1992). Engaging the state was therefore wage 
labour’s way to claim its role in shaping social citizenship and inclusion.  
An early product of labour’s approach to engagement was the 1991 
“Laboria Accord”, which established that all changes to industrial relations and 
employment conditions legislation would be the outcome of negotiation among 
the parties concerned (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 1990). A strike in 1991 
against the introduction of the Value Added Tax (VAT) led to the establishment 
of a National Economic Forum (NEF) as a tripartite negotiating institution on 
issues related to economic and employment policy (Patel, 1993; Habib, 1997). 
The NEF was part of a broader strategy in which COSATU and the other main 
oppositional labour federation, the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) 
were participating in various “forums” charged with negotiating transitional 
arrangements in social provisions and infrastructures. The establishment of 
NEDLAC with a 1994 act was, ultimately, the result of the merger of the NEF and 
the National Manpower Commission (NMC), a consultative institution over 
industrial relations legislation.  
According to Adler and Webster (1995, 1999), the unions’ approach to 
corporatist policy-making was inspired by a strategy of “radical reform” with 
which labour adapted to the realities of a negotiated democratic transition and 
                                                
15 70% of COSATU shop-stewards surveyed in 1991 declared that COSATU best represented 
workers’ interests during the negotiations for a democratic constitution, while 21% and 9% trusted 
more the ANC and the SACP respectively. At the same time, 94% of respondents expressed an 
electoral preference for the ANC (Pityana and Orkin, 1992:58). 
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aimed at “bargaining” the outcome of economic liberalisation with an aim at 
combining economic growth with social security and employment protection. 
Pretorius (1996) is cautious, however, to overestimate the pervasiveness of 
corporatist trends. Due, in fact, to the lack of centralised business interest 
representation, the power of the ANC in policy-making and grassroots union 
suspicions, such trends remained uneven and focused on areas where the parties 
pragmatically and contingently agree to have negotiated solutions. Moreover, a 
corporatist approach to national policy-making was supposed to integrate and 
reinforce a multi-pronged strategy in which labour continued to rely on 
workplace-based and industry-level pacts and agreements aimed at managing the 
social consequences of industrial restructuring, labour flexibility and 
retrenchments (Maree and Godfrey, 1995; Steinberg and Seidman, 1995; Sellars, 
1997; Webster, 1999). Finally, the unions have recognised the importance of 
NEDLAC, in particular its Labour Market Chamber, as an avenue to build 
consensus with sympathetic state organs, mainly the Department of Labour, and 
counterbalance in this way the unilateral decision making of other ministries such 
as the Finance Department (Houston, 2001)16.  
At the same time, however, labour would be required to contain and 
compromise its demands for redistribution and social rights, in accordance with 
business’ and the state’s requirements for social stability, industrial peace and 
economic competitiveness (Marais, 2001: 231). Such sacrifices seem indeed part 
of the very nature of an institution like NEDLAC, which as a “vehicle for the 
social partners to mobilise their constituencies into an effective strategy for social 
and economic transformation” sees participating constituencies as “willing to 
consider the possibility of making short-term trade-offs”, while recognising that 
“there is no other alternative” (NEDLAC, 1995: 3) to a compromise approach. 
Part of such trade-offs is the institution’s own self-limitation in the sphere of 
social policy to advancing an unspecified “floor of improved social benefits” 
(NEDLAC, 1995: 6). Therefore, consent is sought not on broad policies of social 
reconstruction, but on technical adjustments within the narrow allocative 
                                                
16 Bengeza Mthombeni, CEPPWAWU and NEDLAC labour representative, Interview with the 
Author, 12 June 2000. 
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boundaries defined by government macroeconomic policy17. Corporatist 
institutions were also conducive to establishing among workers and the poor an 
ethical discourse that rewarded discipline and sacrifice for the sake of realising the 
RDP’s objectives, similarly to what the ANC government was experimenting with 
its “Masakhane campaign”, aimed at stopping bonds and rents boycotts. An 
emphasis on self-restraint and moderation as part of the new government’s 
practices of governance deflected accusations to the unions of being selfishly 
concerned only with their members’ rights. It also often appropriated and re-
elaborated old languages of struggle to enforce conservative ends. As a delegate at 
the 1994 COSATU congress put it: “We used to have stayaways without pay. We 
as workers should take the lead in sacrificing” (cit. in Von Holdt, 1994: 41). 
Corporatism provided labour organisations with an institutional avenue to 
adapt their demands for structural change to the conditions of the negotiated 
transition. The contradiction inherent to such a strategy, however, was provided 
by the fact that resources available for its accomplishment were defined in a 
macroeconomic policy realm ultimately separate from labour’s influence (Gostner 
and Joffe, 1998: 141; Houston, Mpanyane and Liebenberg, 1998; Eidelberg, 
2000). Moreover, the ANC’s policy discourse was fundamentally at odds with the 
emphasis on universalism and commodification of its COSATU allies. 
Corporatism ultimately underlined the contestation of, and the unresolved tension 
surrounding, the meanings of wage labour in relation to social citizenship and 
social policy. To the unions’ view of labour as an engine for policies of radical 
redistribution was opposed the ANC’s discourse of wage labour as a source of 
individual discipline and promotion. Therefore, as Grossmann (1997: 162) argues, 
new, market-imposed constraints replaced apartheid’s “unfree” labour regime, and 
the ANC came to represent the “problematic” legacy of apartheid in terms of 
workers’ “unrealistic” expectations as much as, if not more than, continuities in 
oppression and exploitation. 
 The hybrid nature of a post-1994 social welfare framework that 
encompassed elements characterised in Chapter 1 as “residual”, “corporatist” and 
“universalist” was largely the product of pragmatic adaptation by the main 
                                                
17 See NEDLAC News Update, Vol.1, No.7, 1996 and Vol.2, No.1, 1997. 
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institutional actors. Equally important was the institutionalisation of organised 
labour as the carrier of deep-seated expectations for socio-economic change, 
which revealed a consensus between the ANC government and trade unions 
around wage labour’s importance for social integration and citizenship. In this 
sense, “free” wage labour, liberated by past bureaucratic constraints and 
authoritarian regulations, was “constitutionalised” as a primary vehicle of social 
emancipation, institutional representation and social contracts.  
The significance of wage labour in relation to social policy, however, 
remained contested between state and labour. The unions’ discourse of labour-
driven transformation regarded wage labour as a tool to extend and protect social 
rights for all sections of the population, including the unemployed and 
marginalized. In  the ANC and the government’s discourse, instead, wage labour 
largely pertained to the realm of individual self-activation, responsibility and 
discipline. Social security remained the precinct of employment-based provisions 
and labour market interactions, and as such it was separated from a sphere of 
social assistance that was residual and targeted to the special needs of stigmatised 
poor. In this view, the role of the public sector in redistributing resources and 
decommodifying services was reduced in accordance with conservative 
macroeconomic policies.  
 While macroeconomic policies constrained labour’s institutional influence, 
the next section will explore a further important limitation that, from below, 
impinged on trade unions’ social citizenship discourse. In fact, adverse changes in 
labour markets led to the widening of inequalities and vulnerabilities, making 
access to a wage increasingly frail and embattled as a device for social insertion.  
 
 
3.3 Labour Market Changes and the Rise of the Working Poor 
 
Labour market and employment trends during the first decade of democratic 
transition have to a large extent deepened processes already observed during 
apartheid’s final years. In particular, employment growth has taken place 
predominantly in the informal economy or in most precarious and contingent 
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formal occupations, which in general have not been able to absorb the growing 
numbers of young entrants in the economically active population, and has actually 
shed jobs due to the economic restructuring that accompanied liberalization 
(Nattrass, 1998; Bhorat and Hodge, 1999). While 69% of the economically active 
population (EAP) was employed full-time in 1995, by 2001 the figure declined to 
49%. During the same period, underemployment in the form of part-time, 
informal or atypical occupations has risen from 14% to 31% and unemployment 
from 17% to 30% according to Statistics South Africa’s “narrow definition”, 
which does not count discouraged jobseekers (Altman, 2003). Once the “broad 
definition” of unemployment is taken into account, the rate of unemployment has 
risen from 30.8% in 1995 to 41.8% in September 2002, with informal 
employment hovering between 13% and 17% of total employment during the 
same period (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2005). In 1995, 67.7% of the unemployed 
had been looking for a job for longer than 12 months, while for only 17.3% 
jobseeking lasted for six months or less. At the same time, 64.8% of African 
participants in the EAP aged between 16 and 24 were unemployed (Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt, 1996: 146-147). 
 The second half of the 1990s recorded massive job losses, especially in 
manufacturing industries that were most heavily unionized (see Table 3.1). The 
impact of employment decline has been clearly differentiated across racial groups, 
revealing labour market’s specifically low absorptive capacity in low-skill 
occupations with a higher number of African entrants in the EAP. In fact, 
according to Bhorat (2003), between 1995 and 1999 African employment has 
grown 9.94%, compared to an African EAP growth of 25.5%, for an employment 
absorption rate of 25.07%. The corresponding figures for whites are a 6.22% 
employment growth, an 8.42% EAP growth and a 70.36% absorption rate. 
National figures are, respectively, 10.17%, 22.18% and 32.59%, making the 
Africans’ absorption rate the only one that is lower than the average. Finally, 
dynamics within specific sectors, like retrenchments and technological change, are 
the main responsible for shifts in labour demand at all occupational levels, which 
leads to the impact of job losses being mainly felt by the unskilled. 
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 Table 3.1. Job Losses in Manufacturing, 1996-2000 
 
Average Annual 
% change 
 
Industry Employment 
March 2000 
% of 
Manufacturing 
Employment, 
March 2000 
Employment 
Change 1996-2000 
1996 2000 
% of Job 
Losses, 
1996- 
Basic metals, 
metal 
products and 
machinery 
222,000 17% -54,000 -19% +2% -5% 35% 
Textiles, 
clothing, 
leather 
220,000 17% -40,000 -15% +7% -4% 26% 
Electrical 
machinery 
71,000 6% -33,000 -31% -3% -9% 21% 
Non-metallic 
metal 
products 
46,000 4% -30,000 -39% -2% -12% 19% 
Food, 
beverages, 
tobacco 
196,000 15% -12,000 -6% -1% -2% 8% 
Transport 
equipment 
84,000 7% -11,000 -11% +5% -3% 7% 
Furniture 
manufacturing 
and recycling 
62,000 5% -10,000 -14% +3% -4% 7% 
Coke oven 
products, 
petroleum, 
Refineries, etc 
174,000 14% -3,000 -2% +1% 0% 2% 
Professional 
equipment 
22,000 2% +15,000 +190% -7% +30% -9% 
Wood, paper, 
printing, 
publishing 
181,000 14% +24,000 +15% -3% +4% -15% 
Total 
manufacturing 
1,278,000 100% -155,000 -11% +1% -3% 100% 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Survey of Employment and Earnings, June 2000, elaborated in 
COSATU (2001). 
  
The rise in “atypical” and informal jobs is also differentiated by race, as evident 
from Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Forms of Employment by Race, 1999 
 
Population   
Group 
Unemployed 
(%) 
Casual and 
Part-Time (%) 
Full-Time 
Employed (%) 
Total (%) % of Total 
Population 
African 47.3 20.1 32.7 100.0 76.4 
Coloured 8.6 20.0 71.4 100.0 8.9 
Indian 21.8 16.4 61.8 100.0 2.6 
White 8.9 5.8 85.3 100.0 10.9 
Source: Torres (2000). 
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At the end of the 1990s, full time waged employment was a reality for only less 
than one third of the African EAP and approximately 40% of the overall national 
EAP. In 2002, according to Bhorat and Oosthuizen’s (2005: 46) findings, based 
on Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey, 65.8% of the unemployed aged 
25 to 34 and 37.9% aged 35 to 44 had never worked in their lives. 
 The inability of economic growth to create enough employment to absorb 
labour market entrants and the employment decline in more protected formal 
economy occupations are been mirrored by wages’ rising inadequacy in ensuring 
household living standards above official poverty levels. Based on the 
Supplemented Living Level (SLL)18 for a family of five as a poverty line, Table 
3.3 shows that only three non-agricultural sectors (paper, food, metal and 
engineering) out of 12 selected had above-poverty minimum wages19. 
 
Table 3.3 Minimum Wages for Selected Sectors, 1998-1999 
 
Sector 1998 
(Rand/month) 
1999 
(Rand/month) 
Real 
Change 
% of SLL for a Family of 
Five 
Paper, paper products 
and packaging 
2240 2409 0.2% 124% 
Food 1974 2156 1.9% 111% 
Metal and engineering 1660 1950 10.2% 100% 
Public service 1750 1872 -0.3% 96% 
Local government 1550 1835 11.1% 94% 
Glass 1515 1820 12.8% 93% 
Automobile industry 1560 1677 0.2% 86% 
Transport 1408 1563 3.7% 80% 
Mining 1262 1373 1.5% 70% 
Wood 1157 1250 0.7% 64% 
Contract cleaning 1022 1194 9,5% 61% 
Building and 
construction 
1041 1150 3.1% 59% 
Source: Labour Research Service (1999, 2000). 
 
                                                
18 The SLL is, together with the Minimum Living Level (MLL), a poverty line calculated by the 
Pretoria-based Bureau of Market Research and is commonly used for poverty measurements. Both 
poverty lines are based on a basic basket of goods and services required for households’ survival. 
The MLL is the most basic line, and includes rents for basic services, minimum dietary 
requirements, schooling expenses, clothing and washing materials, and transportation to and from 
work. The SLL is more adequate to measure working class poverty since it includes contributions 
for pensions, unemployment insurance and medical aids, apart from a broader definition of 
transportation and some recreational expenses (Horton, 1999). 
19 It should be noticed that two of these three sectors are included in the case studies in chapter 6 
and 7 of this work. 
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According to Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1999), by setting the lowest individual 
poverty line at R650 per month, 45.6% of the labour force and 25% of the 
employed would still fall below that figure, with farmworkers and domestic 
workers being the most vulnerable sectors. These figures seem to corroborate 
conclusions that access to a wage is increasingly inadequate in providing for the 
basic necessities of life and household reproduction, especially when 
contributions for employer-subsidised provisions are calculated, as in the SLL. 
They also indicate a growth of poverty within the wage relation, in contrast with 
the government policy discourse discussed in the previous section, according to 
which social exclusion is largely a matter of inability to access formal 
employment.  
Equally challenged (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996) is the 
identification of unemployment as the main cause for social marginalisation. 
Figures from a 1994 SALDRU (University of Cape Town)-World Bank poverty 
survey, one of the most comprehensive panel surveys of social conditions in post-
apartheid South Africa, reveal (Budlender, 1999) that even for the poorest section 
of the South African population (the decile with annual income between R0 and 
R1199) unemployment affects less than half of respondents (41% of males and 
44% of females). For the following decile (annual income between R1200 and 
R1811) it affects approximately one third (31% for males and 37% for females). 
Therefore, most of the 20% of the South African population living in the direst 
poverty conditions continued to have access to monetary remuneration deriving 
from some sort of employment.  
According to Leibbrandt et al. (2000), even if wage incomes are the least 
unequally distributed of all income sources, wages still contribute for 67% of total 
social inequality, only half of which is determined by the 30% of households with 
no wage earners. The authors conclude that employment is still an important asset 
for individuals to avoid plunging into poverty. They however specifically refuse 
to identify the employed as a relatively privileged stratum in South African 
society, observing that earning wages as such by no means guarantees upliftment 
from poverty once household incomes and expenditures are considered. In 1995, 
59.1% of African households with three or more wage earners, 66% with two 
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wage earners, 57.6% with one wage earner and 77.8% with no wage earners could 
be defined as “poor”. A condition of “deep poverty” was ascertained for, 
respectively, 23.2%, 26.5%, 21.3% and 37.4% in each group (Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt, 1996: 155). A report on “Poverty and Inequality in South Africa” 
commissioned by the government indicated (May, Woolard and Klasen, 2000; 
Torres, Bhorat, Leibbrandt and Cassim, 2000) that wages constituted the most 
important source of income for the majority (40%) of poor households, followed 
by state transfers (26%), and remittances (17%).  
According to the union-aligned National Labour and Economic 
Development Institute (NALEDI), formal wages, rather than casual labour or state 
transfers, provide the most important source of income to the second poorest 
household quintile (44% of households) and, with 23% of households, come as a 
close second to remittances for the poorest quintile (Naidoo, 1999: 40). At the 
same time, 47 per cent of ‘poor households’ and 35 per cent of ‘very poor 
households’ have at least one economically active member in employment (in 26 
per cent and 19 per cent of cases respectively all the economically active members 
are employed). These figures are higher or close to those for ‘poor’ and ‘very 
poor’ households with no economically active members (25% and 28% 
respectively) or where all economically active members are unemployed (28% 
and 37% respectively). Both NALEDI researchers and the authors of the “Poverty 
and Inequality Report” draw from their data conclusions explicitly critical of 
policies aimed at providing low-wage employment for jobless low-skill 
unemployed.  
The inadequacy of the wage to provide for income levels above poverty 
lines has also been related to changing labour market stratifications that are 
polarising wage labour, leading to the emergence of new inequalities among the 
employed, and challenging union identities where “the relative lack of social 
segmentation” (Wood and Psoulis, 2001) facilitate collective solidarity. 
According to Owen Crankshaw such trends emerged in the 1980s and were the 
result of occupational mobility into professional and skilled occupations, rather 
than of workers’ ability to raise wage rates for their jobs. Therefore, unskilled 
African workers were largely left behind in wage increases or fell into 
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unemployment, which not only hindered the equalization of wages, but also 
prevented them from playing a role in reducing racial income gaps. In fact, while 
the African share of unskilled manual jobs has remained almost unchanged at 
around 87% from 1965 to 1990, the Africans’ share for semi-skilled and skilled 
occupations increased, respectively, from 70.2% to 76.1% and from 0 to 18.9% 
(Crankshaw, 1997: 147). Such findings confirm the impression that inequalities 
within wage labour assumed complex configurations and blurred a mere 
polarisation between “employed” and “unemployed”. In particular, while a 
minority of skilled and unionised African workers managed to benefit from their 
insertion in waged employment, the majority was left in low-skill, unstable, 
vulnerable occupations (Hindson and Crankshaw, 1990; Bhorat et al., 2001; 
Bhorat, Poswell and Naidoo, 2004). 
 The link between vulnerability within waged employment and the 
expansion of working class poverty in post-apartheid South Africa has been 
recently informed by a bourgeoning body of research that emphasizes how 
precariousness among the employed is facilitated by “atypical” forms of 
employment. These include casual, temporary, fixed-term, part-time contracts, 
labour broking and “homework”, which often question the very distinction 
between formal and informal work (Klerck, 1994; Standing, Sender and Weeks, 
1996; Theron, 1996; Rees, 1997; Crankshaw and Macun, 1997; Kenny and 
Webster, 1999; Kenny and Bezuidenhout, 1999; Mosoetsa, 2001; Newman, Pape 
and Jansen, 2001; Barchiesi and Bramble, 2003; Theron, 2004; NALEDI 2004).  
 According to Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey (2002: 
2.12.2), in 2002, 23.7% of the employed population was working under fixed 
term, temporary, casual or seasonal contracts. While in manufacturing this figure 
was at around 17%, the highest shares of atypical workers could be found in 
agriculture (33%), construction (54.73%) and domestic services (50.29%). 
Independent research in the retail industry suggests that in areas like the East 
Rand the use of casual and contract labour could be as high as 65% of the 
employed workforce (Kenny, 2005: 164). While systematic analyses of trends in 
atypical employment and differential wage and benefits levels between permanent 
and non-permanent work are still lacking, existing case studies point at the fact 
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that atypical jobs are also expanding in labour-intensive operations in mining, 
retail and footwear (Kenny and Bezuidenhout, 1999; Clarke, 2000; Mosoetsa, 
2001; Kenny, 2005).  
Research produced for the ILO (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996; 
Hayter, Reinecke and Torres, 1999) has shown that industrial restructuring is a 
driving force for the expansion of atypical employment and the casualisation of 
work in South Africa. In particular, industrial sectors, like the automotive 
industry, that have seen the success of export promotion policies favoured under 
the GEAR framework have also expanded downsizing, outsourcing and numerical 
employment flexibility. In sectors where precise wage comparisons between 
permanent and “atypical” workers exist (Kenny and Webster, 1999), wide wage 
disparities between the two categories are apparent. In retail, for example, hourly 
wage of largely unionized full-time workers can be as much as 50% higher than 
those of much less unionized casual or fixed-term workers.  
Moreover, casualisation and non-standard forms of employment reinforce 
labour market polarizations along gender lines as atypical work involves 
predominantly women in both temporary and casual employment. By the end of 
the 1990s, in informal, self-employed occupations in urban areas the number of 
women employed tended to be higher than that of men (Grest, 2001; Valodia, 
2000; Lund and Skinner, 1999). Processes of “feminisation” of informal and 
atypical activities are related to “push” factors whereby women often enter the 
labour market under unfavourable and unprotected terms to replace the household 
monetary income lost due to the layoff of male members from higher-paying 
positions (Casale and Posel, 2001). The late-apartheid regime had encouraged, 
particularly through its Small Business Development Corporation, the growth in 
African micro-enterprises, especially based on self-employment. The aim was to 
create an enabling environment for African entrepreneurship and facilitate sub-
contracting of large-scale operations in manufacturing and building not only in 
“industrial decentralization” areas but in townships and inner cities as well 
(Rogerson, 1991).  
Post-apartheid industrial policy had sought the promotion of African 
micro-enterprise on the basis of a rhetoric, largely propped up by the World Bank 
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and the International Monetary Fund, that praised the dynamism and autonomy of 
this sector (McKeever, 1998). The picture of self-employment in South Africa 
presents a high level of complexity based on the wide variety of production 
processes, occupations and skills deployed. Recent studies also indicate, however, 
in self-employment dynamics of informalisation through sub-contracting and 
outsourcing of formal manufacturing production and employment. Therefore, the 
divide between “formal” and “informal” economy is blurred, rather than 
reinforcing a duality between the two spheres (Lund and Srinivas, 1998). In this 
sense, government policies that, with the aim of creating work in the informal 
sector, encourage employment flexibility and “modest minimum wages” 
(Department of Labour, 1996; Nattrass and Seekings, 1996; Baskin, 1998) 
reshape the boundary between formal, relatively protected, and informal, 
relatively vulnerable and unorganized jobs (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996).  
As Chapter 6 discusses more in detail, self-employment is relevant to the 
formal economy not only in terms of outsourcing, but also in providing, in the 
form of double jobs, alternative sources to cope with declining wages or 
employment insecurity. The large majority (almost 90%) of self-employed 
workers are African, and more than half of them are employed in street vending, 
shops and shebeens, with less than 1% in manufacturing (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 
1998). Self-employment in South Africa, in general, is revealing extended 
patterns of poverty and marginality that reinforce the link between atypical work 
and the degradation of wage labour. According to various estimates (Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt, 1998; Torres, Bhorat, Leibbrandt and Cassim, 2000: 80), around 55% 
of self-employed workers in South Africa (76% of which are African) earn below 
the SLL and 45% (72% of which are African) earn below the MLL. Female self-
employed workers are significantly more likely to be poor than male ones. The 
figures of below poverty self-employed income, moreover, are not substantially 
lower than that for unemployed workers below the poverty line  (55.4%). 
 A further, and much more elusive to measure, phenomenology concerning 
the diffusion of atypical employment concerns the use of labour brokers 
(Bezuidenhout, 1997). While reliable statistics on the extent of this aspect are 
lacking, its use has been regarded as particularly detrimental for union 
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organization and bargaining over wages and working conditions. In fact, it 
fragments the labour force under a plurality of employers and bargaining units, 
while turning the contractual negotiations between employers and employees into 
a commercial relation with labour broking companies. Trade unions’ opposition to 
this practice has led to frequent calls for it to be outlawed (NUMSA, 1999), even 
if a more pragmatic approach discussed for example by NUMSA is to approach 
labour brokers, trying to organize their workers and ensure basic wages and 
benefits20. In this way, the union hopes to replicate successes in collective 
bargaining that saw the inclusion in the 1999 Engineering National Agreement of 
a clause for the permanent hiring of casuals employed for at least three months21. 
Research in the former Transvaal manufacturing industries indicated that wages 
paid by approximately 3,000 labour brokers employing 100,000 workers could be 
on average 25% lower than industrial councils’ minimums (Naidoo, 1995a; 
Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996: Ch.3). 
Recent research on retail workers (Kenny, 2005) emphasise how 
casualisation creates new lines of occupational differentiation that fragment the 
workforce along gender, juridical status and occupational lines that intersect in 
very complex ways with trade union solidarity and organization. Trade unions 
have encountered growing difficulties in recruiting and organizing within sectors 
whose geography of production is becoming fragmented and dispersed and where 
casual and temporary workers with unstable jobs, limited attachment to the unions 
and difficulties in paying dues proliferate (Klerck, 1998). Not only does the 
peculiar vulnerability faced by workers in atypical occupations make them 
difficult to organize by trade unions, but it also makes unions uninterested in 
deploying resources to organize employees whose tenure, and therefore union 
membership, is unstable (Appolis and Sikwebu, 2003). At the same time, 
COSATU and other federations have resented “difficulties of regulation in small 
businesses” with most atypical workers, which undermine collective bargaining 
and unions’ influence in an increasingly hostile industrial and macroeconomic 
environment (Labour Constituency to the Jobs Summit, 1998; Webster, 1999).  
                                                
20 Dinga Sikwebu, NUMSA, Interview with the Author, 18 April 2000. 
21 Elias Monage, NUMSA, Interview with the Author, 20 April 2000. 
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Trends to the decentralization of bargaining as a result of subcontracting 
and the growth of small and micro enterprises (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 
1996) are seen as a threat to labour’s influence in centralized institutions for 
policy bargaining (COSATU, 1999a). Consequently, COSATU advocates a 
radical change of approach and a profound rethinking of organizational practices 
to make the organization of vulnerable workers a priority: 
 
The sub-contracting, casualising and division of workers is an 
attempt to deny workers the very citizenship rights that democracy 
promises them: the right to organize and to engage in collective 
bargaining and the right to work in fair and decent conditions. It is 
the re-emergence of a new form of apartheid employment strategies. 
It undermines  COSATU’s project of extending democracy and the 
rights of citizenship into the economy and working life (COSATU, 
1997a: 127). 
 
It is here quite significant that COSATU identifies atypical employment not only 
as an organizational challenge but also as a threat to a deep-seated, long-standing 
discourse of citizenship rights. Available data reveal that casualisation and 
atypical work undermine access to benefits and employer-subsidised social 
provisions (see Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4. Access to Enterprise Benefits for Regular and Temporary Workers (1996) 
 
Benefit Regular workers (%) Temporary workers (%) 
Paid vacation 96.1 16.4 
Paid sick leave 96.5 15.1 
Medical aid 67.8 1.4 
Medical facilities on site 53.0 33.8 
Subsidised housing/ housing allowance 12.9 0.5 
Childcare services 2.2 0.5 
Incentive bonuses 37.6 6.8 
Profit share bonus 12.5 1.4 
Severance pay 77.5 8.7 
Transport allowance 29.3 5.9 
Occupational health service 45.0 25.9 
Provident fund 85.7 8.7 
Paid maternity leave 61.6 2.3 
Pension 62.1 6.4 
Hostel benefits 5.2 0.5 
Source: ILO, South African Labour Flexibility Survey, cit. in Standing (1999: 226). 
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A report discussed at a COSATU policy conference in 1997 noticed that the lack 
of a comprehensive welfare system in South Africa, coupled to an enduring 
legacy of commodification continued to make employees dependant on employer-
subsidised provisions for their social security needs. By impacting on non-wage 
costs, this situation acted as a further brake on permanent employment and as an 
encouragement for casualisation (NALEDI, 1997). Official statistics show 
(Statistics South Africa, 2002: 2.13, 2.17) a growing number of employees that 
are not covered by employer-subsidised benefits. In the early 2000s, 55.08% of 
South African workers in formal employment (56.71% in manufacturing) had no 
medical insurance, while only 26.17% (24.53% in manufacturing) could provide 
coverage to dependants. At the same time, 44.83% of workers (half of which 
domestics and employees in trade), and 24.59% of manufacturing workers were 
not paying UIF contributions for reasons other than wages higher than the UIF 
limits. 
 The next section looks specifically at the broader trends in 
commodification of social provisions within which employment changes 
discussed in this section take place. Commodification, in fact, compounds and 
deepens in the broader society the vulnerability of wage labour emerged in the 
labour market. Employment vulnerability and fragmentation, conversely, 
interrogate the potential for social cohesion in the “hybrid” social citizenship 
arrangement emerged in the South African transition, which heavily relies on 
wage labour as a vehicle for social inclusion. 
In fact, the social marginalisation of wage labour is not merely confined to 
unemployment, but is a product of labour market stratifications that lead to the 
growth of working poverty while weakening the trade unions’ capacity to 
organise, represent and bargain for vulnerable sectors. The problem is heightened 
for the expanding areas of youth marginal population that are irrevocably 
excluded from wage labour and find no representation in a policy and institutional 
discourse that remains largely wage-centred (Sitas, 1998). Conversely, the 
institutionalisation of labour under the new dispensation requires trade unions, if 
they want to avoid being the representatives of a shrinking portion of workers 
with living standards above poverty levels, to develop ambitious policies to 
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allocate resources across a broader spectrum of needs.  Finally, the fact that 
poverty tends to be reproduced inside wage labour across highly complex and 
layered patterns of labour market stratification, rather than being merely reducible 
to lack of employment, questions the viability of government strategies of social 
insertion based on work and wage labour discipline.  
 
 
3.4 Commodification and the Widening Wage-Income Gap 
 
The linkages between commodification and casualisation of work that emerged 
from the previous section, and debates on the relevance of waged employment in 
policies of social inclusion, highlight the importance of commodification in the 
relationships between wage labour and social citizenship. The deepening under 
the new democracy of a long-standing legacy of commodification and welfare 
residualism creates further problems for the waged working class and widens the 
gap between wage and the income required to satisfy broad social needs.  
 Commodification also points at fundamental ambiguities and 
contradictions in labour’s strategies for social provisions. As Barrett (1989) 
argues, unions have a tradition of demanding such provisions from the state, while 
negotiating them with private capital, so that labour has left the question of 
inclusiveness and universality of the social security system unaddressed. The 
paradox of enforcing a selective system of benefits tied to employment status, 
while demanding universal social citizenship rights is adequately captured by 
what NUMSA’s Dinga Sikwebu calls “labour-driven privatisation of social 
welfare”: 
 
We are aware that we can’t continue just to win these benefits against 
the employers without seeing that they are spread throughout society 
as a whole because that reinforces accusations to the working class of 
being an elite. Anyway, I think it is counterproductive where there is 
a high unemployment that brothers and sisters will not be able to 
enjoy these benefits, so we must be able to fight for a universal 
welfare system.22 
                                                
22 Dinga Sikwebu, NUMSA, Interview with the Author, 18 April 2000. 
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In fact, workers’ dependence on company and industry schemes for access to 
healthcare, retirement benefits and housing loans reinforces the neglect of 
problems of social security long considered by democratic unions as the preserve 
of “sweetheart” labour organizations and benefit societies. An ironic outcome that 
many unionists have identified, however, is that only a small minority of waged 
workers have ended up benefiting from company-subsidised benefits, which 
become an added factor of segmentation of union constituencies. In the early 
1990s, approximately 20% of COSATU members had access to housing loans, 
usually through their provident fund’s contributions as collaterals (Schreiner, 
1989). In a sector heavily unionised and with a strong collective bargaining 
tradition like engineering, only 8% of NUMSA members are covered by medical 
schemes, as are only 25% of NUMSA’s overall members23. Sikwebu notices that 
issues related to the withdrawal of provident fund contributions in the event of 
retrenchments are creating increasing tensions and conflicts inside the unions. The 
possibility of withdrawing benefits, a conquest of working class struggles against 
“preservation” in the 1980s, is now turning into a threat for the unions, because it 
makes workers accept being retrenched if that means a substantial lump-sum 
payment with which to explore alternative economic opportunities, like starting a 
small business or buying a taxi. Sometimes the money is just needed to pay for 
household debts. Therefore, benefits and social rights are weighted against needs 
for daily survival with which they often are in contradiction: 
 
The general squeeze on workers leads them to see retirement money 
as a source of relief for their general problems. Now we have had big 
campaigns by workers to get the money into their pockets. That is a 
big issue, in a way I don’t think it is so in a progressive way, it is 
much more of a survivalist way and that is becoming, from a 
survivalist point of view, a big problem for the union (…). I can 
understand a worker that gets a report from the fund saying he has 
accumulated R120,000, and there isn’t an effective bursary scheme to 
get his kids to school, and they are being financially excluded. Or 
maybe his house is going to be taken because of the policies of the 
government on housing. Why should he spare money for when he 
retires when there are so much more pressing things to deal with now 
                                                
23 Paul Biyase, NUMSA, Interview with the Author, 18 April 2000. 
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(…). You can’t survive with your wages, so what do you do? If you 
go to the loan shark you sink into indebtedness and the only way to 
get out of that is to get retrenched and take the package. This has 
created a lot of instability for the union, it’s a time bomb for us.24 
 
With spiralling levels of unemployment, poverty and downgrading of wages and 
working conditions, social security acquires a new sense of urgency for the 
unions. Under apartheid, high levels of social spending were finalised to social 
control, rather than redistribution. In the early 1990s state transfers and grants 
contributed less than 4% to personal income (despite being about 12% of the GDP 
and 40% of the budget) compared to 12% in OECD countries with similar overall 
levels of budget allocations (Kruger, 1992: 8). At the same time, the late apartheid 
state had reinforced the means-tested nature of provisions that were not wage-
related, for example starting to phase out social pensions not for the elderly, like 
family allowances (Lund, 1993), a trend that the post-1994 government continued. 
The early democratic state strengthened the existing dualism in South Africa’s 
social welfare system between a minority of workers covered by comprehensive 
wage-related benefits, and a majority of working poor and unemployed that were 
either excluded from social security and assistance, or received a targeted and 
means-tested safety net, mainly in the form of old-age pensions.  
In this context, the impact of income redistribution was negligible. The 
democratic transition saw the growth of income inequalities along class lines that 
tended especially to polarise the African population, overlapping with existing 
racial disparities. While the income of the poorest 40% of African households 
declined 21% between 1991 and 1996, that of the richest 10% increased 17%. 
Therefore, while the African share of the poorest 30% of the population increased 
from 87% to 92% between 1975 and 1996, the African share in the top 10% also 
increased, from 2% to 22%, and the white share in this bracket declined from 95% 
to 65%. Income redistribution, in itself the source of only 8.4% of overall income 
growth, took place largely towards the richest 10% of the African population 
(40.1%) and the richest 10% of the white population (11.4%), while the poorest 
40% of the African population benefited from only 0.1% of redistribution 
                                                
24 Dinga Sikwebu, NUMSA Education Officer, Interview with Author, 18 April 2000. 
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(Whiteford and van Seventer, 2000). In 2000, while the richest 10% of South 
Africans received 51% of the national income, the poorest 40% received less than 
4% (NIEP, 2000). The following sub-sections will discuss how specific areas of 
policy intervention have dealt with changing scenarios of inequality. 
 
3.4.1 Non-Contributory Grants: A Strained Social Safety Net 
 
Social inequalities and vulnerability related to the crisis of waged employment 
and labour market fragmentation impinge on a system of social security that 
within the GEAR framework has reinforced its residual, selective and 
predominantly means-tested nature (Vorster, 2003). As a result, state social 
policies have unevenly addressed, and often reinforced, commodification levels 
that, together with the decline of wage labour, place increasing strains on working 
class incomes. Current welfare and social assistance expenditures are largely 
targeted at specific areas of social marginalisation and are only loosely connected 
with social security mechanisms. These latter remain largely based on active 
employment and provide an inadequate coverage for retirement and risk events 
related to unemployment, illness or disability. In 2001, approximately 65.5% of 
all social grants paid by the Department of Social Development (former 
Department of Welfare)  went to state old-age pensions (SOAP), with a decline 
from 70% in 1999 (Torres, 2000b; SAIRR, 2003: 348). The variation is largely 
explained by the increase in child support grants (CSG), also means-tested, 
extended in April 2003 to caregivers of  children under 9, up from the previous 7-
year age limit (Dept. of Social Development, 2001 and 2004). CSG beneficiaries 
increased from 2.5 to 7.5 million from 1997 to 2004, and by more than 50% 
between 2001 and 2002 (National Treasury, 2004: 495). On the other hand, CSGs 
were put in place after the gradual phasing out of a former, and substantially more 
generous, State Maintenance Grant (Haarmann, 1998; Zain, 2000)25. Moreover, to 
qualify for the CSG, caregivers must not only pass the means test, but they should 
not refuse employment “without good reason” (RSA, 1998a; Clark, 2000).  
                                                
25 The SMG was gradually phased out between 1998 and 2001, and in 1998 it amounted to R235 
per month. CSGs paid R130 per month in 2002, down from R150 in 2001 (SAIRR, 2003: 348). 
The policy discourse for the transition from SMG to CSG is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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SOAPs are paid on a means-tested basis26 to male recipients aged 65 and 
above and female aged 60 and above. According to the 1996 Census, only eight 
per cent of the population were entitled to SOAPs, whose maximum monthly 
value in 2002 was R620. In 1994, only 5% of the poorest 10% of the population 
were SOAP recipients (Van der Berg, 1994). As evidence of the limited 
decommodifying impacts of old-age pensions, rates of increase of SOAP were 
below the rate of inflation for every year from 1994 to 2002, with the exception of 
1997 and 2002. SOAP payments that were theoretically required, in excess of 
actual payments, to keep pace with inflation went from R13 per month in 1994 to 
R 99 in 2002 (SAIRR, 2003: 349). The functioning of SOAPs and CSGs means 
that South African citizens aged between 9 and 59 (women) or 64 (men) are 
totally deprived of any form of state social security coverage.  
An added strain on SOAPs is due to pension sharing with which, in the 
absence of a comprehensive social security system, elderly members of the 
household are often the main source of support for long-term unemployed 
relatives (McKendrick and Shingwenyana, 1995; Sagner and Mtati, 1999; 
Barrientos, 2003). This factor can hardly be taken as evidence of the 
“universalism” (Matisonn and Seekings, 2002) of the SOAP system. The 
importance of the SOAP as a means to decommodify livelihoods of poor South 
Africans avoiding utter social dislocation can be seen by data according to which, 
in the middle of the 1990s, 52% of the African population would have been at the 
income level of the poorest 10%, had it not been for the SOAP, which on average 
increased the income of the bottom 20% of the population by 206%, and that of 
the next 20% by 24% (Le Roux, 1995). 
 
 
 
                                                
26 In 2000 the means test for SOAP limited eligibility to net incomes of less than R12504 per year, 
or R1042 per month, or a combined income of R23064 per year or R1922 per month for married 
couples. The means test for the CSG limited eligibility to household’s net income of R9600 per 
year, or R13200 per year for households living in rural areas or informal dwelling. Income used to 
calculate means tests include cash payments, pensions and provident funds, income from 
immovable property. The means test formula also penalises, among other, “assets” in the form of 
immovable property and lump sums invested with the aim of procuring an annuity (NIEP, 2000; 
Van der Berg, 2001a). 
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3.4.2 Contributory Provisions: Unemployment Insurance, Retirement 
Benefits and the Reproduction of Exclusion 
 
The South African system of social security for retirement and unemployment is 
separate from social assistance both in its logics of operation and in its 
institutional framework. In particular, the Department of Labour is responsible for 
the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), in terms of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act (UIA) of 2001, which replaced the former UIA of 1966, and for the 
administration of benefits under the 1993 Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act (COIDA)27. The UIF defines as beneficiaries only contributors 
in regular employment and excludes independent contractors, casual workers, 
public employees covered by the Government Employees’ Pension Funds, self-
employed, job seekers, workers employed for less than one full day or eight hours 
per week, and employees with incomes above a maximum ceiling subject to 
variation (Olivier 2000a, xx)28. A 2002 amendment to the UIA has extended UIF 
benefits to domestic and seasonal workers.  
UIF benefits, at a graduated replacement rate ranging from 60% of the last 
wage for low-income workers to 38% for middle and high-incomes can be 
claimed by contributors who have been in employment for at least 13 weeks, and 
have contributed for at least six months, over the 52 weeks that preceded 
unemployment, illness or maternity (NEDLAC, 2000b)29. The contributor must be 
capable and available for work, whereby refusal to accept or to apply for suitable 
employment is ground for the exclusion from benefits. The system is designed to 
punish work avoidance, which includes the denial of benefits for loss of 
                                                
27 On the COIDA, which replaced the 1941 Workmen’s Compensation Act and the 1973 Mines 
and Works Act, see Rosengarten (1983), Benjamin (1992), Department of Labour (1997) and Flutz 
and Pieris (1999). 
28 Since the 1980s the independent trade unions had demanded the inclusion of jobseekers and 
long-term unemployed under state-funded unemployment insurance (Industrial Aid Society, 1984). 
29 Following the Unemployment Insurance Contribution Act of 2002, 7 days of benefits are 
claimable every 42 days of contributions for a maximum of 238 days (121 days for maternity 
benefits) over the four years preceding the application for benefits. This system replaces the 
previous one, where one week of benefits could be paid every six weeks of contributions. Such a 
system departed from the insurance principle of the UIF because it allowed contributors to build 
contributory “credits” over their entire lifetime and be therefore still eligible for benefits even in 
the event of not contributing for long periods of time. The new system, moreover, separates 
maternity and unemployment benefits, allowing claimants of maternity benefits to remain covered 
by insurance against unemployment. 
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employment resulting from strikes and lock-outs where the contributor is part to 
or has an interest in the dispute (Calitz, Grant, Shipman and van Kerken, 1999).  
The financing of the system relies entirely on employers and employees, 
which contribute 1% each of the contributor’s earnings. Since 1979 the 
government has actually stopped contributing to the UIF following an amendment 
to the UIA that limited state contributions to 25% of the aggregate contributions 
of employers and employees but not in excess of R7 million annually. A 
ministerial inquiry reported in December 1996 that less than 10% of the 
unemployed were benefiting from the UIF. At the same time, workers with 
extremely low wages claimed a minor amount of UIF benefits due to the fact that 
it is more difficult for them to build benefits through fixed contributions from a 
meagre payroll. In 1996, two thirds of benefits were paid to employees earning 
more than R1,500 per month. Workers below that level, which constituted 70% of 
contributors, received only one third of benefits (27% in the case of female 
workers). Moreover, less than 5% of contributors in top income brackets received 
almost 20% of total benefits payout. Duration of benefits was also highly unequal: 
for salaries of less than R500 per month benefits were paid for 1.9 months on 
average, while for wages higher than R5,000 per month they were paid for 4.6 
months (Meth, Naidoo and Shipman, 1996: 37).  
As the Unemployment Insurance Board recognised, the UIF functions 
predominantly as a temporary economic relief, hence the conflation of maternity, 
sickness and death benefits in the UIF, rather than as a real income replacement 
for the unemployed (Department of Labour, 1995)30. Moreover, vast areas of 
exclusion from the UIF, especially long-term jobseekers, reflect the fund’s 
inability to face labour market’s failures to absorb new entrants. The UIF 
therefore codifies unemployment or under-employment as temporary accidents of 
life, rather than enduring, long-term forms of exclusion. Moreover, the state’s 
disengagement from the fund heavily limits its redistributive potential, leading to 
                                                
30 At the same time it is to be noticed that, during the limited duration of benefits, the UIF’s 
income replacement rate is approximately 50% with three years contributions and a R2000 
monthly wage, which is far higher than the 27.3% replacement rate the same worker would have 
with 20 years contributions in a defined contributions pension fund. The authors of these 
estimates, therefore, are quick to complain about the “disproportionately high” level of UIF 
benefits (Van der Berg and Bredenkamp, 2002: 45-46). 
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chronic underfunding. In 1999 the Auditor General ultimately declared the UIF 
“technically insolvent” (Auditor General of South Africa, 2001; Thari Consulting, 
n.d.). Since then, the number of unemployment claims approved and the benefits 
paid out have constantly declined, even if the average per capita benefits have 
marginally increased. While in 1998 842,000 UIF beneficiaries received R3,623 
each on average, the number of beneficiaries had dropped to 569,000 in 2003, for 
R4,150 average benefits (Department of Labour, 2003).  
The National Treasury has opposed more generous and inclusive benefits 
and the Department of Labour is not been enthusiastic on expanding coverage for 
casual workers and jobseekers. The UIF Commissioner, Shadrack Mkontho, 
commenting on the question of raising UIF contributions from employers said: 
 
Our approach is to create a balance between security and 
employment. So what we say is that as much as we’d like to regulate 
the market, we also don’t want to kill jobs (…). I think that is where 
the tension is between us and labour, because traditionally we come 
from the same history and I think the expectations they have is that 
we’ll be sympathetic to their reasons and demands, but we are with 
the government now, you see? Let’s take the whole issue of 
casualisation. In terms of labour, what you must do is to legislate so 
that it is not attractive for an employer to casualise, right? (…). Now, 
our approach is we are in a globally economy now, whereby we 
cannot act as if we are in isolation from what is happening in the 
world31. 
 
The South African system of retirement benefits is fully privatised. The country 
does not have a national public pension system, and company or industry-based 
schemes provide the totality of retirement coverage, usually on a fully-funded 
rather than on a more redistributive pay-as-you-go system. In mid-1990s, 
approximately 70% of employed workers contributed to retirement funds, with 
hourly and weekly paid workers belonging predominantly to provident funds, 
which allowed for lump sum withdrawals of contributions in the event of loss of 
employment. Both provident and pension funds are funded by employers’ and 
employees’ contributions at usual rate of 7.5% of the normal wage (RSA, 1992; 
Naidoo, 1995b).  
                                                
31 Shadrack Mkontho, UIF Commissioner, Interview with the Author, 2 October 2000. 
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 Workers’ preference for provident funds is a product of the inadequacies 
of unemployment insurance in providing an income for the long-term 
unemployed, which leads many retrenched workers to give up retirement income 
to withdraw accumulated contributions. As Asher (2000) estimates, a retirement 
fund with a 6.7% payroll contribution level is likely to pay a greater overall cash 
benefit than the UIF, and retirement contributions are usually at a 7.5% level. 
There is abundant evidence of the inability of the private pension system to 
provide for adequate post-employment income. In 1995, 40% of monthly 
payments from retirement funds were lower than the state old-age pension, and 
more than 50% of beneficiaries received less than the SLL threshold of roughly 
R600 per month (RSA, 1995a: 18-19). Labour’s, particularly COSATU’s, 
approach has traditionally prioritised a clear separation between an effective 
unemployment coverage and retirement benefits to be paid entirely at the end of 
the worker’s career (Congress of South African Trade Unions, 1999). In this way, 
the unions have tried to respond to the inherent contradictions in provident funds 
which, rather than the UIF, have come to provide the main safeguard against job 
loss.  
Post-1994 policy orientations to the reform of the retirement provisions 
system have, however, been particularly concerned with extending access to 
private retirement funds as a way to reduce the costs for the state of old age 
pensions. The 1995 Smith Committee on retirement provisions recommended 
incentives of different kinds -- including tax breaks, relaxation of the means test to 
facilitate the accumulation of financial assets and special funds for informal 
workers -- to encourage recipients of the SOAP to save for their retirement and 
cease being dependent on government transfers (RSA, 1995a: 42; Naidoo, 1995b). 
The drive to further commodify retirement provisions was endorsed by the 
Department of Finance and the RDP Ministry in the Office of the President. This 
latter, in particular, argued that job-creating investment, rather than “handouts”, 
should remain the priority of state social spending, while the former supported 
Smith Committee’s emphasis on downsizing the SOAP. It is indicative, from this 
point of view, that the only main recommendation of the Smith Committee that 
was rejected by the Department of Finance was to peg pension payments at a 
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fixed rate equal to 1.7% of the GDP, which the department deemed too 
expensive32.  
Therefore, the government’s approach not only confirmed the 
commodification of retirement income, but tried to expand it by limiting the 
state’s existing responsibilities in the provision of old-age pensions through 
redistributive means. Conversely, a similar emphasis was not placed on making 
retirement benefits more adequate as a replacement income, in a context whereby 
low-wage workers would need substantial portions of their wages as contributions 
only to achieve a retirement income at the level of the SOAP (see Table 3.5). A 
survey conducted in 1999 found out that 94% of retirees in South Africa are not 
financially independent, with 47% still depending on their families after 
retirement, 31% continuing to work and 17% depending on state pensions 
(Falkena and Luus, 1999).  
 
Table 3.5. Percentage of Income Required to Provide Retirement Benefits at 60/65 Years of 
Age Equivalent to a SOAP of R410/month, 1995 
 
 R750/month Wage R1250/month Wage R1750/month Wage 
Years of 
contributions 
Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Both 
40 8 10 18 5 6 11 3 4 7 
35 10 12 22 6 7 13 4 5 9 
30 12 15 27 7 9 16 5 6 11 
25 16 19 35 9 11 20 7 8 15 
20 21 25 46 13 15 28 9 11 20 
15 30 36 66 18 22 40 13 15 28 
10 48 58 106 29 35 64 21 25 46 
Figures represent percentages of income required as contributions at different wage levels and 
years of contribution to be able to receive at least R410/month at retirement. 
Source: RSA (1995a: 47). 
 
The combined impact of inadequacies in the UIF and in retirement benefits 
questions a notion of ‘employment’ as a phase of life in which rights and 
entitlements are built to be enjoyed after work. Increasing uncertainties in 
retirement incomes rather tend to face the individual worker with the alternative 
of either depending on waged employment well after the retirement age, or 
spending retirement benefits to cope with job losses. On the other hand, trends to 
commodification of retirement income are reinforced by the growing exposure of 
                                                
32 Hansard, 13 June 1996, pp.3021-3025. 
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benefits to the fluctuations of financial markets. Following international trends 
(Blackburn, 2004), in fact, the growth of contingent and atypical forms of 
employment has mirrored a shift of retirement funding risks from the companies 
to the employees. The adoption of “defined contributions” in place of “defined 
benefit” schemes (Orr, 1996) in fact reduces the employers’ liability in financing 
workers’ retirement. At the same time, defined contributions schemes carry, 
however, relatively higher returns for workers whose contributory periods are 
curtailed by layoffs or whose working life is shortened by illnesses like HIV-
AIDS. According to independent projections “defined contributions” schemes 
rose from about 25% of total pension assets in 1995 to 60% in 200033. 
 
3.4.3 Healthcare Policy: Universalising Private Access? 
 
In the case of health services as well, inequalities of access inherited from the past 
are coupled to a highly commodified pattern of delivery (McIntyre and Doherty, 
2004). On one hand, the public health sector predominantly serves the low-
income population, with free public primary healthcare for all citizens and free 
access to public hospitals based on income-test or limited to particularly 
vulnerable groups such as children under 6 and pregnant women, but not the 
elderly or patients suffering from HIV/AIDS. On the other hand, private sector 
structures offer a much higher level of quality for customers that can afford health 
insurance under private (usually company-based) medical aid schemes. In 1997, 
between 17 and 18 percent of the population (McCoy, 2000; Olivier 2000a, 152-
153) was covered by medical aid schemes, but while coverage was 60% for the 
richest 20% of the population, it was only 5% for the poorest 40% (Soderlund, 
Schierhoul and van den Heever, 1998: 142). By 2000, the covered population had 
declined to 16.3%, while the African population covered by private healthcare has 
dropped from 10% to 8.4% between 1996 and 1999 (Statistics South Africa, 
2001a). Conversely, in 1995 the public health sector served 80 percent of the 
population with approximately 50% of the total health budget and 40% of the 
practitioners (Pillay and Bond 1995).  
                                                
33 The Economist, 5 June 1999. According to Asher (2000: 3) almost all retirement funds in South 
Africa were “defined benefits” until the mid-1980s. 
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 The state of overcrowding and poor quality of services in the depleted 
public sector is indicated by the fact that in 1999 nearly one-quarter of all private 
sector expenditures were paid "out-of-pocket" by users not covered by private 
medical schemes and entitled to free public healthcare (Goudge, 2000: 71). Facing 
powerful business resistance to proposals to institute a National Health Insurance 
fund (Van den Heever 1994), the 1997 “White Paper for the Transformation of the 
Health System” confirmed the RDP’s orientation to primary health care 
(particularly for women and children) as the most accessible form of health 
delivery. The extension of free primary care for pregnant women and children 
under 6, established in 1996, was marked by unevenness in implementation and 
low standards of newly-built facilities (Bond and Khosa 1999; Bond, Pillay and 
Sanders, 1997). Minister of Health Dlamini-Zuma has emphatically stated that 
“primary health care does not mean cheap care”34. Huge disparities between 
“curative” private care and “primary” public care, however, ultimately reflect in 
the South African case a trend that Packard (1997) identifies across the 
developing world. For him, “primary health care” is applied as a rhetorical device 
spun off an expert knowledge that, within international institutions, is interested in 
downgrading public healthcare in the direction of selective, residual provisions for 
the extremely poor. 
 Post-1994 health policies have looked at regulating the private sector in 
trying to ensure some equity of access (Nadasen, 2000; Blaauw and Gilson, 
2001). In this regard, expert policy recommendations have tended to reinforce a 
view of healthcare provision as based on strict insurance principles, with clear 
connections between risk-events and payments, and a rejection of progressive 
funding systems, like pay-as-you-go schemes, seen as “encouragement of an 
entitlement, as opposed to an insurance, mentality” (RSA, 1994c: 57). Compared 
to other government ministries, the Department of Health has, however, shown 
sensitivity to the need of equalising access to services in private schemes, for 
example by encouraging legislation and tax incentives to provide for risk-sharing, 
limit discrimination and avoid risk-rated premiums (Department of Health, 1996). 
                                                
34 Hansard, 19 June 1995, p.2855. 
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Regulations “against the threat of managed care”35 were also argued for. Rather 
than endorsing the principle of universal publicly-funded healthcare, however, the 
government envisaged the gradual expansion of coverage by private schemes as a 
preferred solution. Indeed, equalising access to private schemes was considered, 
in purported imitation of  what the Smith Committee had recommended for 
pensions, a way to “encourage behaviour that will prevent people ultimately 
relying on the state” (Department of Health, 1997a: 7).  
 In this way, however, employment remained a decisive factor in 
determining access, therefore limiting the decommodifying impact of the 
proposed policies. The 1995 Broomberg-Shisana Committee, for example, 
recommended that everyone in formal employment should be covered by private 
health insurance schemes providing, also in public hospitals, a minimum benefit 
package refunded by the scheme for an amount equivalent to at least the 
corresponding costs in the public system. Indicatively enough, however, one of 
the rationales cited for this proposal was to actually further commodify healthcare 
by “improving cost recovery within the public hospital system” (RSA, 1995b: 
S.23) and limiting “non-payment” of public hospital services by employed people 
without medical aid. 
 The 1999 Medical Schemes Act advanced the notion of "minimum benefit 
packages", which include “essential” hospital care, and prohibited discrimination 
in access and contributions on the basis of age, sex, race, past medical history and 
frequency of use of medical services. The Act established a “community rating” 
principle according to which contributions could not be differentiated according to 
health status, but only on the basis of specified criteria, which include 
contributors’ income and number of dependants. Moreover, as a  counterweight to 
commodification, co-payments were allowed only for non-prescribed benefits, 
and the ratio between health savings accounts and contributions was limited to 
                                                
35 Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Health, 
Hansard, 4 June 1996, p.2197. As organisations that “manage the utilisation of health care through 
the use of mechanisms that are designed to monitor appropriateness, promote efficacy, quality and 
cost-effectiveness” (Roy, 2002) of healthcare delivery, managed care organisations are an effective 
way to contain health costs in a privatised environment. Economies are usually achieved by 
contracting with healthcare providers the delivery of packages at standard conditions, usually on a 
bulk basis (especially in “preferred provider” schemes). In this way, however, commodification of 
healthcare is reinforced by establishing a more stringent connection between the users’ financial 
capacity and the type and amount of services provided (Gottschalk, 2000). 
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15%. Finally, a fixed premium scale was introduced to avoid adverse selection of 
the elderly (Carstens et al., 1999). At the same time, however, and despite a public 
support for the idea of state-funded social health insurance (Doherty et al., 2000; 
McIntyre, Doherty and Gilson, 2003; Blaauw and Gilson, 2001), private medical 
schemes were reinforced as the “socially desirable” option over decommodified 
universal public healthcare36.  
 In the final analysis, the government’s health policy confirmed its 
commitment to liberalise the market and prioritise private provision while 
enforcing regulations to prevent discriminatory coverage. Part of this strategy, 
which departs from strict insurance principles, is to increase diseconomies for 
private providers, which are faced with escalating costs. In this sense, limited 
mandatory services and contributions can facilitate a move towards public 
healthcare. At the same time, however, private providers’ lack of interest in 
“unprofitable” low-income markets, combined to the steady deterioration of the 
public health sector, make the possibility of a greater involvement of the private 
sector in funding a semi-public contributory system remote (Van den Heever, 
1998)37.  
 Rising private healthcare costs have short-term detrimental effects on 
contributing employees, which are increasingly opting out of medical aids. 
Ironically, the prescribed benefits established by the 1999 Act have led many 
schemes offering blue-collar, low-cost products to increase their fees for services 
provided particularly in public hospitals with a low reimbursement rate. While in 
1986 the rate of premiums' increase in relation to inflation was 9:18, in 1995 it 
was 13:8, and from 1990 to 1999 it has been 18:10 on average. According to 
                                                
36 In this sense, the 1999 Act was a retreat from the Department of Health’s earlier commitment to 
establish a payroll-funded Social Health Insurance system which, among other things, was 
supposed to include a public hospital fund in the form of a contributory scheme, a “second tier” 
publicly-funded mechanism intended to increase public propensity to contribute to healthcare. 
According to the Department, the new scheme would have brought coverage to 17.3 million 
members, 10.4 of which with yearly incomes of less than R15,000. At the same time, 70% of 
private schemes’ members are above this income level (Department of Health, 1997b). This 
proposal was shelved after encountering the determined opposition of private medical schemes, 
worried that a publicly funded scheme would have involved an adverse selection against them, and 
from private hospitals, worried about losing their low-income clientele, see Alex van den Heever, 
Council of Medical Schemes, interview with the Author, 29 November 2000). 
37 See also Alex van den Heever, Council of Medical Schemes and Department of Health, 
Interview with the Author, 29 November 2000. 
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Rothberg, Magennis and Mynhart (2000), with the spread of “managed care” 
schemes (Roy, 2002) funders and providers have contained medicalization and 
hospitalisation costs while admission fees for users have risen, signalling a shift of 
the financing burden towards the customer.  
 A survey conducted in 2000 by the Johannesburg Metropolitan Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (JMCCI) on 1500 member companies found that one 
third of respondents addressed rising healthcare costs (and a further 8% was 
planning to do so) by offering "salary packages" to employees as lump-sum 
medical compensations, which substantially reduce the amount of claimable 
benefits38. At the same time, 20% of respondents were limiting their employees' 
medical benefits to schemes with low premiums and limited coverage and 53% 
reported that the number of their staff on medical aids had decreased since the 
passing of the Medical Schemes Act, mostly due to premiums' increases. 
According to other surveys, while overall members' contributions currently stand 
at 55% of the total premiums paid, this is expected to touch 70% (corresponding 
to 14% of the amount of wages) by 2010, also due to the dramatic increase in  
HIV/AIDS prevalence39. The government’s strategy of “privatised universalism” 
as an alternative to decommodification supported through redistribution seems 
therefore questioned by the very market forces initially advocated to limit reliance 
on the public sector. 
 
3.4.4 Housing Policy: Public Expenditure as an Incentive to Commodification 
  
In the sphere of housing policies, finally, the government has followed a line that, 
compared to the Department of Health's emphasis on equalising conditions for 
access, has more closely followed macroeconomic orthodoxy (Bond 1999; Khan, 
2004). The post-1994 housing policy framework remained largely market-based 
and dependent on private banking institutions for credit. It is particularly 
remarkable, however, that these orientations emerged from a broad process of 
consultation that during apartheid’s final years had involved a broad spectrum of 
civil society actors, including the ANC, trade unions and non-governmental 
                                                
38 Sowetan, 14 June 2000, p.5. 
39 Finance Week, 26 June 2000, p.16. 
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organizations. In 1992 a National Housing Forum (NHF) had been started 
following the initiative of the liberally-minded Consultative Business Movement. 
While not unique in a late apartheid context that saw the proliferation of “forums” 
in many areas of socio-economic policy making, the NHF engaged in structured 
interactions with the Department of Housing, which culminated in the 1993 
launch of a National Housing Board (NHB) that replaced all the former racially-
segregated housing policy institutions. An early consensus between the 
government and the NHF was found on the need to reshape existing state housing 
subsidies and define new mechanisms of mortgage indemnity to attract private 
developers to black townships (Rust, 1996). 
 The NHF became increasingly institutionalised within housing policy 
making, and its role increasingly was to select civil society representatives for the 
NHB. The National Housing Summit held in Botshabelo in October 1994 marked 
the end of the NHF, which converged in the broader consultative process charged 
with outlining democratic South Africa’s housing policy. The main product of this 
process was the 1994 “Housing White Paper”. The White Paper’s basic approach 
was in line with a residualist view of social services delivery as a way to “provide 
security of tenure and access to basic services as well as possibly a rudimentary 
starter formal structure to the poorest of the poor” (Department of Housing, 1994: 
5.3.7). To this end, in particular, a new system of housing subsidies was envisaged 
as part of a “social compact” between communities, the state and private 
developers (Tomlinson, 1999).  
Explicitly aimed at promoting home ownerships in poor communities, the 
housing subsidy initially consisted of a maximum of R15,000, set on a scale 
depending on household income, for households earning less than R3,500 per 
month. The NHF had reached consensus on a principle of “incrementalism”, 
which privileged “breadth” over “depth” in public intervention and regarded, 
therefore, public subsidies as starter finance for a wide number of poor recipients, 
rather than focusing on more substantial amounts for smaller numbers (Adler and 
Oelofse, 1996). In this way, subsidies were intended to act as the basis of a 
partnership whereby private finance could arguably complement basic public 
provisions.  
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 Critics of this solution regard it as a capitulation by the ANC government 
and its civil society allies to the centrality of private investment and commodified 
housing provision (Bond, 1999: 122-151). In this view, a logic that had 
historically failed to provide low-cost housing in black communities was therefore 
destined to perpetuate spatial inequalities and marginalisation of the poor 
(Royston, 2002; Hassen, 2003; Huchzermeyer, 2004: 179-223). Progressive 
organizations inside the NHF had lambasted the concept of “incrementalism” as 
legitimising inferior housing standards for the poor, or “a new word for 
[apartheid-era] site-and-service”40 policies. Adler and Oelofse (1996) show, 
indeed, that attracting private top-up investment rapidly became the new 
government’s priority, replacing decommodified housing provisions. This was 
coterminous with a gradual sidestepping of civil society inputs and of the NHF 
itself. Direct negotiations between the government and mortgage lenders led, in 
particular, to reconfigure public housing finance as ancillary to financial capital. 
For example, a public mortgage indemnity scheme was started to cover 
“politically inspired” risks, namely the legacy of apartheid-age rent boycotts and 
land occupations, while a National Housing Finance Corporation was mandated 
with providing finance for private low-income housing developments41.  
 The philosophy of incrementalism was, on the other hand, responsive to 
the ANC’s Housing Minister Joe Slovo’s stated ambition to “end the undeclared 
war between communities, the state and the private sector” in order to alleviate 
communities of the burden of being “passive recipients” of housing42. To present 
limited public subsidy allocations as a benefit for poor communities, therefore, the 
government deployed a substantial amount of entrepreneurial rhetoric, self-help 
imagery and a disciplining discourse based on the individual duty to manage 
scarce financial resources. After recognising that the R15,000 public subsidy “will 
seldom, if ever, buy the kind of house people imagine when they turn to 
daydreaming”, Slovo himself clarified: 
                                                
40 Reid to Pinsky, 30 May 1994, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 25.24.5. 
41 The ANC, on the other hand, was of the opinion that even the state role in providing “bridging 
finance” in the form of mortgage indemnity had to be limited, and that this task was a 
responsibility of the private sector, see African National Congress, Department of Local 
Government, National Housing Subsidy Scheme. Discussion Document, Draft 4, May 1994, Wits 
DHP, PLANACT, 25.24.3.5. 
42 Hansard, 25 May 1994, p.37. 
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If one gets R15,000 and chooses the most expensive area of land, or 
takes R15,000 to purchase expensive building material, it will be 
little, it will not be enough. What I am saying is that we are allocating 
the R15,000 as assistance money for the needy, for the poor, and we 
call upon our people to maximise the use of the subsidy43. 
 
In the final analysis, as Slovo added in a different occasion, “maximisation” of the 
subsidy depended on the people’s ability to attract private developers in their 
communities, which ultimately required the orderly payment of bonds, rents and 
fees in accordance with what the government’s Masakhane campaign was 
recommending44. Far from being a measure aimed at decommodifying housing, 
therefore, the subsidy was an inducement to discipline users into paying for 
municipal services45. Revolutionary, marxisant struggle parlance occasionally 
supported this celebration of public spending downgrading, as in the case of the 
ANC member of Parliament that praised incrementalism as the “dialectical 
unity”46 of public subsidies and private finance. In endorsing the concept of 
“incrementalism”, the NHF had, on the other hand, expressed the concern that the 
new housing subsidy could be intended as “a strategy for substandard provision of 
housing”. To counter this danger, the Forum suggested to present the subsidy in a 
positive light, as a way to reduce dependency on the state47 and as an 
encouragement for the “ingenuity and commitment communities demonstrated, 
even when confronted with limited resources”48.  
 In its current structure, the housing subsidy scheme (HSS) provides 
financial assistance finalised at acquiring home ownership for households with 
incomes of up to R3500 per month (Newton, 1998; Tomlinson, 1999; Lanegran 
                                                
43 Hansard, 28 February 1996, p.240. 
44 Hansard, 16 May 1995, p.1269. 
45 These arguments were, on the other hand, consistent with recommendations from the World 
Bank, according to which “There are significant advantages to end-users paying at least some of 
the cost of services. Not only are public resources freed up for other social objectives, paying for 
services makes users more attentive to the quality of what is provided, more willing to participate 
in delivery, and readier to speak out in the event of quality shortfalls” (Ahmad, Hansen, Fallon and 
Levy, 1994: 44). 
46 Hansard, 16 May 1995, p.1271. 
47 See National Housing Forum, Co-ordinating Committee Third Strategic Workshop, Glenburn 
Lodge, Muldersdrift, 3-5 November 1993, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 25.25.10.3. 
48 National Housing Forum, Submission to the Proposed National Housing Strategy, 4 October 
1994, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 25.11.2. 
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and Lanegran, 2001). Different kinds of subsidies provide, among other, for 
access to land and infrastructures (Project-Linked Subsidy), purchase of a house 
(Individual Subsidy) or rental and co-operative housing (Institutional Subsidy). 
Between 1994 and 2000, 80% of approved subsidies were project-linked and 13% 
were individual (NIEP, 2000). The highest subsidy amount was R20,300 in 2003, 
for households with income of less than R1,500 per month, decreasing to R7,000 
for households with income between R2,510 and R3,500. A recent investigation 
by the Public Service Commission (2003: 86) shows that most recipients of 
project-linked subsidies live in conditions of extreme poverty with household 
incomes in the region of R600-800 per month. These figures rise for individual, 
institutional and credit-linked subsidies. Approximately one quarter of project-
linked recipients had either no income at all or survived on state grants. Individual 
subsidies’ recipients have, instead, a R1200 median monthly household income, 
while 21% percent of them are in formal employment and 16% are in informal 
employment (Public Service Commission, 2003: 87).  
 The limited impact of the HSS in decommodifying access to housing is, 
however, emphasised by high levels of dissatisfaction for poor building standards 
and low quality of services allowed by the subsidies (Tomlinson, 1996; Public 
Services Commission, 2003). By 1999, only 30% of houses built with subsidies 
complied with building regulations, mainly in areas where additional subsidies, 
usually from local governments, were available (NIEP, 2000: 30). Moreover, the 
HSS’s aim to facilitate partnerships between aspiring homeowners and private 
financial institutions clashed with these latter’s resistance to fund low-cost 
housing in black townships with high levels of poverty, unemployment and 
entrenched traditions of militancy and rent boycotts. An alternative for formally 
employed workers, as discussed in Chapter 7, is to use their retirement 
contributions to access mortgage lending49, which amounts to further 
commodification of housing while endangering retirement incomes. For the  
unemployed, however, such possibilities are unavailable, and they are moreover 
                                                
49 The use of accumulated pension contributions in the forms of housing loans is the only form of 
withdrawal of contributions to be legally allowed by the Pension Funds Act (No.24 of 1956, 
Sect.18(5)). This practice has been however repeatedly discouraged by the statutory Pension Funds 
Registrar, especially with Circular PF92/1997, which expressly blames it for the erosion of 
retirement benefits (Janse van Rensburg et al., 1999). 
 135
affected by geographical discrimination, or “redlining”, enforced by private 
investors (Bond and Tait, 1997).  
 Diat von Broembsen, Chief Director of Policy Planning at the Department 
of Housing50, recognises the contradiction implicit in a policy approach that 
encourages ownership among sectors of the population that do not have real 
possibilities to achieve it except at very poor levels of access. At the same time, 
the government has reinforced the commodified nature of access to housing 
abdicating from redistributive policy interventions in the sector, for example by 
denying mortgage guarantees in several impoverished locations. The state has 
rather prioritized the stabilization of the private grants market by targeting 
subsidies according to a concept of housing “affordability” defined in ways that 
minimize housing costs by reducing standards (Bond, 1999). Therefore, the 
Department of Housing's (1995) definition of "full services" encompasses 
relatively rudimentary provisions such as household-connected water supplies, 
paved roads with drainage and 60 amps electricity. These are defined "affordable" 
for households able to pay monthly fees of R270-350, which are relatively high as 
a proportion of state grants or minimum wages in many sectors. 
 The construction of “affordability” as a concept finalised at ensuring 
residents’ ability to repay private lenders, rather than as protecting access to basic 
housing rights, is stated in the position of SERVCON, a public-private partnership 
charged by the government with managing repossessed houses from loan 
defaulters: 
 
The housing policy in simple terms means that the poor will be 
assisted through capital subsidies but beyond that people must live in 
houses they can afford. This is not generally understood nor accepted 
by everyone. The impact is that if you can no longer afford your 
house you will have to move to a cheaper one (…). Those who 
continue to refuse to cooperate will have to face the normal legal 
process (…). Many people who have signed either sales or rightsizing 
agreements will have to receive “intensive care” until they establish a 
constant payment pattern” (Creighton, n.d.). 
 
                                                
50 Interview with the Author, 7 August 2001. 
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The reconfiguration of housing away from a public social provision and towards a 
fully commodified good accessible on the basis of the individual’s financial means 
had also been clearly phrased in Minister Slovo’s warnings. In response to the 
ANC’s Mary Turok’s protestation that “housing is a right, not a commodity”51, the 
minister argued that the government would not “keep listening to excuses”52 of 
poor residents that refuse to pay for their rents. In their case: 
 
Let me make very clear that people who refuse to respond to [our] 
very fair offers will be occupying accommodation which neither 
belongs to them nor to which they have any right. We are determined 
for the rule of law to take its course in these instances. We are saying 
to the communities that it is in their interest to support the rule of law, 
because only then can they hope to attract housing investment on a 
sufficiently large scale53. 
 
In the case of housing, therefore, commodification and the allure of private 
property emerge not only as policy alternatives to public social provisions, but 
also as a pedagogical discursive device that justifies the withdrawal of public 
resources by making the satisfaction of communities’ social needs dependent 
upon individual discipline and entrepreneurial activity (Castles, 1998). 
 The government’s perceptions of the subsidy’s limits as a tool to attract 
private housing finance in African townships have ultimately played a relevant 
part in recent reassessments of housing policy. Current policy debates, in fact, are 
focused on the need to rethink the earlier ownership-orientated approach and 
develop multi-pronged, flexible solutions. These tend to prioritise rental 
accommodation as a mode of occupancy that, on the other hand, research has 
shown as popular among subsidy recipients that are not attracted by prospects of 
building their own home with subsidies often perceived as inadequate54. At the 
same time, however, emphasizing the role of rental has led the Department of 
Housing to accentuate the entrepreneurial dimension of housing delivery. New 
subsidy mechanisms under discussion, in particular, would provide financial 
                                                
51 Hansard, 16 May 1995, p.1290. 
52 Hansard, 16 May 1995, p.1325. 
53 Joe Slovo, Minister of Housing, Hansard, 16 May 1995, p.1268. 
54 Petal Thring, University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School in Public and Development 
Management, interview with the Author, 22 May 2000.  
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support directly linked to users’ savings and ability to mobilize equity in addition 
to the subsidy. This solution is sometimes dubbed inside the Department as the 
“Chilean route”55, after the country where it has been more systematically applied.  
Part of the concept is to develop financing tools that more closely adhere 
to modes of entrepreneurship which in poor communities depend on informal 
networks and microcredit, rather than on formal mortgage lending. The 
mobilization of these networks, together with small users’ equities is therefore 
aimed at increasing users’ participation to housing costs, again under the cover of 
promoting responsibility and self-activation, while addressing grassroots 
preferences for non-ownership options56. Part of the government’s purported 
vision to strengthen individual entrepreneurship as a mode of housing delivery 
(what Housing Department’s Diat von Broembsen calls “psychological 
ownership”)  is the perceived opportunities lying in the informal rental market, 
mainly backyard dwellings which, as explained in Chapter 7, are widespread 
among many of the respondents for this work. Analyses that have informed 
departmental discussions argue, from this point of view, that backyard rental is a 
promising market to “tap” once landlord-tenant relationships are brought under 
the realm of market rationality, entrepreneurial spirit and predictable patterns of 
payment, rather than merely leaving such arrangements to “compassion”, erratic 
personal interactions, rent boycotts and inadequate housing renovations (Gilbert, 
Mabin, MacCarthy and Watson, 1997; Gilbert, 2003). 
 
The social policy overview presented in this section shows how post-1994 
macroeconomic orientations and social citizenship discourses at the institutional 
level have translated into transitional public interventions that reinforce the 
commodification of social provisions while segmenting their forms of delivery. 
The radical separation emerging under the new dispensation between publicly-
funded social assistance and largely privatised or employer-subsidised social 
security confirms in various ways trends emerging under late apartheid. In fact, 
                                                
55 Lucky Mphafudi, Chief Town and Regional Planner, Human Settlement Policy Directorate, 
Department of Housing, interview with the Author, 8 May 2001. 
56 Diat von Broembsen, Chief Director of Policy Planning, Department of Housing, interview with 
the Author, 7 August 2001. 
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social assistance has been nationally unified and fully deracialised, but it remains 
fundamentally residual, targeted and averse to redistributive policies. Social 
security, private healthcare and pensions-backed housing loans, conversely, are 
largely orientated to formal employment and wage labour. Such trends, however, 
are also creating uneasiness among sections of organized labour for which 
employment is still linked to a vision of universal social rights on a strongly 
redistributive basis. 
 Latched onto the separation between social assistance and social security, 
and the residualism of the former, is a visible stigma that, across all policy sectors 
discussed, is aimed at those who cannot productively contribute to society and are 
confined to “dependency” on “handouts” produced by an “entitlement mentality”. 
Stigma in this sense does not reflect necessarily the institutions’ opinion of the 
recipients, but it is predominantly used to justify the containment and withdrawal 
of public resources from social provisions. These are rather seen as the 
predominant domain of individual discipline, either as waged worker or as 
consumer, on the market. The social policy framework of the South African 
transition ultimately reinforces and rewards, also at an ideological and 
argumentative level, wage labour discipline as the main vehicle for social 
insertion. It does so, however, in a highly problematic context, where wage labour 
is becoming increasingly embattled, frail and vulnerable. The problems and 
contradictions inherent in such a scenario are revealed by highly unequal and 
generally quite incomplete levels of social services’ coverage and access. The 
second half of this work will explore in detailed case studies the problematic 
relation emerging between the crisis of wage labour “from below” and the 
reassertion of wage labour discipline in policy discourse. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion: Decoupling Wage and Income in the Transitional Social 
Citizenship Arrangement 
 
In the struggle against the apartheid regime, trade unions had articulated a 
discourse of change that made wage labour the foundation of moral and political 
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claims on the social quality of the new democracy. The emphasis placed at this 
level on inclusion, universalism and redistribution was not, however, deprived of 
important contradictions, related to the fact that on a practical level labour 
strategies had privileged negotiations with business to reinforce a privatized 
system of employer-subsidised, wage-based social protections. Even if such a 
system managed to partially decommodify the sphere of working class 
reproduction, it nonetheless entered a tension with labour’s view of society-wide 
decommodification to be achieved through fiscal means and public spending. 
Finally, labour’s influence in shaping such a specific pattern of social security was 
part of a broader process of institutionalization inside the policy bargaining organs 
that provided a “corporatist” component in the hybrid institutional setting that 
emerged from the transition.  
Subsequent developments have seen a restriction of options to expand the 
boundaries of inclusiveness and decommodification. Two trends, largely 
independent in their origins but nonetheless strictly connected, have played a 
decisive role. First, the macroeconomic policy framework of the transition has 
enabled a social citizenship arrangement where commodification of social 
provisions and a residual role of public policy have prevailed. Second, labour’s 
social position has been challenged by employment changes which increased the 
working poor, questioned the unions’ ability to push for progressive social 
changes and faced them with the problem of representing increasingly diversified 
social needs.   
As a product of the uneven and stratified system of social provision emerged 
in the transition, whose continuities with the past are apparent at many levels, 
wage labour has become a vulnerable, uncertain, highly problematic vehicle to 
expand social rights. While more stable, unionized sectors of the working class 
can still enjoy to some extent the protection of their workplace-based retirement 
and medical schemes, the extension of such safety nets to the casualised and 
atypical sectors of the labour market, apart from the majority of the poor and the 
unemployed, is fraught with difficulties. For a majority of the economically active 
population, having a wage or the prospect of earning one is no longer a guarantee 
of an income capable to provide for basic social needs. The state’s withdrawal 
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from the sphere of decommodification and the predominance of market relations 
in regulating access compound and deepen such problems. In fact, the ANC 
government has been able to re-elaborate the link between wage labour and social 
citizenship, but in ways that justify the downscaling of redistributive and 
decommodifying policy interventions, rather than enabling them as labour 
demanded. 
While in the collapse of the wage-income nexus in the post-apartheid 
transition organized labour pays a price for its own ambiguities and 
contradictions, such dynamics have been at the centre of much recent scholarly 
debate. Labour’s vulnerability begins in fact to be regarded not so much as a 
product of unemployment or dualism between “formal” and “informal” labour 
markets. Rather wage labour’s shifting position in the South African society is 
produced by a complex combination of trends, at a material and ideological level, 
both within wage labour and in the commodification of social life. The wage form 
is being transformed from the basis of a discourse of social integration into a 
determinant of new forms of poverty and inequality. At the same time, however, 
wage labour discipline remains central in the government’s rhetoric of social 
rights and inclusion. Earlier discussions had debated the kinds of compromises 
and trade-offs that labour was required to make to continue contributing to 
democratization and progressive social change. According to some, more flexible 
employment, diminished protections and lower wages were needed in a “two-tier” 
labour market where the unskilled could become “employable” (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 1996). Other views, echoed in labour policy-making (Department of 
Labour, 1996) argued that downgrading wages, social protections and collective 
bargaining would not address poverty and inequality and would endanger 
protections enjoyed by permanent, unionised workers. Therefore productivity and 
competitiveness deals between labour and capital were prioritised, where “wage 
restraint should be treated as one element of a compromise between capital and 
labour” (Webster and Gelb, 1996). Others, finally, rejected both positions as 
implying that labour should carry the burdens and sacrifices needed for social 
inclusion, neglecting the need to establish universal social security premised on 
public redistributive interventions (Torres, 1996).  
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More recent analyses, however, have transcended this debate by moving 
beyond the interactions between labour and socio-political institutions. Instead, a 
greater awareness is emerging of the fact that waged employment as such is 
showing structural inadequacies as a vehicle of social integration or as a solution 
to South Africa’s social question (Meth, 2004b). The concept of “chronic 
poverty” (Du Toit, 2004a), recognises social marginality and inequality as also 
produced within waged work, where the majority of South African workers have 
emerged first as “cheap labour” under apartheid, and then as low-wage unskilled 
under the new democracy. Poverty in this view is not a product of social 
exclusion, but of a subordinate form of inclusion  structured within wage and 
labour market segmentations.  
The final section of this work will examine how the problematic 
interactions between wage labour’s crisis in society and the centrality of wage 
labour discipline in the policy discourse developed in debates on social policy 
change, particularly around the idea of “comprehensive social security”. Before 
that, however, I will analyse in greater detail over the next four chapters the ways 
in which changes in the world of work have manifested themselves in the lives, 
imagery and discourse of working class communities across selected cases. The 
next chapter will look, in particular, at a locality, the East Rand industrial area, 
where post-apartheid changes in the social status of wage labour have been 
particularly dramatic and far-reaching. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Case Studies of a Changing World of Work. I: Industrial Crises and Wage 
Labour Decline in the East Rand 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The 1999 Municipal Structures Act established the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Council, which merged the East Rand towns of Alberton, Germiston, Brakpan, 
Benoni, Kempton Park, Springs and Nigel under a single municipal authority for 
this industrial area with a population of approximately 2.5 million. Now, 
therefore, formal borders encircle a space that has been historically defined as a 
unified entity by processes of economic development and social stratifications.  
Between the 1950s and the 1970s the East Rand has become South Africa’s 
industrial “workshop”, as manufacturing replaced mining as the major contributor 
to the country’s GDP. In the 1970s and 1980s, the area was a primary locale for 
the development of union-community alliances that shaped the trajectory of 
“social movement unionism”. Wage labour emerged as an actor and an engine of 
social integration, nurturing social demands that became deeply embedded in the 
movement for political democratisation.  
The birth of the Ekurhuleni metropolitan government has taken place, 
however, at a moment when established patterns of economic growth based on 
manufacturing are profoundly affected by restructuring encouraged by domestic 
and global forces. During the 1990s, industrial decline and downsizing have 
questioned the social position of wage labour and of the unionized working class. 
Government macroeconomic policies encouraging liberalization and domestic 
competition have placed particular pressures on the restructuring of production. In 
the process, trade union organizations have faced the adverse combination of 
retrenchments, company closures and labour market changes that segmented the 
workforce and expanded atypical employment.     
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This chapter elaborates on the transformations in the world of work 
outlined in Chapter 3 through a case study of selected manufacturing sectors and 
companies on the East Rand. In particular, I will look at industrial restructuring 
and its impact on local labour markets, union organisations and labour politics by 
focusing on three industries. All companies analysed are located in the southern 
part of the East Rand, along a strip of industrial towns stretching from Wadeville 
(Germiston) to Nigel, and including Alrode (Alberton), Brakpan, Leondale and 
Springs. Historically, the majority of the predominantly black hourly- and weekly-
paid workforce in the area live in the largely African townships of the Kathorus 
triangle – made of Katlehong (Germiston), Thokoza (Alberton) and Vosloorus 
(Boksburg) -- KwaThema (Springs), Tsakane (Brakpan), Daveyton (Boksburg), 
Wattville (Benoni), Duduza (Nigel), and in former “coloured” or Indian areas like, 
respectively, Geluksdal (Brakpan) and Actonville (Benoni). The chapter will 
focus on three establishments in the metal-engineering industry, mostly organised 
by the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), plus five 
companies in the paper sector and five in the glass containers and flat glass 
industry organised by the Chemical, Energy, Print, Paper, Wood and Allied 
Workers’ Union (CEPPWAWU), which was formed in 1999 from the merger of 
the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and the Print, Paper, Wood and 
Allied Workers’ Union (PPWAWU).   
The decline of large scale manufacturing on the East Rand during the 
1990s is evident in the  sector’s contribution to the region’s economic activity and 
employment levels. The deindustrialisation of the area is shown in particular in 
massive layoffs and in the growing dispersal of production through the diffusion 
of small-medium enterprises, which encourage employment based on fixed-term 
contracts, labour broking and the use of casual workers. While in the past the 
union movement had built in this region a powerful discourse of emancipation and 
social citizenship, the current transformation is heralding a phase of 
precariousness and uncertainty that underline wage labour’s vulnerability and 
questions established collective identities.  
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4.2 Manufacturing Decline and the Changing Geography of Production on 
the East Rand 
 
Sociological and economic analyses of deindustrialisation (Bluestone and 
Harrison, 1982; Harrison, 1994; Gordon, 1996; Carmody, 2001) are largely 
focused on managerial rationality in corporate processes of ‘downsizing’ driven 
by increasing competition and pressures from financial capital. Such debates 
emphasise that deindustrialisation implies not merely the decline of 
manufacturing industry as a contributor to economic growth, but also changes in 
labour markets towards a low-wage economy characterised by casualisation and 
rising social exclusion.  
Paradigms inspired by ‘network’ concepts (Castells, 1996) emphasize 
shifts from an ‘old’ manufacturing-based economy to a ‘new economy’ with an 
increasing mobility of financial flows and informational content of production. 
New labour market stratifications underpin therefore the spatial dimension of 
restructuring and the territorialisation of inequalities (Sassen, 1996; Marcuse and 
Van Kempen, 1997; Brenner, 2004). The interaction of labour market and spatial 
impacts of industrial change is discussed in recent studies for which such 
processes converge to question the social cohesiveness of working class 
communities and the representational capacity of trade unions (Hathaway, 1993). 
The disappearance of an urban landscape centred on the large manufacturing 
company is in fact seen as highlighting the fractures and the divisions that a 
unitary representation of the working class and its historical “memories” had 
attenuated in the image of workers’ “communities” (Milkman, 1997; Linkon and 
Russo, 2002) based on solidarity and struggle.  
Conversely, deindustrialisation points at the diminishing role of collective 
organising within coping strategies. Accommodation, survivalism and the quest 
for individualised alternatives counterbalance a sense of adverse historical shift 
but also expand areas of social marginalisation (May and Morrison, 2003). In the 
South African case, Mark Hunter (2002) showed how the decline of KwaZulu-
Natal’s textile industry created a vast low-wage, informal, largely female labour 
market where survival activities connected to sex work contribute to social 
emergencies like the HIV-AIDS epidemics.  
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Chapter 6 and 7 will look more specifically at how deindustrialization in the 
East Rand has played at the level of workers’ narratives, meanings, survival 
strategies and discourses of social citizenship. It is here important, however, to 
underline that what warrants a definition of the East Rand as a coherent object of 
study ultimately resides in the production of space as a contested process (Smith, 
1996; Wills, 1998). On one hand, the birth and growth of the East Rand as an 
industrial concentration was the outcome of the interplay of market and 
institutional forces that have negotiated the transition from a mining economy to 
an inward-looking manufacturing-cum-infrastructure complex, especially under 
the aegis of currently discarded import substitution industrialisation (Black, 1993; 
Fine, 1997). On the other hand, working class struggles and traditions have 
shaped the East Rand as a space of solidarity and a conduit for ideas of citizenship 
and social entitlements that, as explained in the previous chapters, transcended the 
workplace in constructing workers’ demands and expectations for a new 
democracy. 
In the South African case, Fine and Rustomjee (1996) relate post-apartheid 
industrial restructuring to the decline of a “mineral-energy” complex centred on 
raw material extraction and the production of consumer goods, which apartheid 
protectionism and state investment buffeted to cater for domestic markets. The 
limitations posed on the development of mass production by a racially segregated 
domestic demand led to the failed development of a local intermediate and capital 
goods sector, which remained dependent on imported capital. Working class 
militancy in the 1970s and 1980s heralded and accelerated the crisis of this 
development model. The adoption under late apartheid and the new democracy of 
a liberalised, export-orientated approach to growth has placed older industrial 
areas under competitive pressures and uneven processes of development (Bond 
1999). During the late 1980s and the 1990s South Africa has seen a constant 
reduction in the economic weight of manufacturing industry, especially in sectors 
geared to the domestic market. This is particularly the case for industries like 
glass, paper, transport equipments, structural steel, domestic appliances, which are 
analysed in this chapter. Manufacturing contribution to total output growth has 
dropped by more than 40% between 1985 and 1998 while contribution to 
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employment growth has declined by 35% (Pieper, 1998). In general, the best 
performing sectors have remained those with the highest capital intensity, which 
have a limited impact on job creation (Machaka and Roberts, 2004). 
Emerging as a cluster of mining towns linked by rail to Johannesburg and 
the West Rand, between the 1950s and the 1970s the East Rand experienced a 
tumultuous growth in manufacturing activities. The share of the industrial 
workforce rose from 27% in 1950 to 52% in 1970, while manufacturing overtook 
mining to become the most important contributor to the GGP (Cockhead, 1970; 
Drake, 1971). By the 1980s the former Transvaal province came to provide 66% 
of the country’s metalworks (40% of manufacturing output) with the East Rand 
accounting for the largest share (Sitas, 1983: 4-5). The availability of cheap land, 
and linkages with apartheid’s infrastructural and heavy industry projects (Eskom, 
Sasol, railways) facilitated the inflow of domestic and multinational companies. 
Small engineering firms, foundries and jobbing companies in precision tools 
persisted nonetheless due to limited scale economies (Sitas, 1983; Webster, 1985). 
Already at the end of the 1940s the East Rand had one third of the whole 
industrial labour force of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region 
and rapid urbanisation led African industrial workers to outnumber African 
miners for the first time in 1946 (Nieftagodien, 2004). Germiston rose to 
particular prominence, contributing most of the manufacturing output, particularly 
in metal and chemical industries.  
The economic crisis of the 1980s, linked to intensified worker struggles, 
was followed by negative growth, in a context marked by increasing costs, the 
contextual decline of mining, rising job losses and the relocation of many heavy 
industries to more competitive locations on the coast or overseas (Rogerson and 
Rogerson, 1999; Rogerson, 2004; Smith and Futter, 2000). In the early 1990s 
manufacturing provided more than 40% of the GGP in all East Rand towns except 
Brakpan (31.6%) and Nigel (23.9%), with the strongest contribution being in 
Springs (54.7%). At the same time, five towns out of nine recorded negative 
growth rates between 1981 and 1991, with only Benoni, Brakpan and Kempton 
Park recording a growth rate of around, or slightly higher than, 1%. Seven towns 
had negative or zero growth between 1991 and 1993 (Kok, 1998), with the most 
 147
pronounced decline being in the “far East Rand” towns of Springs (-1.6%), 
Heidelberg (-2.3%) and Nigel (-4%). By the end of the 1990s, manufacturing 
decline in the region had become spectacular (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 Sectoral Contribution to East Rand’s GGP, 1999 
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Source: Barchiesi and Kenny (2003), based on Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates 
(WEFA) database, 1999. 
 
In fact, manufacturing had lost by then its predominance in all towns, with 
particularly apparent downturns in strongholds like Germiston (from 47.5% in 
1991 to 31% of the GGP in 1999) and Springs (from 54.7% in 1991 to 36% in 
1999). 
Despite economic decline, the region’s economy did not display 
significant diversification and retained a strongly industrial profile, except in 
those towns, like Brakpan and Nigel, where large scale industrialization was 
historically weak (Sapire, 1993), or Kempton Park, which benefited from its 
proximity to Johannesburg’s northern suburbs. In fact, in the second half of the 
1990s, industrial investment in Gauteng started to privilege the adjacent 
Johannesburg-Midrand-Pretoria corridor which became an area of expansion for 
“new economy” sectors linked to finance, information and communication 
technologies (Hodge, 1998; Johannesburg Housing Investments, 2000). 
Conversely, in 1999 activities related to FIRE (“finance, insurance and real 
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estate”) or to information technologies provided only 8.4% of the East Rand’s 
GGP. 
While Industry was declining, trade and services, particularly in Boksburg, 
Benoni, Kempton Park and Germiston, have grown throughout the 1990s  (Urban-
Econ, 1999: 86). The rise of the tertiary sector has expanded low-wage and 
insecure employment through casual and subcontracted labour, as shown by 
recent research on retail (Kenny, 2005). Similar trends were encouraged by the 
fragmentation and the dispersal of manufacturing production in smaller sized 
establishments (Rogerson, 2004). Undergirding formal institutional unification, 
therefore, intra-regional stratification and socio-economic disparities seemed to 
emerge as a product of restructuring to challenge the area’s industrial identity. 
Employment indicators (see Figure 4.2) in particular show that, despite the 
relative predominance of manufacturing, in 1999 the tertiary sector’s contribution 
to employment reached 44.3% overall, calculated as the sum of FIRE and 
computer services (3.6%), public services (16.2%) and wholesale and retail trade 
(14%). At the same time, according to WEFA data, manufacturing has declined 
from the 1970s levels of above 50% of total employment to 32%. Other estimates 
based on the 1996 Census put manufacturing contribution to total employment at 
19% (Erasmus, 2001: 15). 
 
Figure 4.2 Employment by Sector in East Rand Towns, 1999 
Employment by sector, 1999
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Figure 4.3 Total Manufacturing Employment in the East Rand, 1988-1999 
Source: Barchiesi and Kenny (2003), based on Bureau of Market Research (1998); Statistics 
South Africa (2001b) and WEFA database, 1999. 
 
At the same time, total manufacturing employment has constantly declined 
between 1988 and 1999, with a partial recovery in the 1993-1996 period and an 
accelerated downturn that tellingly coincided with the 1996 introduction of 
GEAR, which emphasised the competitive pressures on the sector following 
liberalisation (see Figure 4.3). During this whole period, approximately 80,000 
manufacturing jobs were lost in the East Rand. The occupational composition of 
manufacturing employment shows a lower skill profile than in the rest of the 
province, with “craft and related trades” at 31.7% compared to 33.9% for 
Gauteng’s overall manufacturing. Conversely, plant and machine operators 
(25.3%, compared to Gauteng’s 19.4%) and elementary occupations (13.6%, 
compared to Gauteng’s 11.1%) tend to predominate (Erasmus, 2001: 41).  
In many towns, manufacturing’s share of the GGP has declined by as 
much as 50% between 1991 and 1999 (see Figure 4.4), with the biggest losses in 
absolute terms recorded in the two most important centres of Germiston (18%) 
and Springs (20%). Kempton Park is confirmed as the most rapidly de-
industrialising town, and here as well ‘new economy’ sectors (6.2% of GGP) 
continue to play a limited role. 
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Figure 4.4 Contribution of Manufacturing to GGP, 1991-1999 
 Source: Barchiesi and Kenny (2003), based on Kok (1998) and WEFA database, 1999. 
 
The decline in manufacturing’s employment and economic importance has been, 
finally, paralleled by a reduction in average company sizes (see Figure 4.5), 
particularly in areas, such as Kempton Park, where factories used to employ the 
largest workforce. Job losses might have contributed to this outcome, which is 
also probably related to the emergence of smaller enterprises competing with, or 
contracting for, larger ones (Rogerson and Rogerson, 1999: 92; Rogerson, 2004). 
In areas like Brakpan, Benoni and Germiston, where there are strong traditions of 
small-medium jobbing firms, such figures might indicate a strengthening of this 
kind of production.  
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Figure 4.5 Average Number of Employees per Establishment, East Rand 1988-1996 
Source: Barchiesi and Kenny (2003), based on Bureau of Market Research (1998) and Statistics 
South Africa (2001a). 
 
In conclusion, during the 1990s a process of industrial decline has heavily 
questioned the role of the East Rand as the core of South Africa’s manufacturing, 
which the region had played for the previous 60 years. Deindustrialisation has not 
been accompanied by the rise of viable alternatives in terms of economic activity 
or job creation. Rather, there are signals of an increasing fragmentation of 
production linked in some cases to vulnerable, “atypical” forms of employment. 
Such changes are likely to have far-reaching implications for trade unions and for 
wage labour as an actor of broad socio-economic changes. 
 
 
4.3 Labour Politics from Apartheid to the Transition: Community and the 
Urban Space as Terrains of Citizenship 
 
Rapid African urbanisation and working class formation in the context of 
industrial development during the 1940s and 1950s had made of the East Rand 
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one of the country’s hotbeds of popular resistance and militancy (Bonner and 
Nieftagodien, 2000). African migration to the region’s towns, in particular, took 
place in a context of mining industry decline and industrial growth. Early 
apartheid’s urban planning tried to reshape the urban landscape by building new 
“model townships” to replace the old, overcrowded and crumbling African 
“locations” and enforce tighter segregation and social control. African 
urbanisation was, on one hand, linked to the escape from coercion and 
exploitation on the mines and the farms. Therefore, the search for more dignified 
waged employment in the cities coexisted with widespread “work-shyness”, 
refusal of work and illegal entrepreneurship, which were concerns both for the 
local state and for the popular opposition led by the ANC and the Communist 
Party (Sapire, 1993).  
On the other hand, the PWV “model township” where African populations 
were forcibly relocated became a feature of “high apartheid”’s attempt to reassert 
“influx control” and defuse the challenge of African working class formation and 
militancy. Following the recommendations of the Mentz Commission in 1955, 
new townships were proclaimed at the end of the 1950s, like KwaThema 
(Springs), esatblished from the relocation of Payneville, Tsakane out of the 
removal of Brakpan Old Location, Katlehong, after the removal of KwaDukathole 
(Germiston), and the new township of Daveyton (Benoni). Finally, Duduza 
(Nigel), which in Xhosa means “consolation”, was proclaimed in 1964 following 
the removal of the Charterston location57. New townships tended to accommodate 
recent authorised migrants or illegal “squatters”, both with little links with 
existing traditions of struggle. Especially after the suppression of resistance to 
evictions in the 1950s, “model townships” divided and moderated political 
militancy (Sapire, 1993; Nieftagodien, 1996; Malinga and Verhoef, 2000; Bonner, 
2000). Areas where large-scale industries were only partially entrenched, as in 
Brakpan-Tsakane, remained relatively quiet well into the 1980s. Conversely, the 
old locations were more easily mobilised and became hegemonised by nationalist 
politics starting with the 1950s ANC’s defiance of early apartheid legislation.  
                                                
57 Policy Research Unit at AMCHAM, The Nigel Regional Complex: A Case for the Establishment 
of Non-Racial Local Government, n.d. (but 1990), Wits DHP, PLANACT, 26.25.14. 
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Finally, the segregation of migrants in urban ethnic-based “compounds” 
strengthened the social distance between recent arrivals, particularly in the new 
inflows during the 1960s repressive climate (Nieftagodien, 2004: 9), and 
permanent township dwellers, enforcing among the former traditional age-based 
authorities and ethnic affiliations. At the same time, Africans rapidly moved 
upwards on the occupational ladder, by taking up semi-skilled positions (Sitas, 
1983). The East Rand was one of the areas where independent trade unionism 
emerged in the early 1970s as an original ideological and organisational synthesis 
in which union activities reshaped strongly ruralised forms of consciousness and 
reorientated them towards the struggle for workers’ rights and dignified 
conditions in the workplace (Sitas, 1985a,b). 
The 1973 Durban strikes were followed by the 1975 launch of the East 
Rand branch of the Metal and Allied Workers’ Union (MAWU), with the help of 
student activists, black consciousness-aligned structures, ‘dissidents’ from 
established ‘white’ unions and trade unionists from Durban. Trade union 
grassroots structures challenged symbolic and discursive patterns of authority on 
the shopfloor and in the segregated ‘compound’ and promoted worker 
organisation as an alternative to ethnic hierarchies. In this way, wage labour and 
workplace struggles laid the foundations of a new idiom of citizenship that 
challenged apartheid-enforced loyalties and identifications along the rural-urban 
continuum (Mamdani, 1996: 248-249). Black migrant workers provided a 
decisive support for the unions and became the most militant sections of the area’s 
working class. The presence of large factories in the metal, chemical and food 
sectors facilitated organising and strikes, which could be strategically focused on 
companies that had a particularly relevant role in the definition of employers’ 
policies, or on multinational companies (Webster and Sitas, n.d.).  
 The reorientation of state spending and planning priorities towards the 
“improvement” of African homelands in the 1970s had deepened economic decay, 
infrastructural collapse and social dislocation in the East Rand’s cities and 
compounds. They became increasingly overcrowded and, during the 1980s, 
recorded widespread increases in informal settlements and backyard 
accommodations. Moreover, the provision of urban infrastructures on a “site and 
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service” basis, without direct household connection to services’ reticulation, 
encouraged residents’ “self-help” to reduce public responsibilities (Hendler, 
1989a; Tomlinson, 1990: 86-90). The population of Tsakane (meaning “to be 
happy”) rose from 31,000 in 1980 to an estimated 90,000 in 1988, half of which 
lived in shacks, with an average of 6.3 people per household, and 65% of houses 
without electricity (Moshabela, 1988)58. The large majority of Duduza’s 77,000 
inhabitants were living in shacks by 1989,59 when administrators reported that 
“the squatter community is continuously increasing in numbers”, and 60% of the 
households had incomes below R600 per month60. Almost 80,000 people lived in 
shacks in KwaThema at the end of the 1980s, while informal settlements largely 
outnumbered formal ones61. While Daveyton’s population doubled between 1961 
and 1982, formal dwellings increased by only one third. Political polarisations 
confronted here populist leaders representing, respectively, township dwellers and 
the squatters that in 1986 moved to the nearby Etwatwa area, whose population of 
largely informal settlements rapidly grew to 160,000 (Malinga and Verhoef, 2000: 
9-10)62. During the 1980s the average occupancy per dwelling reached 7.2 
persons in Daveyton, 7.8 in Thokoza, and 9.4 in KwaThema (Pillay, 1984). In 
Wattville, 13.04 occupants per dwelling were recorded in 1985, for an average of 
5 square metres per person and with 60% of the population living in informal 
settlements63. In this case, residents organised into a Wattville Concerned 
Residents Committee that in 1986 occupied adjacent land, which became the 
Tamboville settlement (Royston, 1998: 152-163). 
                                                
58 See also Discussion Draft, Tsakane Discussions, Notes for Proposed Agreement; Mandy to 
Vining, 4 August 1991, Wits DHP, PLANACT 26.8.4. 
59 Capital Subsidy Scheme Application for the Approval of Project Blue Gum View, Wits DHP, 
PLANACT 26.8.5. 
60 Deteriorating living conditions were not limited to the housing crisis. In a township like 
Vosloorus, with deeply entrenched patterns of African home ownership, 43.8% of the population 
lived with less than R500 per month in 1989. See Synopsis of the Vosloorus Municipal Area, 
Report Prepared for the Policy Research Unit of the American Chamber of Commerce, 1990, Wits 
DHP, PLANACT, 26.8.7.4. 
61 Eastern Regional Services Council, Regional Planning Land Delivery Study. Phase 1, Volume 1: 
Land Delivery Framework in the East Rand, Report No.30/93, June 1993, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 
17.7.24.3. 
62 See also PLANACT, Divisional Management Committee 14 April 1992. Project Name: 
Etwatwa Extension 8, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 25.15.2. 
63 PLANACT, Town and Regional Planning Practice III. Project 2 – 1990. Wattville/East Rand 
Housing Project, Wits DHP, PLANACT, 17.7.24.2. 
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As Ruiters (1995) notices, emerging urban stratifications and differential 
access to housing revealed fractures and divides that questioned the ability of 
political organisations, specifically those aligned with the UDF and the nationalist 
tradition, to weld a coherent meaning of “community”. In particular, differences 
in housing accommodations played an important role in shaping communities’ 
claim-making discourses, social citizenship imagery and sense of radicalism. 
Beginning with the East Rand “strike waves” of 1981 and 1982, the emergent 
trade unions placed a greater emphasis on building forms of territorial co-
ordination. Following the establishment of the Germiston shop steward council 
(Baskin, 1982; Webster, 1985), such efforts were not primarily aimed at 
addressing community issues, and remained focused on workplace-related 
struggles around union recognition, unfair dismissals, wages and working 
conditions. They also allowed, however, circulation and exchange of information 
on declining living standards across different townships (Von Holdt, 1987: 24-
25).  
Increasing labour-community interactions led wide sectors in FOSATU 
unions’ rank and file to demand the mobilisation of union organisations against 
the combined pressure of social decay, declining living conditions and apartheid’s 
repressive response to urban social problems. Therefore, trains and 
neighbourhoods became locales of union organisaiton and mobilisation, where 
demands were placed on trade unions’ structures to turn their newly-gained power 
in production towards a struggle for decent living in the residential space. Local 
government and the central state had responded to urban social crisis, which 
threatened the fiscal sustainability of newly established Black Local Authorities 
and deepened the regime’s legitimacy crisis, by implementing evictions and 
relocations of informal settlements. Particularly targeted were East Rand 
townships where, in the context of “orderly urbanisation” that succeeded influx 
control in the mid-1980s, evictions of informal settlements were presented as 
technical measures to prevent “illegal” urbanisation. As Ruiters (1995: 115-116) 
shows, evictions disproportionately affected FOSATU unions’ migrant members, 
and FOSATU’s initial involvement on housing issues was mainly a matter of 
defending members’ rights.  
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Struggles for housing and urban social services became therefore the 
breeding ground for “social movement unionism” in the East Rand. They also 
provided a terrain of contestation between apartheid’s strategies of social and 
labour stratification, which came to rely increasingly on market dynamics, and 
labour’s emerging social citizenship discourse. Therefore, the unions’ resistance 
to evictions in areas like Katlehong and Daveyton after 1983 was connected to 
rents and fees boycotts organised by the civics, which emphasised the lack of 
legitimacy of black local authorities. In Katlehong, the Germiston shop steward 
council directly mobilised against evictions (Rees, 1983). In Daveyton, the black 
local authority under populist leader and councillor Tom Boya had managed to 
some extent to lead the mobilisation against rents’ increases, and the political 
tradition of the ANC and the SACP was relatively weak. The unions played 
therefore a decisive role in mobilising communities (Hendler, 1988: 35)64. In 
Springs, the local shop steward council launched a branch of the civic structure 
East Rand Peoples’ Organisation (ERAPO), which had been in existence since 
1979 (Von Holdt, 1987: 24). 
At the same time, township struggles and social movement unionism 
sparked a debate between and within unions, where grassroots activists challenged 
their leaderships’ predominant orientation to workplace organisation and issues. 
Leaders remained in fact suspicious of the practices of student, church and 
residents’ groups inside the UDF, especially where allegedly ‘petty bourgeois’ 
elements like shop owners and taxi entrepreneurs had gained influential positions 
(Seekings, 2000a: 231-235). UDF leaders and the ANC, on the other hand, tended 
to reciprocate such a hostility towards unions they saw as detached from the tasks 
of political liberation (Ruiters, 1995: 101-102; Lambert, 1987; Lewis, 1983; 
Njikelana, 1984). Conversely, FOSATU unions on the East Rand were divided 
over the feasibility to participate in community struggles. The federation’s official 
policy, enunciated by General Secretary Joe Foster at the 1982 Congress, 
privileged the construction of an independent workers’ movement that, while not 
necessarily confined to the wage relation, did not want to be formally aligned with 
the nationalist political opposition (Foster, 1982). Grassroots structures, however, 
                                                
64 PLANACT, Greater Benoni Report, n.d. (but 1991), Wits DHP, PLANACT 17.7.24.4. 
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grew increasingly restless over the leadership role of “white intellectuals” in 
FOSATU, in ways that did not emphasise racial polarisation as such, but criticised  
production-orientated agendas that prevented solidarity between workplace and 
community struggles (Ruiters, 1995; Mamdani, 1996:241; Buhlungu, 2001). As 
Ruiters (2000) convincingly argued, the combined effect of FOSATU leadership’s 
hostility towards community struggles and of the ANC-aligned organisations’ 
antagonism towards FOSATU’s independent “workerism” facilitated debates in 
the unions’ rank and file whereby the East Rand came to be represented as a 
unified imaginary space woven together by working class mobilisation and 
emancipatory demands that were no longer confined to the workplace. The role of 
shop-steward councils, therefore, encompassed both union organisational 
functions on a territorial scale and a catalyst for community demands and support 
that exceeded union constituencies. 
According to Swilling (1984b), rank-and-file union members engaging in 
community mobilisations remained attached to the unions’ organising style, 
emphasising accountability and mandates, while retaining a distaste for the 
“spontaneist” and “Jacobin” practices of civic movements. Other authors contrast 
the racialised identities of community “marginals’” groups with the unions’ class-
based politics, blaming community activists for causing chaos and 
‘ungovernability’ within organised oppositional structures (Seekings, 1993; 
Bozzoli, 2004). Other analyses, finally, emphasise that the labour-community 
convergence on the East Rand during the 1980s is not merely explainable as a 
contingent and uncertainly politicised outcome of the encounter of separate issues 
and demands. It revealed instead a deep-seated opposition to political oppression 
that, under the impulse of declining social conditions, encouraged new collective 
identities and discourses of citizenship, where socio-economic change came to 
play an important role (Ruiters, 1995; Mamdani, 1996). At the same time, the 
emergence of strata of African middle class and small entrepreneurship in the 
United Democratic Front’s leadership opposed, inside this new struggle milieu, 
working class hegemony with views of social emancipation based on 
individualised market advancement (Ruiters, 2000). 
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Conversely, labour’s renewed emphasis on an urban-based discourse of 
organisation and social provisions tended to marginalize the concerns of migrant 
hostels’ residents. Township-hostel linkages on which the early strength of the 
union movement was built were now therefore weakened, and hostel residents 
with strong rural affilitations became increasingly alienated. Such dynamics 
became more pronounced after the formation of COSATU in 1985 and its 
increasing closeness to the ANC. Hostel dwellers started to resent the neglect of 
their workplace-based problems by unions that tended to privilege mobilisation 
over socio-political issues, and hostels with large Zulu populations, especially in 
the Kathorus area, became fertile recruiting grounds for the anti-ANC Inkatha 
Freedom Party (Segal, 1991; Sitas, 1996; Shaw, 1996; Bonner and Ndima, 1999). 
These dynamics led to the explosion of violence that marred the East Rand 
between the end of the 1980s and the transitional negotiations. Hostel residents 
confronted both township dwellers and recent waves of squatters that moved to 
the cities to compete for shrinking urban resources in the context of collapse of 
apartheid spatial segregation. 
 The democratic transition on the East Rand accompanied deepening 
dynamics of urban decay, violence, economic crisis, deterioration of living 
conditions and rising unemployment. The transitional local governments 
continued prioritising policies of housing privatisation, discussed in Chapter 2, 
with the aim of encouraging black home ownership and attracting private 
developers in low-income housing financing. Private developments in low-cost 
housing, however, failed to materialise, while developers’ profit expectations 
based on their practices in affluent white suburbs were hampered by grassroots 
militancy, entrenched traditions of rents and bonds boycotts and high social 
expectations for housing (Merrifield, 1992; Malinga and Verhoef, 2000: 15-17). 
On the other hand, as union-based researchers found, developers used this 
scenario to justify a constant downgrading of construction and service standards65. 
Local councils sought agreements with civics and unions, which demanded low 
flat rates66, for residents to resume the payment for services. Therefore, the 
                                                
65 Report Prepared for the Springs Shop Stewards Council Concerning the Proposed Development 
of Duduza by Ferrocor Property Developers (FPD), n.d. (but 1988), Wits DHP,PLANACT 26.8.2. 
66 Chairman, Daveyton Interim Committee to Ngcobo, 12 September 1990, Wits DHP, PLANACT 
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responsibility for access to urban social services tended to shift from policies of 
redistribution and cross-subsidisation to the users’ ability to pay. Nonetheless, in 
Daveyton, for example, it was found that with a housing shortage of 70,000 units, 
92% of the population could not afford housing without public subsidies (Malinga 
and Verhoef, 2000: 19). 
 The post-1994 allocation of state housing subsidies in the East Rand has 
privileged almost entirely project-linked subsidies aimed at basic housing 
construction, which largely went to unemployed residents whose poor income 
levels were lower than in the rest of Gauteng (see Table 4.1). Therefore, low-wage 
formal workers were left with the alternative of looking for private finance67, 
usually using retirement contributions as collaterals. In 2001, 41.4% of 
households in the southern East Rand townships where workplaces researched for 
this work are located (Wattville, Vosloorus, Tsakane, KwaThema, Thokoza, 
Daveyton, Katlehong and Duduza) were living in informal settlements, whose 
number increased by 8.89% between 1996 and 200168. 
 
Table 4.1 Total Housing Subsidies Approved, Gauteng and East Rand, 1995-2001 
 
Gauteng Total East Rand Only 
Total 
beneficiaries 
% 
Employed 
Average Monthly 
Income of 
Beneficiary 
Total 
beneficiaries 
% Employed Average Monthly 
Income of 
Beneficiary 
254520 0.27 R 600.28 80992 0.03% R542.80 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Department of Housing, National HSS Database. 
 
During the first half of the 1990s the East Rand witnessed extremely high levels 
of poverty, deprivation of basic services and rampant refusal to pay. Calculated at 
constant 1996 prices, 35.7% of East Rand households lived with real incomes of 
less than R6,000 per year, compared to 32.2% in the whole Gauteng province 
(Development Bank of Southern Africa, 2005: 167). By 1995, services’ payment 
levels in the Kathorus area were approximately 25%69 and remained below 50% 
                                                                                                                                 
17.3.4. 
67 See also Sanjee Singh, Assistant Director, Policy and Evaluation, Gauteng Housing Department, 
Interview with the Author, 1 November 2000. 
68 Author’s elaboration from Statistics South Africa National Census database, 1996 and 2001. 
69 “Councils Unite on Katorus Payment”, Business Day, 14 March 1997. 
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in Tsakane and Geluksdal70, while in 1991 the figure in Wattville was 9%71. In 
1995, 56% of houses in Daveyton, 56% in Thokoza, 62% in Katlehong, 85% in 
Tsakane and 94% in Duduza had no electricity72. In 2001, 30% of Ekurhuleni’s 
population lived without formal shelter and only 42.4% had  water on site, down 
from 68.2% in 1996 (South African Cities Network, 2004: 28). 
 Analyses of poverty levels on the East Rand in the mid-1990s show that 
the area has a “poverty gap” (the difference between average incomes and poverty 
lines) of 29.36%, the widest in Gauteng, larger than in Johannesburg, the Vaal 
Triangle, Pretoria and the West Rand. Five of the region’s former nine 
municipalities were in the province’s bottom half, and the human development 
index (HDI) for the African population in all East Rand towns was lower than 
Gauteng’s HDI (see Table 4.2). In 1999, unemployment on the East Rand, 
calculated at 33%, was the highest of all metropolitan regions in South Africa 
(Municipal Demarcation Board, 1999). 
 
Table 4.2 Poverty Levels on the East Rand, 1995 
 
Magisterial 
District 
Provincial 
share of 
poverty 
gap,1993 
Provincial 
ranking in 
poverty 
gap,1993 
National 
share of 
poverty gap 
in 1993 
National 
ranking in 
poverty gap, 
1993 
Human 
development 
index for 
Africans, 1991 
Johannesburg 24.29% 1 2.46% 1 0.58 
Alberton 7.38% 4 0.74% 40 0.53 
Germiston 1.25% 21  0.13% 172 0.52 
Boksburg 1.42% 20 0.14% 162 0.58 
Benoni 4.17% 7 0.42% 87 0.52 
Kempton Park 3.98% 8 0.40% 93 0.57 
Brakpan 2.15% 15 0.22% 123 0.51 
Springs 4.90% 5 0.50% 77 0.55 
Nigel 1.74% 19 0.18% 142 0.46 
Heidelberg 2.37% 13 0.24% 116 0.41 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Whiteford, Posel and Kelatwang (1995). 
 
Table 4.3 shows employment and unemployment figures for the East Rand 
townships in the area where companies analysed for this work are located. Data 
                                                
70 Brakpan Transitional Local Council, Workshop on Tariff Structures, 13-14 May 1995, Wits 
DHP, PLANACT 25.2.2. 
71 PLANACT, Minutes of Meeting Held in Hume Building in Germiston. Community Services in 
Daveyton and Wattville, Wits DHP, PLANACT 17.3.4. 
72 Hansard, 1995, pp.827-828. 
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reveal, first and foremost an extremely low labour market absorption for new 
entrants.  
 
Table 4.3 Unemployment Levels in Selected East Rand Townships, by Ward, 1996-2001 
 
Population Employed Unemployed Ward 
No 
Area 
1996 2001 Change 
(%) 
1996 2001 Change 
(%) 
1996 2001 Chan
ge 
(%) 
61 Daveyton 
Central 
24651 22807 -7.48 6378 4452 -30.20 5148 6126 19.0 
41 Duduza Cent., 
Tsakane X 
9,15 
20976 31089 48.21 4670 6237 33.55 4788 7380 54.1 
40 Duduza X 2,4 21779 22255 2.19 4833 4350 -9.99 4467 5385 20.6 
62 Etwatwa 23933 31890 33.25 7168 7605 6.10 5740 8124 41.5 
35 Germiston-
Leondale-
Rondebult 
19233 42074 118.76 8192 14064 71.68 1550 9012 481.4 
17 Katlehong 
Zuma-Ncala-
Tsolo 
25984 24329 -6.37 6677 4809 -27.98 6175 7179 16.2 
27 Katlehong 
Central-
Tokhoza X 2 
19476 36151 85.62 5635 9165 62.64 3978 9330 134.5 
23 Katlehong 
South 
23165 36654 58.23 5340 7134 33.60 5754 10437 81.4 
19 Katlehong 
Dukathole 
23876 22698 -4.93 6057 4353 -28.13 5058 6342 25.4 
13 Katlehong 
Twala 
26357 24490 -7.08 7413 5877 -20.72 5745 6471 12.7 
49 KwaThema 
Cent., New 
Payneville 
25386 22625 -10.88 5249 3978 -24.21 5733 6054 5.6 
19 KwaThema 
Phase 1-3 
20619 29454 42.85 6650 7992 20.18 2911 6612 127.1 
48 KwaThema 
Rest-in-Peace 
Tembelisha 
Vergenoeg 
20129 20367 0.73 4776 4116 -13.82 3596 4893 36.0 
46 KwaThema 
Tornado, 
Sunair Park 
22042 23804 7.99 7286 7035 -3.44 3877 5220 34.7 
16 Thokoza 
Hostels, X 6 
16722 23288 39.27 4920 5094 3.54 5095 7734 51.8 
21 Thokoza X 1 29143 24528 -15.84 8817 5835 -33.82 6397 6960 8.8 
42 Tsakane 
Proper 
21371 21522 0.71 5256 4134 -21.35 4410 5226 18.5 
37 Tsakane X 5, 
8, 11 
22151 28775 29.90 6126 6627 8.18 4285 6885 60.7 
34 Vosloorus, 
Eastfield 
24370 30848 26.58 7091 8757 23.49 4631 5574 20.4 
56 Wattville 21323 21194 -0.60 5677 5469 -3.66 5202 5823 12.0 
25 Zonkiziwe 27535 35718 29.72 6280 6210 -1.11 5980 9291 55.4 
TOT.  480221 576560 20.06 130491 133293 2.14 100520 146058 45.3 
Source: Author’s Elaboration from Statistics South Africa, National Census Database, 1996 and 
2001. 
 
The rate of unemployment in these townships rose from 43.51% of the EAP in 
1996 to 52.28 in 2001, while the unemployment rate in the whole Ekurhuleni 
municipality grew from 32.2% in 1996 to 40.4% in 2001, the third highest rate in 
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the Gauteng province, where over the same period the overall unemployment 
figure went from 28.1% to 36.5%. Employment decline mirrored a productivity 
stagnation: the East Rand’s Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita, at constant 
1996 prices, declined from R16,035 in 1996 to R14,928 in 2003. The increase in 
the East Rand’s overall GVA over the same period was of only 2.3%, compared 
with 3.7% in Gauteng and 2.5% nationally (Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, 2005: 167). 
The post-apartheid legacy of poverty, social marginality and 
unemployment that affects the East Rand profoundly questions earlier linkages 
between labour and local community movements, which connected issues of 
social rights and services to broader expectations for a new democratic political 
order. Labour’s role on the East Rand in shaping and structuring discourses and 
imagery of social citizenship, for example through demands for adequate, 
decommodified municipal services and housing, is therefore challenged by 
transformations in wage labour within a social context of growing poverty and 
inequality. The next section will explore more in detail changes in forms of 
employment by introducing the sectors and companies used for my research. 
 
 
4.4 Industrial Change and the Crisis of Wage Labour: Sectors and 
Company Cases 
 
4.4.1 Trends in Employment Decline, Casualisation and Deunionisation 
 
Industrial decline on the East Rand has particularly affected a productive texture 
historically characterised by the predominance of large-scale, heavily unionised 
companies in consumer products, especially chemicals, packaging, appliances and 
light engineering (Ruiters, 1995: 73). Dynamics of restructuring have been 
substantially facilitated by the withdrawal of state support, from which local 
industry benefited in periods of high protectionism and import-substituting 
production. Sectors where large conglomerates have mostly succeeded in terms of 
innovation and competitiveness, like steel,  have developed a strong orientation to 
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export, from which smaller local players downstream have benefited only to a 
limited extent in terms of jobs (Roberts, 2003). This reinforces historical trends of 
disadvantageous pricing with which main companies in highly concentrated and 
vertically integrated sectors have penalised, often through collusion, local 
companies and merchants (Fine, 1998; Bah and Mbano, 2000; Ndabezitha, 2001).  
Moreover, technological innovation, specialisation and differentiation of 
the product cycle are generally not accompanied by renewed investment in human 
resource development (Kesper, 1999). Sectors that are more inward-orientated, 
like light and heavy engineering, have suffered from shrinking domestic demand, 
often related to slowdowns in sectors like construction that suffer from sluggish 
housing development, or transport, which is also negatively affected by cuts in 
public spending and investment. In some cases, like the “white goods” industry, 
social factors explain productive crises, like the excessive optimism by local 
manufacturers about mass electrification as an engine of demand in poor 
communities (Bauman, 1995). In many of these cases, local production also 
suffered due to competition from cheaper imports (Rustomjee, 1993; Labour 
Market Alternatives, 1997; Sector Jobs Summit Team, 2002; Bezuidenhout, 
2002). Competition for sectors like paper packaging comes also from alternative 
materials (Bethlehem, 1994: 90-91), like more capital-intensive plastics.  
Policies of liberalisation and export promotion have led to uneven 
restructuring strategies, which facilitated downsizing, particularly in larger 
workplaces with the highest levels of unionisation. In the companies I looked at, 
restructuring takes different forms, which respond to specific market challenges, 
competitive scenarios, policy settings and the strength of labour organisations. It 
is nonetheless possible to pinpoint some general features that reinforce the idea of 
the East Rand as a cohesive socio-economic space. Conversely, old patterns of 
labour-community interactions are increasingly reversed as a result of 
restructuring. Union-community linkages that fostered “social movement 
unionism” are substantially weakened as unions find themselves embattled and 
confined to defensive struggles to protect jobs, wages and working conditions. 
 During the 1990s retrenchments have been particularly severe in the metal 
and engineering industry. On a national level, approximately 190,000 workers 
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have been laid off in this sector between January 1990 and April 2000 (65,000 of 
which after 1995, with averages between 1,000 and 1,500 retrenchments per 
month between 1995 and 1999). Over the same period, total hourly-paid 
employment plunged from 385,000 to 255,000. At the same time, the average 
company hourly headcount also shrank from 35.54 to 28.1273. According to 
NUMSA organisers on the East Rand, restructuring and retrenchments have in 
fact been accompanied by the fragmentation of production and the growth of 
small-medium companies. Such dynamics are not predominantly linked to 
subcontracting of production, but they are rather the result of specialisation, with 
the attendant appearance on shrinking markets of new small players focused on 
specific products or phases (like palletising, repairs, tool and die making, 
foundries, specific niche products) previously vertically integrated in larger 
companies. With uncertain market prospects, specialised small companies easily 
gain a competitive edge74 in a process of “competitive outsourcing” where such 
companies, emerging out of the downsizing of large ones, compete with each 
other to supply these latter.  
 Downsizing and the fragmentation of production facilitate the re-
employment of a portion of retrenched workers in smaller companies under 
casual, fixed-term contracts or through labour brokers. Moreover, small 
companies are less likely to be unionised and precariousness of employment 
makes unionisation difficult, either because vulnerability acts as a deterrent or 
because unions do not want to invest resources on workers with unstable 
membership. The loss of union representation deepens the levels of exploitation in 
the industry, as union organisers testify: 
 
One night I just went to the township, I went to a certain house, of 
course I knew what I was looking for. I bought one bottle of beer, and 
there were people busy doing Marconi’s [a communication appliances 
company, formerly TEMSA] job. It’s a manual job, very, very easy. 
They assemble small pieces of rubber putting them in the phones, stuff 
like that. They work at home, then Marconi comes and collects, paying 
                                                
73 Figures based on Metal and Engineering Industry Bargaining Council data provided by Elias 
Monage, NUMSA, 20 April 2000. 
74 George Magaseng, NUMSA Springs organiser, Interview with the Author, 11 November 1999. 
According to Magaseng, the current environment is characterised by competition without growth, 
whereby “the cake remains the same but the people eating it have increased”. 
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them very poorly. They’re taking advantage of the social situation of 
the workers. These people, due to a poverty situation, are compelled to 
accept that kind of conditions.75 
 
According to this organiser, 99% of jobs created in engineering on the East Rand 
are by now on a casual basis and the only way in which the NUMSA Springs local 
can retain its membership levels, faced with a constant haemorrhage from large 
companies, is by intensifying recruiting efforts in small companies, often 
employing less than 10 employees, like garages, car washes or repair shops. At 
the same time, organising casual workers has inherent problems: 
 
Well, you can organise them if you wish, but unions are much 
different from, say, a burial society or an insurance company, whereby 
you got an insurance only if you have a problem. With the union it’s 
completely different, you build a relationship over time. Some of the 
issues workers are enjoying today have been fought for many years, 
even the recognition of the union has been an uphill battle. That is the 
problem in organising fixed-term contracts. You can organise them but 
in a union you build up for a future, you must have an agreement. If 
you don’t have an agreement contract workers are terminated when 
their contract expires, so that is what makes it difficult to organise in 
those industries76. 
 
NUMSA’s Wits East region includes the locals of Alrode, Germiston, Wadeville, 
Benoni, Springs and Nigel. At the beginning of 2000 the region had a 
membership of approximately 25,00077, following a 26% decline from the 1996 
membership figures (NUMSA, 1996) and a 45% decline from 1989 (NUMSA, 
1989)78. To stem the tide of membership loss, the union has to stretch its 
resources to organise across a fragmented geography of production, whilst 
targeting large companies had historically shaped organising strategies on the 
East Rand.  
                                                
75 Ibidem. 
76 Ibidem. 
77 Locals’ membership data, April 2000, provided by Meshack Robertson (Wits East regional 
organiser). Membership by local was, approximately as follows: Alrode, 3800; Germiston, 5500; 
Wadeville, 5150; Benoni, 4000; Springs, 5200; Nigel, 1200. Less than 60 companies out of 
approximately 600 unionised had more than 100 members, while approximately 40% of 
companies had less than 30 members. The average number of members per company was 
approximately 49.7. 
78 The 1989 figure is highly indicative as it represents members in the East Rand locals of the then 
Wits Region. 
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Similar challenges are confronted by CEPPWAWU79. Retrenchments have 
had particularly dramatic impacts on sectors like packaging, pulp and paper, and 
glass, dominated by large companies that in the past benefited from state 
protectionism and, in the latter, investment by multinational corporations (Barker, 
1996; Rosenthal, 1999). During the 1990s the unions that merged to form 
CEPPWAWU had known a constant growth nationally, from 80,000 members in 
1990, to 93,000 before the 1999 merger (Buhlungu, 2001: 129). Such growth was 
aided by the relaunch of the once disbanded pulp and paper bargaining council 
and the signing in 1995 of an interim centralised agreement for the glass industry, 
in view of establishing a bargaining council in 2000.  
 At the end of the 1990s, however, the East Rand started to provide an 
exception to the general trend. In late 1999 CEPPWAWU’s Wits region 
(including the locals of Germiston, Springs, Tembisa and Johannesburg) had 
approximately 18,600 members, or 25% of the union’s overall membership, 
12,000 of which were based in the three East Rand locals (see Table 4.4). In 
1998-99 alone, however, CEPPWAWU has lost approximately 3,000 members in 
the region.  
 
Table 4.4 CEPPWAWU Membership, February 1999, Disaggregated by Region and Sector 
 
Sector Regions’ Members Regions’ Companies 
 EC GP KZN NETvl NC-
FS 
WC EC GP KZN NEtvl NC-
FS 
W
C 
Total 
members 
Consumer 188 1229 651 -- -- 145 3 23 8 -- -- 4 2213 
Furniture 79 3153 422 158 710 82 10 59 17 9 13 3 4604 
Glass/pottery 802 2020 172 174 -- 414 10 29 8 3 -- 4 3582 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
1484 5079 2303 511 128 670 18 104 48 7 3 21 10175 
Others 449 2290 1383 601 27 941 35 149 67 42 21 59 5691 
Petroleum 26 2175 546 46 146 743 2 13 9 1 1 6 3682 
Pharmaceutical 863 1365 1177 27 34 366 10 19 6 1 1 5 3832 
Plastics 649 2642 2202 299 -- 1152 17 51 41 5 -- 24 6944 
Printing 722 4019 2626 429 41 1856 23 174 55 13 10 37 9693 
Pulp & paper 200 1906 2268 948 50 485 8 41 23 8 3 14 5857 
Rubber 62 631 364 21 -- -- 1 14 3 2 -- -- 1078 
SASOL mines -- 5145 -- 94 -- -- -- 4 -- 1 -- -- 5239 
Sawmills 1491 12 799 1151 -- 399 12 3 9 34 -- 5 3852 
Woodwork 581 1153 1300 4034 73 1690 37 43 34 38 12 28 8831 
Total 7596 32819 16213 8493 1209 8943 18
6 
726 328 164 64 21
0 
75273 
Note: EC=Eastern Cape; GP=Gauteng; KZN=KwaZulu/Natal; NC-FS=Northern Cape/Free State; 
NETvl=North-Eastern Transvaal; WC= Western Cape. 
Source: Information Provided by John Appolis, CEPPWAWU Wits Regional Secretary. 
                                                
79 On the history and organisation of CWIU and PPWAWU before the CEPPWAWU merger see, 
respectively, Rosenthal (1995) and Buhlungu (2001), pp.120-145. 
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CEPPWAWU was affected particularly badly by membership decline on the East 
Rand, while the Johannesburg local actually gained members, with the Germiston 
local dropping from 6,500 to 4,300 members, Springs from 4,700 to 4,600 and 
Tembisa from 3,500 to 2,500. Unionisation remained heavily reliant on large 
companies, with three firms (PFG, Consol and MB Glass) providing half of all 
members in the Wits glass industry and a similar role being played by Nampak, 
Mondi and Sappi in pulp and paper. Conversely, small enterprises played a much 
more important role in other sectors80.  
Membership losses were largely due to retrenchments in large companies 
(Consol-Wadeville, Waltons Stationery, Bison Board-Boksburg, PFG Flat Glass-
Springs, AECI-Kempton Park), with glass companies being particularly affected. 
Such figures reveal a trend to organisational dispersal and fragmentation that, 
similarly to NUMSA, accompanies restructuring and retrenchments. According to 
Andile Nyambezi, Germiston local organizer81, 2,000 jobs have been lost by 
CEPPWAWU-organised companies in the local from 1998 to 2000 alone. Only in 
companies with the strongest union traditions retrenched workers are re-employed 
on a fixed-term basis. Despite the predominance of large companies in sectors 
like glass and paper, about half of CEPPWAWU members in the East Rand are 
not covered by centralised bargaining.  
 As in metal and engineering, downsizing in chemical, glass and paper has 
been paralleled by fragmentation of production and competitive outsourcing. 
Technological innovation has, however, played a far greater role in company 
downsizing. Small companies, largely un-unionised, have proliferated especially 
in production segments, like palletising or cutting to size, that do not require 
substantial investment and overhead. Volatility in employment and companies’ 
ownership implies renewed organisational efforts for the union and a shift away 
from organisation based on large conglomerates.  
                                                
80 All CEPPWAWU membership figures and related elaborations are provided by John Appolis, 
CEPPWAWU Wits Regional Secretary. In 1999, 54% of Wits CEPPWAWU members were in 
workplaces with less than 30 employees, 16% were in workplaces with 31-50 employees, 17% in 
companies with 51-100 employees and 13% in companies with more than 100 employees.  
81 Interview with the Author, 7 April 2000. 
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 Labour broking is emerging as a significant factor in the casualisation and 
fragmentation of employment on the East Rand. Interviewing direct participants 
allows a glimpse in an otherwise scarcely researched business. Fernando Perneta82 
runs the labour broking company FEDMO, which supplies workers to 
establishments in the Nigel area, especially Union Carriage & Wagon (UCW). A 
former foreman at UCW, Perneta left in 1991 when, besides starting FEDMO, he 
became a coach with soccer team Moroka Swallows. He returned to work full-
time with FEDMO when UCW started retrenching in 1997. During the 1990s, he 
says, the labour broking business has known an explosion in the East Rand, based 
on the proliferation of operators on a largely undocumented and unregulated 
basis. According to him, there are more than 1,000 brokers in operation on the 
East Rand, plus an unspecified number of retrenched or dismissed foremen that 
arrange for small teams of workers to be employed as casuals in their previous 
companies. Nearly all of them are not formally registered and, according to 
CEPPWAWU’s Andile Nyambezi, some of  them entered the business by 
recruiting strikebreakers. 
FEDMO, conversely, is a significant exception. In fact, it is the only labour 
broker on the East Rand that a union, NUMSA, has managed to organise after 
protracted confrontation, forcing it to register under COIDA and the Bargaining 
Council, to pay contractual wage rates and provide UIF, sick pay and a provident 
fund83, although not medical aid (Interview #21). Moreover, agreements between 
NUMSA and FEDMO provide for a 7-day notice for termination of employment, 
as opposed to the customary 24 hours. Perneta rationalises the situation by 
emphasising the uniqueness of his business strategy and the exception it 
constitutes in the East Rand’s labour broking scenario. In fact, he says that he is 
prepared to accept lower profit margins for the sake of building reputation, “social 
capital” and long-term networks of loyalty.  
FEDMO’s approach can also be explained, however, by the fact that the 
company positions itself on the upper end of the labour market, specialising in the 
supply of artisans and skilled workers. At the same time, maintaining a “skills 
mix” with a significant craft component is crucial because many companies 
                                                
82 Interview with the Author, 21 October 1999. 
83 I could verify this on payslips of FEDMO workers that Perneta showed me. 
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employ semi-skilled workers for artisans’ jobs, paying semi-skilled rates to the 
broker who then pays artisans’ rates to the worker.  If FEDMO was not paying for 
benefits, as the near totality of labour brokers do in Perneta’s view, its margin for 
a worker paid R28 per hour would rise from R1.00 to R1.30-1.70 per hour. 
Developing long-term relations of trust between labour brokers and craft workers 
redefines patterns of identity and representation. FEDMO presents itself, in 
alternative to the union, as a de facto representative of workers on whose behalf it 
negotiates with client companies. During our interview, Perneta showed me a 
leaflet from another labour broker advertising its advantages in this way: “As 
contract staff are not  unionised, a client’s time is not spent negotiating with union 
representatives and work attendance of contract staff is not dependent on trade 
union attitudes and agreements”. FEDMO’s approach conversely, is more 
resonant with conventional managerial paternalism disguised as industrial 
relations pluralism: 
 
When I started at UCW, I used to think and behave like all the other 
brokers and the union didn’t like that, and I thought, ‘This can’t be 
real, why must I give you ten Rand more? If these people that are 
bigger than me are not doing it, I am not doing it’. Then I started 
talking to the union (…). Other companies think that if they use labour 
brokers they won’t have to deal with the unions, to get rid of toyi-toyi. 
I am the only one who allows the workers to belong to the unions, 
there’s no other labour broker that I have seen doing that. And still our 
workers don’t stand out of the gate jumping up and down. (…) I have 
no problems with blacks. I come from a football background, I was 
training the Moroka Swallows in the 1970s, I have been training black 
teams since 1972-73, I was one of the two only white coaches, so I 
know these people, I know how they are and I know how they look, 
and they respect me, they are the ones that make me what I am, and I 
respect them. So I have never had problems with what the unions 
want, otherwise they would have started dancing outside the gates. I 
know, Franco, that is not you want to hear…” 
Q No, look, there is nothing that I specifically want to hear… 
A No, really, there has never been fights between us, I have come a 
long way with these people, I have always been with these people, 
many years. 
 
He then went on suggesting the possibility of a cooperation between unions and 
“good” labour brokers to improve knowledge of the law, prevent elusion and set 
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uniform standards in the industry to increase diseconomies for exploitative 
practices. On the basis of his own paternalist framework, he starkly contrasted 
FEDMO’s case with what he regards as harshly exploitative and abusive practices 
linked to labour broking on the East Rand: 
 
Outside it’s not like that, we are a very isolated case. I know lots of 
labour brokers outside and they don’t basically care about the people, 
what will happen tomorrow to that guy. My people are people who 
have worked here before, we don’t just put an advert saying that we 
want six artisans, I personally bring them here and because I bring 
them, I know what the person can do. (…) Outside it’s very stupid, 
companies would just say “I need a boilermaker”, and that’s it, and 
they wouldn’t worry about provident fund. So I have to make R1.50 
and hour while others make R10.50 because they don’t pay benefits, 
that’s exploitation. 
Q but if all these people get away with it, why don’t you do the same? 
After all, they save a lot of money 
A (laughs) yes, a lot of money. Let me tell you something: nobody 
comes to my door, nobody swears at me, nobody calls me names and I 
would like to think that I am still doing business ten years down the 
line. (…) So, you people looking at the labour brokers are quite right: 
labour brokers in general is probably the worst business around, 
because they don’t pay people in time (…). You can’t imagine, you 
haven’t even started to imagine”. 
 
According to research on the subject, companies’ gains from using labour brokers 
are mainly in saving administrative costs, undercutting benefits, avoiding unions 
and enforcing time flexibility counting on the employees’ vulnerability (Rees, 
1998). The specific case here discussed, however, indicates that casualisation 
involves also a process of reshaping worker identities and loyalties in ways that 
new meanings are provided to replace prospects of stable insertion in waged 
employment. The following discussion of the companies that constitute my case 
studies underlines the importance of contestation over meanings and discourses 
used to make sense of the East Rand’s industrial transition. 
  
4.4.2 Presentation of Individual Company Cases 
 
FEDMO’s main client, UCW, is a leading name in the production of locomotives, 
trailers and wagons. Started by an Australian investment in 1958, and enjoying 
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the support of railways parastatal Spoornet as part of apartheid-age policies of 
infrastructural development, UCW reached its peak during the 1970s, specialising 
in particular in the production of 6E/6E1 engines and Electrical Multiple Units 
(EMUs) for suburban transportation. Economic crisis and the decline in public 
transportation from the mid-1980s led the company to privilege the production of 
wagons and, later, to focus on repairs and export to the region following the 
expiry of major contracts for the domestic market84. In 1996 Murray & Roberts 
took over the company from Malbak and it embarked on a massive restructuring 
and downsizing exercise coincidental with new contracts for the supply of 
carriages for Malaysian and Zimbabwean rail networks. UCW was then a 
subcontractor for major multinationals (Siemens, Toshiba) which provided 
electrical systems.  
Retrenchments were motivated by the fact that new contracts were of a 
limited duration, while no production for the South African market had taken 
place since 1982. Layoffs started in early 1997, at the expiration of the Malaysian 
contract, and over the following two years employment dropped from 800 to 310 
permanent workers, 50% of which white artisans. During the 1980s, UCW could 
employ between 1,200 and 1,500 workers. For subsequent contracts, like the one 
for Zimbabwe, workers were re-employed on fixed-term contracts through 
FEDMO, and 200 of them were terminated again when the Zimbabwe contract 
expired at the end of 1997. While UCW was retrenching and casualising, 
FEDMO workers were working on overtime schedules of 27-30 hours per week 
(Interview #33).  
Following further retrenchments after April 1998, the company was 
planning a 150 headcount by October 199985, while 70% of production workers 
and the majority of white artisans were hired through FEDMO, according to shop-
stewards (Interview #21). Since 1997, the company’s survival prospects have 
been, in the words of its Human Resources director, “quite bleak”86 and 
depending entirely on repair jobs, especially for commuter rail operator Metrorail. 
                                                
84 UCW company information on <www.ucw.co.za>, last consulted 30 May 2005, and 
Engineering News, 26 July 2002, p.18. 
85 Information provided by Joe Lekhasi, UCW Human Resource Manager, 3 November 1999. 
86 Joe Lekhasi, Interview with the Author, 3 November 1999. 
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Following unsuccessful attempts by M&R to sell UCW, in 2003 the “UCW 
Partnership” was formed to include UCW and Duduza Rail Engineering, a black 
empowerment consortium led by the J&J Group.  
According to NUMSA organisers, UCW specifically targeted union 
members for layoffs and introduced labour broking in an effort to weaken 
NUMSA87 in a company with a strong union tradition and where MAWU was 
recognised already in the 1970s. Between 1997 and 1999, NUMSA has lost 330 
members at UCW. On the other hand, no negotiations over restructuring have 
taken place. Even if management vaunts its “availability to talk” to the unions and 
the need to move away from an adversarial “them and us mentality”, no formal 
workplace structures exist, on account that they would “restrict the flow of 
communication”, leading legitimate differences of opinion to “question perceived 
authority”88. 
 The second NUMSA-organised company in my sample, Baldwin’s Steel 
in Brakpan, was part of a conglomerate, Dorbyl, which placed a specific emphasis 
on its enlightened, participative, union-friendly management style. Baldwin’s 
Brakpan, part of the Baldwin’s Group, is a company specialised in trading and 
cutting structural steel for branches of the group nationwide. The production of 
structural steel was started at Baldwin’s by Dorbyl when it took over the company 
from Stewart and Lloyd’s in the late 1980s. Flat steel products, once done at 
Baldwin’s Brakpan, were moved to the Isando branch in 1991, when Baldwin’s 
Brakpan was scheduled for closure and the entire workforce was retrenched. 
According to workers, with that decision the company’s aim was to “run away 
from strikes” in a factory characterised by high levels of union militancy 
(Interview #15). Eventually it was, however, the Boksburg plant, previously 
producing structural steel, that shut down, while its workers and structural steel 
production were moved to Brakpan.  
At the time of my research, the workforce at Baldwin’s Brakpan was of 115 
employees, 10 of which working on cutting machines, numbers that remained 
                                                
87 Andrew Zulu, NUMSA Nigel Local Organiser, interview with the Author, 13 July 1999. 
88 Joe Lekhasi, Interview with the Author, 3 November 1999. Lekhasi was a MAWU and NUMSA 
shop-steward before being hired in a managerial position in 1994. 
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stable during the 1990s89. The factory’s prospects are however shadowed by the 
enduring crisis of the construction industry, the main source of demand for 
structural steel, which led between 1997 and 1999 to a drop in sales by almost 
50%. As a result, the plant has come increasingly to depend on steel cutting, a 
relatively capital-intensive segment of production whose share of the turnout was 
planned to double from the existing 10% and which, in the words of a shop-
steward, “keeps the company going” (Interview #5)90. Therefore, Baldwin’s 
Brakpan was trying to become a lean production, made-to-order operation in an 
environment penalised by overpriced locally produced steel and particularly 
subject to competition from what a manager calls “many rats and mice who 
operate on a small basis”91. Increasing pressures on workloads and task flexibility 
have been combined to recurrent rumours of impending retrenchments92, which 
management unofficially reinforces: 
 
If we can avoid all this crap and this hassle with trade unions. We 
can’t fire… here there’s a poor guy that starts a business and then he 
finds out that he can’t fire, he has to deal with the unions, people with 
disabilities, the CCMA, the Employment Equity Act… If we can get 
away with all that crap and employ a machine instead of having ten 
workers employed that would make perfect business sense for the poor 
guy that is doing the business.93 
 
Eventually, Dorbyl decided to sell the Baldwin’s group in a major restructuring at 
the beginning of the 2000s. First its three flat steel plants in Rosslyn, Durban and 
Port Elizabeth were merged with Trident Steel in December 200094.  Then, in 
January 2002 a management buyout of Dorbyl’s steel traders, Baldwin’s and 
Stalcor, created Kulungile Metals as a group with a 49% black empowerment 
shareholding95.  
                                                
89 Keith Roach, Works Manager, Baldwin’s Steel Brakpan, Interview with the Author, 27 October 
1999. 
90 See also Mgibe (MEIBC) to Roach, 4 April 2000, Author’s collection. 
91 Keith Roach, Interview with the Author, 27 October 1999. 
92 Du Plooy to Madiseng, 30 March 1999, Author’s collection. 
93 Keitth Roach, Interview with the Author, 27 October 1999. 
94 Competition Tribunal, Trident Steel (Pty.) Ltd and Dorbyl Ltd, Case No. 89/LM/Oct00. 
95 “Big Steel-Sector BEE Deal”, Engineering News, 4 March 2005; “Pamodzi Gets Grip on Steel 
Sector”, Bisiness Report, 12 February 2004. 
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Before such changes took place, however, work intensification, increasing 
insecurity and a muscular managerial style contrasted starkly with Dorbyl’s 
discourse of participative company governance. According to Osborne Galeni, 
NUMSA’s organiser for the Dorbyl group, the company’s leadership that 
emerged in 1992, represented by CEO Bill Cooper, tried to engage the union in a 
visionary process of joint transformation with which Dorbyl wanted to end a 
history of adversarialism where it was the most hardline voice in employers’ 
organisation SEIFSA. Bill Cooper’s transformation programme involved a radical 
reshuffle of management and the establishment of transformation forums in 
Dorbyl’s subsidiaries, which earned him the respect of the union: “Sometimes 
other employers called him a NUMSA executive. He’s viewed as a union man”96.  
Part of the company’s image of change was the assertion of an ideological 
discourse of cooperation and “company patriotism” that aimed at reshaping 
workers’ attitudes and responses in a non-conflictual direction. “Roadshows”, as 
Galeni calls them, involving company and union officials were organised across 
Dorbyl’s plants to explain to workers the need to transcend a culture of 
confrontational interactions. At the culmination of the process, a “truth and 
reconciliation commission” (TRC) was formed, modelled after the national TRC, 
which seconded officials for this exercise. The Dorbyl TRC had a mandate of 
collecting information about past practices and abuses, with an aim at healing the 
resulting animosities and laying the groundwork for cooperative relationships. 
Even if it considered the TRC a positive departure from a company’s past where 
“foremen used to beat workers”, NUMSA refused to make a submission as an 
organisation, while also many managers resisted the TRC fearing that it could 
turn into a “witch-hunt”97. Baldwin’s workers expressed a generalised scepticism 
and indifference for what they considered as mampara (Interview #9), or a 
rehashing of 1970s “liaison committees” (Interview #11), or a fictitious and 
merely ideological window-dressing with “some reverends and some government 
people going around the plant” (Interview #12). As a result, many of them refused 
                                                
96 Osborne Galeni, NUMSA Organiser for the Dorbyl Group, Interview with the Author, 11 
August 1999. 
97 At Baldwin’s Brakpan management tried to convince NUMSA to demand the formation of a 
“workplace forum” in terms of the 1995 Labour Relations Act rather than being part of Dorbyl’s 
“transformation forum”.  
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to participate. Therefore,  individual cases of racist abuses figure prominently in 
the TRC company reports98. Structural issues related to managerial 
authoritarianism, unilateral decision-making, casualisation, restructuring and 
retrenchments, however, were not part of the Dorbyl TRC’s mandate since, as 
Galeni puts it, “they are driven by market forces”.  
The positive reception by NUMSA’s national headquarters of the Dorbyl 
TRC and of Cooper’s discourse of change, despite refusal and disillusionment at 
the grassroots, reveals the company’s remarkable success in shaping union 
identities away from social radicalism in a context of crisis and high uncertainty. 
Dorbyl’s discourse of corporate citizenship contrasts with the militant utterances 
in the unions’ social citizenship discourses in presenting workers’ empowerment 
as depending on the company’s success: 
 
The emphasis should now be on positives, not negatives (…). What 
we need is a common vision that defies old narrow thinking and 
practices, allowing the empowering of the workforce to give 
everything they’ve got and management to lead confidently(…). The 
time of ‘fanagolos’, dictatorship, ‘double agendas’, unnecessary 
confrontations and all those things has ended in 1994”99. 
 
NUMSA itself has become increasingly concerned about such developments that, 
by exploiting workers’ vulnerability and employment insecurity, mobilise 
corporate identities in ways that could deepen the union’s representation problems 
and cause further divisions. In 1995 NUMSA’s Dorbyl National Shop Steward 
Council “intervened by discouraging members from entering into (sic) any form 
of co-determination at Dorbyl plants”100. A 1996 internal NUMSA report noticed 
that, even if 64.4% of Dorbyl employees belonged to NUMSA, most shop 
stewards did not attend meetings regularly and most members were “out of touch” 
                                                
98 Reports were compiled for all Dorbyl subsidiaries. The most common complaints concerned 
racial forms of abuse, racial favouritism in loans and promotions, racial wage gaps, unpaid 
nightshifts and overtime. Lack of information and financial assistance to purchase housing was a 
widespread complaint at all companies. Equally raised was the lack of information on, access to 
and downsizing of medical aids. See Dorbyl TRC Companies’ Reports (SPI, DHE Vereeniging, 
Roll Work Vanderbijlpark, Dorbyl Marine, DSP Containeering, Mechanical Products, MSP and 
Venco, 11 October 1997; Climax, 28 November 1997; McCarthy Mine Machinery, 2-3 December 
1997; Baldwin’s, 3 March 1998; Busaf, n.d.), Author’s collection. 
99 Dorbyl Transformation Minutes, 28 May 1997, Ndlovu to Girodor et al. See also Dorbyl Ltd., 
Annual Report, 1997, Author’s collection. 
100 Minutes of Dorbyl National Shopstewards Council, 13 April 1996. NUMSA. 
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with the union. On the other hand, management in many divisions was “way 
beyond communication stage” and had started workplace-based informal forums 
and “green areas” where workers were led by fears of being laid off to accept 
unilateral technological innovation, multitasking and reorganisation of shifts. 
Management’s transformative rhetoric was ultimately seen as piecemeal and 
aimed at sidestepping the union, confining it to a “rubberstamp” capacity 
(Morapedi, 1996). 
 Discourses of “company patriotism” and managerial attempts at reshaping 
workers identities, with attendant divisions inside the unions, played an important 
role also in the trajectory of the last NUMSA-organised factory I investigated, 
Kelvinator’s plant in Alrode. Kelvinator’s origins as a household appliances’ 
producer date back to 1929, with a plumbing and sheet metal company founded 
by Carl Fuchs, whose development benefited from industrial expansion in the 
1930s and the war effort in the 1940s. The company acquired licences from 
Sweden and the USA to manufacture products under the brand names of, 
respectively, Westinghouse and Electrolux (Bezuidenhout, 2004). In 1978, the 
then C.G. Fuchs was absorbed by Barlow Rand and took the name Barlows 
Consumer Electric Products Group (Barcep). In 1983, out of 700 employees, 326 
were members of MAWU101. By 1993 Barcep had 1900 employees and a leading 
24% market share, even if its unbundling from Barlows in the same year had 
weakened it in a liberalising scenario that was becoming increasingly competitive 
(Rees, 1994). In November 1996 Barlows announced that due to a 
competitiveness crisis the possibility of discontinuing operations existed, a 
prospect for which the company had already expressed its preference. The choice 
to liquidate was confirmed at the end of that month, and retrenchment letters were 
sent. Few days later, however, the direction notified the employees of discussions 
for a takeover of the company by a consortium formed by NUMSA and Sovereign 
Capital Investment (SCI), led by Simon Koch.  
On 17 December 1996 the SCI-NUMSA consortium became the owner of 
the company as a going concern for R1.00, after that 400 workers had been 
retrenched. SCI owned the Kelvinator brand to be produced on franchise and, as 
                                                
101 Information provided by Greg Ruiters based on MAWU membership statistics. 
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part of the deal, workers were given a 20% share ownership102. The new 
management embarked on an ambitious expansion plan counting on increasing 
demands for household appliances in a post-apartheid market driven by 
government-sponsored electrification, the promotion of an African middle class 
and the spread of consumerism among poor communities. As a director explained, 
“We has a pot of gold in Africa and a pot of gold in Sub-Saharan Africa”103. 
Therefore Koch introduced new technology, opened a cookware line to be 
combined with the previous production of fridges, enhanced marketing efficiency 
through direct sales to the final customers, outsourced transport, planned to 
double output to 1,000 units per day, which was achieved in September 1998, and 
started a massive recruitment drive, employing 500 new workers, mostly 
previously retrenched104. By the end of 1998, Kelvinator employed almost 1,300 
workers (800 in direct production), 840 of which were NUMSA members. 
 While production efficiency, output and working capital improved and 
overhead and purchasing costs were drastically reduced, demand expectations did 
not materialise. Moreover, the market became increasingly competitive in a 
liberalised context where retailers buying in bulks maintain substantial influence 
on prices. Finally, a competitor, Masterfridge, exported to South Africa from a 
Swaziland factory whose workers were allegedly paid one third the hourly rate of 
Kelvinator employees105. In 1999, Kelvinator’s selling prices were 10% lower 
than in 1997. Management felt that the only alternative to restore profit margins 
was to further increase production in the hope of improving economies of scale 
and being able to negotiate more effectively with retailers, which strained 
capacity, led to excess stock and increased costs. To overproduction was added 
growing workers’ resentment at the company’s work intensification106 (Barchiesi, 
1999). 
 For Kelvinator employees “it took a lot of strength to restart the company 
again” (Interview #41), and their sacrifices endorsed Koch’s image as a saviour of 
                                                
102 McCulloch v Kelvinator Group Services of SA (Pty) Ltd, ILJ, 1998: 1399-1413. 
103 Andy Fenn, Financial Director, Kelvinator, Interview with the Author, 20 October 1999. 
104 Ibidem. 
105 See Koch to Ngwenda, 4 August 1997; Koch to Erwin, 30 July 1997; Koch to Erwin, 30 July 
1999, Author’s collection; “Use of Cheap Labour Criticised”, Business Day, 23 May 1997. 
106 Andy Fenn, Interview with the Author, 20 October 1999. 
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jobs and as a visionary business leader in an environment based on cooperation 
and a fair share of rewards. In spite of the going concern agreement, the 
company’s “founder employees”, those who were part of the 20% shareholding 
deal, accepted to place their Barlows’ retrenchment packages in a Kelvinator 
Employee Founder Share Trust, with the promise of being refunded after six 
months in case of negative results. Koch, therefore, restarted the company with 
R16 million in employee’s retrenchment benefits in addition to SCI’s R60 million 
investment107. Moreover, the union had to accept a no-strike pledge and agreed in 
a “record of understanding”, due to expire in June 1999, that while “founders” 
rates of increase would be at the industry’s levels, new workers hired as operators 
at the lowest grade after 1 June 1997 would be paid the minimum SEIFSA rates 
of R8.03 per hour, compared to the R10.42 paid to “founders” in the same grade. 
Not only was this a breach of centralised bargaining but, in the words of a local 
NUMSA organiser: 
 
This created two categories of workers. The founder members were 
disadvantaged because they never got the percent increment in terms 
of centralised bargaining and the newly employed had their wages cut 
as they started with the SEIFSA rate. 
Q: So you agreed to a… 
A: …a wage freeze. We agreed to it.108 
 
Management, however, has a different version: 
 
Bullshit. There was no wage freeze. The deal was that the guys’ 
increases were agreed at SEIFSA rates and new people would be at 
SEIFSA rates, and that created conflict. We had higher wages and 
similar productivity compared to our competitors, that’s why we told 
workers that to continue the business new guys had to get SEIFSA 
rates109. 
 
In any event, differential wages created dissatisfaction especially among the new, 
younger workers, with spiralling theft and sabotage, an absenteeism rate that 
                                                
107 Ibidem and Zweli Livi, NUMSA Alberton Local Organiser, Interview with the Author, 16 
September 1999. 
108 Zweli Livi, interview with the Author, 16 September 1999. 
109 Andy Fenn, Interview with the Author, 20 October 1999. 
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climbed to 36% and accusations to the “founders” of having “sold out” the new 
employees. In the second half of 1998, in the midst of its financial and market 
crisis, the company started looking for possible rescuers. Potential investors, in 
particular the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), demanded an 
extension of the “Record of Understanding” and of differential wage schedules. 
NUMSA’s acceptance of this request led to a breakdown of relations inside the 
union and to clashes between “founders” and new workers which felt betrayed by 
the deal.  
Some “founders” also felt betrayed by the company, who never paid 
dividends on their shares due to financial difficulties, and they accused the 
managers of not disclosing correct financial information. Therefore, many of 
them ended up supporting the new employees’ demands for wage parity. The 
shop steward committee eventually split between those who blamed the company 
for reneging on its promises and those who accused the young workers’ 
radicalism and laxness for the company’s downfall. The former line prevailed and 
the shop stewards stopped attending the “consultation forum” which was the only 
company structure in which changes were discussed, alleging that the forum was 
used by the company to create a direct communication channel to impose top-
down decisions in ways that sidestepped the union. Escalating conflict 
accompanied Kelvinator’s problems and in August 1999 the company announces 
the retrenchment of 200 employees for 10 September110. But on 7 September, 
faced with the failed materialisation of new investments and rising debts, the 
company announced its provisional liquidation. In the meanwhile no negotiation 
had taken place with NUMSA, which was not informed of the decision to 
liquidate (Vlok, 1999).  
As a result of Kelvinator’s liquidation, 1,200 employees were left jobless. 
After prolonged negotiations involving alternative rescue options, a major local 
company, Defy, bought Kelvinator’s assets and resumed production in March 
2000.In June, however, Defy announced the transfer of production equipments 
from Alrode to its plant in Ezakheni, near Ladysmith, in what was, under the 
apartheid-age KwaZulu homeland, an “industrial decentralization” site and is now 
                                                
110 Minutes of the Retrenchment Consultation Meeting, 23 August 1999; Raphoto to Livi, 25 
August 1999, Author’s collection. 
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a deindustrialised backwater of under-employed, low-wage workers, with weak 
traditions of union organising (Hart, 2002: 127-151). With only 250 workers 
employed in the new plant, at a cost one third lower than employing them in 
Alrode, Defy doubled its operating profits and captured 44% of the cookware 
market (Bezuidenhout, 2004: 7). 
 Kelvinator’s collapse ultimately confirms the relevance, already seen for 
FEDMO and Baldwin’s, of managing worker identities and allegiances in a 
process where old promises of emancipation linked to wage labour have 
collapsed, giving way to a reality of uncertainty, precariousness and fear. 
Managers’ bitter comments reveal both the importance of such a terrain of 
contestation, and the problems they encountered in building a worker identity 
centred on company patriotism as an alternative to collective solidarity and union 
organisation: 
 
The new workers employed to work in the cookware plant were not 
part of Kelvinator culture, so new divisions and conflicts arose 
between young and old guys, who were instead committed towards the 
company. The new guys, however, were very disruptive and in the end 
they took over the shop-steward committee and radicalised the 
union111. 
 
According to Simon Koch: 
 
We told the shop stewards about our problems, but they did not 
believe us. They’re a young bunch of guys, (…) disruptive young 
workers with nothing to lose. (…) Their allegations that we did not 
disclose information on the financial situation of the company are 
simple lies (…). It was a mistake to employ workers with matrics. I 
thought they were smarter and I wanted to give them a chance but 
labour intensive production was not suited for them112. 
 
But the Kelvinator drama was also a devastating setback for the union and its 
ability not only to represent workers’ demands in a coherent way, but also to 
contest managerial hegemony. Workers’ views on the responsibility for the 
collapse and on the role of NUMSA are divided and cut across age, seniority and 
                                                
111 Andy Fenn, Interview with the Author, 20 October 1999. 
112 Simon Koch, CEO, Kelvinator, Interview with the Author, 17 November 2001. 
 181
organisational divides. Some NUMSA members, and not only older ones, fondly 
remember “Simon” [Koch] as a visionary leader, “a good guy who got bad luck”, 
under which “everything was going first class” (Interview #55). Many older 
workers blame the younger ones for their alleged envy, greed, lack of discipline 
and commitment to the company, accusing the union for having sided with them 
(Interview #45). Most shop stewards accuse Kelvinator’s management of 
incompetence for a high-volume and overstocking strategy that they see as a sign 
of mistrust and fear of strikes. For a senior shop steward “despotism and anarchy: 
that was the name of the game for the bosses” (Interview #41). Most workers, 
however, old and young alike, ultimately felt betrayed for the collapse of a 
company that was relaunched and became competitive essentially thanks to their 
sacrifices. Instead, after a pattern of unfulfilled promises and violated agreements, 
often with the union’s agreement, they had their jobs erased without consultation 
or notice, facing management’s contempt at their “unruliness”: 
 
Sometimes it felt like a torture chamber, it felt very hard to report for 
work. I felt like, why am I going to that place? That place is boring 
me, I don’t feel that place like home… And he was calling us a family, 
‘we are a family here! We are a family!’, Yes, a big, unhappy family 
(Interview #51). 
 
Kelvinator’s end is a glaring and symptomatic example of how the material 
collapse of wage labour opens up gaps at the level of workers’ collective 
discourse, identity and rationality, and it highlights the growing inadequacy of 
union organisations in weaving meanings and strategies of solidarity that are 
irrevocably questioned. My case studies of glass and paper companies confirm 
such trends in a context of constant erosion of wage labour’s stability and 
rewards.  
 The East Rand’s glass packaging industry revolves around two main 
players, MB Glass in Leondale and Consol Glass in Wadeville. Metal Box (MB) 
Glass, then owned by Barlow Rand, opened its Leondale plant in 1983, recruiting 
many managers and skilled workers from Consol. Nampak bought the whole 
Metal Box group in the early 1990s, and now MB Glass is a fully-owned Nampak 
subsidiary (Interview #221 and 223). Historically, the company is a union 
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stronghold, with 191 CEPPWAWU members among the 450 workers in direct 
production out of a 600-strong total workforce, and prospects for further increases 
following the ongoing merger of CEPPWAWU with the National Employees’ 
Trade Union (NETU). Probably about 25% of the African workforce is made of 
migrants, especially weekly commuters from rural KwaZulu-Natal.  
Strong union identities in the plant translated into company agreements 
with wage levels substantially higher than centralised bargaining rates, the 
provision of a range of company services usually unavailable in the industry, like 
company transport for workers on nightshift, and an uncommon tradition of 
company welfarism. MB had a relatively advanced national housing loans 
programme for its employees (Hendler, 1989b: 8). The scheme started as a 
company project to provide housing mortgage and personal loans backed by the 
employees’ provident fund113. Initially the unions present at MB, especially 
NUMSA, resisted it, seeing it as a company ploy to promote private home 
ownership among most stable employees and in this way divide and sidestep the 
union. In fact, no more than 5% of MB’s employees could afford the company’s 
home loans financing for the cheapest housing products, even if between 50% and 
75% qualified for various types of loan114. However, following advice that it 
should not “cut itself off from the communities”115, the union eventually decided 
to engage the company on this terrain, demanding to focus home loans on low-
wage workers, to introduce one-time company housing subsidies for all 
employees equivalent to the cost of a serviced site116 and to cap the amount of 
withdrawal from the provident fund to 5% of assets. The scheme was then 
restructured under the name Metal Box Provident Fund Housing Project, and 
NUMSA gained representation on its board. In 1999, 44.06% of overall provident 
                                                
113 Hendler, P., Metal Box Provident Fund Housing Project Report Two: Access to the Formal 
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fund members (about 30% in the Leondale plant) had access to loans of an 
average size of R20,173.90117. 
The company has faced two restructuring exercises in 1990 and 1991, in 
which 60 workers were retrenched in a context of heavy technological innovation. 
Moreover, some departments, especially the mould shop resort of faulty bottles, 
were outsourced or, as a shop-steward indicatively says, “privatised” (Interview 
#201). While resorting and moulding have been outsourced to an external 
company, some of the retrenched workers were rehired as temporary. In few cases 
workers laid off in 1990 are still called to work for MB Glass on an intermittent 
basis, but casuals are largely hired in nearby informal settlements, largely through  
labour brokers. At least three labour broking companies operate in the plant, one 
of which owned by a formerly retrenched MB manager.  
According to shop-stewards, temporary workers hired through labour 
brokers earn wages of R150-250 per week with no benefits, and they provided 
first-hand evidence of former MB employees being terminated by labour brokers 
for joining the union (Interview #201). While CEPPWAWU demands to stop 
outsourcing and subcontracting of operations, a further threat to MB workers’ 
employment security and stability comes from the shutdown of the company’s 
Durban branch, which raises fears that managers will move to Leondale some of 
that factory’s machines and that retrenchments would follow (Interview #215). 
 According to both managers and union organisers, relatively high wages 
and company welfarism that made of MB Glass a relatively “insular” reality were 
the product of a perculiar combination of union rootedness, shop-steward 
radicalism118 and the tempo of the company’s expansion. In fact, being a 
latecomer on the glass containers’ market faced MB Glass with the need to retain 
critical skills to be able to compete119. The strengthening of centralised bargaining 
                                                
117 NBC, Home Loans Report – Metal Box South Africa Provident Fund as at 31 December 1999, 
Author’s collection. 
118 Andile Nyambezi, Interview with the Author, 7 April 2000. 
119 Brian Maguranyanga, Nampak National Headquarters, Sandton, telephonic conversation with 
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Management and Shop Stewards, 24 November 1999, Author’s collection. 
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and the threat of new technology following the closure of the Durban plant, 
however, are challenging MB Glass’ peculiarities. While shop-stewards report 
that relations with management have been increasingly strained during 1998 and 
1999, culminating in the suspension of the whole shop-steward committee for 
having taken part in a 1998 national strike, the company welfarist system has also 
shown cracks120. 
 Technological innovation played a decisive role in restructuring and 
employment crisis also at Consol Glass. The company was started in 1948 and at 
the time of my research Anglovaal was its main shareholder. Following 
successful restructuring, in October 2004 Anglovaal “unbundled” Consol and 
allowed it to be separately listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange121. Apart 
from its Wadeville bottle plant, Consol has branches in Pretoria, Cape Town and 
Olifantsfontein. In 1994 Consol Glass Wadeville employed more than 800 
workers in direct production alone. Following a wave of retrenchments, especially 
200 workers laid off in April 1998, the total workforce dropped to 340, of which 
280 in direct production, by early 2000122. The main reason for retrenchments was 
restructuring due to focusing on the company’s “core business” and to the 
introduction of new technology (Beadle, 1995). New computerised bottling 
machines were introduced and two furnaces out of three were shut down 
following the automation of the remaining one. As a result, productivity has 
greatly increased, with less workers employed, which allowed the addition of one 
line to the company’s four. While in 1996 there were 27 palletisers on 9 machines 
(3 per machine), in 1998 there were 9 on 4 machines (2.25 per machine). 
                                                
120 At the end of 1999 the company announced its decision to eliminate its shift transportation 
arrangement. See Minutes of Meeting between Management and Shop Stewards, 24 November 
1999, Author’s collection. CEPPWAWU’s research showed that members’ costs for risk benefits 
in the MB provident fund were increasing, while claims and housing loans were decreasing. See 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees of the Metal Box SA Provident Fund, 24 February 2000 and 
Metal Box SA Provident Fund, Administration Report for the Gauteng Region as at 10 March 
2000 for the Regional Trustees Meeting, 3-6 April 2000, Author’s collection. Few months before 
MB Glass shop-stewards had sent Nampak a letter of complaints blaming management’s “lack of 
effective leadership” and failure to involve workers in decisions, see NUMSA MB Glass 
Roodekop to Evans, 26 July 1999, Author’s collection. 
121 “Consol to Be Unbundled from AVI and Relisted”, Business Day, 13 October 2004. 
122 Steven Kalicharan, Human Resource Manager, Consol Glass Wadeville, Interview with the 
Author, 4 April 2000. 
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Therefore, restructuring was the result of manufacturing expansion, rather than 
the response to market problems123.  
Moreover, numerous operations deemed “non-core” were outsourced inside 
the plant (as in smelting) or closed down and subcontracted outside. In particular, 
resorting was subcontracted to Bompak Services in 1994 and recycling was 
moved to Enviroglass in 1996. All in all, 150 workers were lost due to 
outsourcing and 150 as a result of automation, particularly in the furnace 
(Interview #181). Despite a 1994 agreement on consultation, a 1997 agreement on 
restructuring, and a “competitiveness and restructuring agreement” where the 
company commits itself to securing jobs for its employees, the unions were 
unable to affect the process and a CWIU application to the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) was rejected. Such 
developments contrast with Consol’s stated intention to adopt a participative 
management style based on joint problem-solving and “green areas”, as a worker 
remarks: 
 
Yeah, sure, like this one, it’s a Green Area but they are not working. 
This thing was introduced but we are not participating in it, we use 
these areas to come here, have tea, lunch. 
Q: Well, this corner is unquestionably painted green… The idea is 
that at the beginning of the day you meet with managers for 15-30 
minutes to discuss company problems. Is there anything like that 
here? 
A No, no. we are not discussing anything (Interview #183). 
 
At the same time, workers in outsourced companies are employed in precarious, 
possibly exploitative conditions. Part of restructuring was Consol’s decision to get 
rid of its vast contingent of casual workers, which could be as many as 40% of the 
headcount (Interview #198). According to a Consol shop-steward who visited the 
plant, Bompak, which is run by a former Consol manager, employs approximately 
50 workers, almost all casuals with 1 to 3 weeks contracts,  which are “paid slave 
wages” (Interview #181). The equivalent of a Consol’s Grade 16 allegedly earns 
                                                
123 According to company statistics machine utilisation increased from 80% to 86% between 1996 
and 1998 and downtime decreased from 6.5% to 4.2% 
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at Bompak R1200 per month compared to Consol’s R2160124. Another shop-
steward thinks that Bompak employs illegal immigrants from Mozambique, since 
they cannot speak Zulu (Interview #184). It is the unanimous opinion of shop-
stewards that visible union members were targeted for retrenchments, often on a 
racial basis, under the pretext of their low skills and of the fact that, in this 
continuous operation 3-shifts plant125, workers on a permanent dayshift, which are 
mainly whites, have a higher exposure to the work environment (Interview #181). 
 Other glass companies I visited126 reinforce the impression of generalised 
employment decline linked to intensified technological innovation in highly 
competitive contexts that, however, are not affected by the market crisis 
encountered for metal and engineering companies. In flat glass production, in 
particular, the main industry player, PFG Glass in Springs, has retrenched almost 
1,000 employees from 1995 to 1999 (from 1,700 to 750), almost halving its 
weekly-paid headcount from 850 to 450127. To some extent restructuring was due 
to decline in demand for specific products, like bulletproof glass, of the which the 
company was a major supplier to the military and internal security during 
apartheid. The main reason is, however, competition from small companies 
specialising in cutting glass to specific sizes and shapes. Conditions facing 
workers in some of the  smaller emerging establishments can be gathered from 
questionnaires administered to managers and shop-stewards128. At one of these 
companies a shop-steward explained the reason for union membership’s decline 
as: “Bosses have become stricter on discipline after we joined the union (…), we 
can’t afford walking around”. The main reason for unionisation in this company 
                                                
124 The minimum monthly wage set in the 1999-2000 Glass Sector Interim Substantive Agreement 
is R2000, or R10.26 per hour on a 45-hour week and R11.55 for a 40-hour week. 
125 Like MB Glass, Consol works of a “3-shift, 4-crews” system, whereby workers are required to 
work on morning, afternoon and night shifts, doing the same shift for 2 consecutive days (3 days 
for weekends’ shifts), taking 2 consecutive days off after 7 working days. The system was 
introduced in the early 1990s, before it was a conventional 3-shift system, with one day off after 3 
days on the same shift. 
126 Apart from MB Glass and Consol, where I conducted extensive interviews, I have also 
submitted questionnaires to managers and shop-stewards at PFG Building Glass (Springs), Ace 
Glass (Germiston) and Triumph Glass (Alrode South). 
127 Christo Swanepoel, Human Resource Manager, PFG Building Glass, Interview with the 
Author, 14 March 2000. 
128 I faxed questionnaires to two of such companies, for which managers denied me direct access. 
In one of them, management refused to return the questionnaire. The two companies employed 
respectively 20 and 33 workers and specialised in specific products, like windscreens, or in sub-
supplying automotive manufacturing suppliers. 
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was indicated as unpaid overtime, while a 30% yearly turnover is reportedly due 
to low wages and there are no provident funds or medical aids. In the other, where 
half of the workforce is made of casual workers paid R600 per month without 
benefits, management blamed a decline in productivity on “outside influence, 
once they joined the union” and provided “strike actions” as the main reason for 
employing casuals 
 Paper and packaging companies visited for this research include 
manufacturers’ and merchants’ establishments129. The picture of downsizing in 
large companies, rising competition from small establishments and growing 
outsourcing of operations is here generally confirmed. Kimberly Clark in Springs 
has retrenched 140 workers in direct production from 1994 to 1998, down to the 
current 600, while closing a plant in Wadeville employing 100 workers130. Sappi 
Enstra (Springs) planned two retrenchment exercises in 1992, and from then to 
2000 total employment fell from 1800 to 1030 following technological 
innovation, while outsourcing is now discussed for the first time131.  
Nampak Corrugated (NC) Wadeville’s plant is one of the six in the 
Corrugated branch of the Nampak Group, the leading paper packaging producer 
in the company. In 2000 NC-Wadeville employed 263 permanent workers, 180 of 
which in direct production. While 145 production workers were black, 15 artisans 
out of 20 were white. Before 1994 more than 800 people were employed in this 
plant132, but workers in direct production have dropped from 400 to the current 
180 between 1995 and 2000. 80% of job losses were attributable to retrenchments 
linked to new technology and market competition and 15% are due to 
subcontracting of operations, especially in box stitching. A blow for the company 
came with South African Breweries’ decision in 1994 to use plastic crates rather 
than paper containers. Competition, however, is especially from small companies 
                                                
129 Extensive interviews were conducted at Nampak Corrugated (Wadeville) and Paperlink 
(Germiston). A questionnaire was directly administered to management and shop-stewards during 
visits at Kimberly Clark (Enstra, Springs) and Sappi Enstra (Springs). A questionnaire by fax was 
responded by shop-stewards at Mondi Recycling, while management declined. 
130 Neville Sabor, Human Resources Manager/Specialist, Kimberly Clark of South Africa, 
Interview with the Author, 8 March 2000. 
131 Edgar Kgosi, Human Resources Manager, Sappi Enstra, Interview with the Author, 7 March 
2000. 
132 From 1988 to 1993, employment at Nampak Corrugated nationally declined from 4005 to 3303 
(Sociology of Work Programme, 1994: Appendix 3). 
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which usually do not employ corrugating machines and therefore they specialise 
in the production of finished boxes with corrugated sheets from Nampak, which 
sells an increasing share of its production to such companies. Therefore, in this 
case the border between competition and competitive outsourcing becomes 
blurred and both trends converge in undermining Nampak workers’ employment 
and job security, while probably expanding low-wage, unprotected work in small 
companies. 
New technology has been introduced particularly after 1994, first with 
new boxing machines, which led to 90 layoffs, then with new printers in 1996, 
which shed 50 more jobs, and finally with new corrugators in 1998, which 
eliminated 98 further jobs133. In 2000, the company was planning to introduce 
new conveyors, which would lead to 70 more retrenchments, but it could not due 
to lack of capital. Despite a national Nampak agreement on retrenchments, of  all 
the retrenched workers only 18 were re-employed as temporary, 8 of which 
became eventually permanent (Interview #162). Restructuring has almost doubled 
the company’s production of stitched and glued boxes, and managers praise 
multiskilling and work intensification as a result of new technology134. According 
to a worker, however, “multiskilling is abusing us, because we make more jobs 
with less money” (Interview #168). At the same time, Nampak has tried to 
reassert management’s ideological hegemony around the need of building co-
operation and worker’s commitment to the company’s success. A 1998 agreement 
on “World Class Initiatives” signed by PPWAWU, before its merger in 
CEPPWAWU, committed the union to prioritise competitiveness according to 
criteria benchmarked with international conditions by a private consultancy. 
The union’s shift towards “company patriotism” in a context where its 
members continue to be adversely affected by restructuring is a product of a 
process of engagement started in 1994 with the establishment of a National 
Working Committee with an equal representation of management and shop-
stewards and the launch of an “Upgrade Project” based on Total Quality 
                                                
133 William Sithole, Human Resources Manager, Nampak Corrugated Wadeville, Interview with 
the Author, 10 April 2000. 
134 In March 1999 the corrugating department, the company’s core business, was working at a 
respectable 86% capacity, see Rijnberg to Buthelezi, Memo. Factory Performance Meeting, 23 
September 1999, Authors’ collection. 
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Management and Just-In-Time production concepts. The process represented a 
fundamental departure from worker-management relations historically marked by 
militancy and conflict (Sociology of Work Programme, 1994). In 1989, after ten 
years of attempts at preventing PPWAWU from organising in its plants, Nampak 
withdrew from the printing industry industrial council, which led to its eventual 
collapse, and adopted a strategy based on decentralised bargaining. Prolonged 
conflicts since then saw PPWAWU growing to 4,000 members in the whole 
Nampak group and achieving important gains on the benefits front, like the 
establishment in 1990 of a national Nampak Provident Fund with union 
representation. 
 Successful management strategies to reshape workers’ commitment and 
discourse towards co-operation and industrial peace are also apparent in the case 
of the last company I visited, Paperlink in Germiston. The company, whose other 
branches are in Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban, was started in 1993 as a fully-
owned paper merchant subsidiary of Mondi, following the purchase by Mondi-
owned Main Paper of a competitor, VRG. While the company’s total employment 
of approximately 60 workers is probably half the pre-merger combined 
headcount, employment levels have remained stable since then, even if an 
unusually high number of disciplinary dismissals (10 from 1998 to 2000) is 
considered by one shop-steward as a “retrenchment in disguise” (Interview #142). 
The company has, however, outsourced its transport department and drivers of 
hired trucks are now employed on 3-months contracts (Interview #141 and 150). 
While Paperlink has no formal grading system, contract drivers earn R550 per 
week, compared to R700 for permanents, have no medical benefits and their use 
has led to longer working hours (up to 14 per day), increasing mileage travelled 
and more deliveries.  
 Paperlink’s management has embarked on a strategy of workers’ 
involvement following the appointment of new human resources personnel. In 
management’s discourse the experiment is couched in typical paternalist terms, 
while emphasising the importance of teamwork and quality circles. The 
company’s logistics manager, for example, underlines “adequate financial reward 
in the form of an outing for them, or a day at Gold Reef City or a picnic with their 
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family”135. Workers and shop-stewards, however, credit management, and this 
specific official, with having profoundly changed the company’s mindsets, 
introducing a new sensitivity for the workers’ conditions (Interview #160), 
whereby previously “you could cry until the tears were finished” (Interview 
#141). CEPPWAWU’s regional offices, however, express concern for such 
development, regarded as “a very questionable relationship between management 
and the shop stewards” based on the company’s attempt to “co-opt the shop-
stewards and instill in their mind the idea that there is no need for the 
organization”136. For this union official, what happens at Paperlink reinforced 
“this mentality of ‘we are family’”, which he has noticed in Nampak as well, and 
which exploits increasing competition and insecurity to reshape workers’ 
identities in ways that sidestep the union. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
During the two decades that followed the re-emergence of independent trade 
unionism in the 1970s, the East Rand has been a territory where the spatial and 
economic map designed by urbanisation and industrialisation overlapped in 
peculiar ways with the social maps of grassroots organising and struggles. The 
area acquired therefore coherent and specific characteristics that made it a unique 
laboratory to study relations between wage labour and discourses of 
emancipation. The transformation of waged work on the East Rand during the 
post-apartheid transition emphasises the crisis of a trajectory where, in a complex 
interaction between workplaces and residential communities, wage labour had 
emerged as a vehicle for social as well as political citizenship. 
 In many analyses during the 1980s and 1990s the concept of “social 
movement unionism” has come to represent such a trajectory by looking at 
labour’s involvement in “community” struggles. This chapter has shown, 
however, that both “labour” and “community” are not objective and immutable 
terms, and that the conditions of their encounter and congealing around discourses 
                                                
135 Ellen Roberts, Logistics Manager, Paperlink, Interview with the Author, 5 April 2000. 
136 Andile Nyambezi, Interview with the Author, 7 April 2000. 
 191
of emancipation and social citizenship are highly contingent on the forms of 
contestation through which structured claims emerge out of the complexities and 
the contradictions of specific contexts. In the case of trade unions on the East 
Rand, wage labour played the ambiguous role of a tool for the social promotion of 
a largely migrant labour force and of a boundary to be transcended for the 
organised working class to be able to claim social rights and decommodified 
resources. Such a trajectory, which involved considerable contestation inside the 
trade union movement itself, led eventually to labour’s involvement in struggles 
for the quality of life, grassroots control of the urban space, access to housing and 
municipal services. 
 Industrial decline and wage employment crisis during the post-apartheid 
transition have questioned the social foundations, the sense of stability and the 
symbolic referents upon which wage labour could build its role as a conduit for a 
social citizenship discourse. Casualisation, new labour market hierarchies, the 
fragmentation of production and the expansion of vulnerable labour market 
sectors are among the manifestations of such shifts, but they do not necessarily 
determine their outcome. In fact, as my discussion of labour broking shows, 
“atypical” work itself is a multi-layered, contested arena where worker identities 
are reshaped and discourses are circulated in ways that cannot be merely reduced 
to domination and obliteration of workers’ agency. Chapter 6 and 7 will explore 
this point in deeper detail by looking at workers’ responses to casualisation and 
employment insecurity inside and outside the workplace. 
 For the moment, however, it is important to underline that labour market 
changes, rising insecurity and precariousness open up new terrains of contestation 
over workers’ identities and allegiances. The rise of discourses of worker 
participation and “company patriotism” is an important facet of this phenomenon, 
where defensive worker identifications are elicited at the corporate level to 
weather the challenge of competitive, market-regulated, unprotected wage 
relations. Such changes have caught the unions increasingly unprepared and 
unable to articulate a proactive social citizenship discourse able to bridge gaps 
between wage labour and communities. Rather, adaptation and defensiveness 
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seem to take centre stage for unions that are facing deepening representation 
problems. As NUMSA’s George Magaseng notices: 
 
Previously it was politics more than bread and butter issues. That has 
changed, we now deal with real economic issues, we do participate 
with companies in productivity negotiations, we do also give inputs. 
Workers take for granted that once there has been a process of 
democratising the country everything else will follow, and that's the 
mistake they are doing. But until they realise it it's gonna be difficult 
for them to identify themselves with the union137. 
 
 
For Andile Nyambezi, it is precisely the growing frailty and instability of 
employment that mostly contributes to weakening workers’ identifications with 
organisations centred on wage labour: 
 
Now workers tend to rely largely on the law and how the law would 
assist. With all the defeats they have suffered, militancy in that sense 
has declined, not that it isn’t there but it has changed. The demands 
have not changed: wage increases, hours of work remain the main 
ones. The demand for job security is there but if the wages are settled 
that is a demand on which they compromise. I don’t know, maybe 
that is informed by the notion that it is an impossible request that you 
can make. Albeit it is important for the union, job security is seen 
more as a long-term issue, it is watered down to something that is not 
tangible. The question becomes: ‘Are you being reasonable in the 
current economic climate?’ Workers don’t demand job security, they 
don’t have faith in the union dealing with the issue.138 
 
In a sense, the disillusionment expressed here reflects the unfulfilled promises of 
wage labour which Sitas (2004), in a recent research on what has been of the 1973 
Durban strikers, identifies with the social disorientation and the fading of 
meanings for the half of them that he categorises as the “stuck” and the 
“deteriorated”.  
Of course, the question is opened of what the possible discursive and 
organisational alternatives to the decline of wage labour could be, or of how 
workers reshape their strategies once the terrain of wage labour becomes 
                                                
137 Interview with the Author, 11 November 1999. 
138 Interview with the Author, 7 April 2000. 
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insufficient to gain stability and rights. Debates on the fate and ultimate decline of 
“social movement unionism” underline the impact in severing labour-community 
interactions of changes inside trade unions, in the direction of growing 
bureaucratisation, professionalisation, rank-and-file demobilisation or 
subordination to the ANC in power (Hirschsohn, 1998; Rachleff, 2000; Buhlungu, 
2001; Bramble, 2003). The combination of these factor could open spaces of 
community mobilisations that in recent years have been filled by new forms of 
social movement politics (Desai, 2002; Naidoo and Veriava, 2004; Buhlungu, 
2004). This chapter indicates, however, that important as such factors probably 
are, they cannot replace an analysis focused on the transformations internal to 
wage labour, at the level both of material conditions and of social imagination, 
discourse and desire, to explain its gradual hollowing out as a factor of social 
integration and solidarity. The analysis of changing meanings of wage labour and 
the ambiguities surrounding demands for “job creation” will be explored more in 
depth in subsequent chapters. Before that, however, the next chapter will 
introduce my second case study of transformations of work in another working 
class community, Johannesburg municipal workers under the “iGoli 2002” 
process, largely made of low-wage, migrant workers for which access to a formal 
job became coterminous with a now endangered social advancement. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Case Studies of a Changing World of Work. II: Johannesburg Municipal 
Workers and the Corporatisation of Service Delivery 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Like the previous case study, this chapter presents a process of rapid and far-
reaching change affecting a working class constituency for which in the previous 
two decades wage labour and trade union organization had meant struggles and 
visions of social emancipation that contrasted with a reality of disempowerment, 
vulnerability and instability. Even more than the East Rand industrial workers, 
Johannesburg’s African municipal employees have historically been socialized 
through migrancy, recruitment by the city’s various Councils in rural homelands 
and housing in segregated compounds. Under apartheid, municipal services were 
characterized by authoritarian management, repressive legislation, limits to 
workers’ organizing rights, and a highly decentralized labour process. Workers 
have, in fact, not only been divided by racially and ethnically segregated 
residence, but they were also employed in depots and departments spread over the 
municipal territory and separated from each other.  
Trade union organization provided municipal employees, which are still 
geographically quite dispersed, with a common language of struggle, shared 
claims, and connections with other sections of organized labour. Peculiar forms of 
unionization of municipal employees have also emphasized the role of the union 
in developing a relatively sophisticated agenda on benefits and employer-
subsidised provisions, to complement demands on wages and working conditions. 
Finally, unionization has facilitated, also due to the workers’ role in providing 
services for residential neighbourhoods, linkages and solidarity at the community 
level along the lines of “social movement unionism”. Out of a trajectory of recent 
urbanization and unstable, exploitative insertion in waged employment, 
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Johannesburg’s largely low-skill and unskilled African municipal workers have 
emerged in the post-apartheid transition with a remarkable security of tenure, 
centrally bargained wages, and benefits that on average are better that at 
equivalent levels in the private sector.  
The transition in the Johanensburg’s municipality heralded by the “iGoli 
2002” plan promises radical changes in such a context through the introduction of 
market-based regulation in the delivery of services, in the organizational 
frameworks and in the forms of employment. Coupled to a municipal fiscal and 
financial crisis that has become apparent in the mid-1990s and has led to a 
deterioration of employment conditions, iGoli 2002 was perceived by workers 
with a growing sense of uneasiness and anxiety for what it potentially implied in 
terms of eroding past gains and questioning social advancement.  
My research has taken place in the waste management and roads and 
stormwater departments of the Greater Johannesburg Municipal Council (GJMC). 
This chapter provides a picture of changes envisaged by iGoli 2002, of the 
transformations in municipal wage labour while the plan was being introduced, 
and of how the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) related to 
the plan. I do not therefore deal with the impacts and consequences of iGoli 
2002’s implementation on labour. In fact, from a temporal point of view, my 
discussion stops in December 2000, when SAMWU’s opposition to iGoli de facto 
faded soon before the plan entered its implementation phase. 
 
 
5.2 “iGoli 2002”, Market Regulation and the Transition to the Contracting 
State in Municipal Services 
 
The iGoli 2002 plan for the restructuring of the GJMC is the end result of three 
main, concomitant although historically specific trends. First, the Local 
Government Transition Act of 1993 laid the groundwork for the restructuring of 
municipal government and the unification of apartheid-age segregated local 
authorities under a single system of municipal administration and service 
provision. For Johannesburg this meant, as per Provincial Proclamations 24 of 
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1994 and 42 of 1995 (Swilling and Boya, 1995; Abrahams, 1997), bringing seven 
pre-existing city councils (Johannesburg, Sandton, Randburg, Dobsonville, 
Diepmeadow, Soweto and Roodeport), and areas run by old Regional Services 
Councils (RSC) and the Transvaal Provincial Administration (like Orange Farm 
and Lensdale), under a Greater Johannesburg Transition Metropolitan Council 
(GJTMC), subdivided in 4 Municipal Sub-Structures (MSS).  
Second, the state of fiscal crisis and budget deficits which the GJTMC 
declared in 1997, while facing extreme inequalities and backlogs in service 
delivery between former black townships and white suburbs, prompted the 
intervention of the Gauteng provincial government. A proclamation by the 
province’s Local Government MEC issued on 10 October 1997 de facto blocked 
new capital investment and required the municipality to embark on a restructuring 
exercise. With the aim of reducing deficits, improving service delivery and 
enforcing residents’ payment for services, the Proclamation required the 
municipality, among other things, to embark on “public-private partnership” 
agreements for service departments to be reconfigured as independent business 
units.  
Finally, the 2000 Municipal Structures Act provided for the establishment 
of a unified metropolitan administration (“unicity”) to replace the articulation of 
functions between what was by then the GJMC and its Metropolitan Local 
Councils (MLCs), which replaced the MSS and were largely autonomous in terms 
of budget and services administration139. 
 The massive social inequalities inherited from the apartheid-age 
organization of municipal services and their racially segregated patterns of 
delivery were deepened in the transition period by new social stratifications. In 
particular, the proliferation of informal settlements at the city’s outskirts or in 
backyard accommodations in established townships resulted from the collapse of 
apartheid’s “group areas” legislation and from waves of jobseekers migrating 
from impoverished rural areas (Guillaume, 2001). Before the establishment of the 
GJTMC, yearly per capita expenditures of black local authorities servicing 80% of 
the population were approximately R150, compared to R3,000 for “white” 
                                                
139 Makgabe Thobejane, Labour Relations Specialist, GJMC, Interview with the Author, 16 March 
2000. 
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councils140. During the 1990s, employment patterns in Johannesburg mirrored 
trends noticed for the East Rand, with a constant decline in activities related to 
manufacturing, mining, agriculture and construction, and the rising importance of 
commerce and services (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2000). Information 
technology and finance played an increasingly visible role in the northern corridor 
connecting Midrand, which is part of Johannesburg municipality, to Pretoria.  
With an overall unemployment rate of 33% in 2002, and 17% of the 
population living in informal dwellings (Everatt et al., 2002), the city is marked 
by vast disparities in the access to services. At the end of the 1990s, 30% of 
Soweto’s population lived in backyard accommodations, half of which shacks, 
while a further 14% resided in informal settlements, hostels and “site and service” 
schemes  (Morris et al. 1999). At the same time, 45% of Alexandra’s residents 
lived in informal accommodations and 17% lived in hostels. Finally, only 11% of 
informal settlements residents used electricity as their main source of power, a 
choice dictated largely by lack of affordability. One third of all African 
households had no running water and 50% had no flush toilets in their dwellings 
(Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2000: 113-115). Late apartheid urban change was 
characterized by the collapse of black local authorities amidst widespread political 
insurgency and boycotts of rents and service fees. The government responded 
through the somehow contradictory combination of increasing public expenditures 
and cross-subsidization of the black townships on a contingent, ad-hoc basis, and 
the promotion of privatisation and private housing development on a more long-
term ground (Heymans, 1991; Samson, 2004b: 85-89). 
 The choice to open opportunities for private involvement in the delivery of 
municipal services was part of the late-apartheid policy discourse, and was 
resumed and re-elaborated as a solution to the challenges of post-apartheid 
democratic municipal governance. The municipality had already contracted in 
1996 a group of consultancies headed by PriceWaterhouse & Cooper to conduct 
an “Organisation Review”, which revealed areas of duplication of structures and 
organizational inefficiencies. It also expressed a strong preference for a 
restructuring based on a combination of privatization and corporatisation, or the 
                                                
140 Ibidem. 
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transformation of municipal departments into autonomous, Council-controlled 
business units. The Review predicted  that 
 
The trade unions will offer resistance to efforts which look like a 
privatization. Furthermore, employment risks or lose (sic) of pension 
fund advantages in mergers will engender great disquiet and 
opposition141. 
 
In execution of the October 1997 provincial Proclamation, a “Committee of 10” 
was established with representatives from the GJMC and the four MLCs to 
coordinate their respective functions, elaborate a response to the financial crisis 
and identify “core” council responsibilities in view of the transition to a single 
municipal authority. The Committee of 10 was later expanded into a “Committee 
of 15”, which in February 1999 was succeeded by a Transformation Lekgotla 
(TL). The TL was composed of the chairpersons and the deputy chairpersons of 
the GJMC and the MLCs plus five co-opted councilors, and it acted as a 
transitional political organ in charge of running the five councils as a single 
structure. The GJMC and the MLC entered an “urgency agreement” with which 
they delegated their powers to the TL142. In this way, an administrative unelected 
body assumed full policy-making powers, of which the Councils as composed of 
elected representatives were deprived. 
In September 1998 the GJMC had also decided to select a management 
team on a two-year contract to assist with the short-term phase of the process of 
transformation. In January 1999 the team was appointed, consisting of city 
manager Khetso Gordhan, transformation manager Pascal Moloi, labour relations 
specialist Magkane Thobejane and financial manager Roland Hunter. The 
management team, which sat jointly with a Transformation Lekgotla expanded to 
include the managers of municipal departments, elaborated and presented the 
iGoli 2002 plan to the Lekgotla and the Council, which approved it on 16 March 
1999. IGoli 2002 was then referred to a process of consultation with civil society 
and labour organizations, which lasted from March to August, when an “iGoli 
                                                
141 GJMC, Organisation Review. Final Case for Change Report. Group Executive Report, Group 
1, 1998, GL. 
142 Makgane Thobejane, Interview with the Author, 16 March 2000. 
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Summit” with broad stakeholder participation was convened and a steering 
committee to advise the Council on the long-term implementation of the plan was 
selected143. 
 IGoli 2002 emerged out of a financial crisis to which greatly contributed 
the reduction in central state funding to local government before and after GEAR. 
At the end of the 1990s South African municipalities were expected to raise from 
local sources (mainly fees and rents) approximately 90% of their budget, to which 
national government grants provided for only 7% in 2000 (Ajam, 2001). 
Moreover, the contribution of intergovernmental transfers as a proportion of local 
government expenditures was about 10% (Solomon, 1998), whereby central 
government transfers to local government have been slashed by 55% between 
1997 and 2000 (McDonald, 2002: 23). The  1998 White Paper on Local 
Government and the subsequent Municipal Infrastructures Investment Framework 
(MIIF) limited the extent of intergovernmental cross-subsidisation only to areas of 
extreme socio-economic disadvantage and recommended the contracting out of 
municipal services to achieve job creation, good employment conditions and 
equitable tariffs. In relation to such pressures, during negotiations with SAMWU, 
city manager Khetso Gordhan described in vivid and sanguine terms the urgency 
of iGoli 2002:  
 
Gordhan: Here we are, basically going to the Department of Finance. 
We have said to them that Johannesburg is 11% of South Africa’s 
economy, and it is in shit: ‘You cannot stand there watching us die, 
you have to do something about it’. They say, ‘Why?’. Alright, I will 
tell you, that was one reason why. The second reason is that you gave 
us a number of unfounded [inaudible]. I am just using Orange Farm 
as an example. If you go to Durban today, there is a place called 
KwaMashu close by. KwaMashu used to be a Bantustan (…). Every 
year Durban gets in another occasion roughly R300 million extra 
from the Department of Finance, for KwaMashu, plus Umlazi, plus a 
few other areas that were part of KwaZulu. Now, Orange Farm is no 
different from KwaMashu, Alex[andra] is no different from other 
places in Durban. Our problem is that none of these things were part 
of a Bantustan. You see, you should have fought for a Bantustan, you 
would have got more money. We said to them, ‘Now listen, guys, 
Durban gets the R300 million, we get nothing, it’s not fair’. (…) They 
                                                
143 M.Thobejane, iGoli 2002, Transformation and Implementation. Chronology of Events, Labour 
Relations Section, 20 December 2000, GL. 
 200
said ‘Ja, that sounds good but it’s not good enough. Give us one more 
reason’. I said, ‘Here is our plan, (…) over a three year period it will 
put us back in the right direction, okay? It only takes three years 
before we are sorted out after all, then we will be able to look after 
ourselves. So we are asking for your help or whatsoever, for 3 years 
(…), after that we will be okay. We can look after ourselves. But help 
us out of this mess’. 
Q: Who did you talk to, Thabo Mbeki or who? 
Gordhan: Trevor Manuel. 
Q: Do you know if they will come back? 
(Laughing).144 
 
When questioned about the effectiveness of solutions to the crisis based on a 
greater private sector involvement, Gordhan continued: 
 
There is a woman called Margaret Thatcher, who I am sure all of us 
would love to hate. In the late 1980s, basically she said, ‘I don’t care 
if these things work, I don’t want to own them on my own, please’. It 
wasn’t a study done before a decision was made (…). What the basic 
lesson is that (…) they are not the best, they are not first prize, it is 
definitely second prize, and it is a hell of a lot better than being in a 
government department145. 
 
The imposition of fiscal discipline to municipalities was integral to the GEAR policy 
discourse, but the GJMC invested it with a rhetoric of “crisis” and “emergency” that 
hegemonised public perceptions, reshaping them into accepting the need of drastic 
solutions. IGoli 2002 came therefore to embody such solutions in a policy process 
that, by suspending ordinary democratic-representative decision-making, was 
dominated by corporate managerial rationality and the “rule of experts” (Escobar, 
1994, Mitchell, 2003). According to some analyses, the extent of the municipality’s 
fiscal crisis was “talked up” to accelerate metropolitan restructuring in ways that 
marginalized former anti-apartheid activists now working for the local government 
and marked the ascendancy of a new generation of neoliberal technocrats (Beall, 
                                                
144 South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC), Transcripts of Negotiating 
Committee on iGoli 2002, Tape of 15 June 1999, SAMWU. In 2000 Minister of Finance Trevor 
Manuel announced in its “Budget Speech” that the government would allocate three-years 
“restructuring grants” to municipalities complying with the White Paper’s recommendation. The 
concession of the grant was in fact conditional to the implementation of iGoli 2002 (GJMC, 2000; 
Samson, 2004b: 99). 
145 SALGBC, Transcripts of Negotiating Committee on iGoli 2002, Tape of 15 June 1999, 
SAMWU. 
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Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002: 87-106). At the same time, overt political opposition 
was discouraged by the determined intervention of the ANC leadership in support of 
iGoli 2002, which led to the expulsion from the party of vocal critics of the plan, like 
Pimville councillor Trevor Ngwane. 
The broader spatial and economic strategy context in which the GJMC’s 
restructuring took place was defined by the Council’s Strategic Metropolitan 
Development Framework (SMDF) and Integrated Development Plan (IDP). The 
SMDF defined the spatial coordinates of metropolitan change, decentralizing 
service management functions into the 11 regions in which the GJMC was 
supposed to be subdivided. The IDP was an economic development strategy 
strongly geared towards a high-skill, “post-Fordist” economy, a move actively 
encouraged by the Province’s “Blue IQ” project-based investment programme. 
According to critics, the vision envisaged by GJMC’s spatial and economic 
planning was liable to increase the marketization of the urban space in ways that 
would benefit only the top, qualified layers of the labour market to the detriment 
of low-skill, unemployed and informal workers. Reinforced class divisions would 
therefore emerge in a context where deracialization of the urban space itself had 
advanced only to a very limited and unequal extent (Tomlinson, Beauregard, 
Bremner and Mangcu, 2003; Beavon, 1998: Noble, 2000). 
 The iGoli 2002 plan is based on a conceptual separation in the services 
provided by the GJMC. Social services like health, libraries and sport amenities 
remain under this framework the direct responsibility of the Council in terms of 
local government’s constitutional obligations. To this end, the management of 
such services is decentralized to the new 11 regions to be established, in place of 
the 4 MLCs, as autonomous non-political bodies. They will contract the provision 
of social services with the Council, which as “client” provides a “ring fenced” 
budget and sets standards, targets and delivery performance evaluation. Trading 
services like water, electricity and waste, conversely, are transferred from former 
Council departments to autonomous business units of various kinds. First, 10 
“utilities” and “agencies” are established and registered either as proprietary 
limited companies or under Section 21 of the Companies Act, and the Council 
remains their 100% shareholder. In particular, three utilities become responsible 
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for the provision of the income-generating services, namely water and sanitation, 
electricity and waste management. Moreover, “agencies” are created for the 
management of roads and stormwater, parks and cemeteries. Finally, five more 
entities will be the corporatised companies of the zoo, the fresh produce market, 
the Civic Theatre, the bus company and the newly established property company. 
Other activities are fully privatized, like Metro Gas, the Rand Airport and the 
Johannesburg Stadium, while fleet management and information technology 
functions are outsourced to private companies in terms of the MEC 
recommendations for public-private partnerships.  
In the case of the utilities, the Council remains responsible for appointing 
their directors, setting policies and targets and approving five-year programmes, 
using their dividends to finance social services, even if as a rule it will no longer 
cross-subsidise their budgets. Agencies, which do not raise their own income 
through direct user payments, and the bus company will instead continue to be 
subsidized (GJMC, 1999a). Retaining a 100% share-ownership was aimed by the 
Council at strengthening its regulatory functions and setting tariffs and delivery 
standards in accordance with RDP-mandated obligations to satisfy basic needs, 
with particular regard to lifeline free basic services for approximately 20,000 
households identified as “indigent” (GJMC, 1999b). New public-private 
partnerships, for example in the newly established Johannesburg Water (which 
manages 30% of the GJMC’s budget), privilege short-term, 5-year management 
contracts aimed at acquiring critical skills rather than capital finance. Therefore 
the GJMC eschewed the 30-years concession contracts experimented in other 
municipalities, like Nelspruit, which came under severe criticism by opponents of 
privatisation146 (Van Niekerk et al., 1999). 
The World Bank supported the GJMC’s shift towards entrepreneurialism 
in municipal service delivery, providing funding to monitor market and 
investment opportunities that focused specifically on involving local small-
medium enterprises. The Bank recognised that from the success of “iGoli 2002” 
depended the introduction of similar processes in other South African metropoles 
(Chandra and Ahmad, 2000).  
                                                
146 Makgane Thobejane, Interview with the Author, 16 March 2000. 
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Johannesburg’s transition in municipal governance translates at the local 
level the abandonment, discussed in Chapter 3, by the ANC government of its 
earlier developmentalist approach based on state intervention in redistributing 
resources and equalizing social provisions. The structure of service delivery 
envisaged by iGoli 2002 is rather reminiscent of the concept of “contracting state” 
(Harden, 1992; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1996; Eardley, 1997) as a form of 
governance based on the separation between the local functions of service 
authority, reserved for the local government, and those of service provision, which 
are delegated to entities operating on private business principles. The former 
function is redefined in terms that I have elsewhere in this work defined as 
“residualist”, aimed at providing non-tradable social services and minimum safety 
nets for the extremely poor. The latter is reconfigured through autonomous profit 
centers supplying  customers at market rates with “ring fenced” products -- like 
water, electricity, refuse collection -- that replace municipal services as cross-
subsidised, decommodified provisions (Bond, Dor and Ruiters, 1999).  
Managerialism and entrepreneurialism as rising ordering principles for 
access to social services allow, finally, to de-politicise the sphere of delivery, 
reduced to “technical” adjustments within given policy borders (Hassen, 1999). 
Social provisions are therefore subtracted from political contestation and insulated 
from social conflict, while emphases on profit-making disable criticism of the role 
historically played by the private sector in shaping Johannesburg’s unequal social 
and urban geography. As Gamete (2002) notices, these local administrative 
practices facilitate modes of social control that, similarly to what I have noticed in 
previous chapters in relation to national social policy, construct the urban poor as 
a passive entity coterminous with social “problems” and related governmental 
“interventions”. In this way the poor’s agency is disempowered and its claims for 
radical redistribution of resources are defused.  
Finally, urban managerialism tends to be hostile towards non-market, 
informally decommodified forms of access to services, as in the case of land 
invasions, bond boycotts and illegal water and electricity connections. Instead,  
transferring municipal services to individual providers as “business units” that 
raise their income on the market, makes the maintenance of stable credit ratings a 
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priority that requires minimal political “interference”, a prompt recovery of costs, 
regular payments from users and repression of rates boycotts, including evictions 
and disconnections when needed (Govender and Aiello, 1999).  
 
 
5.3 The Reorganisation of Waste and Roads Services under iGoli 2002 
 
In terms of iGoli 2002, assets managed by the GJMC Solid Waste Directorate 
(SWD) were transferred under a new utility, Pikitup Johannesburg (Pty.) Ltd., which 
started operations in January 2001, while the roads and stormwater department 
became the Johannesburg Roads Agency. Before the establishment of Pikitup, the 
MLCs were largely responsible for waste collection and disposal, while the GJMC 
was allocated approximately 9% of the budget in 1999-2000. The largest share of the 
budget (approximately 33%) went to the Southern MLC (SMLC), which covered 
rapidly urbanizing, impoverished areas such as Orange Farm and new extensions of 
Ennerdale and Lenasia (GJMC, 1999a; Barchiesi, 2001). 
 The structure of waste management inherited from apartheid was the 
product of racially segregated administrations that caused vast inequalities in 
access (Swilling and Hutt, 1999: 194-197). Therefore, the Johannesburg City 
Council had a ratio of staff to serviced population of 1:482, a budget of 
R123.41/person per annuum, waste collection once a week and regular street 
cleaning. Conversely the staff-to-residents ratio in the Soweto City Council was 
1:2,412, with a budget of R26.31/person per annum, refuse collection every two 
weeks and no service for street corner dumps. Shack settlements, then 
administered by the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA), had a staff-to-
resident ratio of 1:28,333 and a budget of R0,74/person per annum. 
At the time of my research, waste collection was structured in 13 depots 
and 54 “garden sites”, or fenced dumping areas attended by a supervisor and an 
assistant, used to collect  domestic waste, garden refuse, tree cutting and waste for 
recycling companies (GJMC, 1999a: 12). All garden sites, which collected 15% of 
the city’s waste, were located in historically ”white” neighbourhoods.  
Round collection of domestic refuse was done by approximately 200 
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municipal rear-end loader trucks or by contractors’ compactor trucks, working 
with 240-litres wheeled bins or 85-litres bins. Bulk collection for the city’s 73 
informal settlements, with approximately 130,000 households and 553,000 
inhabitants, was made -- on a typical “site-and-service” basis – in 5.5 cubic 
metres’ open skip containers placed at street corners. Underservicing in these 
areas favoured illegal dumps, vermin and rodents, contributing to poor health and 
hygiene conditions (GJMC, 1999c,d). Street cleaning, which collected about 11% 
of the city’s waste, covered approximately 1,000 kms of municipal streets (mainly 
business, shopping and public parking areas), while litter-picking covered 
approximately 3,000kms, out of the city’s 7,700 km. of streets (GJMC, 1999a: 12-
13).  
The GJMC’s waste management budget has been drastically reduced 
between 1995 and 2000, and no capital expenditures have taken place between 
1997 and 2000. The 1997-98 capital budget of R1.5 million was only 0.4% of the 
total for the GJMC. The council was therefore prevented from directing resources 
to expand existing infrastructures. The 1997-98 operating expenditures of R338.3 
million led to a shortfall of R133.6 million. Following an increase in the operating 
income from R200 million to R280 million in 1999, the shortfall was reduced to 
R110 million in 1999-2000. To the improvement contributed, however, a drastic 
reduction in repairs expenditures for an ageing and collapsing fleet (GJMC, 
1999a: 16).  
At the same time, the neglect of the Council’s assets and fleet, deepened 
by budget cuts, had direct negative impacts on garden sites maintenance, street 
cleaning and refuse collection. The fiscal crisis in the sector was not so much the 
consequence of rising debts and external circumstances, but it largely self-
reproduced: rising shortfalls required budget cuts, which increased the shortfalls. 
Therefore, rather than being a means for a more efficient allocation of resources, 
fiscal austerity was a main factor in reproducing the deficit (Barchiesi, 2001).  
Before iGoli 2002 waste management was one of the most cross-
subsidized municipal services at GJMC. The service has many non-tradable 
activities, like garden sites, that in terms of waste by-laws have to be provided 
irrespective of payment. In 2000-01 waste contributed 3.55% to GJMC’s revenues 
 206
and 5.1% to its expenses (third biggest item), which implied that 40% of its 
budget was funded with income generated by other departments147. At the same 
time, the scope for further increases in waste tariffs was limited considering that 
most revenues came from poor families (12.5% of all domestic rates were paid by 
stands of no more than 280 sq.m. and R7,000 land value, while 6.1% came from 
stands of more than 1,205sq.m. and at least R45,000 land value). In 1998 non-
payment for waste was R55 million, equivalent to 41.1% of the shortfall and 15% 
of the budget (GJMC, 1999a: 15). Such figures questioned the sustainability and 
the equity of a market-based cost-recovery option. Waste, more than other 
municipal services, reflects and amplifies inequalities between segregated urban 
spaces and how they translate into consumption habits of affluent and 
marginalized neighbourhoods.  
Given the urban polarization between the suburban sprawl in “white” areas 
and higher population density in poorer black ones, Johannesburg has an inverse 
relationship between the accumulation of waste and the levels of access to refuse 
collection. The provision of the service is more regular and pervasive in areas of 
town that are dispersed and characterised by more wasteful patterns of individual 
consumption, even if they constitute a bigger drain on GJMC’s waste 
management budget. Conversely, marginalised, overcrowded communities, whose 
modes of consumption are less wasteful and patterns of accumulation of waste are 
more efficient for collection, are less serviced. In fact, while the affluent northern 
suburbs (approximately 25% of the municipality’s surface and with a per-capita 
daily waste production of 3.35 kg.) have less than 10% of households without 
waste collection services, this figure increases to about 70% in the southern ones, 
with peaks of 90-100% in the Ennerdale-Orange Farm area, whose per capita 
daily production of waste is 1.48 kg148.  
Therefore, wasteful individual consumption by a minority is rewarded by 
                                                
147 It should be added, however, that budget cuts have led to substantial reductions of municipal 
allocations for individual depots. Some of them, especially those in affluent suburbs, like the 
Waterval depot which services the Melville-Northcliff  area could counter the trend by increasing 
the turnout of the income-generating activities, like round refuse collection (RCR). In these cases, 
it can be therefore concluded that it is waste management that subsidises the council, rather than 
the opposite. See Anton Van Niekerk, Manager, Waterval Waste Depot, Interview with the 
Author, 17 February 2000. 
148 Author’s elaboration from GJMC population database and 1999-2001 budgets, see Barchiesi 
(2001). 
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service access to the detriment of community needs for improved environmental 
conditions in under-serviced, over-populated zones. It can be therefore questioned 
how a greater emphasis on users’ ability to pay as conditions to provide services 
will revert trends to spatial inequalities that those very dynamics have encouraged 
in the first place. On the other hand, comments by officials of the Municipal 
Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU), a government-initiated company that 
mobilizes private investments for public-private partnerships, authorize 
conclusions that a market-based approach to municipal service delivery might not 
be the most effective way of reducing inherited inequalities: 
 
[Site-and-service schemes] offer a much lower level of service, but 
they may be the only services sustainable given the economic 
conditions of the customers being served. In general, different levels 
for solid waste collection services could also be applied. Lower 
services levels, including communal skip or once a week collection 
could be used in lower income areas with a lower ability or 
willingness to pay. Twice weekly curbside service with 240 litre 
containers is the top level of service in higher income communities” 
(Dohrman and Aiello, 1999: 697). 
 
The abdication of public institutions from redistributive and decommodifying 
functions, noticed for national social policy, is replicated at the level of municipal 
services. Market discipline in the allocation of scarce resources and in enabling 
users’ claims to services is therefore confirmed as an alternative to “entitlements” 
based on universal social citizenship rights.  
The assets of the GJMC’s Roads and Stormwater Department were 
transferred to the newly constituted Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) with 
effect 1 January 2001 following the approval by the Council on 23 October 2000 
of a sale of business agreement followed by a service delivery agreement for the 
duration of 25 years. Reaffirming the nature of the JRA as an “agency”, the 
agreement established that the GJMC’s control over it was in terms of the 
Council’s constitutional obligations to provide municipal road services, and nor 
merely as a result of the Council’s being the JRA’s sole shareholder149. The nature 
of roads services as non-income generating, non-tradable components of the 
                                                
149 GJMC, Mayoral Committee, Review of Service Delivery Agreement and Sales of Business 
Agreement: Johannesburg Roads Agency, 13 September, 2001. GL. 
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GJMC’s activities had led to their substantial penalization in the 1990s austerity 
climate. As a result, the department’s capital budget had been almost frozen 
between 1996 and 1999, dropping from R296 million to R10 million (less than 
2% of the overall GJMC capital budget)150, 80% of which was spent for roads 
(almost entirely in repairs) and 18% for stormwater maintenance151. Only 18% of 
the overall departmental budget was employed in “townships roads”, while 47% 
went to “major schemes” (GJMC, 2001). In 1999, 1,780 roads workers were 
employed by the MLCs in addition to the 484 hired by the GJMC to work on 
“metropolitan roads”. At the same time, vacancies due to attrition and the 
employment freeze were estimated in 1999 at 1,626, or 47% of the service’s fully 
manned level (GJMC, 1999e: 17).  
Unevenness in levels of service delivery were also visible across the 
various MLCs. In fact, while in the Northern MLC the staff-to-road length ratio 
was 0.19 per km, the Southern MLC, which includes Soweto and Orange Farm, 
had a ratio of 0.33 (GJMC, 1998: 12). Conversely, the Council estimated in 1999 
that R250 million per year were needed to maintain and upgrade existing roads 
and stormwater infrastructure. This meant a R100 million yearly shortfall which 
was causing a “dramatic deterioration” of services, especially in “sub-economical 
areas”, where expenditure for major construction and upgrade has “literally come 
to a stand still”152. In case the existing shortfall had been filled entirely, the 
elimination of backlogs would have required at least 6-7 years. 
While the city’s road network is of approximately 7,500 km, 1,000 of 
which untarred, the construction of new roads was entirely left to private 
contractors, whose costs for repairing a pothole were estimated at about half of the 
Council’s costs and whose prices for hot asphalt were approximately two thirds of 
those paid by the GJMC153. The majority of trucks and the near totality of heavy 
equipment (patchers, rammers, compressors, bomag machines) were 
subcontracted. Budget cuts, however, had led to reductions in contracts and 
                                                
150 Alan Agaienz, JRA Project Manager, Interview with the Author, 27 January 2000. 
151 Remaining services included footways, bridges, railway sidings and grass cutting. Traffic 
engineering was being transferred from Metro Traffic to the JRA, while traffic signals and street 
lights would be transferred from the Eletricity Department. 
152 GJMC, Johannesburg Roads Agency Implementation Business Plan, 7 June 1999, p.20, GL. 
153 Ibidem, pp.18-19. 
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equipments, the sharing of trucks by more than one team of workers, and the 
accumulation of backlogs, unfinished jobs and unserviced repairs.  
Lacking a direct, market-related mechanism to raise revenues, the rationale 
for establishing the JRA was clearly related with the need to assert managerial 
authority and minimize costs, especially wages and salaries, which absorbed 24% 
of the 1999-2000 operating budget. In fact, as in the case of Pikitup, the JRA was 
constituted as a Council-owned private company in the form of a “proprietary 
limited” enterprise, and not a “Section 21” one. Among the aims in adopting this 
corporate structure the council cited the need to “avoid[s] the possible negative 
perceptions that may surround the establishment of a Section 21 company, which 
is very often the legal entity chosen for charity organizations”, whereby instead “a 
profit-seeking work ethic will be easier to establish in a private company”154.  
The importance placed on “work ethic” in the establishment of the JRA -- 
whose stated aim is, according to what is by now a familiar refrain, to be 
economically viable and not to provide “entitlements” -- introduces the topic of 
the next section. It also allows to identify a crucial feature of GJMC’s 
restructuring in the attempt to modify power relations in a sense detrimental to 
municipal employees. 
 
 
5.4 iGoli 2002, Wage Labour Changes and the Reassertion of Managerial 
Control 
 
When Pikitup and the JRA started operations on 1 January 2001 as going 
concerns with GJMC assets and workers, their service delivery agreements 
provided for the three years job security guaranteed to the former 14,000 Council 
employees that were transferred to the new council-owned utilities and agencies. 
According to GJMC’s labour relations specialist, Makgane Thobejane155, the 
measure was intended as a powerful signal aimed at allaying workers’ fears of 
layoffs and at increasing trust towards iGoli 2002, which remained fiercely 
                                                
154 GJMC, Transformation Lekgotla, Proposed Establishment of the Johannesburg Roads Agency: 
Legal Entity to be Established and Supporting Documentation, 9 October 2000, GL. 
155 Interview with the Author, 16 March 2000. 
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opposed by the unions. He remained, moreover, confident that employment levels 
would not decrease after the three year period, which could be used to redefine 
career paths, skills profiles and grading systems to achieve a more efficient 
utilization of the workforce. The GJMC’s has in fact tried to elicit workers’ 
acceptance of restructuring by launching reassuring image-based campaigns. 
When I visited the Central Roads Depot in Benrose (early 2000), the place was 
the stage of a broader tour by a Council-sponsored theatre company performing a 
play called “iGirlie 2002”. This was specifically designed to show workers that 
with the impending “transformation” their jobs would not be jeopardized since, 
among other explanations provided, “a computer can’t clean the roads”. Unions, 
which were previously notified that the play would be on issues related to HIV-
AIDS, vociferously resisted the initiative. 
My research in various waste and roads depots, however, showed that 
important changes in conditions of employment and workplace power relations 
were already taking place in the period of austerity and transition to iGoli 2002. 
Moreover, middle-level officials and executives of the new corporate entities 
regarded the whole process as an opportunity to reassert managerial control with 
an aim at ensuring greater task and time flexibility while containing wage and 
benefit costs. The waste management workforce is characterized by a historical 
predominance of migrant workers, which until the collapse of “influx control” 
tended to originate predominantly from Transkei. Research conducted by Melanie 
Samson (2004b: 110-111) shows that waste workers used to be recruited 
predominantly among the amaBhaka clans in rural Transkei, and even after the 
de-ethnicization of Johannesburg’s municipal employees, the name “amaBhaka” 
remained as a derogatory ethnic name to stigmatise populations identified with 
lowly, unsavoury occupations.  
To the ethnic stigma are added peculiar forms of gender subordination for 
the vast majority of female workers in cleansing functions like street sweeping. In 
this case, the collapse of the migrant labour system, which opened new urban 
employment opportunities for women, has led to the transfer onto the labour 
market of women’s subordinate positions that in the sphere of domesticity are 
expressed in their confinement to cleansing jobs. Ethnic stigmatization and gender 
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hierarchies reflect and reproduce in this case vulnerabilities historically associated 
with migrancy and the municipal compounds. A further element of vulnerability is 
linked to the high number of casual workers156, which is specific to waste 
management (see Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 Employment and Workloads in Waste Management, 1998 
 
Council Employees Employees (incl. 
Casuals) 
Tons. of  Waste 
per Employee 
Domestic Units 
per Employee 
(Year) 
EMLC 674 1016 278 148 
NMLC 539 718 282 179 
WMLC 330 560 415 247 
SMLC 961 1151 645 204 
GJMC   78 83 N/A N/A 
Source: GJMC (1998: 15). 
 
In 1998, 36.6% of the GJMC’s 2,582 waste workers were employed on a casual 
basis. This share increased over the following two years. At the end of 1999, out 
of 3,000 waste workers, 1,500 were casuals, out of a “theoretical” fully staffed 
level of 4,523, and all new positions were filled in this way due to the freeze in 
the recruitment of permanent workers (GJMC, 1999a:8). In some depots, up to 
70% of workers were employed as casuals157. Casuals have no formal contracts, 
are not notified of their employment duration, are not covered by GJMC’s 
benefits (medical aid, provident fund and housing scheme) and their length of 
employment can be as short as a single day.  
Longer  temporary contracts are equally excluded from GJMC’s benefits, 
but provide for the same wage rates as GJMC workers and can be renewed for as 
long as 6 months or one year with an option of becoming permanent thereafter. 
Casuals’ remunerations range from R35 to R45 per day, compared to 
approximately R60 for GJMC’s street cleaners. The decision to hire casuals rest 
with the depot's manager, requires an authorisation from the MLC’s technical 
                                                
156 Since a precise legal definition of “casual worker” does not exist in South Africa, the GJMC 
utilises the expression in two senses. First there are what can be called “casual-casual”, or workers 
that, by working less than one full working day in a month, are excluded from UIF benefits. Then 
there are “permanent casuals”, or workers that are regularly employed on a casual basis and work 
in such a capacity for at least one full day a week. 
157 Roelf De Beer, EO Waste Management, WMLC (Roodepoort), Interview with the Author, 19 
October 1999. 
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service department, and is funded by the depot’s budget. Lack of consultation in 
decisions to hire casuals was a major source of shop-stewards’ complaints.  
Permanent employment has been reduced largely through natural attrition 
but, considering the municipality’s territorial expansion by about 10% in the 
1990s and an average vacancy level of 22% estimated by the GJMC, the 
recruitment freeze implied a cutback in real terms of employment levels in the 
service. With a hypothetic natural attrition of only 5% a year, 650-700 permanent 
jobs could have been lost in waste between 1995 and 1999 (Barchiesi, 2001). 
Shop-stewards at the Avalon waste depot, which covers Klipspruit, Lenasia, 
Eldorado Park and the sprawling surrounding squatter settlements, reported that 
after 1994 local workforce had been cut by more than 50%, down to the 300 
employees of 1999, mainly through natural attrition and redeployment to other 
depots, and their positions had been filled by casuals (Interview #82). Moreover, 
casuals are hired to fill staff shortages and perform intermittent tasks, such as the 
removal of illegal dumps. As such, they are largely concentrated in the poorer 
areas of the city, as in the SMLC, where in 1999-2000 the amount of money spent 
on casuals was 20% of that for wages of permanent workers, and the WMLC, 
were this share was 48% (GJMC, 1999a). 
Municipal waste management in South Africa has tended to encourage 
casualisation through a language of community empowerment and residents’ 
participation in low-wage, labour-intensive segments of the service. Experiments 
with “community contracting” in waste collection opened up spaces of low-end 
managerialism and entrepreneurship (Swilling and Hutt, 1999: 206; Development 
Bank of Southern Africa, 2000; Rogerson, 2001). They were also aimed at 
enforcing social control and political legitimacy by increasing trust for the 
municipality and minimising non-payment and illegal dumping. In such schemes, 
local entrepreneurs and community leaders recruit local residents to perform 
refuse collection details, while in some cases financial institutions provide 
funding and the Council covers fixed costs and risks (Sindane, 1999; Muncipal 
Infrastructures Investment Unit, 2001; Palmer Development Group, 1996: 116-
117). At the same time, employment in community schemes can be used by 
parties in power and local councillors to establish networks of patronage in areas 
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with high unemployment. Conversely, organized labour regards with suspicion 
these initiatives, seen as expanding precariousness, low-wage exploitative 
conditions and competition with the permanent council workforce (MSP-ILRIG, 
2000; Xali, 2000). 
 The fate of casuals under the new waste utility was a source of great 
uncertainty even in management’s discourse. Pikitup’s mandate was to provide 
stable employment to the GJMC’s “permanent casuals”, integrating them in the 
service’s permanent headcount. Their wages, however, remained lower than 
former GJMC permanents, and equalization was phased in over a three-year 
period (Samson, 2004b: 119-121). In this sense, as Samson notices, under Pikitup 
fiscal austerity was confirmed and strengthened, far from being limited to a 
transient period of adjustment. In fact, investment prioritized income-generating 
activities, like collection, to the detriment of street sweeping. Moreover, vast 
geographical unevenness in the provision of services remained, the employment 
freeze was confirmed, and the GJMC phased out cross-subsidization of the service 
at a faster rate than expected. Finally, the whole GJMC fleet was contracted to a 
single company, Superfleet, which reduced the availability of trucks and increased 
the flexibility of tasks and functions performed inside waste collectors’ teams 
(Samson, 2004b: 122-125). 
 Management’s discourse on the long-term future of casualisation displayed 
high levels of ambiguity. Makgane Thobejane158 maintained the Council’s 
commitment to have all casuals hired as permanents by Pikitup. He also admitted, 
however, that one of the main rationales for the new utility was the widespread 
introduction of capital-intensive methods of collection, like the use of 240-litres 
bins, which would limit the capacity of the new company to absorb casuals. In this 
case, horizontal mobility and reskilling were seen as possible alternatives. Middle 
management was, however, of a different advice. An executive working on 
Pikitup’s business plan argued that a corporatised waste service would allow a 
greater numerical flexibility and an easier recruitment of casuals because “the 
Council will no longer have political responsibility for that, the decision would be 
                                                
158 Interview with the Author, 16 March 2000. 
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strictly business”159. 
Casualisation in waste management is strengthened by the fact that the 
Council has preferred for a long time to use its own workers for labour intensive, 
relatively low-skill operations, while relying on contracts from private companies 
for capital-intensive equipment and tasks. Contracts, of a duration of up to four 
years, are usually entered for the provision of compactor trucks, with or without 
drivers and attendants included160. Under iGoli 2002, the use of contracts for 
trucks has become the GJMC’s policy across the board through the subcontracting 
of the entire transport operations to Superfleet. Contractors work with teams of 
council workers that include loaders, sweepers and “boppas”, or employees in 
charge of the distribution and collection of plastic bags. In 1999-2000 the GJMC 
spent R62 million in vehicles’ contracts (15.8% of operating budget), plus R30 
million in smaller, ad-hoc contracts for collection, street cleaning and supply of 
bins, bringing the total outsourcing costs to 23.5% of the operating budget 
(GJMC, 1999a: 17).  
The council recognised that a substantial share of contracts’ costs was 
caused by ad-hoc hiring of vehicles to compensate for the ageing and breakdowns 
of the council’s fleet, which could not be attended due to funds shortages. 
Therefore, in this case as well austerity measures designed to restore efficiency 
ended up increasing costs. Moreover, the use of compactor trucks, required with 
the proposed 240-litres bins, increases costs threefold compared to smaller trucks 
collecting 85-litres bins (Swilling and Hutt, 1999: 204). Compactors, however, are 
particularly effective in treating inorganic waste, which predominates in more 
affluent areas. On the contrary, organic refuse, which requires less compacting 
and is more evenly distributed, could be more efficiently collected by council 
trucks with less capital intensity and more interactions between municipal workers 
and residents. Labour intensity in this case would enhance municipal workers’ 
role in educating residents in differentiated collection, or in introducing in poor 
                                                
159 Roelf De Beer, Interview with the Author, 19 October 1999. It is to be noticed that at the time 
of the interview De Beer was also a member of the trade union IMATU, nominally opposed to 
iGoli 2002.  
160 In 2000, 34 out of 49 contracts in waste management (for a value of R 62 million out of R 94.5 
million in total contracts, or 25% of the operating budget) were for the fleet and its maintenance 
(GJMC, 1999a). 
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neighbourhoods garden sites that are instead penalized as “non-income 
generating” (Barchiesi, 2001).  
Therefore, the current fragmentation of the waste labour process, that for 
its income-generating collector activities comes to depend on capital intensive 
equipment on contract, reinforces urban inequalities by rewarding wealthy 
suburbs’ consumption and waste patterns. At the same time, the use of compactors 
on contract dequalifies the contribution of municipal workers reducing it to mere 
manual loading. Instead, valorizing their role as providing expertise, advice and 
awareness on how to reduce waste at the source, for example through 
differentiation, recycling and composting, would emphasize the “knowledge” 
component in waste management while strengthening the positive environmental 
impact of the public service.  
IGoli 2002’s discourse of scarcity and austerity played, at the same time, a 
pedagogical and disciplinary role beyond its short-term, crisis management 
implications. In fact, the project was also aimed at shaping public perceptions 
towards accepting the market as the most efficient mechanism for resource 
allocation. Municipal service managerialism in making access to services 
dependent on the users’ financial resources is combined to market-related 
efficiency criteria to reassert managerial authority inside the workplace. The 
connections between the managerialist reconfiguration of service delivery and the 
reassertion of management power in production are highlighted by the aim of 
iGoli 2002 as prioritizing “income generating” activities. In the case of waste such 
logics is particularly pronounced, and it translates into strengthening refuse 
collection paid by users over “unprofitable” community services like street 
cleaning and garden sites. The aim is to reduce levels of cross-subsidization and 
enhance “the ability to attract capital funding for critical short and long term 
programmes” while  “identify[ing] external sources of funding and partners, 
where required” (GJMC, 1999a: 5-6). Providing profitable opportunities for 
private investors is the task of consultants who, following suggestions from World 
Bank advisers (GJMC, 1999a: 24) are centrally co-ordinated by a “lead 
consultant”, a corporate technocrat that, due to the “lack of capacity or expertise 
within the council structures”, becomes an extremely powerful figure.  
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In such a framework, labour, which is incidentally concentrated in “non-
income generating” functions, is more liable to be regarded as a cost to be 
minimized, rather than as a community interface whose expertise and skills are to 
be enhanced and rewarded. As a matter of fact, middle-level managerial discourse 
strongly emphasizes this point, and gives a specific turn to the GJMC’s stated aim 
of building employment policies “around processes”, rather than “around people” 
(GJMC, 1999a: 33). In the words of a manager at Roads Central depot (Benrose), 
work reorganization in corporatised entities will mean the end of an era in which 
municipal work was for the “sick, lame and lazy”161. According to the JRA’s 
project manager “a key lack of work ethic” is the main problem with the GJMC’s 
workforce and the reason, rather than the shortage of trucks and equipment due to 
budget cuts, for most unfinished work. Therefore iGoli 2002, as a means to 
impose work ethic and wage labour discipline, comes as a dire warning for 
“people who are skimming from their backsides in the course of the day”162. The 
rhetoric of budget emergency greatly boosts such muscular managerial utterances, 
therefore fiscal austerity has an important impact in shifting workplace power 
relations, whereby permanent, unionized council employees are weakened by 
employment stagnation, production flexibility and casualisation. 
Moreover, municipal managers and the GJMC see in the new market-
based corporatised service entities, an important opportunity to revert municipal 
workers’ gains in wages, working conditions and benefits. Compared to the 
private sector, municipal services tend to enjoy a higher level of job and wage 
security, even if not necessarily higher wage levels. Managers in both roads and 
waste complained about the excessive wages of their general workers, estimating 
them at up to R2,800 per month, rising to R3,500 when housing and health 
benefits are considered163. In both cases a more extensive use of subcontractors 
was mentioned as a possible way to “make workers more accountable to costs”. 
 The same rationale is applied to working times, whereby waste 
                                                
161 Peter Howard, Manager, Roads Central (Benrose) Depot, Interview with the Author,16 
February 2000,. 
162 Alan Agaienz, Interview with the Author, 27 January 2000. 
163 Roelf De Beer, Interview with the Author, 19 October 1999 and Alan Agaienz, Interview with 
the Author, 27 January 2000. After-deductions wage figures mentioned by both are, however, 
between two and three times higher than the actual net wage levels I could ascertain in my 
workplace interviews (see Chapter 7). 
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management’s De Beer defines the prevailing 40-hours working week arrangements 
as “the biggest threat to our survival”. Conversely, he emphasized that 
subcontracting has the virtue of achieving a higher degree of flexibility, a 45-hour 
week and a lower salary, counting on the fact that “there are lots of people out there 
who need a job”. When asked about how he would respond to the unions’ possible 
objections to such prospects, he commented: “I know, but they should be careful of 
what they promise to the workers, because they could end up shooting themselves in 
the foot”. This confrontational attitude on the part of management confirms an 
option of unilateral restructuring where the role of the unions is categorized as that of 
vehicles to make workers accept flexible working arrangements and negotiate inside 
the boundaries defined by corporate profitability.  
 Finally, on the side of benefits, management identifies cost-cutting 
opportunities in capping the amounts of claims from medical aids and in reducing 
Council’s liabilities and contributions for pension and provident funds. Both 
benefits are historically characterized by a proliferation of schemes, often 
inherited from pre-GJMC councils, to which the unions contribute with their own 
products. Less than 50% of the GJMC employees were covered by medical aid in 
1997, with one scheme, Jomed, recruiting half of the combined schemes’ 
membership164. High costs and low wages meant increasing levels of 
commodification of healthcare, whereby even workers that could afford medical 
coverage were rarely able to register family members as dependants (See Table 
5.2). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
164 In 2000, monthly contributions for the “primary option”, with no dependants and a R2001-3000 
income, in a major medical scheme at GJMC, Bonitas, were R434.00. This figure can be related to 
the estimates on wages and medical contributions from my data in Chapter 7. It is however 
indicative to compare it with the payslip of a road worker at the Orange Farm depot, dated 27 
January 2000. Out of a basic salary of R2,890.00, this employee paid R2,485.66 in deductions 
(R456.00 of which in medical aid), including housing, for a take-home pay of R498.34. 
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Table 5.2 Dependants for Members of Main GJMC Medical Schemes, 1997 
Bonitas Jomed Munimed Other 
schemes165 
Total Dependants 
(Member +) 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
0 34.5        34.5 34.6        39 32.6        34.5 23.1        23.1 33           36.4
1 14.8        14.8 18.9        27.3 19.6        28 12.2        12.1 17.3        24.1
2 16.5        16.5 16           12.3 16.6        13.6 20           20 16,6        13.8
3 16,5         16.5 18           12.8 22.1        16.9 19.6        19.6 18.3        14.4
4 17,6         17.6 12.5         8.7 9.1           7 25.1        25.1 14.7        11.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Column 1 refers to active members, Column 2 includes pensioners.  
Source: GJTMC, Medical Aid Task Team, Investigation into the Rationalisation of Medical Aid 
Schemes within the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, January 1997, p.15, 
GL. 
 
In the case of Bonitas, probably the most popular and cheapest basic services 
scheme,  approximately one third of yearly claims was for less than the amount of 
contributions with no dependants, while 72.6% of all members claimed less than 
100% of expected claims and 49.8% claimed less than 50%166. Such low levels of 
claims in relation to contributions and total expected claims, however, did not 
prevent the Council from complaining about the “financially unsustainable” 
situation of medical benefits, where council liabilities had increased following the 
elimination of exclusions from schemes due to “risk rating” and the prescribed 
minimum benefits provided for in the 1999 Medical Schemes Act. Therefore, 
already in 1997 the council had adopted a strategy based on the proposed 
unification of existing schemes under one single scheme, to be fully privatized, 
combining a platform of basic services with employees’ savings accounts and 
managed health care with capped claimable benefits167.  
 A similar logic inspired the GJMC’s approach to retirement benefits. 
Facing the fragmentation of 12 different schemes, generally inherited from 
apartheid-age municipalities and based on varying levels of employer and 
employee contributions, in September 2001 the GJMC embarked on a general 
                                                
165 Among these schemes, the main union scheme was SAMWUMED, run by SAMWU. 
Established in 1952 by SAMWU’s precursor, CTMWA, and later called SAMWU National 
Medical Scheme as a “closed” Industrial Council plan, in October 2000 SAMWUMED was 
registered as a fully-funded scheme under the Medical Schemes Act. In 2004, it had 40,000 
members nationally. See SAMWU, SAMWU Medical Scheme, Report Prepared for the Social 
Benefits Committee, 11 August 1998. SAMWU. 
166 GJTMC, Medical Aid Task Team, Investigation into the Rationalisation of Medical Aid 
Schemes within the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, January 1997, 
pp.17-19, GL. 
167 Ibidem. 
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overhaul of the system. Following the approach indicated by the South African 
Local Government Association (SALGA), the Council merged the existing 
schemes into a single fund, with contributions set at 15% of the contributor’s 
wage for the employer and 7.5% for the employee. In previous schemes, 
employers’ contributions were always higher than 15% and could be as high as 
22% of the member’s wage168. Moreover, historically municipal retirement funds 
were different from private sector ones due to the prevalence among the former of 
“defined benefits” schemes which, compared to “defined contributions” ones, 
provide better retirement incomes to long-term employees, while raising the 
employer’s liability. By contrast, the new scheme reversed such a situation, in line 
with practices prevailing in the private sector, and increased the commodification 
of workers’ retirement benefits in the form of a “defined contributions” fund169. 
These schemes limit the employer’s liability and make retirement income more 
uncertain and fluctuating in accordance with the fund’s market performance. 
 In the final analysis, GJMC management’s offensive on wages, working 
conditions and benefits, framed within an aggressive reassertion of work ethic in 
the template of budget “emergency”, is enabled by the transition from fiscally 
cross-subsidised services to profit-driven companies. In this sense a strong 
correspondence exists between growing commodification and market discipline in 
communities’ access to services, and the reconfiguration of wage discipline in 
municipal workplaces. Such shifts, conversely, challenge the position and role of 
labour organizations as the actors through which a historically marginalised and 
vulnerable municipal workforce could in the past build stability and entitlements 
centred on wage labour. 
 
 
 
                                                
168 Trade unions can still retain their funds, as long as they have the same contributory share of the 
municipal fund. The 15% employers’ contribution level was the minimum required by the 
government-appointed Katz Commission in 1995, with the maximum being 22.5%. The 
municipality’s conservatism and cost-cutting approach was contested by SAMWU, whose official 
policy demanded a minimum employer contribution of 18%, see SAMWU, National Bargaining 
Conference Resolutions, 1998. SAMWU. 
169 GJMC, Office of the City Manager, Restructuring of Retirement Fund Arrangements, 13 
September 2001, GL. The new fund is intended to absorb the 4,000 non-permanent employees to 
be hired by the new municipal services entities. 
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5.5 Trade Unions’ Responses to iGoli 2002: The Case of SAMWU 
 
Similarly to cases discussed with regard to the East Rand, iGoli 2002 configures a 
long-term process of transformation of waged employment which, under the 
initial impulse of responding to GJMC’s contingent crisis, questions wage labour 
as the core of strategies and discourses of collective rights. Between 1998 and 
2000, casualisation, resurgent managerial authoritarianism, pressures on wages, 
working conditions and benefits have in particular become the terrain of 
intensified confrontation between trade unions and the GJMC in the context of 
iGoli 2002’s formative stages. 
The modification in the material conditions of municipal workers related 
to the employment freeze, the obsolescence of Council infrastructure and the 
fragmentation of the labour force have been perceived by SAMWU in particular 
as heralding a trend to growing workers’ disempowerment and devaluation. The 
union has also identified potentially detrimental effects on worker identities, 
power and links with communities.  
The unionization of Johannesburg municipal employees has taken place 
during the 1980s in the face of coercive labour control and workers’ vulnerability 
due to the territorial dispersal and isolation in the labour process and residential 
accommodations. To this was added the general instability of a working class 
predominantly made of migrants on contract, segregated in compounds, subject to 
deportation and under the surveillance of regulations of a highly repressive nature. 
The appearance of the employees of the then Johannesburg City Council on the 
scene of emergent unionism dates back to July 1980, with a strike of the 12,000 
African migrants which were the bulk of the Council’s 14,000-strong black labour 
force. Extra-workplace demands for migrants’ dignity and stable residential rights 
were among the prime determinants of that strike, whose participants asked the 
Black Municipal Workers’ Union (BMWU) for support. The BMWU had been 
launched only one month before the strike by Joseph Mavi, a former official of 
the African Transport Workers’ Union (ATWU), a “parallel” union for black 
employees run by the conservative, white-dominated Trade Unions Council of 
South Africa (TUCSA). Mavi’s expulsion from ATWU, which led him to 
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organize the BMWU, was caused by his demands for TUCSA’s involvement in 
support of black squatter communities’ rights (Keenan, 1981). When the 
Johannesburg municipal workers approached BMWU for help, the still weakly 
organized union advised caution to the strikers, but the strike spread out of its own 
momentum and on a largely spontaneous basis. The eventual repression of the 
mobilisation, with thousands of dismissals, arrests and deportations to the rural 
“homelands” delayed the unionization of Johannesburg municipal employees by 
almost a decade. 
The national organization of municipal workers has given shape, however, 
to a very innovative pattern of unionization that combined different political 
traditions and orientations. Eventually, 1987 saw the birth of the South African 
Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU), out of the merger of worker organisations 
that had members in municipal employment. The most important among them was 
the Cape Town Municipal Workers’ Association (CTMWA), a formerly 
conservative and bureaucratized union, born in 1928, which came to recruit a 
large stratum of Cape Town’s “coloured” municipal workforce. In 1964 the 
CTMWA had been taken over after a prolonged confrontation by a faction of 
young organizers with an aim at democratizing it and making it responsive to 
rank-and-file membership. In the 1970s, 84% of all municipal workers in South 
Africa belonged to the CTMWA (Budlender, 1984; Buhlungu, 2001: 79-82).  
The other unions that joined the CTMWA in establishing SAMWU were 
the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), a former “workerist” 
FOSATU multi-purpose union whose municipal members were moved to 
SAMWU, and three “community unions” emerged in the 1980s: SAAWU’s 
municipal workers, the Port Elizabeth-based General Workers Union of South 
Africa (GWUSA) and the Municipal Workers Union of South Africa (MWUSA), 
a spin-off from Mavi’s BMWU after its crushing by state repression after the 
1980 strike. The peculiar blend of workplace-orientated and community-based 
trade unions that was at the heart of SAMWU was underlined by the fact that, 
although the CTMWA had a very strong emphasis on worker control from the 
shopfloor, its raison d’etre had also eschewed “narrow economism” and the union 
had supported community struggles in Cape Town during the first half of the 
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1980s (Ernstzen, 1991). Therefore SAMWU summarized and re-elaborated in a 
very specific way, by collapsing and transcending the “populist”-“workerist” 
divide inside its very organization, the trajectory that during the 1980s led to the 
emergence of “social movement unionism” out of the encounter of worker 
organizations with broad socio-political struggles. 
During the 1990s, SAMWU, along with other public sector unions, was 
among the fastest growing COSATU affiliates, while the numerical weight of the 
organization moved from Cape Town to Transvaal/Gauteng (see Table 5.3) 
 
Table 5.3 SAMWU Membership, 1987-2003, and Members in Transvaal/Gauteng Region 
Year Total 
SAMWU 
Membership 
Members in Tvl/Gauteng Members in 
Tvl/Gauteng as % of 
Total 
1987 15,906 2,386 (Tvl) 15% 
1990 59,014   
1993 73,342 24,936 (Tvl) 34% 
1994 100,410   
1995 110,032   
1996 113,056   
1997 120,109 38,334 (Gauteng) 32% 
1998 121,065   
1999 120,069   
2000 119,072 37,182 (Gauteng) 31% 
2001 115,258   
2002 113,616   
2003 114,964 35,621 (Gauteng) 31% 
Sources: SAMWU (1997a, 2003). 
 
By 2003, SAMWU was the largest local government union in South Africa, with 
55.9% of the total workforce among its members (52.9% in Gauteng), followed at 
a distance by the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU), with 
71,412 members and 32.5% of the workforce (31.1% in Gauteng). At the same 
time, in 1999 SAMWU recruited approximately 23,000 GJMC workers, roughly 
equivalent to 70% of the workforce. Local government was, moreover, a heavily 
unionized sector, with a union density of 91% nationally and 91.8% in Gauteng.  
The late 1990s, however, showed signs of a decline in SAMWU 
membership, coincidental with the introduction of restructuring, corporatisation 
and privatization in various municipalities. SAMWU’s “Secretariat Report” to the 
2003 Congress noticed the growing “lack of appeal” of militant and political 
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unionism and a reorientation of workers’ preferences towards service unionism, 
the defence of jobs and benefits security among the possible explanations for 
numerical decline (SAMWU, 2003). At the same time, however, approximately 
70% of SAMWU members in the GJMC were located in low-wage, low-skill 
hourly occupations, with a small contingent of fixed-term contracts (less than 
2,000) and basically no casuals170. The increase in the numerical weight of this 
section of the workforce during the iGoli 2002 process could therefore be thought 
of as an added pressure on SAMWU’s representative capacity. 
Since the inception of policies of corporatisation and public-private 
partnership in municipal services delivery, along the lines recommended in the 
1998 White Paper on Local Government, SAMWU has opposed such 
restructuring exercises, seeing them as tantamount to privatization and a threat to 
municipal workers’ wages and conditions and to poor communities’ access to 
affordable services (SAMWU, 1997a). SAMWU’s opposition to iGoli 2002 was 
inserted therefore in the union’s “anti-privatisation campaign”171, even if the 
union accepted the “unicity” concept and the need to restructure service delivery 
in a uniform manner. Concurrently, the union regarded the linkage by the 
employers between restructuring and financial crisis as a device to enforce 
managerial authoritarianism and erode hard-won gains and customary employer-
employees interactions: 
 
Whilst acknowledging the crisis, we are firmly of the view that 
national government has a moral (and indeed constitutional) 
responsibility to ensure that local authorities are able to meet their 
service delivery and staff obligations. When workers have resorted to 
industrial action in support of one or other demand, deductions were 
quickly made from salaries and wages. Many workers have even lost 
their jobs. Now, when workers present themselves for work, and 
indeed perform in terms of their employment contracts, they are 
simply not paid. Our members have shown great loyalty, commitment 
to service delivery and patience in continuing to work 
notwithstanding the uncertainty (…) of whether or not they would be 
paid172. 
                                                
170 Hlubi Biyana, SAMWU Johannesburg Branch Organiser, Interview with the Author, 17 April 
2000. 
171 Victor Mhlongo, SAMWU International Relations Officer, Interview with the Author, 19 May 
2000. 
172 SAMWU, Memorandum to Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, 23 
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The union’s opposition to municipal privatization was premised on a Framework 
for the Restructuring of Municipal Service Provision, signed by COSATU and 
SALGA on 11 December 1998, which defined the public sector as the “preferred 
method” for service delivery aimed at universal coverage and a lifeline amount of 
free basic services. In the case of iGoli 2002, SAMWU accused the GJMC of 
unilateral implementation of restructuring in violation of the agreement. An early 
attempt to declare a dispute on the recommendations of the GJMC’s Organisation 
Review was however withdrawn pending renewed negotiations.  
The first meeting to discuss the plan between SAMWU and the GJMC 
took place on 25 February 1999 at the newly-established South African Local 
Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC). On 6 April SAMWU demanded a 
two-month moratorium on the implementation of iGoli 2002, which the GJMC 
accepted but only limited to labour-related issues. In May 1999 a special 
bargaining committee on iGoli 2002 was formed inside the SALGBC, and 
SAMWU demanded to stop the implementation of the plan as long as negotiations 
were in progress. The GJMC-convened “iGoli Summit” on 13 August 1999, 
however, concluded that sufficient consultation had been achieved, despite the 
fact that unions were not even present at the summit. On 27 September the GJMC 
adopted the “iGoli 2002 Transformation and Implementation Plan” and on 10 
October SAMWU declared a formal dispute. The stalemate in negotiations led on 
26 October to a strike based on SAMWU’s demands for a moratorium, in which 
the police physically confronted  demonstrating municipal workers173.  
In the same period, the ANC’s GJMC Councillor for Pimville (Soweto), 
Trevor Ngwane, was expelled from the party for his criticism to iGoli 2002 and to 
the GEAR macroeconomic framework. The issue of municipal restructuring 
proved controversial for the ANC-led Alliance as well, with the Johannesburg 
branch of the SACP supporting the SAMWU strike. In January 2000, the ANC 
decided to directly intervene in an attempt to mediate between SAMWU and the 
GJMC. On 5 July, a “Record of Political Understanding” was signed at the 
                                                                                                                                 
July 1998, p.2. See also Ronnie to All Provinces, 24 July 1998, SAMWU. 
173 The chronology of events is based on M.Thobejane, iGoli 2002, Transformation and 
Implementation, cit. 
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SALGBC, setting a 30-day deadline to resolve outstanding issues and break the 
stalemate (Etzo, 2003: 154). An agreement on tariffs and service lifelines was 
achieved in August, but no progress was made on the overall plan, whose 
implementation proceeded nonetheless. On 10 August the Labour Court 
authorized the transfer of the GJMC workforce to the new corporate entities on a 
going concern basis.  
In the meanwhile, SAMWU had decided to strengthen links with civil 
society organizations that were also opposed to privatization. In May 2000 an 
“anti-iGoli forum” was started, with the participation of some local branches of 
ANC-aligned SACP and SANCO, and various extra-parliamentarian left-wing 
groups (Etzo, 2003: 185-186). Following students’ mobilization against a 
conference to popularize iGoli 2002 and co-convened by the GJMC at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, various organizations, including SAMWU and 
student groups, converged on 23 September to form the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
(APF). A renewed cycle of confrontation seemed to start with SAMWU’s 
decision to go on strike indefinitely on 30 November. The strike was, however, 
suspended on 4 December, the day before the local government elections, in a 
date that  can actually be taken as the end of SAMWU’s direct opposition to iGoli 
2002. Less than one month later, the new utilities and agencies started their 
operations. 
 The defeat of SAMWU’s opposition to iGoli 2002 can be attributed to 
many factors, most of which converge to indicate limitations and shortcomings in 
trade union organizations as actors capable to contest broad social restructuring. 
At the same time, they reinforce an impression of crisis and erosion in the ability 
of wage labour to be a repository of imagery and policies for progressive social 
change. Some observers have emphasized that iGoli 2002 was from the beginning 
a technocratic process of decision-making implemented in an authoritarian way 
with a limited civil society participation which, despite the GJMC’s stated aims, 
was largely cosmetic (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002: 87-106). Technocratic 
decision-making was reinforced by the GJMC’s adamant refusal of having 
representatives of labour and communities in the boards of utilities and agencies, 
as demanded by the unions. SAMWU officials share the impression that top-down 
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decisions sidestepped public participation. Johannesburg branch organizer, Hlubi 
Byiana, feels that the role of the union was from the start conceived by the GJMC 
as “rubberstamping”  decisions taken unilaterally, which led to union-municipality 
relations that remained “purely adversarial”. At the same time, when the plan was 
introduced SAMWU was surprised by the speed with which events unfolded and 
found itself in the position to negotiate a very complex general organizational and 
institutional overhaul. According to Byiana, as a union which had privileged 
either its militant background or workplace-based services to the members, 
SAMWU had neither the preparation nor skills adequate to the task174.  
 Opposition to iGoli 2002 ignited, however, also debates and divisions 
inside SAMWU, which revolved on whether the union’s most effective role is to 
contest broad social policies or to manage them primarily in the interest of its 
members. SAMWU’s Gauteng provincial office emphasized pragmatism, based 
on the fact that, as Byiana puts it, “as a trade union, we are reformist”. Therefore 
preference at this level was given to negotiating jobs and benefits security for 
workers under the new corporatised entities, in a way that separated labour issues 
from ideological oppositions.  
Other voices inside SAMWU argue that, while the union’s national 
headquarters remained staunchly opposed to privatization, moderate orientations 
prevailed inside the local offices, especially after the intervention of COSATU 
and the ANC. These latter were in this view worried that anti-iGoli militancy and 
the co-operation with radical civil society organizations could facilitate the rise of 
an anti-government rhetoric that could prove divisive for the Alliance175. In the 
final analysis, such debates point at problems and crises, already noticed on the 
East Rand, in the concept of “social movement unionism” in a post-apartheid 
context of wage labour decline, erosion of workers’ protections, trade unions’ 
institutionalization and hollowing out of labour as an engine of social citizenship. 
SAMWU’s focus on community linkages and social movement alliances had been 
shaped by an awareness of the overlap in its members’ lives between the 
                                                
174 Hlubi Biyana, Interview with the Author, 17 April 2000. 
175 Rob Rees, SAMWU Research Officer, interviewed in Etzo (2003: 185-186). See also Naidoo 
and Veriava (2005). It is indicative, for example, that before the December 2000 strike the APF 
used to meet in SAMWU offices, a practice discontinued since then. 
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provision of municipal services and the household use of such services. Therefore, 
opposition to iGoli 2002 was nurtured by a view of commodification of services 
as a two-pronged threat to both workers’ power in production and to their rights as 
residents. Countervailing this discourse, however, SAMWU embodies also a 
tradition of service unionism emphasising worker benefits that is uncommon in 
the unions emerged from the 1980s climate of political radicalism.  
Paul Johnston (1994) notices that a fundamental asset for public sector 
unions, which in many cases also explains their growing orientation to social 
movement unionism, is the fact that they can articulate their demands not only in 
commodified, wage-related terms but as “public needs” and as a matter of social 
citizenship. In a context of service privatization and marketisation, such themes 
carry substantial community legitimacy and could be conducive to broad social 
alliances (Clawson, 2003: 110-124). In SAMWU’s case, however, political, 
institutional and organizational constraints, combined to the union’s lack of 
preparation and to its declining ability to represent a rapidly casualising 
workforce, prevented an unambiguous resumption of social movement politics 
within a clearly articulated discourse of social citizenship and decommodification. 
In a frank assessment of setbacks in opposing municipal privatization, the 
Secretariat Report to the 2003 National Congress concludes that links between 
the union and civil society organizations “have not been taken seriously”, and 
when only in mid-2000 such connections were ultimately formalized, it was too 
late for them to stem or meaningfully influence the iGoli 2002 process. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The restructuring of Johannesburg municipal services under the iGoli 2002 plan 
affects employees both as workers and as community residents. This case is 
therefore particularly indicative of the connections between social policies of 
commodification and residualism, analysed in previous chapters, and the changing 
position of wage labour in South Africa’s post-apartheid society. In fact, by 
emphasizing cost containment and income generation, iGoli 2002 delegates to 
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market-based corporate entities the provision of municipal services in ways that 
enter an uneasy relationship with the reduction of inherited social inequalities. 
SAMWU’s discourse has underlined to this end the necessity of a strong public 
service that, by playing a redistributive and decommodifying role can also protect 
municipal workers from the erosion of their shopfloor rights and power.  
Conversely, the material conditions, wages, employment security and 
benefits of GJMC’s employees have come under considerable stress from a 
process of restructuring presented as a necessary adjustment to emergency 
financial and fiscal conditions to be therefore conducted as a largely technocratic 
exercise. Even if this chapter is focused on the pre-implementation phase of the 
plan, with particular regard to roads and waste management, recent studies on 
Pikitup seem to indicate that such trends are indeed strengthened by the fully-
fledged corporatisation of municipal utilities. Therefore, rather than a solution to 
contingent problems, iGoli 2002 has emerged as a structural reconfiguration of the 
nature of local services, of the relevance of the commodity form in determining 
access, and of the relationships between citizens’ rights and consumer’s individual 
market position.  
Similarly to the East Rand cases discussed in the previous chapter, 
organized labour is affected by the transformation of work and employment at 
GJMC in far-reaching ways. On one hand, a trajectory of labour-community 
alliance and activism, to which SAMWU’s tradition of “social movement 
unionism” is deeply tributary, is now questioned and shows significant 
inadequacies. On the other hand, SAMWU’s ability to organize and represent a 
workforce whose permanent employees retire and are replaced by casual and 
contract labour is also questioned. The incorporation of former “permanent 
casuals” under Pikitup has taken place under unequal wage conditions and has 
been accompanied by an erosion of workers’ benefits, especially medical aids and 
retirement funds. At the same time, subcontracting of services, especially in fleet 
management, has been widened and systematised. In such adverse conditions, a 
response could be the retreat in the defense of members’ conditions and benefits, 
for which a deeply entrenched tradition of service unionism is readily available to 
SAMWU, even if this would minimize radical engagement with social policies. 
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The withering away of SAMWU’s opposition to iGoli 2002 seems to indicate the 
likelihood of such an outcome.   
While this chapter has provided a picture and analysis of broad trends in 
the restructuring of work and service provision in the GJMC, the next two will 
look at workers’ experiences of, and responses to, such changes at the level 
respectively of the workplace and the community, by contrasting them with those 
emerging from the East Rand cases. My discussion of the relations between wage 
labour and social citizenship will therefore move the level of analysis from the 
structural dynamics of employment change to subjective elaborations at the 
grassroots level. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
When the Workplace Disappears. The Unfulfilled Promise of Wage Labour 
in Changing Experiences of Life at Work 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter and the next analyse the ways in which the structural transformations 
in the social constitution of wage labour discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 with regard 
to the East Rand and GJMC workers are reflected in everyday workers’ 
experiences, discourses and strategies. While this chapter looks, in particular, at 
the workplace-related impacts and dimensions of the crisis of wage labour, the 
following is concerned with how the changing significance of work in 
respondents’ individual lives shapes their living standards, household access to 
social provisions, perceptions of community problems, sense of social and 
political agency. Both chapters address from an empirical perspective whether the 
emancipatory “promise” of wage labour in the process of democratization has 
been fulfilled in combining political freedom with workers’ access to income and 
basic social provisions. 
 My findings confirm the picture of crisis and fragmentation  in waged 
employment that emerged from the discussion of the restructuring of production 
and employment in East Rand’s manufacturing industry and in the GJMC under 
“iGoli 2002”. In particular, workers’ experiences of change in the shopfloor show 
that the “promise” of wage labour is questioned by a series of interrelated trends 
that subjective perceptions clearly relate to the structural aspects of restructuring 
of work and production. As an anecdotal, but illustrative, indicator of workers’ 
feelings of disillusionment with workplace change under the new democracy, only 
6 respondents out of 220 reported unequivocally to be both generally happy with 
their present job and to have a positive view of their occupational future. My 
contention is that growing disaffection and weakening workplace identities are 
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mainly produced by a combination of disillusionment in the capacity of the new 
dispensation to change established patterns of power and inequality in the 
workplace, and new uncertainties within increasingly flexible production 
environments following more recent restructuring. In a sense, these findings 
confirm Sennett’s (2000: 71) observation that “lack of attachment is also coupled 
with confusion. The (…) flexible workforce had little more clarity about where 
they stood in society”. In the cases under examination, however, “confusion” is 
not the exclusive outcome of corporate change and production flexibility, but it 
also resents of the negative ways these changes have impacted on broad 
expectations for socio-economic change following political transformation. 
The following pages look at the decline of workplace-based identities as 
related to the deprivation of content and meaning in individual experiences of 
work, to the increased insecurity due to labour market changes, and to the 
intensification of work due to employment flexibility and technological change. In 
all these three spheres, perceptions and feelings of growing adversities, 
disempowerment and exploitation are not necessarily the product of recent 
changes but they are also decisively shaped by the impression that political 
change has not led to reversing previous, long established forms of authority, 
hierarchy and inequality in the workplace. Responses to the crisis of the 
workplace as a place of social advancement, collective identity and solidarity take 
highly differentiated forms clearly linked to the specific circumstances of industry 
and locality.  
Part of this chapter is also a discussion of workers’ responses to the 
workplace-based aspects of the crisis of wage labour, and how alternative 
employment strategies are defined in the form of double occupation, informal 
work and entrepreneurialism. This discussion provides a link with the topic of the 
following chapter, which explores how the crisis of wage labour impacts on 
workers’ access to decommodified social rights, perceptions of family and 
community problems, rights-based social citizenship discourses and sense of 
socio-political activism. 
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6.2 The Weight of the Past: The Unfulfilled Promise of Workplace Change 
 
6.2.1  Fear and Loathing on the East Rand: The Betrayal of Shopfloor 
Transformation  
 
Interviews with workers both at GJMC and in East Rand manufacturing 
companies reveal  significant consistencies in the ways in which workplace-
related problems are experienced and elaborated. The political context marked by 
the end of institutional racism and the emerging economic climate of globalisation 
and international competition consciously enter many workers’ discourses of 
expectations and challenges. As a whole, the impact of such changes on everyday 
life in the workplace is not generally seen as conducive to greater empowerment, 
improved working conditions or enhanced control over jobs and tasks. Instead, 
pre-existing problems like managerial authoritarianism, racialised favouritism, 
unilateral modifications in tasks and workloads, and lack of skills recognition 
constantly resurface in individual narratives that reflect a deepening sense of 
vulnerability faced with the combination of these old problems with the impact of 
more recent restructuring.  
 Karl von Holdt’s (2003) reassessment of Michael Burawoy’s concept of 
“factory regime” usefully emphasizes the relationships between workers’ 
“political incorporation” within the post-1994 democratic dispensation and their 
“workplace incorporation” as the renegotiation of forms of control, authority and 
hierarchy at the point of production. In his view of the “post-apartheid workplace 
regime”, the shopfloor becomes a terrain of contestation over the moral, symbolic 
and normative frameworks that should structure the relations between capital and 
labour after the crisis and collapse of apartheid-age structures. Workers’ agency is 
shaped by “a complex amalgam of popular, class and workplace identities, many 
of which (…) were forged beyond the workplace” (Von Holdt, 2003: 9). 
However, when it categorizes the range of possible outcomes of contestation – 
neo-apartheid authoritarian reassertion of racial hierarchies, union-driven 
reconstruction via codetermination, or management-driven “wildcat co-operation” 
to sidestep the union -- this argument focuses almost exclusively on workers’ and 
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employers’ attitudes towards trade union organization.  This point of view does 
not question the fundamental unity of “the workplace” as the arena of contestation 
or compromise, the stability of “work” as a universe of meanings where social 
actors operate and the centrality of the trade union in shaping workers’ collective 
agency. Instead, the picture emerging in this chapter does not fit any of Von 
Holdt’s possible features of a post-apartheid workplace regime, and indeed 
questions the basic assumptions upon which those outcomes are predicated.  
First, worker agency in the cases analysed here seems more concerned 
with defining subjective alternatives to the looming (and in few cases actual) 
disappearance of the workplace as a set of relations within which sense of 
stability, norms, values and ethics are reproduced, rather than with negotiating the 
features of a more humane, democratic and worker-controlled workplace regime. 
Restructuring and employment changes, with their burden of instability, 
precariousness, threats of joblessness, are often seen as the product of an 
unstoppable globalised economic rationality faced with which not only the 
workplace order, but the democratic government itself, are forced to capitulate.  
Second, production and employment changes question the very meaning of 
“work” in workers’ narratives, expectations and strategies. The widening reach of 
“atypical” and flexible forms of employment and the permanently impending 
threat of retrenchments mean that workers seem to lose a sense of worth in their 
work that is not merely instrumental, especially as this is no longer seen as 
conducive to fulfilling family and community responsibilities that act as extra-
workplace determinants of work ethic and “disciplined selves” (Lamont, 2000). 
Rather, due to its inherent instability and unpredictability, the work effort is no 
longer regarded as a reliable foundation for “social contracts” between capital and 
labour at the point of production. 
Third, collective workplace-based identities tend to play a decreasingly 
important role in workers’ responses to restructuring in parallel with perceptions 
that the shopfloor as a place to advantageously negotiate the outcome of 
restructuring is becoming increasingly constrained. Rather, workers’ imagery is 
much more responsive to the idea of escaping the workplace, its institutions and 
its structured patterns of interaction through strategies that range from the socio-
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economic (search for informalised double occupations, self-entrepreneurialism), 
to the symbolic (reconstruction of community selves around religious motifs), to 
the political (attempts to become active in the community and trends to confine 
the union to a purely instrumental and defensive role). 
 Once the workplace ceases to be an unproblematic site of periodisation 
between an apartheid and a post-apartheid “regime”, it is possible to better 
appreciate the coexistence of continuity and change in defining shifting meanings 
of work in a context of flexibility and globalisation. The immediate evidence that 
most workers mention to express their sense of betrayal and unfulfilled promise 
within the post-apartheid workplace resides in the continuities with the old 
racialised hierarchies and power relations. My factory case studies show, 
moreover, that the persistence of unequal power relations are not so much the 
product of the permanence of adversarial mindsets that, by preventing alliances 
and co-operation between workers and managers, do not allow to “de-politicize” 
productivity increases (Dickinson, 2003). Rather, co-operation between 
management and unions does not seem to cause a fundamental difference in this 
regard, especially as long as restructuring, retrenchments, casualisation and multi-
tasking are presented as part of unavoidable adaptations to objective market forces 
and constraints. It is precisely the economic environment external to the 
workplace, as seconded and reproduced by the government macroeconomic 
policies summarized in previous chapters, that “freezes” past patterns of 
workplace inequality and disempowerment, projecting them into the new era of 
deracialised labour market regulation. 
The most visible manifestations of the permanence of racialised inequality 
in workplace power relations have to do with authoritarianism and favouritism in 
the allocation of tasks and functions, in job advancement and skills recognition. 
While these features are commonly associated with the apartheid-era shopfloor 
(Kraak, 1987; Adler, 1993), here they contribute to a more general loss of job 
identities, meanings and perspectives that are primarily determined not by the 
existence of an authoritarian political regime and an apparent suppression of 
political citizenship, but by dynamics of restructuring clearly perceived as linked 
to the forces of liberalization and global competition. Workers’ perceptions in this 
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regard do not seem to be primarily influenced by changes at the level of the labour 
process, or by the depth and spread of technological innovation. Wage labour is in 
fact losing its importance across the board both as a vehicle of collective identities 
and solidarity and as an avenue for further advancement and development in life. 
Therefore, companies that have significantly introduced new technologies, like 
Consol and MB Glass display responses similar to those where innovation is 
constrained by market uncertainties, like merchant establishments Baldwin’s Steel 
and Paperlink.  
At Baldwin’s, however, workers’ uncertainty about the future and their 
general disaffection are increased by the fact that the company is operating in an 
environment where the borders between sales and manufacturing, as explained in 
Chapter 4, are becoming increasingly blurred. As a result a process of 
routinization and deskilling is affecting here also monthly salaried workers that as 
a result of flexibility are now increasingly required to perform shopfloor functions 
that are felt as depriving the “conceptual”, problem-solving features of office 
work, apart from reducing its comfort and stability. One self-defined “picker-
loader” at Baldwin’s is now in charge with loading structural steel on trucks for 
clients or for deliveries, a function that previously he was just co-ordinating from 
his office. In his words transpires how the impact of restructuring and the burdens 
of flexibility have been unfairly allocated along racial lines: 
 
Some of us blacks are not moving at all. I prefer to make myself as an 
example, even if I know 6 or 7. For 16 years I have been staffing one 
area, only names change: today I am loader, next week I am an 
expeditor, next month I’ll be running as a clerk, but the job is always 
the same, no money improvement, promotions are made to suit 
whites. 
Q But your job description… 
A I don’t know what’s my job description, I don’t have one. I no 
longer know what answer I am supposed to forward to my children 
who ask ‘dad, what job are you doing?’. I am supposed to be called 
multiskilled because I am on the floor, I do the loading, I am in the 
office, I run around, I do the administration, come back here, answer 
the phone. The guys at the machine, I don’t think they have a job 
description either (…). If one has to pick up those materials he must 
do as the boss says it should be done. He cannot think, he’s not 
allowed to think. (Interview #2) 
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The racially unfair nature of these changes, and the fact that blacks remain 
predominantly confined to hyper-flexible occupations where thinking is not part 
of the process, emerge immediately upon further questioning. This worker’s 
bitterness clearly indicates that the promise of wage labour still holds differential 
rewards: 
 
I brought some white boys here that didn’t know anything and now 
they are sales managers, they are part of the directors, and they have 
gone through me. When they came in they found me, I showed them 
how we work, and from this department they moved onwards. Boys! I 
mean boys. I’m not undermining them, but today they are the senor 
guys, and I won’t move an inch from where they left me behind. 
(Interview #2) 
 
During the interview he showed me his payslip from which I could see that after 
16 years at Baldwin’s this worker’s wage was R105 per week after deductions, 
taken mainly in the form of approximately R400 per week for the company’s 
medical scheme. Even considering his wife’s wage as an employee at Gauteng 
Health Department, which allows the family to pay for a housing loan and utility 
rates, he says that their combined wages are hardly adequate to feed their family, 
which includes two school-age children. When I entered Baldwin’s shop-steward 
office, the venue for my interview, a poster was hanging from a wall. It said: 
“God came and saw my work and he was satisfied. Then he came again and saw 
my salary, he turned away and bowed his head and wept”. 
 Issues of work intensification, unregulated multitasking and racially biased 
promotions and allocation of workloads are felt with great urgency among 
Baldwin’s NUMSA members. Mike, head of the small shop-steward committee, 
told me that these are the main reasons why one of his co-workers and friend tried 
to commit suicide by hanging176. Lack of advancement for black workers into 
traditionally “white” jobs like external sales or, as a worker put it, “job 
reservation for whites and blacks” (Interview #16) is a widespread complaint at 
Baldwin’s, and is used by workers to belie the transformative rhetoric adopted by 
                                                
176 At the same time, an atmoshpere of authoritarianism and intimidation was quite apparent in the 
ways workers were afraid of talking about these issues. Two workers agreed to have an interview 
with me on working conditions at Baldwin’s only if I waited for them outside the factory gates and 
drove them home, because they did not want to be seen by their foremen. 
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the Dorbyl group in the Cooper era. As I have discussed earlier, the ideological 
offensive of management, geared towards redefining an image of corporate 
citizenship underpinned by employees’ commitment to productivity and 
competitiveness at the overall company level, was quite effective in recruiting the 
support of NUMSA headquarters and, in some cases, shop stewards. At the 
workplace level, however, the contradictions and ambiguity of managerial 
discourse become apparent when confronted with the reassertion of previously 
existing hierarchies and authoritarianism, now put at the service of ensuring a 
flexible workforce unable to translate the expectations of political 
democratization into a new discourse of rights and entitlements in the workplace: 
 
Here, you see, apartheid is alive, there are jobs which are made for 
white guys. Why don’t they give people a chance? It is better to try 
and fail than to fail to try. We once had a meeting and I said it seems 
to me that black people are used as doormats, if you have a mat in the 
door someone will come with mud in their shoes and wipe his feet 
there, that is what we have here. (Interview #6) 
 
There are many indications, in Baldwin’s workers narratives, of the perception 
that the permanence of apartheid-style workplace practices is dictated both by the 
need to maintain racial wage gaps as a condition for the company’s survival and 
as a correlate of increasing flexibility, especially as a consequence of prioritizing 
structural steel special cuts to carve up new market niches and counter the decline 
in sales. According to a worker (Interview #9), after the Dorbyl takeover and a 
strike in 1991, which effectively put an end to trade union organizing at 
Baldwin’s for six years, Dorbyl circulated and publicized an internal memo 
according to which Baldwin’s “should try and put whites in key positions” to 
prevent further disruptions. The conclusion that many draw is that Dorbyl’s claim 
to a participative, egalitarian corporate citizenship, which during the “Dorbyl 
TRC” became an explicit mirror-image of the deracialisation of citizenship 
spearheaded by the new government, actually stops at the factory gates, where 
“affirmative action as introduced by our new government is applicable only to the 
other side of the coin [employers], but our side of the coin is not receiving 
anything” (Interview #4). 
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 Even at Paperlink, a company whose employees credit the new 
management with a transformative approach at the workplace level that stands in 
stark contract with past practices, workers resent the arbitrary imposition of 
multitasking, which blurs existing qualifications and moral assumptions of “fair” 
expectations from individual jobs in ways that connect workplace 
authoritarianism to historically entrenched patterns of abuse: 
 
I have been abused so much, to such an extent, that I am no longer 
willing to help… what department do I work here? That is the first 
question I ask to myself. I have to work in dispatch, in admin clerk, 
receiving clerk, I don’t have a license but I am driving the truck… so I 
am not happy individually. I would leave this job immediately if there 
was something better. I got an offer from another paper merchant, 
they promised me better wages, but there are no benefits, provident 
funds and working time, they knock off any time. Lucas, from 
CEPPWAWU, tried to organize them, and people who organized have 
been chased away, not even retrenched”. (Interview #141) 
 
A colleague of this worker, a driver, more explicitly related his feelings of daily 
unfairness and humiliation to the fact that “managers are racist”: 
 
Nowadays when you are a driver, it is as if you are working on the 
mine. You see, now my leg is broken, they shot me in September, in 
Doornfontein, trying to hijack me. If you are a driver they can kill you 
any time, any time. They have hijacked me three times, and you must 
answer for it, they will ask you a lot of questions, a lot of questions… 
They think maybe you sold it. That is unfair and humiliating. 
(Interview #147) 
 
In companies like Consol, MB Glass and Nampak Corrugated, where 
technological innovation has represented, as discussed earlier, the most evident 
strategy to cope with newly liberalized domestic markets, the dilution of workers’ 
skills and the resulting loss in job meanings and identities decisively question the 
advancement of black workers in artisans’ positions, one of the most important 
features of workplace democratization gained during late apartheid worker 
struggles. Once a constitutive factor of unionized workers’ self-awareness as a 
vanguard committed to workplace and societal change, and often achieved from 
very humble beginnings, such advancements and the sense of pride that went with 
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them, seem now irredeemably revoked, as in the case of a Consol artisan 
(Interview #197). He was hired in 1988 at a labourer’s rate (approximately 25% 
the wage of an artisan) even if he had a matric and an NTC3 4-year qualification 
as a fitter (but, as he puts it “it was better to have a job rather than just sit in the 
township”). Becoming an artisan (“the first black electrician at Consol”) was for 
him the outcome of a long struggle started by doing “piccanin” jobs for white 
employees in the early 1980s. In this case, far from enforcing a “labour 
aristocracy” type of consciousness, craft advancement is interwoven with a 
personal history of union militancy where workplace change and socio-political 
democratization have eventually come to be represented as coterminous. Yet, 
even if workplace inequalities have been partially redressed in a post-apartheid 
workplace where white artisans are now only a slight majority, new technologies 
have emptied his job of most of its content while confining him to a wage rate 
lower than his qualification and from where prospects for further promotion and 
recognition are constrained: 
 
In this department I am still the only black fitter working with four 
whites. Besides, the job got deskilled now because machines are 
capable of doing their own diagnostics and they can be fixed without 
having to stop them, and major repairs are done outside. A fitter’s job 
is now mainly about inspection rather than fixing. (Interview #197) 
 
At Union Carriage and Wagon (UCW), a “jobbing” company where artisan jobs 
retain a strongly manual character and where no recent technological innovation 
has taken place, employment insecurity and the fear of retrenchments are the 
weapons used by management to redesign job contents and conflate tasks to 
enforce lower rates of pay. Here, workers performing manual wiring and testing 
of electrical connections, an A Grade artisan position, are trained entirely on the 
job, apart from the training they might have received from former companies. As 
an employee in one of these positions (Interview #40) reports, he is now doing all 
sorts of low-level maintenance jobs in addition to the operations for which he is 
qualified (and which took five years for him to learn). The company had initially 
recognized his grade to retain his skills when all maintenance workers in his 
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department were retrenched. However, he was also eventually retrenched and 
rehired four months later at the rate of a maintenance labourer.  
The weight of the apartheid past still impinges heavily on memories and 
narratives of UCW’s workers, and as a result the sense of betrayal implicit in the 
continuation of workplace authoritarianism is perceived all the more acutely. 
Whites retain a majority in artisans’ jobs, even if the new economic climate is 
impacting on their job security too, and most of them are currently recruited 
through FEDMO, the local labour broker. Their position is often not matched by 
actual qualifications or education, being rather the product of past privileges and 
what black employees regard as racially biased selection processes. Yet, their 
sense of security and company sensitivity to their needs is generally much more 
pronounced than for blacks. As one white artisan puts it, “UCW is a good 
company, a company that looks after its people” (Interview #37), for example by 
predictably providing for re-employment after periods of retrenchments and 
joblessness between contracts. When I asked this worker how relations between 
black and white workers have evolved between apartheid and the “new” South 
Africa, his elusiveness punctuated by embarrassed giggles articulated evasive 
responses that nonetheless sum up a self-reassuring genealogy of the workplace: 
“At that time we were working nicely, I have been working for a long time with 
blacks and I have never had a problem with them, but now everything is in a 
hurry, work is faster”. In any case, he excludes that UCW was in the past a place 
of racial abuse and mistreatment, and when asked he could not remember any 
episode of racial conflict.  
This narrative contrasts markedly, however, with black workers’ own 
recollections. According to Sipho, chair of the NUMSA shop steward committee, 
 
It was cruel before… this company was a volkstaat, like the one the 
boers are requiring from the government as their own place. A guy 
like [the white worker quoted above] would address me only in 
Afrikaans, that was the language of the dominators. They are trying to 
change now but they stick, they are stubborn. 
Q: He said relations between blacks and whites haven’t changed much 
over past 30 years. Do you agree? 
A: They have changed a lot compared to five years ago. Before it was 
cruel, black men weren’t even supposed to come to the office, your 
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supervisor could come, not you, otherwise you were fired on the spot, 
until five years ago. Maybe to his mind things haven’t changed 
because he’s not prepared to change. (Interview #21) 
 
Sipho appreciates as one of the most visible signs of the post-apartheid workplace 
climate the fact that the burden of uncertainty and recurrent joblessness are now 
no longer distributed in a racially skewed pattern. They, indeed, affect the 
previously privileged as well, those workers whom, lacking proper qualifications, 
“Vorster provided (…) with papers when he realized that black men might take 
over in future, even if they didn’t want to go to school, because they said ‘why 
should I carry on since I am going to be on top of a black man?” (Interview #21). 
Growing workplace equality is especially translated into the downgrading of 
working conditions and job security across racial divides, but it hardly seems to 
work in the opposite direction. In fact, the advancement of black workers into 
high skill positions, desirable as it might be considered by literature on a “high 
road” exit from apartheid-age deskilling (Kraak, 1996; Hunter, 2000), has 
coincided for “jobbing” companies like UCW with greater business  uncertainty 
due to intensified competition.  
As seen in Chapter 4, UCW has particularly suffered due to difficulties in 
finding new contracts for new fully built wagons. As a result, artisanal skills have 
increasingly been deployed into low-grade occupations in maintenance and repair 
(Interview #28), where workers’ wages and working conditions, moreover, are 
fragmented by the use of a labour broker and fixed term contracts. To give an idea 
of this level of fragmentation, a “coloured” worker employed as carpenter reports 
that a carpenter’s job entailing the same range of operations can be graded 
anywhere between AA (more than R20 per hour) to D (R15 per hour) entirely on 
the basis of the foreman’s discretion (Interview #29). The explanation that many 
foremen provide for this disparity is that “there is money for the black township, 
money for the coloured township and money for the white suburb” (Interview 
#29). Accusations of “corruption” and “favouritism” on racial grounds are 
widespread, despite the fact that the new human resource manager, Joe Lekhasi, 
has a reputation for fairness and transformative intentions. The prospect of 
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workplace change that his arrival brought seems to many workers revoked by the 
unfettered power that foremen continue to enjoy. 
Therefore, not only existing racial wage gaps have not been addressed, but a 
continuous source of workers’ complaints remains the persistent lack of 
recognition inside artisans’ grades of “tacit skills” earned by black workers 
throughout their careers outside formal qualification systems and without 
company training (Wood, 1989; Leger, 1992). Sipho himself, a welder-assembler 
with a de facto AA artisan qualification, but developed entirely through a myriad 
of formal and informal jobs and not formally recognized, has last used a welding 
machine working on the 9M trains made by UCW until the expiry of its last 
contract, in 1997. As discussed earlier on, policies introduced under GEAR have 
meant a decline in spending in public railways equipment, which has confined 
UCW largely to repair jobs. For Sipho, this meant that democratization and 
workplace deracialisation have coincided with a process of systematic 
downgrading whereby his skills have become redundant and useless, confining 
him to menial wiring jobs with which he is deeply unsatisfied (Interview #21).  
Workers’ tacit skills and cognitive abilities -- often developed through 
complex networks that include previous jobs, community-based informal work 
and forms of neighbourhood self-help and reciprocity – supported an ethos and 
pride external to the wage relation. They are now, however, faced  inside the 
workplace with invalidating and diminishing conditions that are no longer the 
product of institutionalized racial barriers, but of restructuring and employment 
uncertainty. In the final analysis, the sense of betrayal and violation of wage 
labour’s “promise” is not alleviated in this case by the fact that the workplace has 
become deracialised, or at least sacrifices are now more equally shared than in 
the past: 
 
It’s bad for everyone. Now even foremen get retrenched (…). It looks 
like a person is blown away, they are taken away from a family, you see. 
When we enter here we want to stay, because we get to know each other 
and it’s sad to see other people staying at home when they’ve got a 
family. I also feel bad, really, because we have been together. (Interview 
#40) 
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Being “blown away” is, of course, a feeling more likely to be encountered in those 
cases where the disappearance of wage labour is experienced as a sudden, devastating 
impact, rather than as gradual process of “hollowing out” where a delayed sense of 
insecurity can at least prepare workers for life and work transitions. As noticed in 
Chapter 4, the collapse and closure of Kelvinator revealed peculiar forms of 
“company patriotism” that cut across race, age and class divides, with NUMSA’s 
own constituency deeply divided on how to respond to management’s corporate 
discourse and rescue plans. The image of a shared corporate identity, where both 
workers and managers are equally victims of uncontrollable macroeconomic forces, 
however, provides for shop-stewards a thin rationalization that hardly alleviates the 
sense of loss: 
 
People should try by all means to understand that it is a national 
problem, it is not one person’s problem, but it becomes a traumatic 
situation because you are not given even a day’s notice, you see; it 
comes automatically. (Interview #51) 
 
Waiting for the fate of the company during protracted negotiations between NUMSA, 
management and potential rescue bidders, showing up at weekly report-back 
meetings held at “Freedom Square” -- the company’s yard -- daily picketing, often 
with wives and children, in front of the factory gates in Garfield Road, Alrode: all this 
remained as a set of rituals reaffirming a collective identity and refusal to disappear 
for this once 1200-strong working class community. Workers’ individual narratives, 
however, revealed a level of anguish and desperation that clearly combined the rapid 
disappearance of wage labour as a source of income and the inadequacies of 
workplace-based identities to counter non-negotiable economic dynamics: 
 
Q: What is going to happen to you now that the company is closed? 
A: Before I used to say that if the company survives I will survive. 
Now that the company is dead I must see where to go. It’s not easy to 
say that I am going to go back home and start to be dependent again on 
my parents, it’s not something I can do anymore. But as it is now I 
haven’t paid my rent for two months, and the guy is starting to get 
pissed off and said I can’t stay there for longer than two months. I am 
in deep problems in this moment, unless the company, of course, 
survives. Otherwise,  I can go to the nearest lake and drown my 
problems. 
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Q: Don’t say that! 
[Everyone in the room laughs] 
A: Just joking… but I’ll have to go back to my parents and start 
depending again with my child… how can I do it? 
 
In other workers’ narratives, however, the betrayal of the promises of fulfillment 
through waged employment predates Kelvinator’s closure per se, and once again the 
weight of the past reveals the inadequacies of workplace-based emancipatory 
discourses: 
 
I can’t think of other things, I no longer have visions, plans and what-
what. The treatment I received inside the company, I wonder whether 
we can have a sticker here where apart from our value it is written 
‘respect, honour and trust’, that we respect one another whether you 
are a white man or a black man, and if we see one another so that you 
can accommodate me and appreciate me. I came to work here mainly 
because of the financial pressures that I had at home, but I was not 
feeling good, coming to work in this company meant dying mentally, 
because even our bosses, managers and foremen, they were not 
treating us well.  
Q: Would you say there was racism here? 
A: Yes, there is something like that inside the company, you feel very 
low, down, useless, hopeless, discouraged. When I had to attend to such 
and such a problem they shouted at me: ‘Why? Why? We don’t have 
people here! Production is slow!’ (Interview #52) 
 
Even in a case in many senses dramatic, like Kelvinator, therefore, it seems that the 
perception wage labour has irredeemably betrayed its own promise of social 
upliftment cannot simply be confined to employment insecurity and job loss. Rather, 
it is the very daily experience of work, the permanence of workplace despotism, the 
added pressures of restructuring, the consequent loss of meanings and, as I will 
explain in the next chapter, the mismatch between deprivation in the employment 
sphere and expectations of progress in the socio-political sphere, that define 
intolerable situations on top of which insecurity adds the burden of economic 
compulsion. Wage labour itself, therefore, often comes to be experienced in 
workplace narratives discussed in this paragraph as something akin to Patterson’s 
notion of “social death” (Patterson, 1982), a loss of the sense of the self as person and 
member of a collectivity.  
 The next section will discuss the implications of workplace crisis in the case 
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of Johannesburg municipal employees, revealing important differences in the 
elaboration of grassroots responses from what has been noticed in this section, which 
largely depend on workers’ understanding of the workplace-community interactions. 
While relatively “opaque” to manufacturing employees, such interactions are more 
clearly visible to municipal workers, and the crucial implications of this difference for 
workers’ discourse of social citizenship will be explored at greater length in the rest 
of this chapter and in the following. 
 
 
6.2.2 New Canaan, New Egypt: Constructing Memories at Johannesburg 
Municipality 
 
Similarly to my manufacturing cases, workplace narratives at GJMC reveal 
attempts by Johannesburg municipal workers to make sense of uncertainties 
generated by current restructuring by relating them to a shopfloor genealogy 
dominated by continuities with authoritarianism and disempowerment. A 
temporality marked by a clearly defined “before” and “after” is actually 
particularly pronounced in the case of GJMC employees, probably as a result of 
the fear of losing stability and benefits that are characteristics of public and 
municipal employment. Workers in the waste and roads departments relate 
increasing insecurity and workloads, and decreasing content meanings on the job, 
to the unfolding of iGoli 2002 process. Municipal budget constraints and 
employment freezes, used by the municipality as part of an objective crisis 
scenario that ultimately requires the enforcement of market discipline under iGoli 
2002, are viewed instead by workers as the result of deliberate neglect in the 
provision of municipal services and as a planned decay. Respondents see these 
processes as unfairly enforcing practices of workplace flexibility and 
multitasking, while facilitating what SAMWU regards as the privatization of 
council functions. Many of them hint at practices of “corruption”, alleging  
councillors’ private interests in companies that are perceived as possible 
beneficiaries of contracts from the new waste management utility, Pikitup, and 
the Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA). 
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 The legitimacy crisis suffered by the Council at the workplace level is 
strengthened by workers’ rejection of the municipality’s discourse of 
Johannesburg’s fiscal crisis and by their mistrust as to its real intentions. At the 
same time, municipal workers’ grassroots solidarity, and the radicalism of their 
response to iGoli 2002, are reinforced by two factors that are largely absent from 
my manufacturing cases and that shape very powerful normative frameworks at 
the heart of employment’s “moral economy”. Such factors make these workers 
very sensitive to perceived violations, unfairness and outrage, and relatively 
unavailable to the possibility of compromise solutions based on a shared 
corporate identity. First, municipal workers have a longer employment tenure, 
have spent most of their working lives in municipal employment (see Table 6.1) 
and have known each other for longer periods of time. Moreover, they are 
attached to their job by a set of benefits (company subsidies and loans, medical 
schemes, provident funds) that are qualitatively better than in private sector 
companies, including those operating in their own sector (Samson 2003, 2004a: 
26-28, 36-40; Miraftab, 2004).  
 
Table 6.1 Seniority and Job Changes by Sectors (Workplaces Investigated) 
 
 Metal-
enginee
ring 
GJMC-
Municipal 
Glass and 
Paper 
Average Age of 
Interviewees 
42.36 46.35 40.75 
Average Years w/Current 
Employer 
12.3 18.3 13.6 
    
Workers with Past 
Employment Involuntarily 
Interrupted  (%) 
38.7% 26.0% 54.1% 
- of which 3 or more 
interruptions 
9.6% -- 20.9% 
- of which 2 interruptions 12.9% 4.3% 25.8% 
- of which 1 interruptions 77.4% 95.7% 53.3% 
 
Finally, municipal workers’ shopfloor communities are still largely the product of 
migration, and the rural-urban divide remains a powerful factor underpinning 
collective identities and sense of “otherness” vis-à-vis management177. 
                                                
177 48 workers out of the 80 I interviewed in the GJMC have migrated from rural areas to the 
Witwatersrand in search for employment between 1968 and 1988, with municipal jobs being the 
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Second, municipal workers’ rejection of iGoli 2002 is facilitated by the fact 
that they understand themselves not only as workers, but also as residents of 
communities whose access to services is supposed to be adversely affected by 
privatization (MSP-ILRIG, 2000; Samson, 2004b). Seeing themselves as 
employed in and actors for the provision of municipal services reinforces the 
pride for their job, with the associated expectations of decent wages, adequate 
equipment, fair working times, acceptable workloads and respectful treatment: 
 
As workers our primary objective is to serve the community but the 
second primary objective of workers is to upgrade the standard of living 
of every individual. Rather than upgrading the standard if living of every 
individual we are receiving the contrary status as workers. Now 
generally we are saying the performance with regard to the current 
government compared to the previous deteriorated. We were expecting 
under the new dispensation good quality performance in terms of serving 
communities but we are not getting that. As workers also we were 
expecting that conditions of service would improve from bad to better 
but rather we are deteriorating from bad to worse. (Interview #103) 
 
In other words, a high level of decommodification, in the form of employee-
subsidised provisions and of cross-subsidised municipal services, has shaped the 
identities of Johannesburg’s municipal working class to an extent that is not 
discernible among manufacturing workers that are more used to see their 
employment tenure and benefits responding to a rapidly changing market 
environment. Conversely, the historical experience of decommodification now 
feeds directly into SAMWU workers’ opposition to and rejection of restructuring. 
As a corollary, while workers in many of the manufacturing companies I 
investigated credit management (for example Simon Koch at Kelvinator, Bill 
Cooper in the Dorbyl group, or human resource managers at UCW and 
Paperlink) with transformative visions and intentions, and therefore see them to 
some extent as fellow victims of market competition and globalization that 
                                                                                                                                 
first one for almost all of them. These workers, the majority of those aged 50 and above, come 
predominantly from Transkei (uMzimkhulu, ThabaNkulu, Mt.Frere areas), but also from Lebowa, 
Gazankulu, Northern Cape and QwaQwa. 
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require sacrifices from all to make the company survive178, all this does not apply 
at GJMC.  
 Moreover, GJMC workers’ longer tenure and deeper historical memory of 
workplace change makes more likely for temporality to play a greater role within 
the repertoires they use to give meanings to change and to reinforce their moral 
claims to entitlements and authority over manning levels, tasks and workloads. 
Compared to manufacturing workers, however, the ways in which the re-
elaboration of the past “re-signifies” the municipal workplace of the present show 
a remarkable variation of overlapping themes which go beyond the mere 
denunciation of continuities with apartheid-age practices. At the same time, the 
construction and selection of memories from the past reveals significant 
contradictions and ambiguities when it comes for GJMC workers to compare the 
apartheid workplace with the one in the “new South Africa”. In fact, on one hand, 
the uncertainties iGoli 2002 visited upon municipal workers are seen as the 
product of a long tradition of authoritarian workplace decision-making that, in the 
case of this particular sector, includes for many the experiences of coercive 
recruitment in rural areas and of life in segregated compounds. On the other 
hand, respondents contrast present stringencies and uncertainties with the past in 
terms that can unequivocally be defined as nostalgic.  
The evocation of the past as an age of greater worker power and “better”, 
“more manageable” or “acceptable” working conditions is more pronounced for 
GJMC workers -- for one of whom under iGoli 2002 everything has conversely 
become “abnormal, unusual, totally unacceptable” (Interview #87) -- than for 
East Rand factory employees. A 52-year old street sweeper in the Norwood waste 
depot, born in uMzimkhulu (Transkei) and residing at City Deep hostel since 
                                                
178 In general, workers in manufacturing companies are much more available than GJMC 
employees to consider the country’s general macroeconomic context as an explanation and an 
alleviating circumstance for problems experienced in the workplace. This is the case also with 
manufacturing workers that are otherwise politically radical, like the following case of a self-
defined “africanist” at Nampak Corrugated, which we will meet again later on: “if one is asking 
that question [“how has the company changed over past five years ?”], one must bear in mind the 
situation of the country at that time compared to now (…). We must take political considerations 
into question. Before we were not competing globally, now we are competing globally, there are 
more companies coming in and we have more competitors now, so machines have taken some of 
our jobs”. (Interview #179) 
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when he started working for the Johannesburg City Council in 1968 aptly 
summarises these feelings: 
 
Before it was good, now it’s too difficult. We have to sweep three 
streets for each worker, before it was not like that, when it was still 
City Council. The municipality now does not know how to sort out 
the shortage of staff, even when people die or go on pension they 
don’t employ new people so the job stays with one person. (Interview 
#67) 
 
These views are especially shared by younger workers that have always lived in 
the urban area and have entered the labour market after the collapse of apartheid, 
like Angelina, a street sweeper at the Avalon waste depot: “Now it’s worse even 
than when the boers were sitting on our neck, worse than under apartheid. It was 
better before”, on account that “the people in the apartheid system were coming to 
the people, never mind they were doing wrong, but they were coming to talk to 
the people” (Interview #89). 
Workers at Norwood agree that before the amalgamation of the various city 
councils in the GJMC and its four Metropolitan Local Councils (MLC) in 1997, 
prelude to the “Unicity” envisaged by iGoli 2002, teams had more workers, which 
allowed for lighter workloads, smaller backlogs and tasks that more clearly fitted 
job descriptions and grades. Workers in roads report reductions of between 50% 
and 75% in serviced surfaces, mainly due to cuts in teams’ size and to shortage of 
trucks and machinery (which are usually contracted from private firms). Another 
area in which the past favourably compares with the present is in the provision of 
equipment, tools and safety clothes (Interview #109). At Nancefield roads depot, 
which serves almost the whole of Soweto, tarring and patching is now entirely 
manual and done with elementary tools, which lowers the quality of the end 
product, and this in a compartment of municipal work which has great pride in its 
craft traditions and artisan skills.  
 Opinions according to which the pre-GJMC, or even the pre-1990s, past 
was preferable to the present, however, do not merely reflect an idealization of the 
apartheid era as an antidote to current disempowerment. Rather, the selective 
construction of memories -- as in Bauman’s notion of “class historical memory” – 
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and of “ideal normative schemes” (Bauman, 1982: 115) largely originated within 
the workplace-community relationship and therefore “independent of the reality 
opposing them” (Bauman, 1982: 115) on the shopfloor plays a relevant role in 
workers’ image of the past. In fact, many employees still appreciate a 
fundamental, positive discontinuity with a foregone workplace environment 
characterized by the presence of “baas boys”, spies, impimpis, unpaid forced 
overtime and arbitrary dismissals (Interview #83). At the same time, this very 
discourse does not see a contradiction in nostalgically evoking the pre-transition 
era as a context where the union’s strength and solidarity could still force the local 
municipalities to adhere to fair work practices and to respect the workers’ moral 
economy: 
 
The job now is heavy, more than before, since we have got this new 
city council. Before, in the apartheid system, it was heavy but now 
like now. The old city council was not right because of apartheid, but 
we were working alright (…). Before we got training and with this 
new council we haven’t got training. (Interview #109) 
 
Therefore, the “before” GJMC workers miss seems to mean a phase defined in 
non strictly chronological terms, but as an age in which labour organizations on 
the shopfloor had the power to mobilize and successfully bargain over the 
restructuring of workplace life. IGoli 2002, presented as a sweeping, city-wide 
exercise respondent to objective global market forces appears now to foreclose 
that window of historical opportunities. It does not seem as coincidental, 
therefore, that indifference for workers’ needs is stigmatized as one of the features 
of a GJMC management style obsessed with financial results, whereby, as 
Angelina said, in the past the union retained the ability to force managers to 
“come and talk to the people”. 
It is often the same workers that argue for the preferability of the past who 
are denouncing iGoli 2002 precisely for bringing back the most oppressive 
features of apartheid. The seeming contradiction in understanding change as 
departing from an idealized past, when it comes to workplace power relations, and 
at the same time going back to that very past, when it comes to oppression at a 
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broad socio-political level, is apparent from a group discussion I had with 
SAMWU members at the Avalon waste depot: 
 
W1: We are saying we are going back. Now we can say we voted for 
out government and we thought we were going to live better but 
because it is our government sitting there on top, they are making us 
suffer. 
W2: For example, when one is acting as a supervisor, he is doing the 
job of three supervisors… 
W3: …under apartheid you were never working for three people. 
W4: It is like coming from Egypt and now we are going back to Egypt. 
The old government was Egypt and we thought we were going to 
Canaan, but instead with this new utility we are going back to Egypt. 
(…) All these changes, I don’t see green forward, I see red because as 
we used to work before, now it is not the same, it’s different. (Group 
Discussion #1) 
 
It is however instructive that the “return to Egypt” in this workers’ narrative 
characterizes the permanence of a broad pattern of oppression and poverty that 
still originates from changes within the workplace and is then projected into an 
apocalyptic view of community-wide collapse. The workplace remains 
throughout these interviews the benchmark to evaluate social and political 
change.  
 
 
6.3 Casualisation, Workplace Insecurity and the Crisis of Work-based 
Identities as Vehicles of Social Emancipation 
 
As I have discussed in the previous two chapters, the two most visible 
manifestations of the transformation of work in the cases here investigated are the 
accelerating rates of job losses and retrenchments as a consequence of restructuring 
and the introduction of new technology, and the growing fragmentation and 
precariousness in contracts of employment. Both elements are clearly related to the 
weakening of collective solidarity and workplace-based identities. They are also 
evidence of the violation of what workplace surveys (Torres, 1995) identified as 
the new democracy’s promise to uplift working conditions, workers’ personhood 
and the dignity of wage labour. Workers’ “historical memories”, both in the East 
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Rand and at GJMC, serve precisely to shape feelings of violation and 
unacceptability triggered by recent restructuring in terms of work intensification 
and hardship. 
 Some of the manufacturing companies here analysed, which are facing 
increased domestic competition in the liberalizing climate of the 1990s, have 
tended to respond with an accelerated introduction of new technology mostly 
geared to cutting labour costs through increased productivity, reduced headcount 
and greater job flexibility. This is particularly the case of an industry like glass 
packaging where the rapid phasing out of tariffs is combined to the competition 
deriving from the use of materials, like plastics and aluminum, that are replacing 
glass containers. A standard practice in the industry has consisted in a “technicist 
approach” (Rosenthal, 1999: 143) that has combined massive technological 
innovation, increased flexibility of tasks and the aggressive promotion of corporate 
loyalty in a context of massive retrenchments, which creates important challenges 
for the unions. Companies where the possibility of technological innovation is 
more constrained, due to the nature of the production process (like for metal and 
paper merchants) or to persistent lack of demand for new products (as in the case of 
UCW), the quest for productivity has featured employment flexibility, including 
casualization and subcontracting, more prominently.  
In all cases, however, workers perceive a rise in employment insecurity and 
the intensification of work as consequential, or at least closely linked, to 
technological innovation, job losses and casualization. Shop stewards at PFG Glass 
report increases in workloads of up to 50% over five years, largely due to “new 
machinery and heading for global competitiveness” (Interview #223). In companies 
like Kimberly-Clark and MB Glass these factors accompany multitasking and the 
blurring of established job descriptions and grade boundaries (Interviews #201 and 
221). The fact that for most of these companies production levels and market 
shares often remain stagnant makes shop stewards aware that the maintenance of 
profit margins crucially depends on increased exploitation and tighter enforcement 
of workplace discipline. As I have noticed in Chapter 4, sectors like metal-
engineering, glass and paper have recorded on the East Rand impressive waves of 
retrenchments throughout the 1990s, and in workers’ narratives of current 
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restructuring the threat of job losses has come to compound both a reinforced and 
authoritarian managerial control of the workplace and the fears that come to 
dominate workplace life. Both trends converge in suppressing workers’ attachment 
to their jobs by further eroding its perceived content and value, therefore 
invalidating views that waged employment is a vehicle to a “better life” and a more 
active social citizenship:  
 
The company is being productive, but with this restructuring they are 
working with less workers and the guys that remain behind, like me, 
they are doing a job which could be done by 4-5 people. One guy is 
doing all that, you know (…). And before when we were working 
harder we were doing money, but now we are working faster and we 
are not doing fuck-all, because they are telling us that even if we are 
working harder the company is not making money! It is like we are 
going back to the dark years, where we used to have slaves, people 
are being enslaved in this company because of restructuring. 
(Interview #181) 
 
Conversely, what seems to increasingly shape individual workers’ relations to their 
jobs is some sort of spirit of adaptation linked to the economic compulsion of 
retaining a monetary remuneration and the fear of losing it. The loss of a sense of 
collective power is a manifestation that usually preludes to and accompanies the 
reconfiguration of worker identities in such an hostile climate. A worker at 
Nampak Corrugated, a company particularly hit by retrenchments, brilliantly 
captures the link between powerlessness, insecurity and decline of wage labour as a 
tool for social advancement: 
 
We can’t even strike over retrenchments, it is just what they call a 
consultation issue. And when workers on the floor every time see 
these retrenchments, there is no longer that feeling that when you 
were going to work you knew what you were doing. Now most 
workers just come to work for the sake of getting their pay because 
they know that they can be retrenched any time. Before there was a 
motivation to go to work, a pride, but now most workers are not 
happy, they just work for sake of the money because they know they 
have to support their families, they can’t just stay at home (Interview 
#170)179. 
                                                
179 Three workers out of 20 interviewed at Nampak Corrugated cite union membership as a 
specific reason to be targeted for retrenchments by a management who “like[s] non-union 
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In this case the diminution of meaning and “pride” in the job is heightened by the 
fact that talks about possible retrenchments, which followed the introduction of 
new conveyors, have a directly disciplinary overtone. In fact retrenchment plans 
are deliberately kept vague by management “as a tactic, to scare workers” and 
weaken their opposition. Retrenchments are periodically announced but details are 
not provided, therefore acceptance of increasing workloads is seeing as a way to 
escape this fate. The same worker reports that since retrenchments have taken place 
in his department workers have been working under a “tremendous pressure”, with 
one worker performing the tasks previously done by two and with no one daring to 
object: 
 
If a manager comes and says, ‘hey, you must work double shift’ [i.e. 
two shifts, 16 hours, in a single day, FB], you can’t say no, because 
they are scared and managers are taking advantage of that: if you don’t 
want to work, the retrenchment is coming. They don’t say that openly, 
but you can hear the tones, you know, even if they don’t say it 
directly180. (Interview #170) 
 
The use of the threat of retrenchment to unilaterally enforce more flexible and 
intense time schedules has been reported in many companies. At Consol it is not 
uncommon to meet employees that work for 16 hours a day for three consecutive 
days, with the possibility of being called any time, even in the middle of the night, 
to report immediately. The introduction of a “quick change” system as part of  
MB Glass’ “three shifts, four crews” continuous operation system means that 
workers who change shift have only an 8-hours break, even if the system allows 
for two consecutive days off per week. The introduction of this system was 
facilitated by fears of retrenchments after the closure of the company’s Durban 
plant (Interview #207). Conversely, the new time arrangement, despite its massive 
demands on workers’ schedules, has created a split in what is otherwise a stable, 
strongly cohesive, powerfully unionized plant. In fact, many workers who 
                                                                                                                                 
members and those who don’t know their rights” (Interview #177), whereby “if you fight 
management always you go down” (Interview #166, see also #161). 
180 Many workers at Nampak Corrugated have a de facto 80-hours working week due to the need 
of replace on a “double shift” basis workers that do not report for the following shift (Interview 
#175, 176). 
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commute weekly from KwaZulu-Natal approve the new system because it gives 
them more uninterrupted time to spend with their families (Interview #204). Other 
workers, however, reject this mechanism, which forces them to work three 
weekends per month and is therefore highly disruptive for their family lives and 
obligations (Interview #200). The MB Glass case is interesting, therefore, because 
it shows management’s ability to unilaterally impose greater workplace flexibility 
under duress while at the same time appealing to the individualized needs of 
sections of the workforce for which flexibility can be presented as an opportunity 
of “self-realization”. 
 At Baldwin’s Steel, one of the strategies used to counter the slump in sales 
was, as I have explained, to diversify the company’s activities towards special 
cuts of structural steel, for which new machinery was introduced at the same time 
that rumours of retrenchments were aired in the sales departments. As a result, 
according to shop stewards, much of the servicing for the new machines is often 
done on an unpaid overtime basis following managers’ remarks on the difficulties 
facing the company and that “we are all part of the Dorbyl family” (Interview #4 
and 11). The resulting workplace climate of fear, intimidation and 
authoritarianism is described by one worker in unequivocal terms: 
 
One of those tricks used by the company, they want to reduce a 
number of employees and they have more work for each employee in 
order not to employ casuals, those are the reasons they are using. 
Employees that go are never replaced, that is another tactic they use 
(…). Maybe the next time you’ll come back only not to find me, you 
never know, these days anything is possible. I’m not saying I’m 
leaving, but they are just hinting that anything is possible these days. 
Today I’m here, tomorrow I’m not here, after 16 years. 
Q Well, they can’t fire people just like that… 
A They can’t fire, but they make means that you lose your job. 
Q What do you mean? 
A Frustrate you, make you run around, make you feel lost, many 
things. They won’t fire you just like that, no, they are actually even 
scared of the rules of the game, of the courts and all that. (Interview 
#2) 
 
Similarly to Sennett’s “corrosion of character”, the link between the threat of loss 
of work and the actual loss of power and meaning in subjective experiences of 
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work seems to be greatly reinforced by employment flexibility of a “numerical” 
kind (Standing, 1997). This is specifically related to the replacement of permanent 
workers with short-term contracts or casual employees. As I have explained, at 
UCW this practice, which led to the retrenchment of many workers which were  
re-employed as contingent employees, is enabled by labour broking. The fact that 
FEDMO is a peculiar kind of labour broker, whose workers are unionized by 
NUMSA and enjoy significant contractual protections in terms of contract 
duration, has undoubtedly contributed to establish fixed-term labour as the basis 
of the “social contract” between management and workforce.  
Contract workers hired through FEDMO, often artisans retrenched from 
permanent positions, benefit from higher cash payments than UCW employees, 
due to FEDMO’s strategy of building long-term networks of skills but also to the 
fact that the labour broker does not provide medical aid. When FEDMO arrived at 
UCW, the management tried to persuade workers to look for employment there, 
rather than being hired on 6 months contracts at UCW, using as an argument the 
fact that FEDMO had no provident fund contributions (Interview #35). A 
provident fund was ultimately introduced as a result of NUMSA’s successful 
unionization of FEDMO workers. 
UCW, on its part, enjoys the advantage of employing contract workers on 
overtime for flat rates that are lower than the contractual one-and-half or one-and-
third rates. Moreover, it can use them for both high-skill functions and various low-
skill operations at lower wage rates, counting on the fact that these jobs are of 
limited duration and, especially when, like at present, no fully built-up wagons are 
made, involve substantial amount of menial repairs (Interview #45). In this specific 
case, contracts have a duration of at least three months, can be terminated at a one 
week notice, and last as long as the individual is needed for repairs in his 
department.  
Apart from undermining the position of permanent employees, the use of 
labour broking and fixed-term contracts creates significant divisions in the 
orientation that UCW and FEDMO workers have towards their job. Many workers, 
in particular have come to see labour broking in a positive light because this form 
of employment is seen as more responsive to short-term economic needs, 
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stringencies and crises in household income. A worker hired by FEDMO has been 
retrenched and re-employed on contract at UCW three times between 1996 and 
1999. His current gross wage of R1300 per week is boosted by the lack of medical 
aid at FEDMO and by access to overtime (R550 per week for what amounts to a 
72-hours average working week), for which UCW prefers the cheaper FEDMO 
workers181. Of course, the fact that UCW continues to retrench workers while using 
contract labour on overtime confirms workers’ fears that retrenchments and 
flexibility are not mere responses to objective market demands, but they are used 
by management as a tool to adversely modify power relations. In the case of this 
specific individual, however, it is to be noticed that being employed by a labour 
broker carries with it an economic reward equal to about 50% of his weekly wage, 
which represents an important asset for his family’s survival even if it means the 
loss of employer-subsidised healthcare and a growing intensification of work under 
exploitative conditions. It is no surprise, therefore, that this worker is happier with 
FEDMO rather than being a UCW employee, even if in his case the expression 
“permanent employment” has lost all significance and external economic 
compulsion shapes his life strategies much more directly than work-based ethics, 
solidarity and identity: 
 
You see, if you are unmarried and are not a husband your problems 
would be less than mine, especially on the finance. For those years 
when I was a permanent, I really didn’t benefit anything, but I started 
to benefit when I started to become a contract, then I saw an 
improvement in my life, at home and in my life. I could save 
something like R500 a month while I am giving my wife enough 
money to support herself and her children, I could pay an equal share 
of the telephone bill and the electricity bill, and we still suffer. But 
before, when I was a permanent, I used to suffer more, I had lots of 
debits behind my back, I couldn’t even afford to pay everyday 
expenses with the money I used to have in my pocket. 
Q But in this way your job is always on the line, is that a problem for 
you? 
A No… Actually… maybe I don’t get an advise from other people… 
                                                
181 Overtime at UCW has greatly decreased after the expiration of the 1997 Zimbabwe contract, 
and company agreements set it to a maximum of 10 hours per week, used especially over 
weekends. However, specific departments like test bay, to which this specific case refers, have 
greater demands for overtime, which is usually performed by FEDMO employees to which the 
UCW agreement on this matter does not apply. At peak times and with new contracts, like at the 
end of the 1980s, overtime at UCW could average 30-40 hrs per worker per week. 
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Q Which people? 
A Like you, who can tell me that in ten years things are going like 
this and that. Now I am just thinking that I have got a job here, I am 
just like a horse who’s got now enough grass, I don’t look at the 
outside and after that maybe I’ll get another job. I have been in this 
situation for a long time, when the job is finished I have to sit down 
and wait for another one 
Q And how would you survive in the meanwhile? 
A God knows, I’ll find something. (Interview #45) 
 
At the same time, many UCW employees resent the presence of FEDMO in the 
company. They often voice their opposition by resorting to moral condemnation 
reminiscent of the working class “ethics of responsibility and commitment” that 
defines Lamont’s (2000) concept of “boundary discourse”: 
 
I am permanent and I care for my house, my children, everything. 
These guys [FEDMO’s contract workers] come only to get the money 
and they are told they’re going to stay for two months, after which 
they must go. But I am permanent, I am working here more than two 
months, and those guys don’t care about what is going on here in the 
factory, they’re only here to take their pay and they cannot look 3-4 
years from now, they just say “ek weer nie”-- I don’t know -- but here 
I have to do my best for the future of the factory, because I worry 
about my children. (Interview #27) 
 
In the case of GJMC, as discussed in Chapter 5, budget cuts, fiscal austerity and 
the three-year freeze in new recruitments in the transition to iGoli 2002 have 
deepened long established trends in the subcontracting of vehicles and equipment 
and, in the case of waste management, in the employment of casual workers. 
Interviews conducted in waste and roads depots show that the most visible impact 
of the situation is a deepening manpower shortage, often combined with an 
expansion of neighbourhoods and areas of need to be serviced. As a result, 
heavier workloads and the multiplication of tasks to be performed question 
existing job descriptions and skill levels, without concomitant rewards or even 
adequate tools. On the long term, workers see the fully-fledged implementation of 
iGoli 2002 as leading to the loss of job security and benefits.  
At the same time, the introduction of a profit motive in the future provision of 
municipal services is seen as impoverishing their quality in the case of the very 
 259
poor. Management’s constant emphasis on cost reduction and wage containment, 
provides, as I have previously explained, a powerful, albeit contested, element in 
iGoli 2002 technocratic discourse. It in fact ultimately demonstrates in the workers’ 
eyes that restructuring of the GJMC is a response to the Council’s fiscal crisis that 
will ultimately make workers and poor communities pay a heavy price. Compared 
to my manufacturing cases, for municipal workers the plight of poor communities 
and their demands for decommodified services is here therefore immediately 
mobilized as a discursive strategy to enhance demands for worker power and 
security that do not primarily rely on workplace-based identities. 
While casualisation is an enduring feature of municipal employment in South 
Africa, especially in waste management, the use of casual workers acquires new 
meanings under an employment freeze that many workers see as a logical prelude 
to the iGoli 2002 workplace environment. The image of older workers retiring and 
being replaced by casuals with no specific attachment to the workplace, in 
particular, conjures up fears of eradication of the municipal working class’s 
“historical memory” and of its ethical codes and norms of a “well done job”: 
 
Contracts were working there to put the caps, then our permanent 
guys are going to work and they find the caps fucked up and they 
have to fix them. I got injured in my back and now I can’t sleep 
because I fell down the caps put there by contracts. Contracts are 
dangerous, they just leave the job fucked up. (Interview #132). 
 
The use of contract workers is also considered as going against community needs: 
 
Contracts are doing their jobs in halves and then they leave, we as 
maintenance people who are running Soweto are supposed to finish 
the job they started, repair the damage they have done, and those 
people just go with the money, money of ours as Sowetans, money of 
ours as workers (…). At the same time we have people with 
experience who can do construction jobs and we can’t do that for lack 
of funds and instead they have to finish up the job of contractors that 
are moreover wasting council’s money. (Interview #108) 
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A Johannesburg roads manager, when asked, denied knowledge of such trends in 
the use of contract workers182. Workers’ sense of outrage is nonetheless sharpened 
by the perception that management considers their wages a cost to be contained, 
and they consequently resent being defined as “idle” and “wasteful”. The 
devaluation of subjective sense of pride and identification with their work is seen 
therefore as a tactic to increase their insecurity and prepare their future layoffs: 
 
We used to construct [roads] before, but now we are simply doing 
repairs, jobs have been contracted and since 1993 the construction of 
roads has been contracted out, that was the directive. When we were 
constructing we were sure that we were working but since then the 
capability of constructing roads has dropped and we feel sort of 
redundant, you know? We feel that we might lose our job because we 
are only doing maintenance but when we were doing constructions 
previously we had by all means the feeling that our job was secure. 
Since we are doing maintenance and cleaning there is a likelihood 
that we might be kicked out because we might be perceived as if we 
are idling, we are not working, and that is already happening: 
councilors are claiming that municipal workers are idling. (Interview 
#116) 
 
Similarly to what I found in my cases from the manufacturing industry,  
municipal workers regard subcontracting as a way to enforce casualisation of 
employment and as a managerial tactic to  restructure a more vulnerable 
workforce. The high costs of contracts and the poor quality of the jobs they 
perform are often quoted as evidence of the intellectual dishonesty in 
subcontracting’s economic rationale and as an indication of its actual motifs. The 
perception than subcontracted operations are more expensive than jobs performed 
by council workers is widespread both in roads and in waste management. A 
SAMWU shop-steward processing payments for contracts at the Central Roads 
Depot in Benrose argues that almost all the depot’s capital budget for 1999 was 
spent on contracted trucks at a cost of R20,000 per month per truck (Interview 
#136), a massive amount for a municipal service whose overall capital budget was 
drastically curtailed due to budget deficits. At the same time, workers complain 
that council drivers, whose wages are lower than for contract ones, are demoted to 
                                                
182 Alan Agaienz, Interview with Author, 27 January 2000. 
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“acting” positions in low-level repair jobs (“there are too many drivers in this 
depot who have to do sweeping”, Interview #121). Far from being an unwelcome 
necessity due to GJMC’s budget crisis, workers see the use of contracts as one of 
the causes of the crisis, and as a tool used by manager to achieve its real target of 
weakening their workplace strength and bargaining power. 
For a sector like roadworks, where the use of atypical workers and casuals is 
historically rare, and where work identification is often nurtured in strong 
awareness of the skills and prowess required, issues of casualisation are 
particularly sensitive (“we are becoming like waste management”, Interview 
#109). A constant thread across the roads depots I have visited is the view that a 
condition upon which iGoli 2002 and the restructuring exercise are premised is 
the disarticulation of municipal workers’ communities whose cohesiveness is 
produced by a history of working class formation that made them extremely 
sensitive of their rights as workers and as residents in the community. Therefore, 
casualisation is considered as conducive to a workforce that is less attached to 
their work and their community, less aware of their rights, and therefore more 
available to see their livelihoods fully commodified, more exposed to short-term 
labour market fluctuations and with reduced cross-subsidised social provisions. In 
this sense, the destruction of workplace-based sense of security is considered as 
the first step towards the weakening of the link between work and social 
citizenship claims.  
In the case of waste management, where the use of casuals is a long-
standing and widespread practice, and a constant source of conflict between 
workers and managers, a generalized increase in this practice is noticed as 
concomitant with the employment freeze. As a result, cases of physical clashes 
between permanent and casual workers have occurred, like at Waterval depot 
(Interviews #82, 83, 84). Workers also complain for the erosion of time-honoured 
practices through which they once used to customarily regulate to some extent the 
employment of casuals, as in Inner City and Norwood depots, where the use of 
“lotteries” at the gates have been replaced by the management’s unilateral 
decision-making in having casuals ferried by trucks from other depots, like 
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Marlboro, a practice once commonly used by the apartheid-era Soweto City 
Council: 
 
The casuals, I can’t say, when we see these people coming to the gate 
nobody can say how these people are hired and we have to keep quiet 
because we don’t know, and they say these people just want to work 
(…). Before people were hired in the depots and it was a, how you call 
it, zama-zama, there were the papers… 
Q: A lottery? 
A: Yes, but that was stopped. Now the council just brings people in 
but we don’t know how they are hired. Last month we confronted 
them because this is still happening, trucks of people are downloaded 
in front of the gate and we don’t know where they come from. And we 
told SAMWU that we don’t want these people, we want people hired 
at the same spot and in the right manner. We have brothers who stay at 
home and aren’t working and then the council hires these 
people…(Interview #91) 
 
As with manufacturing companies, growing insecurity and casualisation are 
regarded as closely linked to work intensification and content deprivation, 
additional mechanisms that weaken workers’ attachment to their work. A term 
drawn from the Council’s technocratic parlance has entered workers’ everyday 
conversation to capture the connections among these different aspects: 
“deployment”. The word indicates the practice of constantly moving workers 
across depots to compensate for workforce shortages linked to expanded areas to 
be serviced and to the freeze on new employment: 
 
We have lesser staff, now, due to the deployment and the issue of 
people who have retired and died, so our workers are reduced and 
little people can take sufficient work. Previously we used to have 
large numbers of people who worked as expected but now less people 
are unable to cover the expected jobs. (Interview #118) 
 
Shortages of staff due to constant “deployments” and to the addition of new areas 
to the Johannesburg municipality generally lead to an intensification of work due 
to the understaffing of teams, as in roads (Interview #92), or to the increase in the 
number of teams per truck, as in waste (Interview #91). As a result, it becomes 
impossible to service neighbourhoods regularly and backlogs tend to increase. On 
the topic, workers’ knowledge directly challenges what one waste department 
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official defines as “proper management processes”, openly advocating an increase 
in the teams-to-trucks ratio on account that “it is cheaper to have a team waiting 
than to hire a vehicle: rather let the team waiting for the vehicle than the vehicle 
for the team”183. A street sweeper from the Norwood depot servicing the upmarket 
Rosebank suburb attacks this argument as a mere tactic to increase job and time 
flexibility, in a context where one sweeper performs the operations once done by 
two and workloads and backlogs are noticeably increasing:  
 
If we go out at 9:00 we can’t finish the streets and we have to make 
up the following days. And all those bloody jacarandas! When I go to 
sleep I am dead. (…) What this guy told you means that there will be 
more problems and people are going to stay out of job. Now the 
rubbish coming on Monday stays on the streets until Friday so the 
area stays dirty and the residents complain, and it’s residents who pay 
me and they should be happy. Bring that guy here, and we are going 
to debate with him! (Interview #69) 
 
The most important problem with deployment, reported in practically all the waste 
and roads depots is that, due to constant shortage of personnel, relatively qualified 
jobs like drivers or supervisors are performed on an “acting” basis by employees 
that often lack the relative qualification and are not paid accordingly. In the 
Waterval waste depot it was possible to meet ‘boppas’ (Grade 1 employees in 
charge of delivering plastic bags) employed as acting drivers (a Grade 8 job) for a 
R1200-1800 monthly wage compared to the R4260 that a regular driver would get 
(Interview #97). At Ennerdale roads depot supervisors are net by die naam (only 
by name) but the position “does not mean anything anymore” (Interview #102) and 
is performed by under-qualified, underpaid employees. While this reality reflect 
and enables a growing neglect for training on the part of the Council, it testifies to 
the extent of workers’ disaffection and lack of identitication with their jobs. 
Faced with a reality where it becomes increasingly difficult to strengthen 
claims based on their identities and pride on jobs whose meanings are increasingly 
devalued, workers’ opposition to restructuring and to the erosion of their rights and 
powers turns to community-based discourses. Budget constraints and the 
impending corporatization of municipal entities are blamed for the deterioration in 
                                                
183 Roelf De Beer, Interview with author, 19 October 1999. 
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the quality of services, which negatively impacts on the relationships between 
workers and communities. If the workplace is seen as the first line of attack on 
workers’ identity and ability to articulate citizenship claims, the disarticulation of 
the workplace-community continuum is seen as the following logical step. At the 
same time, however, GJMC workers’ “affective work” (Hardt, 1999) in contact 
with local residents and handling human interactions and emotions reinforces 
workers’ moral standing vis-à-vis restructuring and provides elements on which an 
alternative citizenship discourse can be developed to counter the inadequacies 
experienced on the workplace: 
 
We are not self-centred in terms of thinking about our benefits in the 
workplace. We are actually saying that we are workers and we are 
also part of the community, because for 8 hours we work here but at 
the end of the day we will be faced with a similar monster which is 
iGoli 2002 also as communities. (Interview #101) 
 
Building a community-workplace solidarity repertoire involves, however, dealing 
with and mediating with a range of worker-community conflicts often originated 
by dynamics of casualisation and production flexibility. The increase in backlogs 
is, for example, an important cause of conflict inasmuch it leads to residents’ 
complain. For waste workers servicing “garden sites” this is a daily reality when 
the sites are filled with refuse for which trucks, following the above mentioned  
“proper management processes”, are not available.  
Consequently, residents frustrated with overflowing sites and scavengers 
raiding the refuse direct their antagonism at municipal attendants in accidents that 
often involve firearms or stabbing, a fate occurred to three Norwood depot workers 
during 1999 alone (Interview #63). Waste depots that, as a result of the post-1995 
GJMC boundaries, have come to include new informal settlements are particularly 
exposed to conflicts with communities for which the informal disposal of refuse 
often represents a rare, albeit meager, source of income. The Avalon depot has 
incorporated one of such settlements, the sprawling Freedom Park, on the Golden 
Highway to Soweto, whose residents regularly chase municipal waste collectors 
away, even if many workers try to articulate a discursive solidarity across this 
divide: 
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It is a bad situation, when we go to Freedom Park we don’t know 
whether we’ll come back, and I blame the councilors there, the 
council must speak to these people and tell them that is us who are 
cleaning the place but the council doesn’t talk to those residents. The 
council, when they call those people, they promise them jobs to clean 
the place, so when they see us they fight with us because they were 
promised jobs by the councilors. They want the vote so they promised 
them jobs. They tell them, vote for me and I will do something for 
you tomorrow, then they vote for them. (…) The councilors, they are 
gambling with our lives, so we have to run away. (Interview #97) 
  
The office of the Ennerdale roads depot, which serves Orange Farm, is a makeshift 
zozo on an untarred,  ground that become ankle-deep muddy when it rains. The 
depot was started when the Ennerdale local council was incorporated in GJMC’s 
Southern MLC together with Orange Farm, previously run by the Transvaal 
Provincial Administration (TPA). Before 1997 a formal depot operated in Orange 
Farm and covered Ennerdale with workers deployed from Nancefield and Avalon 
(Soweto), and no local residents were hired to work on the premise. Rather, 
between 200 and 400 locals previously employed as casuals had their expectations 
of being hired permanently rebuffed due to budget cuts. Local residents’ anger 
translated into demonstrations and toyi-toying, which forced the relocation of the 
depot to its current Ennerdale facilities (Interview #137). In an extremely 
marginalized area of the city, with little or no formal economic activity and where 
two-thirds of residents live in informal settlements (Fiil-Flynn and Naidoo, 2004: 
14-16) municipal restructuring pits against each other impoverished residents and 
municipal employees.These latter, conversely, face increasingly exploitative 
working conditions, working without tools or basic protective equipment in an 
unhealthy environment, with no heating, dislocated panels and gaping cracks in the 
walls. This case further illustrates how restructuring of production and changing 
meanings of work project themselves onto the social fabric, but it also indicates the 
relevance of the workplace-community continuum in structuring a potential 
alternative discourse on rights and power. 
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6.4 Beyond the Factory: Individualisation and Entrepreneurialism as 
Responses to the Crisis of Wage Labour 
 
Many recent analyses of workplace change in South Africa have argued for the 
emergence of a workers’ approach to “engagement” of business whereby 
acceptance of the “inevitable reality of restructuring” (Rosenthal, 1999) is no 
longer merely coterminous with “compliance” but it can also indicate employees’ 
willingness to proactively contest the outcomes of restructuring (Von Holdt, 2000; 
Hirschsohn, Godfrey and Maree, 2000). Findings from my municipal and 
manufacturing case studies, however, underline that in a context whereby 
restructuring questions deep-seated worker identities and meanings attached to 
wage labour as a vehicle for individual realization and citizenship claims workers’ 
responses are not easily captured by binary oppositions like “capitulation” vs 
“compliance” or “resistance” vs “engagement”. While such oppositions reassert 
the centrality of the workplace and of the wage relation as a repository of 
workers’ selves, the most common responses I found tend rather to 
“peripheralise” the workplace and to transcend the wage relation. In the case of 
municipal workers this is achieved for example through the appeal to community 
needs and sense of morality, a factor that, as the next chapter will show, carries 
important implications for discourses of social citizenship and 
decommodification.  
 The appeal to the community and extra-workplace sources of collective 
solidarity is however more difficult for manufacturing workers, who tend to 
develop a less militant approach towards insecurities and vulnerabilities on the 
job, which in many cases involve ideas of cross-class “company patriotism”, as 
seen in the case of Kelvinator. In stark contrast to GJMC employees, many 
workers in the glass-paper and metal-engineering companies tend to develop 
strategies to cope with the collapse of waged employment that rely on 
individualized forms of adaptation with a strong orientation to self-
entrepreneurialism. A level of instrumentalism creeps in such strategies which, 
while recognizing the importance of defending waged employment as a crucial 
source of livelihood, rely on individual escape and defection from the workplace. 
 267
 Self-entrepreneurialism mainly takes the form of starting individual 
businesses as an alternative or in addition to a factory job that is considered 
precarious, unrewarding or lacking fulfillment. A total of 19.3% of metalworkers, 
9.7% of glass-paper workers and 4% of GJMC employees among my respondents 
perform double jobs, almost all of them on an informal, self-employed basis. In 
the case of metalworkers this figure grows especially due to the collapse of 
Kelvinator and by the highly fluctuating production schedules at UCW. The 
average income from second jobs in the case of metalworkers is R588 per month, 
compared to an average net monthly wage of R2202 (see also Table 7.1). A 
majority of workers, however, considers to pursue the avenue of double 
employment should the opportunity arise. Lack of capital, crime and difficulties in 
access to further education and training are the reasons most often cited as 
obstacles facing a self-entrepreneurial strategy that is usually expressed in terms 
of mere survivalism: 
 
The income for the workers is far too little to allow them to go out 
and buy what they may sell. On Friday they get their money, do 
grocery shopping for the family and on Sunday they are left with only 
5 or 10 Rand, only enough to pay to come back to work on Monday, 
and on Monday they are borrowing money from other people. That’s 
the life we are living in this company.  
Q: And what about you? 
A: I don’t know, it’s as good as I can get. There’s this “Tata ma 
Chance” lottery, and if I can get maybe a million, that would be good 
business in Lesotho.  
Q: And if you don’t win?  
A: I will stay here because in Lesotho there are no jobs. Vosloorus 
too is a problem when you don’t have money, ek se, so my intention 
is to have enough money to run a business, because around here, ek 
se, you are taking a risk if you open a business because you don’t 
sleep when you have got a business; too much crime, especially in the 
township. (Interview #4, Baldwin’s) 
 
Some workers who lost their jobs at Kelvinator have been planning to pool their 
provident funds payments with colleagues or retrenched neighbours to start 
various kinds of small businesses, even if more pressing needs like providing for 
basic family expenditures, paying for retail shops’ accounts and refunding 
company loans take the priority to avoid being blacklisted or falling prey of “loan 
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sharks” (Interview #57 and 59). However, also the sheer desire to escape from the 
factory, and not mere desperation or fears about the future, plays a role, as in the 
case of this worker at Consol: 
 
If it wasn’t for financial constraints I should have left this company 
long ago. As an alternative, I have got my industrial relations 
diploma, I am intending to take another course, there are possibilities 
in government posts but I must get my degree. But I don’t think I will 
stay here.  
Q: Do you think your job is becoming insecure? 
A: No, no, my job is secure, it’s just a question of it being a shit job. 
(Interview #181) 
 
Survivalism unquestionably remains the main motivation for self-entrepreneurial 
strategies of response to the crisis of waged employment. At a company where the 
disappearance of stable jobs is particularly acute, UCW, an important source of 
income is provided by seasonal employment at SASOL’s Secunda refineries 
during the annual shutdown. The shutdown and cleanup of the plant usually take 
place in September and December, for the duration of two weeks, when permanent 
SASOL employees are on leave (Interview #27). Cleaning the plant from oil and 
chemicals is an extremely dangerous job, performed mostly by scarcely trained 
casual and contract workers, whose use the unions recursively blame as one of the 
main causes of frequent deadly accidents. 184 UCW workers doing this job usually 
work for around 100 hours, spread mainly over weekends, amounting to up to 10 
hours per day, with a total working-time flexibility: 
 
They don’t worry about you. If you want you can work overtime, it’s 
up to you, you are there to make money, you can work nighshift, 
dayshift, 7 to 7 maybe, or even 7 to 10, it’s up to you. (Interview #27) 
 
Reasons most commonly indicated for such choices have to do with the fear of 
being retrenched from UCW, but they are not confined to this element: 
 
The company can close any time now, retrenchments can take place 
any time, you can sit down without a job, there are other people there 
                                                
184 See Salgado, I. “Union Names Sasol’s Seven ‘Deadly Sins’”, Business Report, 16 February 
2005. 
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who are also working at Sasol, I think now there are 30-35 of them. 
But it’s not only people who are going to be retrenched.  
Q: Why do you go to work for Sasol?  
A: Other companies, they all close, there’s no jobs around so the guys 
see on the newspaper that at Sasol there’s jobs during the shutdown 
so they go there and got interviewed for a contract. At the gate they 
ask you from which company you are, then they check on the 
computer and let you in, because any people that works for them is on 
their computer, so they check on the computer if this guy is a 
returning guy or what. (Interview #27) 
 
Apparently, labour brokers working for SASOL, like one I encountered called 
MSA, are also responsible for the recruitment of this workforce. But it mostly 
seems a competitive process, based on information provided by word of mouth or 
newspaper adverts, rather than on the activation of “social capital” in the forms of 
connections inside SASOL or in the community. Monetary wages paid to these 
workers are higher than for average SASOL operators (with whom these workers 
have no contact whatsoever) and could be as high as a skilled grade at UCW, but 
SASOL provides them no benefits. In this way, new divisions are created within 
SASOL itself, which weaken the locally employed workforce. The fact that the 
collapse of stable employment is functional to providing new reservoirs of cheap, 
unprotected labour for large corporations working in sectors with intermittent 
labour demand, like the petrochemical, has been documented elsewhere (Desai, 
2002: 105-115). In these sectors, double employment creates therefore a labour 
market fragmentation where the borders between “formal” and “informal” 
economy tends to disappear, and where actually demands of companies operating 
in the formal sectors amplify the informalisation of labour contracts (Crichlow, 
2000).  
Few cases show, however, the extent to which double-job strategies can be 
functional to express individual self-valorization perceived as constrained within 
an increasingly meaningless factory environment. At the same time, such cases 
provide hints as to the variety of activities and the complexity of cognitive abilities 
involved in double jobs, and witness the relevance of extra-workplace formative 
experiences (Boegenhold and Staber, 1991). An MB Glass worker, for example, 
has a second job making potteries out of clay. As he says, he “nurtured that art 
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through the struggle” (Interview #111), being taught how to mold and paint while 
being an underground MK operative and during training in Zambia.  
Sipho is a shop-steward and electrical fitter at UCW, whose attachment to the 
company has been constantly eroded by frequent retrenchments followed by 
intermittent employment by FEDMO, often too short to allow him to claim his UIF 
payment. The frustrations and deprivation arising from his waged occupation 
contrast markedly with the satisfaction and ambition Sipho derives from his 
parallel career developed on entirely self taught skills. For three hours after 
clocking off at UCW and before going home in Duduza, Sipho works as a self-
defined “architect” in an office rented from an NGO involved in community 
mediation services in downtown Nigel. Here he drafts plans for all sorts of 
buildings, multi-storey, churches, extensions, and hires two helpers, one of which 
is practicing towards a formal qualification. Sipho himself does not hold any 
formal certificate, but “just a talent for drawing” (Interview #21) developed while 
making additions the house of his mother’s and his family of 12. After having his 
plan examined and approved by the local building inspector, redrawing it 
numerous times and “learning by mistake”, he was contacted by neighbours for 
similar operations.  
Thanks to “being recognized by the community”, he decided to start his 
practice in Nigel while remaining employed at UCW, which became de facto 
ancillary to paying the rent for his office. Even if what he earns in this business is 
approximately two-thirds of his UCW wage, it represents an important 
complement to his income coupled to a new sense of pride in providing a service to 
the community by charging fees that are far lower than those of formal architects. 
At the same time Sipho recognizes that a double income is a vital necessity for 
atypical workers and intermittent employees at a company like UCW whose 
reputation as a company that is constantly retrenching and hiring workers 
discontinuously makes local shopkeepers unwilling to allow for credit for which it 
is often impossible even to have access to UIF money as collateral. 
In other cases, finally, double jobs and self-employment strategies are more 
consciously linked to a purposive escape from the factory and refusal of wage 
labour. Here, frustration, exploitation, humiliation and workplace authoritarianism, 
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not insecurity, fear of job loss or the need to survive, are the main reasons cited. 
An electrician-wirer at UCW has a second job as house electrician in Alberton, 
which he usually attends over weekends. In some cases, however, he actively 
sabotages his workplace functions to be able to do his other job: 
 
Sometimes I can take a day off here at work. Before there was no pay 
for sick leave, now it’s paid so I can just take one day and bring back 
a fake doctor’s note to cover up. Many people do it, even if one must 
be careful, they notice when someone brings doctor’s notices 3 times 
a month.  
Q: So working at UCW for you is mainly something like… 
A: To improve my life, but the main thing is that I can really stand 
alone, I can work alone, the electrician job is what I really care about. 
(Interview #39) 
 
The prospect of starting an independent business actually makes many workers 
view the possibility of being retrenched in a positive light, especially because 
provident fund payouts can be used to finance the new enterprise. In this sense, 
while wage labour and the workplace are further weakened as a site of identity and 
life strategies, unemployment is not necessarily considered as something 
unquestionably detrimental, but it can be seen as potentially revealing of new 
opportunities. Often the example of retrenched colleagues or neighbours that have 
successfully started similar activities is a more powerful source of inspiration than 
the image of acceding to whatever sacrifice to defend one’s employment 
(Interview #182, 148). Sometimes a positive attitude towards retrenchments is part 
of a broader, intentional subversion of factory discipline which, according to 
worried shop-stewards, even aims at creating conditions to be retrenched so that 
provident fund money can be used not only to start businesses, but also to pay for 
household debts and “loan sharks”: 
 
I discovered that people who don’t want to work and have problems, 
account problems, problems with cash loans, and so on, they 
volunteer when they hear the company wants to retrench, they know 
that under packages they’ll get lots of money to pay for their 
accounts. What the company is doing now is to say, ‘We must work 
as a team and we have to explain people to learn not to come late’, 
because people who come late enjoy coming late, sleeping at work 
and that is not the right thing. Even when we as shop stewards told 
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them, ‘No, you mustn’t do this, let’s wait what the company is going 
to do’, and they say, ‘No, the company told us they want to retrench, 
now you have to remind the company about that’, and I say, ‘No 
that’s not my job, to remind the company to retrench people’. 
(Interview #1) 
 
Finally, the search for individualized, self-entrepreneurial responses to the crisis of 
wage labour and to the collapse of workplace life, as opposed to trying and rebuild 
alternative collective and community-based claim-making and citizenship 
discourses, is often rooted in transcendental value systems and discourses of 
salvation where religion plays a major role. As Michele Lamont observes, 
“Religion also offers an alternative to social status and is often defined in 
opposition to it” (Lamont, 2002: 40). As such, it compensates for the failure in 
monetary and career-based notions of success with a view of mundane 
transcendence based on personal integrity, faith and morality, which can be highly 
individualistic and competitive. In particular, while workers belonging to more 
established denominations, like Roman Catholic, Lutheran and the Zionist 
Christian Church (ZCC), stress more the important of collective solidarity, 
individualism seems more linked to the discourse of Evangelical-type beliefs, as in 
the case of this self defined “born-again Christian” Kelvinator employee assessing 
the dramatic fate of his company: 
 
We have to believe we can do what we want with our lives. For 
example, in the parable of Lazarus, when Jesus raised Lazarus from 
the dead, he said before that: ‘Take away the stone from the tomb of 
Lazarus’. What does the stone mean? The stone means disbelief, that 
people don’t believe they can do whatever they want with their lives, 
they don’t believe they can have their own houses, their own car and 
that’s what we should do instead of relying on these whites to give us 
jobs. (Interview #56) 
 
These examples seem to confirm observations, often referred to the collapse of 
formal employment in African societies where state institutions are incapable of 
defining alternative citizenship discourses. Here “survival strategies” to cope with 
socio-economic decline are contiguous with strategies of “extraversion” (Marysse, 
2003) whereby individual agency creatively defines new “exit” opportunities out 
of the crisis of the, workplace-based in this case, collectivity. The next chapter will 
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explore more in detail how these differences reflect on workers’ discourse of social 
citizenship and decommodification. 
  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The processes of restructuring of production and transformation of forms of 
employment discussed in this chapter emphasise the relevance of the workplace as 
a site of contestation over working class identities and discourse. A crisis of wage 
labour as a vehicle of social advancement and the decline of workplace-based 
identities is a common thread that emerges across various cases, experiences and 
worker narratives. The interaction between persisting forms of exploitation, 
racism and authoritarianism inherited from the past and the new forms of 
insecurity and vulnerability generated by the post-apartheid socio-economic and 
competitive climate seem mostly to characterize the ways in which the crisis of 
wage labour is subjectively elaborated on the shopfloor in ways that reflect a 
growing detachment on the workers’ part. 
 At the same time, the contestation over workers’ identities and citizenship 
discourses that emerge in the workplace cannot be looked at in isolation from 
broader trends involving shifting power relations in social policy-making and 
employment trends. As previously noticed, restructuring and casualisation are 
enabled by societal changes that reaffirm inequality by legitimizing it within a 
newly deracialised discourse which belies the betrayal of wage labour’s 
emancipatory promise. Such shifts are quite present in the ways workers make 
sense of current changes, the possibilities implied and the alternative discourses 
available. The sense of decline of workplace-based identities expressed across 
different cases, however, is not merely the product of externally-imposed 
production flexibility, atypical employment and the constantly impending threat 
of retrenchments. In fact, it is also the manifestation of a crisis of meanings and 
sense that emerge from within the wage relation and which makes its questioning, 
when not overt rejection, not uniquely dependent on economic factors or 
insecurity. It is ultimately a worldview where waged work itself used to be a 
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vehicle to ultimately achieve, as a worker here quoted put it “respect, honour and 
trust” in a democratized society that seems profoundly eroded. 
 It comes as no surprise, then, to notice an increasingly instrumental 
attitude, deprived of specific career expectations, towards individual jobs. This 
makes many workers see the prospect of retrenchment and unemploymeent as 
something not entirely “catastrophic” but as a reality which can hide new, 
unforeseen opportunities, especially when workers adhere to ideologies of 
individual self-entrepreneurship. The modification and the diminution of 
meanings attached to wage labour inside the workplace is a determinant in 
shaping workers’ extra-workplace strategies at least as important as the fear to 
remain unemployed or to face poverty. In this sense refusal of work and fear of 
losing it seem to coexist in highly complex and often contradictory ways within 
worker narratives of restructuring. 
Finally, the workplace emerges in this chapter as a “first line” of attack to 
the nexus between working class cohesiveness and social citizenship discourse. 
The difference that I have here noticed and which can be crudely summarized 
between community-orientated and individualist responses to the crisis conceals 
an extremely wide array of responses to the decline of waged employment, in 
ways that profoundly question monolithic view of working class solidarity. The 
following chapter will explore more deeply these questions by looking at how 
restructuring and employment change impact on workers’ communities, with 
particular regard to levels of commodification and decommodification. Second, I 
will look at meanings attached by workers to the notion of their “community”, and 
to the position the union has inside it. Third, I will analyse the ways in which 
changes in the meanings of waged employment inside the workplace and in the 
community impact on workers’ sense of collective agency, on their expectation 
vis-à-vis the new democracy’s ability to respond to the crisis, and on their social 
citizenship discourse more generally. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Workers’ Experiences of Commodification and Contested Social Citizenship 
Discourses  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
When asked about challenges and changes facing his household’s living standards 
during the five years before the interview, a worker at Baldwin’s Steel replied: 
 
When I was still at school most of the things we never worried about, 
which now people are worrying about. For example, I’d go to school 
without any shoes on my feet, I couldn’t worry, but now our children 
have to go out just from the bed to the kitchen and there must be 
shoes in their feet. You see, it’s different, I could walk kilometers 
without shoes. Money makes the world go round… We were walking 
most of the time but now you must pay for taxi, locations are bigger 
now and to go from point A to point B you won’t be able to walk. 
(Interview #3) 
 
In addition to the workplace-based processes and dynamics analysed in the 
previous chapter, the image of wage labour as a vehicle of social emancipation is 
challenged by the deepening commodification of working class livelihoods in all 
the cases I have looked at. In particular, a growing dependence on the market for 
access to basic social provisions amplifies the detrimental effects of insecurity and 
casualisation on the living standards of working class families. Perception are 
widespread of worsening capacities to cope with changes and of shrinking 
financial resources available for basic reproduction expenditures. An analysis of 
wage disparities across sectors and workplaces seems of limited usefulness 
precisely because the monetary income available to individual workers is largely 
influenced by factors -- like the decision to join company medical schemes or to 
ask for company loans -- that largely originate from broader family needs and is 
heavily affected by the existence of alternative support, in the form of double 
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jobs, other incomes in the family or kin networks. Finally, race continues to play a 
role in such disparities due to the widespread persistence of “township rates”, or 
racial wage gaps based on the alleged cheaper consumption and reproduction 
costs in non-white neighbourhoods (Interviews #8 and 28). The resulting high 
levels of variability in families “income”, as opposed to individual workers’ 
“wages” is reinforced by the fragmentation in types of contract of employment, 
which for example has a visible impact on workers’ ability to access company 
loans.  
As I have previously discussed, influential analyses (Nattrass and Seekings, 
1997; Van der Berg, 1997) tend to identify workers in the “formal” economy as 
part of the “winners” from the South African democratic transition largely 
because waged employment is linked to employer-subsidised social provisions 
like healthcare, unemployment insurance and retirement benefits. The picture 
emerging from my interviews tends, however, to reveal a high unevenness, and a 
general decline, in access to wage-related benefits which challenge those 
contentions. In this regard, precariousness of employment inside the workplace 
and rising commodification outside act as interrelated, mutually reinforcing 
factors. 
 Generally declining levels of decommodification, taken as the portion of 
workers’ reproduction expenditures that is either publicly provided outside of the 
market or that is cross-subsidized by the employer, increase the economic 
pressure on workers’ remunerations, amplifying the gap between actual wages 
and levels of income considered acceptable for family reproduction. Furthermore, 
the growing inadequacy of the wage to cover household expenditures and family 
reproduction is reflected in vast areas of indebtedness with banks, retail chains 
and informal lenders at usury rates, the so-called “loan sharks”185. The widening 
gap between “wage” and “income” linked to commodification, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the growing inability of the wage to provide for access to social 
                                                
185 Recent studies show that short-term predatory lending in the form of cash loans linked to 
inability to pay for basic household expenditures is considered a major cause of rising 
indebtedness between 1995 and 2000 for all yearly income groups except the R15,000-25,000 and 
the above R150,000 one (Human Sciences Research Council, 2003). Some workers interviewed 
for this study have been physically threatened, harassed or beaten, even inside work premises, by 
“loan sharks” to whom they owed money (Interview #120). 
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services like healthcare, housing, retirement benefits, municipal utilities. 
Conversely, the breakdown of the wage-income relation has far-reaching 
implications regarding the articulation of alternative social citizenship discourses 
and the organizational means through which such discourses are asserted vis-à-vis 
the new democratic dispensation.  
 
 
7.2 Commodification and the Reconfiguration of Working Class Lives 
 
The uneven impact of commodification on workers’ lives across the workplaces 
and sectors that I have analysed tends to further deepen the fragmentation in 
experiential worlds and materials conditions, thereby reinforcing the picture in the 
previous chapter on workplace- and employment- based dimensions of the decline 
of wage labour as a stable social subject. The substantial portion of workers’ 
wages used to pay for social provisions like healthcare, education, housing, 
transport and utilities is combined to the withdrawal of cross-subsidization from 
both employers and the public sector.  
Workers’ tales of becoming increasingly unable to “cope”, to save money 
at the end of the month, or to be facing growing difficulties in providing for 
families’ basic necessities seem indeed to confirm a growing commodification of 
life in the cases here under examination. The ultimate questioning of the wage as 
a vehicle not only for socio-political emancipation but for basic household 
reproduction – in other words the widening gap between “wage” and “income” -- 
shifts, therefore, onto the broader society the crisis of wage labour’s “promise” 
anticipated on the shopfloor, and creates a critical disjuncture in the post-apartheid 
“work-citizenship nexus”.  
 A useful starting point for the discussion is to look at the economic impact 
of commodification on workers’ wages. In trying to draw conclusions in this 
regard from my interviews, a word of caution is nonetheless necessary. The 
numerical estimates presented below are not taken from a representative sample, 
therefore possible conclusions remain to some extent impressionistic. However, it 
is possible to define trends within my limited case studies that provide an 
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adequate picture of the realities upon which workers I interviewed construct 
meanings of commodification and strategies of response, which I will elaborate in 
greater detail. 
  
7.2.1 Access to company-subsidised healthcare 
 
As recent research has shown (May, 2000), in the South African case wages of 
employed workers usually provide an essential form of support for unemployed 
relatives within family networks, therefore wages themselves are important social 
safety nets and a source of decommodification for other members of the family. 
As Table 1 shows, my findings support this conclusion, while revealing 
significant differences across sectors. 
 
Table 7.1 Remittances and Family Support Networks of Employed Workers 
SECTOR Average Wage 
(R/month) 
Remittances to Family 
Outside Household 
Average Remittances Sent 
(R/month) 
 Gross Net % sending 
remittances
Average 
Number of 
Persons 
Supported 
All 
Workers 
Only Workers 
Sending 
Remittances 
Metal/engineering 3011 2202 48.4 2.47 R121 R416 
Chemical 3708 2062 82.6 1.74 R251 R386 
Municipal 2397 1326 54.1 5.15 R395 R838 
TOTAL 3039 1863 59.5 2.91 R256 R547 
 
It is first to be noticed that only a small minority of workers I interviewed have 
family members outside their households that benefit from state pensions and 
grants (17.3% of chemical workers, 12.5% of municipal and 9.7% of metal ones). 
Conversely, 64.5% of metalworkers and 47.9% of chemical ones have other 
income earners (formal or informal) in their household, with before-deductions 
average monthly wages of respectively R1688 and R1840 per month.  
While both manufacturing and municipal workers tend in their majority to 
send remittances outside their households, differences in the number of persons 
supported on average indicate a variation in the mechanisms of support. Chemical 
and metal workers send their remittances mainly to family members located in 
urban areas near their workplaces (particularly East Rand cities affected by 
deindustrialisation and retrenchments). For example, 22.6% of metalworkers and 
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17.4% of chemical workers have working-age unemployed relatives living with 
them, while almost no GJMC employee does.  
GJMC workers, instead, maintain stronger connections in rural areas 
affected by widespread, long-term unemployment, where extended family 
networks tend to prevail. It is indicative that municipal workers can send as much 
as three quarters of their net wage in the form of remittances, a choice that is often 
enabled by opting out of medical schemes (which for other categories are usually 
the biggest deduction) and by residing in hostel accommodations, usually 10-
occupants rooms, whose monthly rental can be as low as R20-30. Therefore for 
the wage to act as a de-commodifying factor for relatives in rural areas, who often 
attend to land, properties and cattle that constitute post-retirement income 
prospects, requires trade-offs  with access to social provisions like healthcare. 
 With the partial exception of municipal workers, payments for medical aid 
schemes represent the most important cause of variation between before- and 
after-deduction wages. Table 7.2 illustrates the impact of medical schemes 
contributions on the average wages of respondents. It should be added, however, 
that if only workers covered by medical schemes are considered, healthcare 
contributions as a share of average gross monthly wages increase to 15.1% for 
chemical workers, 21% for metalworkers and 11.5% for municipal. Municipal, 
and to some extent metal, workers’ small increases are explained by the fact that 
mainly higher-wage employees (average of R2654 per month) tend to be covered, 
while low-wage ones are overwhelmingly uncovered. The already discussed 
nature of the South African healthcare system, whose resources are highly skewed 
in favour of private provision, is combined to other factors specific to company 
medical schemes that decisively reinforce the commodified nature of access to 
healthcare.  
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Table 7.2  Impact of Social Provisions Expenditures on Wages 
SECTOR Average 
Monthly 
Wage (Rand) 
Average 
Household 
Size 
% with 
more than 
one income 
in 
household 
Average 
medical aid 
expenses 
(month) 
Average 
education 
expenses 
(month) 
Average 
utilities* 
expenses 
(month) 
Average 
transport 
expenses 
(month) 
 Gross Net   (a) (b) (a) (c) (a) (c) (a) (c) 
Metal/engineering 3011 2202 4.42 64.5 617 20.5 148 6.7 207 9.4 N/a N/a 
Chemical 3708 2062 4.34 47.9 496 13.4 238 11.5 274 13.2 156 7.5 
Municipal 2397 1326 4.37 20.8 267 11.1 252 19.0 241 18.1 160 12.0 
TOTAL 3039 1863 4.38 44.4 460 15.1 213 11.4 241 12.9 N/a N/a 
a)= in Rand 
b)=as percentage of GROSS wage 
c)=as percentage of NET wage 
*= “Utilities” is here limited to water and electricity 
 
Faced with rising administrative costs and premiums, also linked to the spread of 
the HIV-AIDS epidemic, and spiraling “medical inflation” (Council of Medical 
Schemes, 2001; Old Mutual 1999 and 2003), companies have tended to scale 
down the provision of medical schemes by introducing “cost-to-company” options 
as lump sum payments to employees. They also resorted to “managed care” 
products based on capitation and defined employers’ contributions (TWIG-Old 
Mutual, 2000; Doherty and McLeod, 2002)186. These de facto cap the amount of 
subsidized services that the employee can claim. In both cases, reductions in 
company subsidization of workers’ healthcare expenditures increase the level of 
commodification of the service by shifting costs onto the customer. Therefore, 
consumer discipline in the allocation of scarce monetary resources is reinforced 
under the pretense of individualized self-management of healthcare (Gordon, 
2003: 210-261; Gottschalk, 2000: 114-136). 
For example, in the mid-1990s the Nampak Group introduced in its 
companies (which include MB Glass and Nampak Corrugated) a Fedsure 
managed care option in parallel to the existing, company-subsidised MSP-Sizwe 
schemes, whose escalating costs were already driving many employees out of 
membership. This move was coupled to a reduction in employers’ contributions 
from 70% to 50%. The company motivated the shift with the need to contain costs 
                                                
186 See also Shevel, A. “Medical Aid Rates Set to Gallop Ahead of Inflation”, Sunday Times, 14 
December 2003 and “Medical Aid Costs Continue to Hit Home”, Sunday Times, 10 May 2004, 
where it is estimated that low-income earners (monthly income R2500-7000) will be the most 
adversely hit by these changes. According to the 2003 Old Mutual Healthcare Survey, 21% of 
South African employers have introduced “cost-to-company” products. Simultaneously, the 
number of companies providing healthcare payments to their pensioners has declined from 85% to 
43% between 1995 and 2002. See also Bisseker, C., “On Borrowed Time”, Financial Mail, 24 
October 2003. 
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related to the spread of HIV-AIDS, and the Fedsure scheme caps HIV-related 
claims to R7,000 a year compared to R25,000 for MSP-Sizwe. According to shop-
stewards in both companies, Nampak aggressively promoted the new scheme, 
making it de facto compulsory for all new employees (Interviews #161, 215 and 
218). The lack of coverage for many services, including traditional healers, or 
inyangas, has convinced many MB Glass workers not to subscribe to the new 
scheme (Interview #110). In addition, at Nampak Corrugated management’s 
unilateral decision making led local shop-stewards to “take the issue seriously” 
(Interview #161) and bring it to the fore in shopfloor conflict. As a result 
PPWAWU managed to win a workplace agreement that, as an exception to the 
Nampak company agreement, retains freedom of choice of medical schemes at 
Nampak Corrugated’s Wadeville plant. Limits to the amount of claimable health 
benefits and increasing individual co-payments, as a result of schemes often 
introduced without consulting the unions (as reported at Paperlink, MB Glass and 
Consol), are common complaints in glass and paper companies.  
Paperlink’s owning company, Mondi, introduced in 1997 as the only 
company-subsidised medical aid an Anglo-American scheme (AAC Med) that 
caps benefits for general practitioners’ visits and medicines, the most commonly 
claimed items, to R275 per year, even if the premium with no dependants for its 
basic Primary Scheme product is R80 per month (Interview #143). According to 
shop-stewards, 45% of employees (both hourly and weekly paid) at Paperlink 
have no medical coverage (Interview #141). Similarly, Baldwin’s introduced 
unilaterally a Discovery Health managed care plan with benefits capped at R7000 
per year to replace the old MSP-Sizwe scheme which, by management’s own 
admission, was cheaper for the workers. Most hourly-paid employees, in fact, did 
not register for the new scheme, while many covered workers feel constrained in 
claiming benefits by the fear of reaching the yearly limit. Therefore, they often 
have to weigh present health risks of leaving ailments untreated against those of 
more serious accidents in the future (Interview #19). To facilitate the transition to 
the new scheme, Dorbyl’s management had initially agreed to subsidise it by 
paying the difference between the old and the new premiums, but this company 
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subsidy was interrupted with effect January 2000, a decision explained by a 
manager in harsh and uncompromising terms: 
 
That is going to have quite a big impact. In fact, suggestions are that 
many will stop paying and it is a topic that we are going to be 
discussing in our ‘transformation forum’. We have informed them 
[the union] that from January they’ll have to make their own 
contributions and for some of them it’s going to be tough. We have 
worked out that on average it would be R40 per month, which is quite 
a lot, and for some of them it’s a hell of a lot more than R40. 
Q Are you negotiating this with the union? 
A We are consulting them, but we are not really negotiating. There is 
nothing to negotiate other than to advice them that their premiums are 
going up and obviously some of them will not be able to afford it.187 
 
Cost-cutting measures introduced by companies in contributing to medical aids, 
and the consequent decline in coverage and increases in co-payments, are reported 
by many workers as one of the main reason to opt out of medical schemes 
altogether. Of the workers I interviewed, those who lack company medical 
coverage are 63.1% of metalworkers, especially due to the collapse of Kelvinator 
and atypical employment at UCW, 40.7% of municipal workers, despite the 
relatively more generous conditions in the sector188. Uncovered are also 32% of 
glass and paper workers, a percentage kept relatively low mainly by high coverage 
levels at Nampak Corrugated following the union’s successful defense of free 
choice in that company. Conversely, the average number of dependants covered is 
relatively high (which carries obvious cost implications): 2.88 for glass and paper 
workers, 2.28 for metal and 2.05 for municipal, this latter a low number that might 
be due to a higher propensity to save on medical care in relation to this group’s 
remittance behaviour. 
                                                
187 Keith Roach, Works Manager, Baldwin’s Steel, Interview with the Author, 27 October 1999. 
Apart from being considered more user-friendly by workers, the old scheme covered 
approximately 80% of most claim categories, with limits for private hospital care, it did not have 
overall caps and it cost on average R60-70 per month for basic products with no dependants, 
compared to the R140 of the new scheme. Conversely, this latter, with its “Vitality” options covers 
services like physical training more geared to the lifestyle of higher paid employees. In this case, 
therefore, it can be argued that low-wage workers subsidize to some extent the health expenditures 
of managers. 
188 The GJMC usually contributes for 75% towards the payment of premiums for the plethora of 
schemes operating in the Council. 
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The impact of healthcare contributions on worker wages, summarized in 
Table 7.1, leads to extreme differences between gross and net remunerations. 
Showing me his payslip dated 24 December 1999, a GJMC employee with four 
dependants on medical aid points at a net wage of R498 per month out of a gross 
remuneration of R2490, adding with dismay, “I am going to steal” (Interview 
#62). A worker at UCW who takes home R800 out of a R3500 gross wage argues 
that survival is ensured for him only by the additional R600 that he earns as 
overtime pay, often replacing his own retrenched colleagues (Interview #33). At 
UCW most employees and the near totality of contract workers are uncovered and 
according to one of them “only supervisors have medical aids” (Interview #37). 
One contract worker retrenched by UCW on a R900 net monthly wage, and re-
employed by FEDMO at R1300, owes 75% of this increase to the fact that he has 
foregone medical coverage, counting on the fact that “a man like me doesn’t get 
sick”, with the rest of it being due to increased overtime (Interview #37). In this 
company, it was NUMSA shop-stewards that demanded the introduction of a 
managed care scheme, seen as more affordable, and applied to the engineering 
Industrial Council to move out of ailing industry scheme Steelmed189. 
In few cases, the rising commodification of healthcare coupled to the 
inadequacy of wages to keep pace with living expenses face workers with 
dramatic choices, especially when they or their dependants have to regularly pay 
for treatment. Joseph is a truck driver at Paperlink and a former CEPPWAWU 
shop-steward, a “soldier”, as a colleague praises his dedication and commitment 
to his job and to the union (Interview #143). He supports a family with 5 children, 
two of which at school in Queenstown, his wife’s birthplace. One of Joseph’s 
daughter suffers from epilepsy, has been left partially paralyzed by a recent 
accident, and requires regular hospital visits. With no state social grants in the 
                                                
189 Joe Lekhasi, UCW Human Resource Manager, Interview with Author, 3 November 1999. 
Steelmed rules and the engineering industry national agreement stated that transfer to another 
medical scheme required the approval of 100% of Steelmed-covered worker. UCW, which already 
in 1994 had terminated its policy of compulsory membership to medical schemes, applied to move 
out of Steelmed with effect 1 January 2000. On 19 April 1999 Steelmed had announced substantial 
increases in contributions to face the requirements in the 1999 Medical Schemes Act, for schemes 
to have reserves equal to 25% of annual contribution income (Steelmed, Circular to Members, 19 
April 1999). Failing to meet this target, Steelmed faced liquidation, was disbanded in 2000, and its 
12,000 members were transferred to Sizwe (Jacques Scalomidi, MIBFA, interview with Author, 2 
May 2000).  
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family, she depends entirely for her medical assistance on Joseph’s wage, which 
from a gross R2100 per month declines to R700 after deductions. Deductions, on 
the other hand, are not limited to medical aid but they also include the repayment 
of a bank loan taken by using his provident fund as collateral to buy a flat in 
Hillbrow, Johannesburg. He moved there with his family when he could no longer 
stay in the backyard room he was previously renting in Orlando East, where prices 
for new family homes and bonds for privatized municipal housing were 
skyrocketing. Once other expenses are taken into account (utilities, transport and 
remittances to Queenstown), what is left hardly allows Joseph to pay for food and 
other basic items, which leads to recurrent debts with “cash loans”.  
The limits to claimable medical benefits introduced under Paperlink’s new 
managed care scheme force Joseph to painful monthly calculations and trade-offs 
between the need to provide care to his daughter and that of satisfying the rest of 
his family’s basic needs, which is the main reason for constant indebtedness. In 
fact, if it was not for his daughter’s condition, he would be able to move to a 
cheaper medical aid product, which would allow him to save approximately R100 
per month and therefore stay out of personal debts. 
Joseph’s case is hardly unique of how rising commodification of basic 
services undermines wage labour’s capacity to adequately contribute to families’ 
income. In the rare cases where family members are employed in sectors with 
relatively generous health coverage, like the public service, employees tend to 
register as their dependants. In cases where medical expenses are relatively 
exceptional and unpredictable, community networks like stokvels and club 
accounts provide vital help as a form of healthcare funding broadly investigated in 
other African societies (MacIntyre and Hotchkiss, 1999). Otherwise, the refusal of 
commodified healthcare provision can take the form of rationalizations played out 
at a mainly cultural and epistemological level as a criticism of, or skepticism 
towards, mainstream curative medicine and re-evaluation of traditional practices. 
In this way worker responses to commodification of healthcare make the body 
itself a contested terrain, an “embattled zone of governance” (Prakash, 1999: 144) 
where grassroots forms of knowledge challenge the meanings and practices 
imposed by the “disciplinary techniques” (Ong, 1987) of the market. Therefore 
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many workers complain that medical schemes’ coverage does not extend to 
inyangas, “witch-doctors” and herbalists. The re-evaluation of grassroots 
knowledge is not so much intended to claim a superior curative potential of these 
practices, but it often becomes an explicit rejection of commodification190 and an 
assertion of the gratuity of healthcare, reinforced by the appeal to transcendental 
powers and religious affiliations: 
 
Q Are you under medical aid? 
A No, never been for 23 years. 
Q Why? 
A Good question. A person like myself, I don’t use medicine. If I am 
ill, I use just water, coffee and tea. My family is not covered either, 
they are only covered by the church. ZCC is like a clinic, ill people 
are treated in the church. I am also a doctor, and a priest: if one is sick 
I know what to do. 
Q Can you give me some examples of treatment that you have 
provided recently? 
S I mustn’t explain everything, because it’s a secret [laughs]. Even 
AIDS I can treat. I only help those who come to us, everybody, and 
it’s free. I can only say I tell the guy to bring me the coffee and tea, 
and I make something. Someone came before me, from the 
headquarters, to teach me that, how to make medicines. The ZCC is 
against the use of medicines because the church has got to help you, 
freely. You pay when you buy tea or coffee, that’s it. (Interview #157) 
 
The need to send regular remittances to extended families in rural areas 
profoundly shapes GJMC workers’ behaviours with regard to medical aid, and is 
responsible for a broad lack of coverage among their low-wage, most vulnerable 
sectors. At the same time, this factor seems responsible for a different kind of 
trade-off for workers that sacrifice their medical coverage to support their 
families. According to shop-stewards at Nancefield roads depot, 90% of workers 
are uncovered and when, during a meeting to explain the purpose of my research I 
asked how many of the present were covered, only two out of 15 raised their 
hand. When I asked the same question to workers in the Ennerdale depot, whom 
under the old TPA administration had compulsory coverage, only five out of the 
16 persons present replied in the affirmative. I gathered similar, albeit highly 
                                                
190 The general theme of the use of cultural repertoires in making sense and opposing forms of 
discipline based on the commodity form is analysed in Taussig (1980). 
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impressionistic, findings from my visit to the Waterval waste depot, where many 
workers still live in municipal hostels, especially Selby and Anthea (Industria). 
An exception, which seems to confirm the importance of migrations and 
remittances, is provided by the Avalon waste depot, in Klipspruit, previously 
falling under the Soweto City Council and where, according to SAMWU shop-
stewards, most workers are covered by medical schemes. Here, apart from many 
migrants from Transkei, Gazankulu and Tzaneen, there is a large complement of 
workers either locally born or whom have resided in the area (mainly Soweto, 
Eldorado Park, Orange Farm and Grasmere) for a long time.  
 
7.2.2 Housing Financing and Loans 
 
The structure of commodification of workers’ lives become clearer, and its extent 
fully evident, once housing expenditures are added to the picture (see Table 7.3). 
 
 Table 7.3 Types of Housing and Housing Expenditures 
 
SECTOR Type of Dwelling –formal 
(%) 
 1-2 
rooms 
3-4 
rooms 
5+ 
rooms 
% with 
no toilet 
inside 
% in 
informal 
housing* 
% in 
hostels 
Average 
bond/rent 
(month) 
Bond/rent 
as % of 
net wage 
Chemical 15.8 36.8 21.0 31.5 26.4 -- R612 29.7 
Municipal 5.9 17.6 11.8 35.2 35.3 29.4 R375 28.2 
Metal 8.3 45.8 16.7 25.0 25.1 4.1 R419 19.0 
TOTAL 10.0 33.3 16.7 30.0 28.3 11.7 R457 24.5 
*= Including backyard rooms/shacks 
 
Once housing expenditures are added to those reported in Table 7.2, it can be 
noticed that -- after medical aids contributions are deducted from workers’ gross 
remunerations -- services like education, transport, utilities and housing absorb on 
average 61.9% of after-deduction wages for glass/paper workers and 77.3% for 
municipal workers, while for metal workers payments for such social provisions 
(excluding transport, for which I have no reliable data) is on average 35.9% of net 
wages. Once remittances are added, the impact of these extremely high levels of 
commodification are heightened, which leaves to most workers, especially 
municipal ones, almost insignificant resources to provide for basic family needs 
and consumption. 
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Only a small percentage of respondents (9.3% of manufacturing workers, no 
municipal worker) have built their houses by benefiting either from government 
subsidies or RDP housing projects191. Those who have, tend to express a sense of 
dissatisfaction for subsidies that allow the construction of only very small 
dwellings with poor materials. In fact, all the cases of self-built housing have cost  
between R15,000 and R30,000 only for materials, faced with government 
subsidies that, for households with less than R800 per month, vary between 
R15,000 and R16,000. Even in this way, access to “social capital”, in the form for 
example of friends in other workplaces who can sell materials at discounted price 
or use company vehicles to help (Interview #6), seems to be more relevant than 
meager and uncertain government support. In the final analysis, however, self-
built accommodations often tend to be mere ukhukhus, informal dwellings (see 
Table 7.3) made of wood, paperboard and corrugated tin, mostly without running 
water, often without proper connections to the power grid, where almost 30% of 
workers interviewed for this study live. In few cases, ownership of an ukhukhu, or 
of a stand upon which to build one, is cited by housing officials as evidence of 
property, therefore as a ground to reject subsidy applications, which are seen as 
helping “only people who don’t have anything” (Interview #22). 
Other complaints regarding subsidies point at what are considered 
discriminatory housing policies at local government level. A “coloured” UCW 
employee living in Geluksdal, near Brakpan, laments that while residents in old 
council houses in nearby Tsakane and KwaThema could obtain ownership title 
deeds after 15 years of bonds repayment and benefited from debts write-offs, new 
houses built with government subsidies in largely “coloured” communities like 
Geluksdal are “scandalizing” in terms of size and quality. Local residents call 
these houses “Unos”, like the automobiles, to underline the lack of space in these 
low-income dwellings (Interview #24).  
In few cases subscribers bought new houses through developers that were 
expected to apply for subsidies that never materialized, which led to boycotts of 
bonds repayment. One of such cases involved Khayalethu Loans, a public-private 
project of the South African Housing Trust, whose bonds payments were 
                                                
191 Moreover, only two workers have received the full R15,000 subsidy. 
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boycotted by 300 Tsakane residents, including one of my informants at 
Baldwin’s192. The local branch of the ANC-aligned South African National Civic 
Association (SANCO) intervened by trying to convince residents to resume 
payments while waiting for an independent evaluation, which also never arrived. 
Failure to benefit from the government’s housing policy is felt in this case with a 
bitter sense of betrayal: 
 
I understand the previous government was giving you R15,000 if you 
were a first time homebuyer. Now these people are talking another 
language, they say [that when we expect subsidies] we’re talking 
about a previous government. But we were boycotting the previous 
government, now we are talking about this government. When you 
check the previous government’s subsidy the money was R15,000, 
but this one, they are talking about less than that, depending on your 
income. So we are saying no, we are not paying. I think COSATU 
must try to sort this thing out, we must get the money from this 
government. (Interview #4) 
 
In general, lack of access to subsidies seems to confirm the shortcomings of the 
subsidy scheme in creating an adverse selection for low-income people who are 
formally employed193. In fact, workers whose household income is higher than 
R3500 per month are excluded from the subsidy, and if they approach that ceiling 
they receive allocations that are insufficient not only to build a house but to access 
credit as well. Conversely, developers prefer to service the very poor and the 
unemployed who are more likely to receive the full subsidy. Meanwhile, formally 
waged workers remain excluded from credit, a fate that particularly strikes 
intermittent employees, as in the case of UCW. According to some recently 
retrenched workers from this company, “people who sit in the office” (Interview 
#21) refuse lending as soon as they hear the name UCW, linked to a reputation for 
employment uncertainty.  
The most common way for respondents to build a new house is, however, to 
borrow from private lenders -- predominantly banks, private developers and “non-
                                                
192 In 1995 it was estimated that half of all Khayalethu loans were not serviced, and reports 
complained that the government’s “Masakhane Campaign”, aimed at stimulating payments, 
clashed with “an intractable ‘culture of entitlement’ among SA’s blacks” (Charney, C., “A New 
Point of Departure on the Bond Boycotts”, Business Day, 14 December 1995). 
193 Petal Thring, P&DM, University of the Witwatersrand, Interview with the Author, 22 May 
2000. 
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traditional retail lenders” like NGOs and housing associations -- securing such 
loans with accumulated provident funds contributions used as collateral. Using 
provident funds as collaterals is the overwhelmingly most common way of 
securing mortgage lending for people in waged employment in South Africa 
(National Housing Finance Corporation, 1995; Tomlinson 1998; Jones and Datta, 
2000: 403-408). Alternatively, contingent and contract workers or employees that 
lack the seniority to build up sufficient provident funds contributions tend to be 
excluded from housing loans, apart from smaller “employer-backed loans”, 
usually less than R5,000, used for house renovations and repaid through payroll 
deductions.  
On the other hand, due to prohibitive costs and the lack of public financing 
for newly built housing, purchase of housing from banks, developers or councils 
through monthly bond repayments remains the most common way of access to 
home ownership. Rental housing (including backyard informal accommodations 
and hostels) is less frequent, involving 38.5% of municipal workers (living mainly 
in hostels) and 41.4% of metal workers, who live mainly in backyard rooms and 
shacks. This might explain why the average amount of monthly housing payments 
for this group is lower than for chemicals (see Table 7.3), and further testifies to 
the deepening poverty and precariousness of living conditions already noticed for 
metalworkers, particularly in coincidence with Kelvinator’s closure and UCW’s 
retrenchments. Yet, the number of workers still living with parents without paying 
rent is negligible across the three groups, a figure that reinforces the impression of 
pride and achievement attached to starting an independent life, especially after 
marriage, despite the rising financial difficulties and the growing commodification 
of housing. 
In conclusion, my findings indicate that public subsidies for low-cost 
housing have the somehow contradictory and paradoxical effect of increasing the 
commodification of housing provisions for waged workers whose monetary 
income is an impediment for the subsidy and a deterrent for other forms of low 
cost financing. Moreover, in this case, not only has earning a wage an effect that 
is in direct contradiction to accessing social provisions, rather than being 
conducive to them, but using provident funds as collaterals jeopardizes retirement 
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incomes as well, therefore increasing the likelihood of a commodified post-
employment life course. 
 In a context of inadequate public support for workers’ housing needs, 
access to company loans and repayment conditions can become areas of 
heightened workplace contestation. Workplace-based negotiations as a surrogate 
for access to social housing rights, however, reveals and confirms the already 
noticed erosion in wage labour’s strength. No company I investigated has a 
housing lending policy that is not based on provident fund- or employer-backed 
loans, and most of them have reportedly tightened the requirements for access, the 
size of loans and the repayment conditions. According to shop-stewards, Consol, 
for example, is planning to replace its existing loan facility of up to 80% of the 
house value, depending on contributions and seniority, with a loan limited to 10% 
of the house value, capped at R33,000. A similar move is apparently under way at 
MB Glass, a company which, as discussed in Chapter 4, already in the 1980s had 
developed a Metal Box Provident Fund Housing Project as an experiment in 
company welfarism during a short-lived private housing development surge on the 
East Rand. That process was spurred by late-apartheid expectations for expanding 
low-income housing markets in black townships that authorized optimistic 
expectations of working class home ownership based on stable access to waged 
employment, which ultimately failed to materialise194. 
Provident fund-backed loans are relatively more generous in paper 
companies, but they are never higher than R20,000 (Paperlink, see Interview #87). 
Moreover, the size of loans is linked to house values and provident contributions, 
therefore to seniority, which penalizes young and intermittent workers195. 
                                                
194 Still in 1988, only 5% of Metal Box provident fund members had access to viable housing 
finance even for the cheapest products. The project was established to encourage working-class 
home ownership, following negotiations between the company and NUMSA with an aim, among 
others, of providing an answer to growing social conflicts, land invasions and rent boycotts in 
Duduza, KwaThema and Tsakane. See Hendler, P., Metal Box Provident Fund Housing Project 
1988/89 Final Report: Employee Benefit Funds and Financing and Delivery of Low-Income 
Housing, DHP, PLANACT, 25.14.16. 
195 According to the rules of Mondi, which owns Paperlink, loans are linked to housing values and 
cannot exceed 50% of accumulated contributions. To claim a R40,000 loan, therefore, 
approximately 15 years seniority on an operator wage, without claiming benefits during periods of 
unemployment, are required (Interview #87). Only three employees out of 20 interviewed in this 
company would fit this requisite, which is generally unusual also for the vast majority of 
manufacturing companies I looked at, which are relatively less generous than Paperlink. Half of 
Paperlink workers I interviewed have company loans, which they repay through payroll deductions 
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Employment uncertainty and fear of retrenchments are further constraining 
factors, since unemployment could lead to the loss of provident contributions used 
as collaterals for loans. Complains on lack of access to company loans, and their 
inadequacy in buying even the most basic materials are widespread. According to 
a Nampak Corrugated employee, company loans barely allow workers in lowest-
wage positions to “buy two bricks per week” (Interview #98). In some cases, 
rejection of loans applications is accompanied by abuse and humiliation: a worker 
at Paperlink had a loan application rejected by a human resource officer who 
allegedly suggested him to rent a container as an accommodation more suitable 
for Africans (Interview #144).  
Workers at Baldwin’s report that the company refuses loans applications on 
a selective and discretionary basis to punish poor performance and absenteeism, 
and management then stopped providing loans altogether, citing impending 
retrenchments as a reason (Interview #1 and 3). Such behaviours reinforce, even 
among moderate and co-operative workers, the impression of a company that is 
insensitive to extra-workplace needs of its employees, despite Dorbyl’s 
pretensions of a community-responsible management style: 
 
The company is not looking after its workers. This company is big, 
but we start from scratch and we struggle to get the houses and they 
don’t give us loans, they send me to the bank and the bank wants too 
much interest. They don’t do nothing for us, to help us to improve our 
lives (...). Even if you aim not to toyi-toyi to change things, managers 
force you to toyi-toyi. (Interview #3) 
 
 
7.2.3 Retirement Benefits 
 
The near totality of workers I interviewed, especially those in hourly-paid 
positions, belong to provident funds, rather than pension funds, not only due to the 
possibility of using contributions as collaterals for housing loans but also, as 
noticed, because of the fact that lump-sum provident funds payments provide an 
                                                                                                                                 
averaging approximately R400-500 per month out of an average gross wage of R2181 per month. 
Nampak Corrugated has a housing loan scheme for which 5 years seniority are required to qualify, 
for 10% of the housing price capped at R80,000 (Interview #98). 
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income during extended periods of intermittent unemployment. Provident funds 
remain, moreover, a crucial source of livelihoods for extended families in the 
event of loss of a sole breadwinner’s wage (Ardington and Lund, 1995). 
Compared to the situation of medical aids, where most workers I interviewed 
belong to company schemes, industrial provident funds -- like the Chemical 
Industry National Provident Fund (CINPF)196, the Metal Industry Provident Fund 
(MIPF), the SAMWU Provident Fund at GJMC -- generally constituted by 
bargaining council agreements and with equal employers-employee representation 
in boards of trustees, are prevalent.  
In many ways, echoes of past union struggles for worker-controlled 
retirement funds, discussed in Chapter 3, resonate in such institutional 
arrangements, as does a generalized rejection of pension funds as a largely post-
retirement monthly income (“only whites like pension funds”, Interview #19) run 
by private financial corporations (considered, as one worker puts it, “lots of tsotsi 
business”, see Interview #155). Nowhere is the relevance of the issue for the 
unions more evident than at UCW, where NUMSA conducted its most successful 
battle precisely in forcing the labour broker, FEDMO, to join the Engineering 
Industry Provident Fund (EIPF).  
Exceptions are provided by Baldwin’s and by the two companies belonging 
to the Nampak Group. In fact, MB Glass’ own Metal Box Provident Fund, 
administered by NBC, is another remnant from its “company welfarism” age. 
Nampak Corrugated, on the other hand, contributes 50% of contributions to  a 
Nampak Contributory Provident Fund, also managed by NBC (Interview #94). 
Finally, Baldwin’s employees are mainly covered by Dorbyl Group funds. The 
cases of Baldwin’s and Nampak’s are linked to the mounting trend that sees 
companies shifting from “defined benefits” (DB) to “defined contributions” (DC) 
schemes. Reasons provided for such changes are usually related to the increasing 
costs of insured benefits provided under defined benefits schemes, especially in 
relation to factors like the HIV-AIDS epidemics that tend to shorten workers’ 
lives197. “Defined contributions” funds, on the other hand, allow employers to 
                                                
196 At the time of writing negotiations were in progress to merge the CINPF with the PPWAWU 
National Provident Fund (PNPF), following the formation of CEPPWAWU. 
197 Jan Mahlangu, CEPPWAWU National Benefits Coordinator and CINPF Coordinator, Interview 
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limit their financial exposure by shifting risks on employees, making their 
retirement benefits more dependant on the fluctuations of financial markets, and 
often forcing them to voluntarily increase their contributions to protect future 
claims. Some workers, quite significantly, resent the increase in healthcare 
contributions, preferring instead to have their retirement contributions raised to 
protect their benefits. Similarly to what has been already noticed with medical 
schemes, this process in the end amounts largely to a reduction in employers’ 
responsibility and participation towards workers’ retirement benefits and to a 
deepening commodification of post-employment income. 
Union officials either support or do not antagonize the shift from DB to DC 
funds. Indeed, both MIPF-EIPF and CINPF are currently structured as DC funds. 
In fact, high, recurrent long-term unemployment and rising insurance costs are 
seen as constraining the benefits available under DB schemes, which moreover 
reward long employment tenure. For workers that have to face growing 
employment uncertainties, therefore, the riskier, but cheaper and potentially more 
rewarding DC funds are preferred198. They are also, however, creating uneasiness, 
sense of uncertainty and frustration among workers involved. The implications of 
adopting DC funds appear, for example, to be quite clear for a weekly-paid 
employee at Baldwin’s: 
 
Before I had a statement and I knew how much I was going to get and 
the pension was protected. But now I don’t know any more. 
Sometimes I read in the paper there’s a company that is closing down, 
managers who invested with Alex Forbes [Baldwin’s DC fund’s 
administrators, FB] and they didn’t get enough money. That is when I 
started saying, ‘This Alex Forbes, I don’t like it’. It worries me, one 
day they send you a leaflet saying this month we made 2%, this 
month the markets were down. I don’t want my pension to be on 
fluctuating markets. (Interview #5)199 
 
                                                                                                                                 
with Author, 12 April 2000. 
198 Ibidem, and Paul Biyase, NUMSA National Benefits Co-ordinator, Interview with the Author, 
18 April 2000. 
199 It is indicative that Baldwin’s has retained the DB option for its pension fund, which mainly 
covers managers, supervisors and high-wage weekly employees, while it introduced a DC 
provident fund mainly for hourly paid shopfloor workers. 
 294
Benefits, especially the fate of provident funds and housing subsidies, are one of 
the main areas of concern for GJMC workers and SAMWU members in the 
transition to iGoli 2002.  
The unification and rationalization process upon which the GJMC was 
built out of the various apartheid-age councils in the Johannesburg region has left 
a legacy of institutional fragmentation in benefits organizations, and a wide array 
of pension funds, provident funds and medical schemes. At the end of the 1990s, 
13,500 out of the 29,000 GJMC employees belonged to approximately 11 medical 
schemes (more than 50% of which to Jomed)200. Nine different retirement funds 
operate in the metropolitan council, including the SAMWU National Provident 
Fund. This latter, with 20,000 members nationally (3,000-4,000 in Johannesburg 
alone) and the third largest membership in South African local government, is 
also one of the main union-based provident funds and a product of a strong 
tradition of orientation to members’ services in South Africa’s democratic 
municipal trade unionism201. Pension and provident funds were mostly of a 
defined benefit kind and contributions ranged from 7.5% to 9.5% of the 
employee’s salary for employees and from 16% to 22% for the employers. 
Finally, a municipal housing subsidy to which the Council contributes 1.5% of an 
employee’s wage provides a monthly payment of up to 30% of the person’s 
wage202.  
 Compared with the situation in private companies, GJMC’s benefits 
package is more generous, employers’ contribution share is much higher – most 
private retirement schemes work on the basis of 7.5% contributions from 
employers and employees -- and addresses a wider spectrum of needs, like 
housing. The shift from municipal services departments to independent 
corporatised entities envisaged by iGoli 2002 determines widespread anxiety in 
both the union’s offices and the depots. In particular, SAMWU is afraid of the 
                                                
200 GJTMC, Medical Aid Task Team, Investigation into the Rationalisation of Medical Aid 
Schemes within the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, January 1997, 
SAMWU. 
201 GJTMC, Pension Fund Task Team, Investigation into the Rationalisation of Pension and 
Provident Funds within the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council, January 
1997, SAMWU. 
202 Hlubi Biyana, SAMWU Johannesburg Branch Organiser, Interview with Author, 17 April 
2000. 
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council’s intentions to transfer its employees from the existing funds to schemes 
run by corporate administrators along private sector lines, which would involve 
lower employer contributions, defined contribution schemes203 and, therefore, a 
growing commodification of retirement provisions. As an alternative, the union 
proposed the “secondment” of existing schemes for a transitional periods, as 
opposed to “transfer” to new schemes. “Secondment” would imply that the 
council remains as the employer and, to protect retirement benefits, rules of the 
funds are not changed. According to SAMWU organizers, however, GJMC has 
 
major problems with the idea of secondment, they are concerned with 
productivity, that people are not working and council feels that they 
are paying too much in wages and contributions to individuals204.  
 
The perception, already examined, that the municipality intended to use 
restructuring to reassert managerial control on the workplace and contain workers’ 
strength by undermining job security and employment conditions, is therefore 
transferred onto the terrain of social provisions. The union identifies here the 
increasing commodification of retirement income and benefits as a tool through 
which workplace power relations themselves could be profoundly modified. Such 
fears and worries are mirrored in workers’ narratives and analysis of service 
delivery changes. Apart from casualisation and the threat of job losses, loss of 
benefits, especially housing subsidies, and the uncertain fate of the provident 
funds figured prominently among the perceived threats of iGoli 2002. At the same 
time, however, the “secondment” of retirement contributions did not resonate in 
workers’ demands on the shopfloor. On the contrary, more pressing, immediate 
needs and the fear of layoffs -- despite the  reassurances by the mansapala (the 
GJMC) that no retrenchment would occur during the first three years of 
implementation of iGoli 2002 -- made many workers demand the full 
reimbursement of their accumulated contributions before the transition to the new 
utilities and agencies. In this sense, the contrast between the union’s militant 
                                                
203 The adoption of a unified, municipality-wide DC scheme was already advocated in 1997 by the 
Council’s task team in charge of reforming municipal retirement funds, see GJTMC, Pension Fund 
Task Team, cit., p.28-29. 
204 Hlubi Biyana, cit. 
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rhetoric of resistance to iGoli 2002 and workers’ preoccupation with daily 
survival and hardships could not be more marked: 
 
Coming to iGoli 2002, I am shivering like a branch from a rotten tree. 
There is the possibility for salary cuts and even the possibility of 
being kicked out, because the people who are going to run this 
business will say they don’t have enough money to pay us and we 
must know that we are no longer working for Greater Johannesburg, 
so you can pack your stuff and just go (…). The council is harassing 
us because they don’t want to give us our money like pension funds, 
provident funds. All those money they deducted from our wages must 
come back to us, because council is changing now and employing 
contractors, so we want our money before we can enter those utilities, 
and the Blue Card money, the UIF. The mansapala, is supposed to 
give us what it owes us before it goes to utility.  
Q: The municipality says they won’t retrench anyone. 
A: It can happen. it’s like when you make a proposal to a lady, you 
can promise her anything, that you will buy her this and that, even if 
you can’t, and that is what they are trying to do with us (…). There is 
a person, appointed city manager, Khetso Gordhan, he’s the one who 
has transformed railways to Metro Rail: how many people lost their 
jobs there? (…) When they say our jobs will be secured for just three 
years, that is nonsense to us, we don’t want that. If they can say our 
job is secured for 3000 years, that is alright, or 300 years, not three 
years. When they talk about three years they make us confused. That 
is why we say, before they do anything they must give us our benefits 
back and we can start thinking where we want to go with them. 
(Interview #138) 
 
The demand for full reimbursement was not only unanimous at the Central roads 
depot (Interviews #113-124), but it was also combined to massive resentment 
towards SAMWU itself, due to its failures to inform the workers and indecision in 
“demanding our money back”205. As these cases show, however, demands for 
reimbursement revealed that the prospect of unemployment was regarded as 
somehow inevitable. Securing a lump sum payment could cushion the resulting 
uncertainty and provide opportunities for self-employment, to “make job creation 
for the poor people who are not working” (Interview #114). 
                                                
205 In this depot, the fact that SAMWU introduced me to the workers encountered substantial 
hostility. During my presentation of the project I was verbally assaulted by a worker shouting anti-
SAMWU arguments almost in tears, while another worker called me a Council’s spy. Only after 
considerable negotiations I was allowed to conduct interviews, whose participants, however, 
declined to provide their names, asked me not to tape the interviews and expected me to “go 
straight to the union and tell them that the people have said that they want their money back”. 
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7.2.4 Municipal Services and Utilities 
 
The picture of widespread and deepening commodification of working-class lives 
emerging from this chapter is, finally, completed by an analysis of problems 
related to access to municipal utilities (especially water and electricity). Recent 
research has underlined that municipal utilities provide an important terrain to 
observe trends in commodification (Barchiesi, 1998; Fiil-Flynn, 2001; McDonald 
and Pape, 2002; McDonald and Ruiters, 2004; Naidoo, 2004). In fact, 
restructuring of local government finances and changes in forms of local service 
delivery have emphasized “cost recovery” and the introduction of market-related 
rates as conditions for access. The introduction of devices like pre-paid meters for 
electricity and, more recently, water, and the disconnection of services for rates 
defaulters, have been particularly emphasized as tools to enforce user participation 
in the funding of services. Therefore, the shift from service subsidization by local 
councils to individual user payments redefines the nature of utilities from services 
to commodities, decisions to purchase which become a matter of individual 
consumer discipline in the allocation of scarce monetary resources. 
 Having a formal waged employment does not necessarily protect workers 
across the various sectors from declining access to local services. 15% of 
municipal workers interviewed lack running water in their houses and use 
communal taps, while 19% of chemical workers, 18.5% of metal workers 
(concentrated especially at Kelvinator), and 42% of municipal workers (24% of 
the total sample) cannot afford electricity as a regular source of heating, for which 
they use therefore paraffin stoves, coal stoves or heated bricks. A significant share 
of chemical workers (20%) is repaying arrears from past rates boycotts (for an 
average of R152.7 per month), while 6% of my overall sample was participating 
in boycotts at the time of the interview. Confirming findings of research done on 
the topic (Booysen, 2002), it seems that lack of financial resources, rather than 
socio-political militancy or preconceived refusal to pay, is the main reason for 
defaulting.  
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In general, it is possible that metalworkers’ visibly lower expenses for 
utilities compared to other categories (see Table 7.2) is a reflection of the critical 
conditions faced by many UCW and Kelvinator’s employees, which constrain the 
use of water and electricity. The internalization of consumer discipline and the 
need to exactly calculate consumption to better control how increasingly 
inadequate wages are spent are, however, attitudes that can be ascertained across 
the spectrum. The broadening adoption of, and more positive attitudes towards, 
pre-paid consumption of electricity is a clear indication of the reconfiguration of 
users as individualized customers of a discrete commodity, rather than as 
beneficiaries of a service rendered through public cross-subsidization. Therefore, 
more than half of all workers interviewed buys pre-paid electricity (69% of 
municipal workers, 55% of metal workers and 25% of chemical workers), with a 
strong preference for this form of access also among those who have metered 
consumption.  
The use of pre-paid cards has also been successful in containing costs, even 
when as I explained many workers do not use electricity for heating. While there 
is no substantial difference in the use of prepaid meters between workers with and 
without electric heating, it is nonetheless indicative of reinforced consumer 
discipline that almost all of Kelvinator’s ex-workers who don’t have electric 
heating use prepaid meters. Chemical workers’ payments for prepaid cards and 
metered amounts are, respectively, R96 and R162 per month, for municipal 
workers they are R108 and R239 per month, while metalworkers pay, 
respectively, R111 and R174. Overall, expenses for prepaid electricity are on 
average R108 per month, compared to R170 per month for metered consumption. 
It is, however, to be noticed that workers with electrician-types of jobs have a 
strong opposition to prepaid meters, blaming their colleagues’ acceptance of them 
on “bad influences” that prevent them to see how prepaid cards actually tend to 
increase the costs of consumption, for example by turning off boilers when the 
inserted amount is exhausted, which requires more electricity to re-heat the 
cooled-off water, while meters allow for thermostatic regulation of the 
temperature (Interview #23). 
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The preference for prepaid use is generally explained by the possibility this 
system allows to strictly discipline consumption and to make transparent when 
sacrifices have to be made: 
 
You know how much you use, you don’t have to talk to anybody, you 
just have to cut somewhere along the line, but you won’t get a 
statement that says you owe R1000 and you don’t know what to say 
(…). If someone doesn’t have money he shouldn’t use electricity, he 
should try other means, it’s his problem. (Interview #33) 
 
Increasing user payments for utilities related to policies of access based on “cost 
recovery” confirm trends discussed in this section with reference to other social 
provisions like healthcare, retirement benefits and housing. All these have seen 
the shift of a rising portion of the financing burden onto workers’ wages, a 
concurrent decrease in employer subsidization and limited coverage from public 
programmes. In conclusion, an increasingly commodified access to social services 
and provisions mirrors the strains imposed on workers’ wages by restructuring 
and growing insecurity within a disempowering workplace environment, as 
elaborated in the previous chapter. Commodification outside the workplace 
reinforces the erosion of workers’ strength inside and questions the significance of 
the wage form as a vehicle for social inclusion and citizenship, rather than mere 
survival, which conversely shapes a large part of workers’ narratives. The next 
sections will look at how challenges to waged employment are experienced within 
workers’ social life and how this translates into agency and strategies of social 
claims. 
 
 
7.3 Impacts of Commodification on Living Standards and Community Life 
 
The previous chapter has discussed the differential forms and impacts of the 
mobilization of community-based themes and discourse in intra-workplace claim-
making strategies with which workers respond to restructuring. While the appeal 
to community needs in some cases reinforces, as seen expecially for  municipal 
workers, demands for morality and fairness at work, the meanings of local 
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communities themselves, and the position waged workers and their families 
occupy inside them are deeply questioned and challenged by interconnected 
trends of commodification explored in the previous section. Therefore, for most 
respondents, the extra-workplace spaces of the community, the family and the 
household are materially experienced as areas of declining living standards and 
difficulties to cope with basic consumption due to employment uncertainties and 
the amount of resources shifted towards commodified social provisions. The sense 
of precariousness that is primarily felt in the workplace is therefore amplified 
within residential neighbourhoods where “everything is about money” and “things 
are more and more expensive”.   
The sense of frustration derived from such realities tends to be all the more 
pronounced especially insofar these workers eschew a mentality based on 
“handouts” and state protection and place great pride in the capacity of their work 
to provide for family needs. The moral universe surrounding work in relation to 
family and community responsibilities emerged, on the other hand, in many 
workplace interviews from the previous chapter, where having a permanent 
employment was assumed, in ways that reflect a recurring theme in South African 
labour historiography (Goodhew, 2000; Vincent, 2000), as specifically conducive 
to family obligations and community respectability. Conversely, unemployment 
and job losses are associated by most respondents to social decay, community 
disintegration and crime as moral opposites of rightful employment. 
Simultaneously, disruptions in the relations between employment and family life 
largely reflect rising vulnerability within the sphere of employment itself 
(Crompton, 2002). In this sense, links between waged work, family and 
community define workers both as “disciplined selves” (Lamont, 2002: 28-33), 
which heavily invest in their own work as the main vehicle for social inclusion, 
and as “caring selves”, whereby work is not seen in isolation from moral criteria 
for success, such as providing for the family. In the final analysis, once the web of 
ethical meanings and standards that are bestowed upon the wage are challenged 
by commodification, the vision that social citizenship and inclusion are enabled 
and strengthened by wage labour is irredeemably eroded. 
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Compared to five years before being interviewed, 54.5% of respondents 
reported a decline in their families’ living standards, 24.2% did not find 
substantial differences, while for 21.2% (approximately half of which had started 
a double occupation over the same period) there was an improvement. In the case 
of metalworkers, more hardly hit by deindustrialisation and retrenchments, 57.1% 
reported a decline, which include various cases with more than one household 
income, and 14.3% an improvement. In this group, 19 out 60 respondents said that 
monthly household income is inadequate for basic necessities, and 26 out of 60 
experience a total inability to save money by the end of the month. For 35 of them 
food is the main household expenditure, followed by transport (11), education (7) 
and accounts with retailers (5). At crisis-ridden companies like UCW and 
Kelvinator, but also among GJMC employees, indebtedness with “loan sharks” is 
widespread, which is all the more significant considering the respondent’s 
reluctance to talk about this topic. 
 The self-biographical conceptualizations that inform my informants’ sense 
of residential communities resonate with the structural dynamics and processes 
that shaped the experiential world of South Africa’s black working class between 
apartheid and democracy. They are at the same time manifestations of the 
subalterns’ ability to articulate before and during the transition localized 
trajectories of liberation by connecting to, and creatively adapting, broader 
oppositional discourses of race, class and gender. Therefore, the experience of 
migration, life in segregated neighbourhoods and compounds, and, especially in 
the case of East Rand workers, the violence that accompanied the post-apartheid 
transition, are integral to the extra-workplace determinants that have shaped 
working-class communities within a general trajectory of urbanization and 
layering of the rural-urban divide (Stewart, 1981; Sitas, 1983; Webster, 1985; 
Moodie, 1994). 
 The complex interplay between structural determinants of waged working 
class formation and subjective responses, repertoires and values attached, often 
oppositionally, to the process is what ultimately shaped respondents’ awareness of 
belonging to “community” spaces. Wage labour provided at the same time a force 
of exploitation and degradation, but also the repository of discourses and practices 
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of solidarity, resistance, pride, respectability (Bozzoli, 1991). In a previous 
chapter I have explained how the organized and ideological trajectory of South 
African trade unions in the struggle against apartheid refused to be contained 
within the terrain of the wage and workplace bargaining by investing it with  
demands and expectations related to community upliftment and access to social 
rights. Simultaneously, the space of the “community” is not reducible in these 
cases to the mere socio-economic forces shaping residential localities in their 
functional articulations with the factory (Dawley, 1976; Cumbler, 1979). Nor can 
the sense of residential working-class communities be reduced to a mere 
projection of workplace-based collective solidarity, meanings and identities 
(Bozzoli, 1987). The relationship, in this case, cuts both ways, and discourses of 
needs, rights, morals, ethnicity, religion and citizenship that are developed from 
interactions in households and localities invest wage labour, the workplace and 
working-class discourses.  
In the previous chapter I have underlined how these themes are mobilized to 
structure feelings and utterances that express deprivation and disempowerment 
experienced at the point of production. Similarly, the sense of collective power 
and cohesion brokered by wage labour and union organization inside the 
shopfloor is projected on the residential locality in the form of normative codes, 
expectations, regulatory ideas and discourses, where for example the relevance of 
the urban-rural interaction remains pre-eminent. In the past the action of powerful 
organizations based on waged employment was seen as  reshaping the rural-urban 
relations as a divide where rurality and ruralised mindsets were increasingly 
identified with conservatism, reaction and persistence of pre-modern identities. 
This trend became more pronounced in the 1990s with the growing distancing of 
union organizations from migrants’ hostels (Taylor, 1991; Chipkin, 1994).  
In the cases I investigate, however, the crisis of wage labour, its unfulfilled 
promises, its increasing instability that make linkages with visions of 
emancipation and social citizenship blurred and hollow, tend in many respects to 
alter this relation. Now it is the city itself, its expensiveness, its hyper-
commodified lifestyle to be regarded by many as a place of instability and 
dislocation. Therefore even for many workers that have been residing for long 
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periods of time in urban areas, rurality often comes to be idealised as a space of 
renewed opportunities, of more relaxed forms of life, or more ethically-minded 
patterns of interaction, of social order vis-B-vis the disorderly forces of 
restructuring and global competition. Idealization of extra-urban life forms is here 
often phrased more in terms of building a strategy of “exodus” from the decay of 
waged employment, a theme that graphically surfaced in the “Egypt vs Canaan” 
trope used by a worker in the previous chapter, rather than as reference to material 
and calculable opportunities. The surfacing of such forms of anti-urban imagery 
are all the more relevant considering the importance, also noticed in Chapter 6, 
that community needs and morality play in reinforcing workers’ claims, especially 
in the GJMC, vis-B-vis workplace restructuring. 
Marginalized urbanization and subaltern insertion in waged employment 
provide common foundations for most of my respondents’ trajectories into the 
working class, and defined the social conditions out of which waged labour was 
linked to an emancipatory imagery throughout the transition to post-apartheid 
democracy. Conversely, cases in which insertion in formal employment was the 
result of downward social mobility are few and relatively exceptional, like that of 
a Baldwin’s employee that between 1979 and 1989 was a professional soccer 
player in the NPSL and, following an injury, had to give up “an expensive life 
which I can’t afford any more, taking my family out, I had a car, my kids were 
attending a multiracial school, and I managed to buy food from the shop” 
(Interview #18). Most exporters, though, experienced wage labour as a, certainly 
conflicted, process of social advancement.  
For two groups of workers, Kelvinator’s “founders” and GJMC employees, 
migrancy is a widespread feature of working class formation. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the former group was mainly made of previous Barcep’ workers, older 
and with longer tenures than other Kelvinator’s employees, and with which Simon 
Koch built a “social contract” based on family-type ideology and employee share 
ownership when he took over the company in 1996. The collapse of the company 
left many of them with no other prospect than becoming dependant on relatives 
and wives, or pool their provident funds’ payments with colleagues in the hope of 
starting small businesses. In this way, incidentally, suspicion and recrimination 
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left by the company’s closure between older and younger workers could to some 
extent be bridged in the quest for new avenues of survival. Many others were 
simply faced with the choice of using their provident funds to repay debts and 
accounts, or falling prey of “loan sharks”. For a minority, the return to rural 
communities was a possibility, especially when family networks in rural areas 
allowed survivalist activities in subsistence agriculture or cattle grazing on 
“chiefs’ land” (Interview #60). 
A substantial portion of municipal workers still live in hostels like Anthea, 
City Deep, Nancefield, which could host up to 4,000 people in 10-beds dorms. 
The persistence of this elements, which goes back to the coercive processes of 
recruitment under the migrant labour system, is amplified by the fact that many 
workers have left the hostels “looking for greener pastures” after the first 
democratic elections, or were chased by “migrant workers that were politicized to 
be Inkhata members” (Interview #129) during township violence in the early 
1990s. Moreover, not only elderly workers reside in hostels as a remnant of an age 
in which “the council asked the amaKhosi [“Chief”] for people to work for two 
cents per week, cheap labour, people from the farms, who didn’t know about 
money” (Interview #88). In fact, also younger workers in their 20s, escaping 
unemployment from the former “homelands” and arriving to the depots’ gates to 
look for casual jobs, end up in the hostels, like the following 29 year old 
employees at GJMC’s waste department: 
 
The rooms can accommodate 8 or 10 people, but in my room we are 
14. They keep promising they are going to change these hostels but 
until now nothing has changed, there is water leaking and everything 
is bad. It is still the same as under apartheid, no change. (Interview 
#96) 
 
Many workers from rural areas regard the return to their places of origins as a 
force countervailing employment uncertainty wrought upon them by restructuring. 
Such attitudes often militate against the development of urban-based militancy 
and nurture a sort of fatalism based on the identification of the “city” with a 
“workplace” that becomes increasingly precarious. This is the case of a 60-year 
old worker from ThabaNkulu (Transkei), who has worked in the Johannesburg 
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waste department since 1969 and lived in Anthea hostel (Industria) since 1971. He 
sends R1,500 of his R1,800 monthly wage to Transkei, where he provides for his 
wife and six children, none of whom with a formal occupation: 
 
A1: I want to go back to Transkei because I don’t have any family 
here and I can’t bring them here [laughs]. As our culture, I think we 
don’t belong with Johannesburg. The graves of our family are in the 
homeland, we come here just to work, not to sit, not to get some 
house here. We could, but when I retire I am supposed to sell that and 
go back to my roots. 
[A female colleague nearby overhears our discussion and laughs] 
Q: Why are you laughing? 
A2: It’s about this thing of going back… I was born here and I must 
stay here. 
A1: They wouldn’t have anywhere to go back to, but we were born 
outside of Johannesburg, in Mpumalanga, Transkei, and we are supposed 
to go back there. You see, those people left their houses and their 
brothers and bought houses here and then when they had to go back they 
no longer knew where they came from… 
A2: Ahhhh! I don’t agree, I know where I come from, I know where 
my grandfather’s place is, Pietersburg, but I am not planning to move 
there! 
A1: When their grandfather passes away their grandchildren forget 
everything about their roots [the other worker laughs], but we, our 
family is there and we come here just to work and after few months I 
travel back there. If I die here in Johannesburg they will take me back 
to my forefathers to bury me there at home, we must be there to the 
grave of our forefathers. (Interview #106) 
 
For other workers, the decline of waged employment leads to a re-evaluation of 
rurality as a dimension that can shelter the individual from the negative perceived 
social and moral consequences of unemployment. In these cases, attempts to 
reassert masculinity and household authority are not foreign to the development of 
anti-urban rhetoric: 
 
At home [Gazankulu] it is better than in Johannesburg. In 
Johannesburg you need a lot of money, you cannot stay here without 
money, you see, so at home I can get food by ploughing, mielies, you 
know, selling bananas and mangoes, it’s better. Life is harder here if 
you don’t have good money. If you are not working, to get a divorce 
is very easy, but now somebody thinks he cannot lose his wife 
because he’s not working, but that is to start thinking something 
wrong. (Interview #177, Nampak Corrugated) 
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 It would be, however, misleading to read respondents’ attitudes to urban 
and rural life as merely the reflection of a polarized divide between younger and 
older employees or between “urbanized” workers and “migrants”. Things seem 
indeed to be more complex, and an approach that could be defined as “resurgent 
ruralism” has been developed by fully, second- or third-generation urban workers 
that have come to see the reconstruction of community and economic possibilities 
in the rural areas as a form of escape from the decline of waged employment in 
the city. A Paperlink employee born in 1940 in Orlando West (Soweto), after the 
forced removal of his family from Kaserne (Johannesburg) during the early stages 
of the township, is now planning to move to GaRankuwa (former 
Bophuthatwsana), where his father transferred to his family’s land and bought 
some cattle in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto revolt. While always opposed to 
follow his father to GaRankuwa (“the riots were bad for the kids who couldn’t go 
to school, but they were good for me”) he is now re-imagining rural life as an 
opportunity to reconstruct in his old age the pride, authority and respectability 
shattered by unfulfilled workplace expectations and increasing commodification 
of life at home: 
 
Life in Johannesburg is not that good, because it is too fast, 
everything here is too fast, people kill each other, do what-what, 
robberies, hijackings. Eisch! It’s very terrible, you can’t buy, can’t 
have anything nice, when you stay in the location you must carry a 
gun all the time and I can’t live like that. And people don’t have 
respect for each other, they behave very reckless, you can’t expect 
help from somebody and if you have something better than them that 
will start jealousy and they will try to remove that from you. There is 
no solidarity. (Interview #157) 
 
Others are more skeptical of unwarranted idealizations, and look at opportunities 
in rural areas with a more strictly utilitarian and calculating mindset, which is 
nonetheless revealing of the growing burden of commodification on family life. 
The following respondent’s father moved to QwaQwa “looking for a homeland”, 
but for him, born in Soweto, economic necessity seems the deciding factor in his 
future life strategies: 
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Q: Are you planning to retire to QwaQwa? 
A: It is not attractive to me, I don’t like the place. The way I see that 
place is the way we are living in Soweto, I don’t see it any different. 
Before, when homelands were doing things like farming, people had 
cows, there was action, but now when I look at that place, it is like I 
am living in Soweto, I don’t see anything different. If I had land and 
some cattle and I could grow my mielie I would move there. In 
Soweto I pay rent, pay electricity, everything is money, everything! 
(Interview #165, Nampak Corrugated). 
 
Diverse views and arguments with which rural-urban interactions are articulated 
in workers’ community and family discourse seem not easily reducible to a 
mechanic opposition between “rural” and “urban” forms of consciousness. They 
rather appear useful as commentaries on the problems experienced within the 
urban setting itself, which most workers accept as their primary experiential 
world. Perceptions of what are the most urgent problems experienced by the 
respondents in their residential communities are mostly associated with images of 
social decay and subversion of the moral order revealing anxiety with rising 
uncertainty, concern for greater stability and a strong orientation to family values 
(Klubock, 1997; Lamont, 2002: 30; Kaufman, 2003). The social constructions of 
the sense of stability and instability already noticed inside workplaces are 
transferred and reflected in the community, where the decline of wage labour is 
considered as tantamount to no less than social chaos. Crime, in particular -- 
almost invariably linked to growing unemployment as a cause and as an effect 
inasmuch it scares investors away -- is the most pressing community problem 
emerging from my interviews, relegating issues like HIV-AIDS, or access to 
social services to distant seconds: 
 
I have been treated bad in my life many times, but now I have to have 
guns pulled out at me by young tsotsis, children really, and that is too 
much for us. Schoolchildren walk around with guns and if I go to the 
police they are running for cover, but if you beat your wife you go to 
jail, but for crimes and hijackings the police doesn’t come”. 
(Interview #130) 
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It is to be noticed that the view of domesticity emerging from this quote, whereby 
“beating your wife” is seen as separate and different from “crime”, indicates that 
one of the ways in which life treats this respondent badly could be to frustrate his 
masculinity. Many other respondents articulate a sense of growing inability to 
take care of the family as a result of retrenchments and insecurity. As a matter of 
fact, “family violence” or “violence against women” is indicated as a specific 
problem, apart from the broad heading of crime, by only a tiny minority of 
respondents (three, all of them women). The use of crime as a metaphor for social 
collapse linked to unemployment points therefore at deeper anxieties with the 
erosion of age and gender power within the household, which in their way provide 
a conservative response to the crisis of a male breadwinner role linked to waged 
employment.  
 Reassertion of masculinity as a bulwark of social stability and a pillar of 
community moral order is widely voiced across different cases, in forms often 
mainly defensive, sometimes overtly conservative: 
 
As in our customs, you are responsible for your family, I must make 
sure everything is in order, that my children and my wife have enough 
food. Even if she’s working I shouldn’t rely on her money. (Interview 
#88) 
 
Other male workers express resentment at the fact that, faced with a decline in 
household living standards, rising expenditures and growing commodification of 
social provisions, double family incomes become a necessity and wives have to 
look for jobs. This leads to a renegotiation of the gender division of household 
labour, and the shift of some family care responsibilities on the husband 
(Interview #9; see also Harries, 1994 and Lindsay, 2003). Masculinity, on the 
other hand, is not the only way in which the decline of wage labour is turned into 
a construction of community problems around a conservative discourse of “moral 
scare”. Another factor cited with some regularity (21 respondents out of 220) as 
linked to crime and conducive to job losses is immigration. A small but visible 
minority of respondents identifies foreigners at the same time as responsible for 
growing unemployment and actors in spreading criminal behaviours: 
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Here in SA we didn’t know what drugs, cocaine were before, so 
South Africans must get jobs and the foreigners must go out. 
(Interview #56). 
 
The fact that this respondent’s hostility towards criminalized foreigners conceals 
anxieties with labour market competition is then revealed by the mixed sense of 
admiration and alarm with which he recognizes that “they know how to get things 
done, they know how to find work”. 
Finally, the conservative social imagery with which the crisis of wage labour 
is translated into a discourse of community order and morality leads some 
respondents to criminalise community radicalism that, emerging outside the 
traditional ambits of working class politics and organization, responds to 
decommodification with forms of direct action. While conducting my interviews, 
for example, a wave of fees and rents boycotts had spread in many sections of 
KwaThema, organized by a “KwaThema Electricity Crisis Committee” (KTECC) 
in protest against the installation of prepaid meters and disconnections for 
residents who defaulted on arrears. A UCW worker living in KwaThema, for 
example, while reasserting the civic duty and community responsibility of paying 
for arrears, quickly dismissed KTECC’s form of activism: 
 
Two weeks ago in our location they robbed Eskom to get electricity 
but now the police is trying its best, they arrest those people (…). 
[They] make a lot of wrong things, smash company cars, so Eskom 
doesn’t dare to come to KwaThema. (Interview #35) 
 
It is, moreover, significant that, even if many workers blame increasing 
commodification of life and access to social provisions for their declining living 
standards, very few (23 out of 220) directly mention issues related to 
commodification (including evictions, utilities disconnections, municipalities’ 
refusals to write arrears off) as community problems. This is all the more striking 
considering the importance of access to services and community justice in 
workers’ discourse, especially in the GJMC, inside the workplace. In this sense, it 
seems easier for respondents to raise the threat of commodification to underline 
the erosion of their wages and job security, rather than directly tackling 
commodification with an activist discourse at the community level. At this level, 
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instead, waged employment is reasserted as a cornerstone of an order that is at the 
same time economic, social and moral, whereby the decline and uncertainties 
faced by wage labour are therefore easily translated into a defensive, conservative 
discourse. 
 The ambiguities here emphasized in the meanings attributed to 
commodification and the decline of waged employment within workers’ 
communities contribute to problematise the notion of community as a disputed 
social and symbolic space. Competing, often contradictory, discourses and 
ideologies are used in this space by social actors to position themselves within 
broad socio-economic changes characterized by high levels of uncertainty and 
where stable identities are deeply questioned. Such ambiguities and quandaries 
also raise, however, issues related to the agency of actors involved and to their 
ability to shape coherent claims, strategies and responses. The final section of this 
chapter will look at how respondents’ views of entrenched working class 
organizations are affected, how views of trade union activity and government 
delivery are modified, and how all this impacts on workers’ discourse of social 
rights and citizenship. 
 
7.4 Workers’ Agency and Social Citizenship Discourse in the Crisis of Wage 
Labour 
 
Unionization and shopfloor organizing have been experienced by respondents in 
highly differentiated ways, largely dependent on factors related to age, timing of 
insertion in the labour force, periods of recruitment and length of union 
membership. Such differences, conversely, profoundly influence views of the 
unions’ role and possibilities in response to the crisis of wage labour, growing 
instability and commodification. At the same time, different responses help to 
shed light on the dilemma, emerged at the end of the previous section, of the 
persistence of extra-workplace understandings of the crisis that emphasize 
defensive and conservative worker identities. In fact, a large majority, albeit by no 
means unanimous, trend across different experiences tends to regard union 
organization alone as inadequate to stem the tide of changes and reverse their 
 311
most undesirable effects, even if most workers continue to rely heavily on the 
union for defense and protection within their specific work environments. 
 It is possible to gather from older workers’ narratives of union 
organizating from apartheid to the “new South Africa” not only the expectations 
for socio-economic and political change that accompanied unionization, but also 
the diversity of themes and emancipatory discourses the unions injected in 
workers’ everyday lives. For many migrant workers the union was the actor that 
made oppression legible within segregated compounds and factory gates, and 
made liberatory possibilities emerge out of an oppressive system of social and 
labour control. Others recall unionization as essentially a process of development 
of social and political consciousness out of an opening to community struggles 
and a gradual questioning of the boundaries of the workplace and of the wage 
relation. For others, finally, the union was a force capable to effectively bargain 
for workers’ rights and power on the point of production, counterbalancing the 
exploitation and precariousness that are constitutive of black working class 
formation in South Africa. 
 The story of Vukile (Interview #201), a shop-steward at MB Glass is 
particularly illustrative of how the experience of union organizing could bring all 
these strands together. Born in 1960 in KwaZakhele to parents from Korsten (Port 
Elizabeth), and therefore classified as “coloured”, Vukile was first exposed to the 
climate of shopfloor worker militancy developing around Durban in the 1970s 
while visiting relatives in Pinetown. After school he found employment at the 
Ford plant in Struandale (Eastern Cape), where he absorbed the discourse of 
political radicalism emanating from “community unions”. He joined  one of them, 
MACWUSA, where  he was recruited by the historic leader Thozamile Botha in 
1979, when “unfortunately or coincidentally” a strike wave started and “all hell 
broke loose”. Conflict in that period took place between “workerist” and 
“community” unions, and between pro-ANC organizations and Azanian People’s 
Organization’s (AZAPO) supporters. In the process, Vukile came to regard wage 
labour in nuanced terms, as a factor enabling a discourse of solidarity and 
struggle, but also as a boundary that confined emancipatory desires, preventing 
strategic choices more attuned to a radical vision of political freedom and social 
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liberation. The contradictory tensions between oppression and liberation that 
emerged within the wage relation were ultimately resolved by Vukile with a 
radical political choice. Following experiences of dismissals and arrests that for 
him were evidence of the limits of a purely workplace-based struggle, his brother, 
who was in exile but also conducting underground activities inside the country, 
recruited him as an Umkhontho we Sizwe (MK) underground operative.  
After some training in Zambia and a growing frustration with the climate of 
tension, repression and internecine strife in the Eastern Cape, in 1984 he finally 
moved to Katlehong South (East Rand), where the unions were particularly active 
with local social movements to resist evictions and forced relocations. In the East 
Rand he initially worked “under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church”, of 
which he is a member and under which he did further studies in Lesotho, since it 
was “the best education you would ever get in Southern Africa”. At the same 
time, his political work in the East Rand, “working from Khotso House under the 
guidance of Moss Chikane and Reverend Frank Chikane”, included the political 
education of migrants from the Eastern Cape and helping some of them to join the 
exiled opposition. Finally a relative who was a shop steward at Metal Box’s 
Leondale plant found him a job there in 1986. While his identity as an 
underground MK operative was concealed from his colleagues, and recruitment 
inside the factory was deemed too dangerous, the workplace and the union were a 
basis and a cover for an essentially political type of activism.  
At the same time, Vukile was not merely instrumental about belonging to 
the union, as he worked to organize an underground structure of the Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union (CWIU), before it was recognized at MB Glass. Union 
and political activism were ultimately seen as mutually reinforcing because “we 
were all people working together in terms of pursuing our political aims”. Vukile 
combined his political radicalism with a remarkably pragmatic approach to 
workplace struggle, for example refusing to embark on illegal strikes before the 
union was recognized, which was regarded as “shooting ourselves in the foot”. 
After the union was recognized he became a shop steward in 1987. Subsequently, 
Inkatha supporters inside MB Glass started organizing their own union, UWUSA, 
and clashes with CWIU members erupted inside company premises. COSATU 
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unions’ policy at the time was that “we need not to draw the dagger inside 
company premises”, mainly not to jeopardize political networks. In the first half 
of the 1990s, when MB Glass started retrenching and Vukile was scheduled for 
layoffs, he went back to full-time political activism, this time amidst the turmoil 
and violence that in Katlehong confronted residents at Kwesini hostel, an IFP 
stronghold, and township people during apartheid’s final phase. His task was first 
“a kind of conscientising and politicizing” among informal settlements residents 
recently migrated from the Eastern Cape, and then organizing the local “self-
defence unit”: 
 
It was comprised of people who were mostly illiterate, they were not 
educated, and our task was to convince them that we were fighting for 
a just cause and also convince them that they must not believe in 
ethnic leanings, that was after Madiba came and called ourselves and 
said, look here, you must form your own self-defense units. 
(Interview #201) 
 
In general, the experience of violence in the early 1990s surfaces in other 
companies I researched, like Consol20 and Nampak Corrugated, and it played a 
decisive role in strengthening community links and pro-ANC allegiances among 
East Rand workers. Once rehired by MB Glass in 1997 as a palletizing machine 
operator, Vukile now sees its position in the company as stable and relatively 
satisfying. The company is strongly unionized, with a tradition of militancy that 
managed to win comparatively generous in-house wage agreements, and where 
having a political background is considered as an asset (“we are not used to rely 
too much on our union officials because we have what it takes to be self-
esteemed”). Moreover, he lives in a two-room RDP house given to him as “a 
reward for my contribution to the struggle”. As he puts it, “We pushed the 
breadline level, that’s what we fought for”, and he is overall satisfied with his 
situation in the company and in his community. Rather than reinforcing a 
conservative attitude towards problems facing the “new South Africa”, however, 
his long-standing ANC and SACP membership does not make him forget the 
                                                
20 Here, according to a worker, IFP supporters spread rumours that if they had joined COSATU 
“their money would be used to kill workers” (Interview #181). 
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importance of a strong and independent union movement to struggle for socio-
political change: 
 
I don’t think we have to rely on the government when we want to 
pursue our aim, more especially as labour. For that matter we do have 
a right to see that the government hasn’t done enough for labour as 
such, we as workers need to be independent. (Interview #201) 
 
I have delved in some detail into Vukile’s self-biographical narrative as 
particularly illustrative of an organizational and political trajectory that for many 
workers came to represent the union as the harbinger of a discourse of democracy 
and citizenship. Functional to this was a growing sense of inadequacy towards the 
workplace and the wage relations as sites where the struggle was initially 
confined. At the same time, working class organization became in the imagery of 
many East Rand workers a vehicle for structural social change that was not 
merely delegated to political leadership, even when the option of a negotiated exit 
from apartheid emerged at the institutional level. 
 For many respondents, however, the sense that wage labour solidarity and 
union mobilization could continue to effectively strive for fundamental social 
change started to be increasingly questioned once it emerged that, instead of being 
the avenue for broader and more protected social rights, wage labour was 
becoming increasingly unstable and vulnerable. The macroeconomic and 
productive restructuring that accompanied the birth of democratic South Africa 
faced workers with new forms of exploitation and insecurity, taking place under 
the rule of a friendly government and with a legislation protecting trade unions 
and centralized bargaining. While the tide of retrenchments started mounting, not 
only was the identification of responsibilities made difficult by shifting 
conjunctions of policy-making and economic globalisation, but the very power of 
the unions on the shopfloor came to be seen as ineffective and endangered. A 
colleague of Vukile at MB Glass had also approached the unions in the 1970s, 
when “I was at school and I was fighting for my rights, when the apartheid regime 
was forcing us to learn Afrikaans” (Interview #212). The strength of the union as 
a vehicle for change dawned on him when CWIU was recognized at MB Glass in 
1986, when “counseling people told management they can’t see how they could 
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fight the union”. He identifies the period before 1991, in particular as an age when 
“we always got what we want”, and strikes for plant-bargained wage increases 
were regularly successful. From 1991 on, however, “management started to turn 
things around” with a first wave of retrenchments, followed by another one two 
years later, in a context of heavy technological innovation, for a total of 
approximately 250 laid off workers.  
A new sense of powerlessness crept in on the shopfloor, where it became 
clear that the new government’s legislation and policies validated restructuring as 
an ineluctable, purely market-driven, politically “neutral” process: 
 
We didn’t go on strike because the LRA [Labour Relations Act] was 
in favour of them having retrenchments. They said it was an 
operational requirement, then there was a second restructuring which 
was made in that period and they brought in some subcontractors, like 
in canteen, and later spares of bottle manufacturing and molds have 
been outsourced. (Interview #212) 
 
At Nampak Corrugated, CEPPWAWU shop-stewards tend to agree that relations 
between the union and management in the post-apartheid workplace environment 
have improved, also due to new African human resources and work managers and 
to the fact that innovation and retrenchments are discussed in a “weekly action 
group” with a 60% union representation. Even in this context, however, shop 
stewards recognize that workers’ power on the shopfloor has been weakened, the 
union is confined to a predominantly defensive position and options to exercise 
collective power are constrained: 
 
We are no longer fighting like before. We had a Nampak national 
strike in 1990, especially in the corrugated division and the paper 
division. That was a big strike, it took us three months and three 
weeks (…) Those strikes have taught us many things, they taught the 
management a lesson, but they taught us also a lesson because many 
people have lost their jobs after the strikes. As workers we have been 
victims of that, we have lost in terms of our salaries and we have lost 
in terms of our comrades being fired during those strikes. (Interview 
#180)  
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In other companies, like Consol, management is, moreover, seen as maintaining 
an adversarial approach towards the unions as a presence “they want to do away 
with”, and whereby committees to discuss technological innovation and 
retrenchments “are only for communication” (Interview #185). According to a 
respondent in this plant, the situation for the union was better in the 1980s 
because management, even if “they had all these racial problems” accepted to 
recognize the union after prolonged confrontation. Then, when in 1995 the 
company introduced its plans for restructuring and downsizing,  
 
the union was not prepared because we were not sure what was going on, 
what they were referring to, we didn’t know that this restructuring and 
outsourcing was a monster or what. Before 1995 we had a good 
relationship with managers and we had job security. Then in 1995 they 
started talking about this downsizing, what-what, they came up with all 
these names. They said we had to compete globally to enter the world 
market and for us to compete they had to downsize (Interview #195). 
 
Here too, the marginalization of the union as a source of workers’ strength is 
considered as the product of a conjunction between shifting power relations and 
an economic and legislative environment favourable to business: 
 
it is better with the devil you know. The managers in those years were 
arrogant but were better than the managers of today. In fact even the 
LRA in those years was much more better [sic], it was more union-
friendly than the LRA that we are having today whereby you cannot 
strike if the company is restructuring. In the older days I could organize a 
strike now and take all the workers but today you can’t do that, because 
of the LRA that we are having. (Interview #181) 
 
Many workers talk nostalgically of the 1980s as an age in which unions were 
more capable to tip the workplace power relations in workers’ favour. A 
Kelvinator employee, for example, fondly talks about the 1987 strike and sit-in 
which won NUMSA the recognition at his employer at the time, Brollo Africa at 
Elandsfontein, an historic locale for metalworkers’ struggles: “It was a very well 
organized strike and we got recognition, it was very, very surprising how easily 
we won that one” (Interview #56). Now, however, the unions’ weakening and loss 
of power tend to reflect a sense of disillusionment due to the lack of fulfillment of 
 317
what union struggles seemed to promise at that time: making wage labour the 
foundation for citizenship, rights, social insertion.  
Sometimes union organizations have found themselves confronting their 
own members who expressed their frustration through spontaneous, unstructured 
industrial actions. Chapter 4 has already dealt with intra-union confrontations 
which accompanied Kelvinator’s demise. In 1991, union organization at 
Baldwin’s Brakpan plant has actually been eradicated following an unprocedural 
strike due to a slight delay in the payment of weekly wages. The seeming minor 
nature of the problem revealed however pent-up anger and anxiety among workers 
facing increasing economic pressure. The action escalated after hourly-paid shop-
stewards decided to side with the strikers while weekly-paid NUMSA members, 
backed by local organizers, condemned the action and continued to work. The 
intra-union confrontation, with the former group accusing the latter of “drinking 
tea with management” (Interview #1, 6 and 16) was the prelude to the eventual 
dismissal of the entire workforce and to the relocation of much of the plant’s 
operation to the company’s Isando facilities. Only in 1997 could NUMSA start 
organizing Baldwin’s Brakpan factory again.  
 Faced with a decreasing union’s ability to shape workplace power relations 
and to articulate a discourse of rights and citizenship with regard to a government 
ruled by an allied party which introduced pro-business industrial relations 
legislation, many union members share the opinion that “the union is ineffective 
because whatever it demands, their laws and their structures won’t allow 
anything. They’d just tell me about the economy, all these things” (Interview 
#160). Some workers blame union structures for bureaucratizing tendencies and a 
growing distance from the workplace, as in the case of this NUMSA shop-steward 
at Baldwin’s: 
 
We restarted the union here in 1997, and NUMSA Wits or National 
has done nothing to help us reorganize, they don’t even tell us what 
happens in Dorbyl’s shop steward council. Is Dorbyl paying them? I 
always call [NUMSA national official’s name]. 
Q: Well, he was telling me that Bill Cooper sounds almost as a union 
guy… 
A: Managers know [this NUMSA official] very well, he was a crane 
driver and now he’s a big man… I don’t get enough money, even the 
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organizers don’t get enough money, but the man has a house in 
Tsakane, and a house in Katlehong, and in Delpark, somewhere 
around there: three houses, man! You can ask yourself the question: 
why are our leaders relaxing too much? (Interview #1) 
 
Respondents display a wide variety of opinions as to what course of action the 
unions should take. Four main groups of answers emerge. The first option, 
particularly strong, quite predictably, among GJMC employees, but also among 
glass and paper workers, argues for a more radical, fighting union movement (“by 
toyi-toying things can be improved”, Interview #168) that asserts its independence 
outside and against the ANC if necessary: 
 
It was the workers who changed the government, we were toyi-toying 
for this new government, we were part of it and now what we want 
from the government really is to address our problems, because we 
are not earning. And now when we toyi-toyi, when we start to fight, 
they say we are killing our economy, our economy is going down. So 
we ask ourselves: can’t we fight anymore? (Interview #166) 
 
 
Sometimes this opinion is related to a view that union radicalism can be enhanced 
by struggling not only for employed workers but for broader social rights that can 
materialise the promise of the new democracy: 
 
The union has to engage the government, because the government has 
been voted by us. The previous government was oppressing us but 
now we are in a democracy so now if we have some complaints those 
people must hear us (…). Every night I am always dreaming about 
whether I will lose my job, where will I go? What will happen in ten 
years time in our country if people are not working? The union needs 
to be more militant in engaging the government, because in the 
present day I can’t be happy that I am working. If the union says, hey, 
let’s go and fight the government and I say no, I can’t go there 
because I am working, then I will be killing myself, at the end of the 
day I will lose my job. The union must fight both for the unemployed 
and for the people which are working. (Interview #217) 
 
The main areas of conflictual “engagement” are usually identified in “trying to 
convince the government that companies must stop retrenching workers” 
(Interview #170) -- also because “if the union keeps losing members it will go 
 319
down the drain” (Interview #216) -- and in demanding changes to the LRA to 
allow strikes over retrenchments and to force companies to disclose financial 
information that can enable workers to evaluate operational requirements for 
layoffs. 
 Second, a call is discernible for the unions to be more active as service 
organizations and develop skills to negotiate with managers the outcome of 
restructuring exercises. Once more in an unsurprising way, this view is 
particularly strong at Kelvinator, where many workers expressed dissatisfaction 
with the union’s ability to deal with technical issues raised by management to 
support the decision to liquidate. Therefore, being a union member is not 
primarily geared towards structural change and broad social citizenship 
discourses, but it is predominantly regarded as a form of protection at the point of 
production: 
 
When management brings its statements here, do we have on our 
benches qualified chartered accountants? NUMSA said they don’t have 
any, so how can they read the financial statements? (…). The union is 
like our lawyer in this company. (Interview #52) 
 
Third, and in radical opposition to the first group, there are respondents who 
blame the unions for their excessive radicalism which, by scaring off potential 
investors with unrealistic demands, prevent employment creation. This view is 
discernible across different companies but it is more concentrated at Baldwin’s, 
where the sad memories of the 1991 strike are still alive. In some cases this 
argument is presented in clearly conservative overtones: 
 
When there was the strike then I went to work, and they started toyi-
toyiing in front of my house, calling me sellout. The problem in South 
Africa is that unions are too militant: tomorrow Telkom is going on 
strike, teachers might also go on strike. If we are realistic, we have a 
government here who says, ‘Look, we know people are suffering but 
the cake is too small’. Telkom has given jobs to thousands of youth 
who passed their matric and now they want to go on strike, and when 
they go on strike maybe they will get 10.5%, but in the long run, what 
is it going to happen? Telkom will retrench people because they 
cannot cope now. (…) But now radicalism is gone at Baldwin’s and 
maybe I can even go back to the union, because it’s more interested in 
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“building the company. Before it was just intimidation, now it’s a free 
country. (Interview #15) 
 
Finally, a small minority holds the view that the priority is to fight for structural 
socio-economic change and social rights, and that the union alone is not adequate 
for this task. This orientation, which privileges the terrain of social movement-
type of organizing, is generally shared by those that identify commodification, 
evictions and disconnections of services as most pressing social problems. In this 
case, there is also a clearer perception that the struggle for democracy in South 
Africa was closely linked to social rights and provisions: 
 
When we refer to the previous manifesto of the ruling party, we were 
actually saying there must be a community-driven RDP, that simply 
means that the community should reconstruct and develop their areas, the 
local councils should be influenced by the community because they are 
actually serving humanity, they are serving the communities. (Interview 
#108) 
 
Some respondents, in particular, have been taking part in organized rents and fees 
boycotts within organizations like the KTECC in KwaThema or similar groups in 
Daveyton. Others support networks of activists who broke away from ANC-
aligned structures like SANCO but still articulate their demands through legal 
ways, like a group self-defined as “Skeleton” in Thokoza. In these experiences, 
boycotts are not necessarily and self-consciously articulated in a political sense, 
sometimes they are a self-reproducing practice inherited from the apartheid 
period, “just an automatic thing, we just don’t pay anymore. By now it has 
become a second nature” (Interview #8). Community-orientated discourses, 
however, can also take a markedly self-help, entrepreneurial flavour which 
emphasizes the importance of self-reliance as an alternative to dependence on 
government spending. Such views are often expressed in moderate political terms: 
 
People say Thokoza is too radical and they can’t go there, they say 
people there aren’t good, they are too rude. We are trying to improve 
that. We must try to be one, we have a ‘Simunye project’ that tries to 
build houses without the help of the government, or we repair sewerage 
so that we don’t have to call for the municipality to come because we 
pay people from here in the location. We also address problems of crime 
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and violence without waiting for the government. (Interview #57) 
 
In conclusion, attempts to rearticulate a sense of worker agency in response to the 
crisis of wage labour and to challenges facing union organizations seem to take 
place at the convergence of diverse, often contradictory, perceptions and visions. 
In particular, a sense of growing inadequacy of existing models of union 
organizing mirrors the decline of wage labour as a vehicle of entitlements and 
identities in workplaces and communities.  
 Yet, as already noticed in my discussion of the ambiguities of working 
class “conservatism”, wage labour in different ways remains at the center of 
respondents’ moral and symbolic order, and radically alternative, community-
orientated political identities that directly tackle commodification are relatively 
eschewed. Workers’ orientations to government and discourses of rights seem to 
confirm these observations. When specifically asked, a majority of my 
respondents (35%) trusted trade unions over the government as a representative of 
their interests, followed by those who answered that they trust both (28%). Some 
answers expressed trust for the government but skepticism as to the motives and 
morals of government officials as individuals. A deep distrust of, when nor overt 
hostility towards, the government is particularly pronounced in the case of GJMC 
employees: 
 
It’s my government who I have voted for that is my problem. Because 
they said they were going to change the things and we would be going to 
live in harmony. But now because it is our government sitting there on 
top, they are making us suffer. I see only fear, and the crisis, and it is our 
government who is creating all these things because these people from 
the municipality are part and parcel of the government. Now the 
government is saying they are making changes, but we don’t trust them 
any more.  Residents don’t know nothing about the changes, they are 
hitting us as the working class because about these changes what I see is 
privatization. (Interview #89) 
 
Most respondents are actively identified politically with the ANC -- either as 
members (36.4%) or as “supporters” (12.8%) – or with its allied organizations, 
SANCO and SACP. 15% of them identified community-based groups (burial 
societies, stokvels, club accounts, self-help groups, women’s groups, unaffiliated 
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civics) as their main arenas of associational life, while 14.2% indicated the 
churches. Support for the ANC still resonates with discourses of rights and 
expectations that structured anti-apartheid mobilizations, and which sit 
increasingly uncomfortably with current realities and social problems: 
 
If I continue to support them maybe I can make them make those 
changes. You see, in the past we were suffering, I could not go to that 
robot, they would catch me when I didn’t have a reference book. Now 
the ANC has fought for us and we are free because of the ANC, that 
is why I support the ANC. [Yet] when we were fighting we expected 
to get something, I didn’t expect to be treated like this. (Interview 
#148)21 
 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed as a contradiction that strong pro-ANC loyalties, 
nurtured in entrenched political consciousness and identities, are coupled to 
predominantly negative opinions of “delivery” during the first six years of 
democratic dispensation. Responses to these questions, however, reveal once 
again profoundly divided views between municipal and manufacturing workers. 
In fact, approximately 60% of workers interviewed defined themselves as 
unhappy with progress in social delivery by the government. While 88% of 
municipal workers expressed this view, however, less than half of manufacturing 
workers (48%) did. 
Perceptions of main problematic areas in government socio-economic policy 
and delivery are closely related to the nature of problems experienced by 
respondents in their workplaces and how they are reflected in their residential 
communities. This indicates an understanding of difficulties and vulnerability that 
is not mainly based on individual causes and responsibilities, and reinforces the 
impression that the crisis of wage labour is deemed as profound as to require 
structural policy interventions. Therefore, tariff barriers and reforms to company 
laws are mainly mentioned by Kelvinator workers, UCW employees refer to the 
collapse in public transportation, changes in the LRA to constrain managerial 
prerogatives on retrenchments are demanded by MB Glass and Consol workers. 
                                                
21 “Being treated like this” refers in this specific case to problems in having access to a housing 
subsidy. 
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Only 14% of respondents mention social expenditures not related to education 
(housing subsidies, public healthcare, income support for the jobless) as a priority 
area of government intervention. In some cases, respondents are apparently 
unaware of this aspect and mention it only when specifically propped, like in the 
case of workers demanding lower taxes once I raised the alternative between 
lower taxes and higher social spending (Interview #183). 
 The most widely cited priorities for government interventions are, 
however, “job creation” (31.8%) and education and training (30%). Both 
preferences indicate a persistent relevance of discourses of social insertion based 
on employment, self-activation and entrepreneurialism -- which mirror the noted 
importance of work in community discourses of order and respectability – despite 
the fact that wage labour is perceived as increasingly and “structurally” embattled 
in providing access to income, coping with commodified existence and nurturing 
collective identities. Conversely, a discourse of social rights and social citizenship 
as premised on policies of redistribution and decommodification is relatively 
marginalized by respondents. Many of them actually explicitly deny that the 
government has specific responsibilities to protect the income of unemployed 
workers. Sometimes, neglect of social rights as a government intervention is 
motivated by growing apathy and “wait and see” attitudes, even by workers who 
recognize that the struggle against apartheid was also a struggle for “people’s 
rights” like healthcare or affordable housing:  
 
I try not to think about these things because I don’t think anything is 
going to change, we have been fighting for a long time and now people 
are tired of fighting. (Interview #14) 
 
Faced with similar results and the centrality of “job creation” in the expectations 
of South Africa’s poor, Craig Charney (1995) took them as evidence of their 
“patience” and reduced expectations, as an indication of their aversion to radical 
demands, and as a sign of suspicion towards working-class organizations and 
militancy, seen as inimical to job growth. Therefore, Charney’s argument presents 
attachment to waged work and demand for decommodification and redistribution 
as opposed and mutually excluding. Such conclusions to some extent resonate 
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with my own observations on “working class conservatism”. They are, however, 
methodologically premised on binary mutually excluding oppositions – for 
example on whether “higher wages” or “jobs at lower wages” are preferable – that 
obscure individual and collective experiences of transformation and decline in 
wage labour’s conditions. It is precisely such experiences that ultimately make 
working class conservatism and moderation concepts fraught with ambiguities 
and contradictions. The impression emerging from my findings is that demands 
for job creation coexist with a widespread, and problematic, perception that wage 
labour does not guarantee social inclusion, rights and acceptable living standards 
even for formally employed workers. Therefore, rather than being merely opposed 
to decommodification and redistribution, the discourse of “job creation” expresses 
also a need for policy interventions and is not satisfied with individualized 
strategies.  
To address the seeming contradiction surrounding wage labour -- the 
contrast between its gradual disappearance in society and its persistent centrality 
in popular discourse of rights and entitlements -- a useful analytical key is 
provided by scholars, specifically within postcolonial theory. They have, 
specifically, looked at how institutions and official ideologies related to the 
development of subaltern subjectivities from below (Chakrabarty, 1988; Gooptu, 
2002; Cheah, 2003). Common to these analyses is the realization that the origins 
of subaltern discourses and demands cannot be understood as entirely separate 
from and indifferent to institutional discourses emerged from national liberation 
movements. Rather, institutions continuously provide repertoires that are 
variously utilized within subaltern communities to structure claims and contest 
meanings and strategies.  
In this sense, workers’ demand for “job creation” can be understood as the 
community extension of a widespread concern with protection of jobs inside the 
workplace, and as the appeal to government to protect the social status of wage 
labour. Workers’ autonomy and the search of a common ground with the post-
apartheid institutions coexist in unstable ways. At the same time they indicate the 
ability of institutional discourses, mainly from trade unions and the nationalist 
tradition, to “resignify” (Butler, 1997) grassroots desires and shape their reflexive 
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understanding of social problems by positing wage labour as a primary source of 
subjectivation. Here “jobs” come to mean not only employment in an abstract 
sense, but a set of dignified working conditions, including stability, respect and 
adequate wages, identified as necessary for social advancement and to fulfill 
family and community obligations. This section has also emphasized, however, 
how competing discourses are emerging to challenge attempts to reassert a view 
of social citizenship centred on wage labour. Such competing discourses try in 
particular to build community-based views of rights either in the form of anti-
urban “escapes” from wage labour, or by emphasising an entrepreneurial view of 
self-help and self-sufficiency or, in admittently a minority of cases, to privilege 
social movement activism to elaborate an autonomous discourse of 
decommodified social rights independent on waged employment. 
 
7.5 Conclusion  
 
The crisis in wage labour’s capacity to structure individual and household lives, to 
nurture strategies of social advancement and emancipation and to provide for 
rights and dignity, observed in the previous chapter, is confirmed by analyzing 
respondents’ community lives, perception of social problems, discourses of social 
citizenship. The main factor that at the level of residential spaces mirrors wage 
labour’s vulnerability and instability in the workplace is a widespread and 
growing commodification of workers’ lives. This makes access to the wage an 
increasingly inadequate measure of households’ security and a problematic form 
of access to social rights and citizenship. 
 Workers’ perceptions of and responses to commodification tend to 
rearticulate the borders between individual agencies, workplace and community in 
highly diversified, complex and contradictory ways. Commodification amplifies 
the anxieties and insecurities generated by adverse workplace changes, disclosing 
visions of social and moral decay associated with the hollowing out of waged 
employment, questioning the ability of union organizations to provide effective 
responses and producing generally negative attitudes towards progress in social 
delivery by the government. An autonomous discourse centred around social 
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citizenship rights, decommodification and redistribution of resources, however, is 
limited to a minority of cases. It is actually more likely to see criticism of waged 
labour coded as anti-urban ideologies as in old and resurgent forms of “ruralism”, 
often with strong traditionalist overtones. 
 For the majority, the crisis and disappearance of wage labour is the 
hallmark of negative social changes, when not overt catastrophic decay, and 
endangers a social and moral order based on age hierarchies, masculinity, male 
breadwinner’s pride and gendered structuring of household authority. Anxieties 
with regard to crime, and to a smaller extent immigration, reveal a proclivity for 
strategies emphasizing the restoration and stability of the private sphere and of 
immediate neighbourhoods, rather than alternative forms of community activism 
or political engagement. 
 At the same time, it would be reductive to read these findings as 
unproblematic evidence of working-class “conservatism”, as self-conscious 
downscaling of social expectations or as mere endorsement of individualized 
solutions. First, a crisis of wage labour is perceived as structural, its impacts in 
terms of poverty and precariousness are not blamed on failings on the part of the 
individual. Then, “job creation” essentially emerges as a way of contesting from 
within institutional discourses, from the government and the unions, reminding 
those in power of their historical obligations to fulfill workers’ emancipatory 
desires. It is indicative in this regard, that “job creation” is a widespread demand, 
not only confined to those facing specific forms of precariousness and insecurity 
that are either the product of job losses or of fears for their own jobs. Social 
citizenship discourses do not emerge spontaneously in a vacuum and they always 
resent of the institutions’ ability to structure grassroots discourses and desires. 
This factor is particularly pronounced in a South African case marked by national 
liberation politics with a strong pro-working class rhetoric. 
 Finally, the problematic reassertion of wage labour in respondents’ 
citizenship discourse, and the contradiction created with a social reality of crisis 
and weakening of waged employment, stimulate in a minority of cases dynamics 
of contestation based on community movements and decommodification. Despite 
the limited extent of this trend, the powerful resurgence of social movement 
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politics and radical decommodification demands that has taken place in the first 
half of the 2000s (Desai, 2002) makes it a worthy object of future investigation. 
The next chapter will look at how the crisis of wage labour in post-apartheid 
South Africa has been elaborated within the social policy and social citizenship 
discourse of the democratic state, and the ways in which government institutions 
respond to the social experiences and perceptions emerged from the decline of 
waged employment. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Wage Labour Discipline in South Africa’s Social Citizenship Discourse: 
From “Developmental Social Welfare” to “Comprehensive Social Security” 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Cases of transformation in waged employment and changing workers’ meanings 
of social citizenship in the last four chapters emphasise three general conclusions 
out of highly diversified processes. First, wage labour’s “promise” of social 
emancipation for East Rand and GJMC workers has been substantially questioned 
by production restructuring and labour market changes. Second, workers perceive 
the decline of wage labour as a condition for a dignified workplace life, collective 
identities and stable community and households not as a matter of individual 
market failure but as the result of structural dynamics requiring systemic policy 
interventions. Job losses, growing precariousness and uncertainty define in such 
perceptions a sense of fragility as part of the waged condition. Third, going back 
to the definition of social citizenship as a “contested field of signification” 
advanced in the Introduction, no structured alternative image of social rights is 
emerging to “re-signify” the emancipatory discursive space vacated by the crisis 
of wage labour. In particular, demands for social citizenship based on 
decommodification, or the rearticulation of grassroots identities in the form of 
social and community movements do not seem to play a decisive role in shaping 
workers’ responses. When the theme of the “community” is indeed mobilized, 
that often takes place in defensive ways, to reinforce workplace-based claims or to 
protect forms of authority and status endangered by the erosion of waged 
employment. 
 The specificities and discrepancies emerging from workers’ narratives 
over the last two chapters, moreover, validate the methodological choice, 
explained in my Introduction, of focusing on particular case studies to highlight 
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the links between social processes, discursive elaborations and the contested 
production of space at local levels. Under economic globalisation and neoliberal 
policy restructuring, as Brenner (2001) argues following Henri Lefebvre’s concept 
of “state mode of production”, the regulatory functions of the state tend to be 
separated from a sphere of social reproduction that is “contracted out” to the 
private sector. The process takes place essentially on a local scale, where the state 
“rescales” (Swyngedouw, 1996) space by promoting the competitiveness of 
localities according to their potential on global markets. The “uneven 
development” processes fostered by restructuring establishes new territorial 
hierarchies and geographical inequalities. Unequal processes of mobilization of 
space as a productive force are relevant both to the East Rand’s decline as a 
manufacturing area and, on the contrary, to the rise of a “contracting” model of 
local state in the GJMC under the “global city” imagery of “iGoli 2002”.  
My cases also show that a further reason to appreciate the importance of 
locality resides in the contested nature of local restructuring. New modes of state 
regulation clash with established traditions of solidarity and organization, the 
significance of labour in the social order, and histories of struggle that also shape, 
“from below”, localities in highly specific ways. Specificities also include the 
ways in which the decline of wage labour is elaborated within alternative 
strategies and grassroots discourses. Evelyn Nakano-Glenn’s (2002: 2) 
observation that it is at the local level that labour and citizenship are primarily 
“brought into the same frame” emphasizes that practices that shape identities and 
contestation at the local level often diverge from institutional perceptions and 
elaborations in the national state. Discourses and modes of signification of the 
labour-citizenship link within post-apartheid policy-making constitute the object 
of the present chapter. 
 A multiplicity of meanings and practices emerge from the scenario of 
crisis in waged employment, as reflected in the ambiguities inherent in demands 
for “job creation” discussed in Chapter 7. In the final analysis, such demands lend 
themselves to differing interpretations. They could, on one hand, be seen as 
confirming Slavoj Zizek’s view, mentioned in Chapter 1, of rights-based 
discourse as an “hysterical demand for a new master”, meaning that demands for 
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“delivery” and “jobs” in the absence of structured challenges to established social 
power relations are doomed to reinforce atomized patterns of subordination on the 
market. On the other hand, however, the fact that political power is reminded of 
its responsibility in the sphere of job creation can also indicate a deeper inability 
of the government’s post-1994 developmentalist and de-racialising agenda in 
enforcing an identification between “citizen” and “worker”, or a self-
understanding of citizenship as premised on waged employment. 
 In this chapter, I discuss how the relations between wage labour and social 
citizenship are elaborated and framed in the policy discourse of the democratic 
South African government. My aim is to relate the reconfiguration of the relations 
between work and citizenship “from below”, as emerging from the previous 
chapters, with the ways in which such relations are articulated in official policies. 
Chapter 3 has defined the post-apartheid social citizenship arrangement as 
characterized by hybridity, contestation and pragmatic adaptation. Debates on the 
reform of the South African system of social security will be analysed in relation 
to such a framework.  
I look, in particular, at the trajectory leading from the 1997 White Paper on 
Social Welfare to the 2001 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social Security System (Taylor Committee). My argument is that 
these two nodal points encapsulate a contradictory evolution in the South African 
official discourse on the relations between work and social citizenship. In fact, 
across the whole process waged employment, work ethic and wage labour 
discipline remain the priority forms of social inclusion, which determines a highly 
problematic relation with the social and material decline of waged employment. 
At the same time, however, the passage from the White Paper to the Taylor 
Committee takes place in the context of debates on decommodification as a mode 
of access to social provisions. While initially absent from the post-apartheid 
policy discourse, decommodification has in particular emerged in the work of the 
Taylor Committee to identify social provisions not related to individual labour 
market positions. In the final analysis, the ways in which “decommodification” is 
inserted in labour demands, expert discourse and official inquiries is conducive to 
new controversies, contradictions and conflicts.  
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8.2 “Laudable Citizens” and “Silly Fools”: Developmental Social Welfare 
Policy as a Work-Commodification Nexus  
 
As seen in Chapter 3, the transition to a post-Apartheid institutional dispensation 
had inherited welfare and social security structures characterized by a 
substantially residualist approach to public spending, high levels of 
commodification – particularly in retirement benefits and healthcare -- declining 
coverage, as in the case of unemployment insurance, and various forms of 
unevenness and inequality. During apartheid’s final decades, the biggest strides in 
terms of equalizing access to social assistance had been accomplished with the 
State Old Age Pension (SOAP) programme, where black beneficiaries came to 
outnumber whites by the end of the 1980s. Conversely, the vast majority of 
unemployed workers, employees in vulnerable occupations, sectors like 
agriculture or domestic services, or “working poor” in casual and informal jobs 
remained largely uncovered by social insurance or social assistance schemes, 
while workers who lost their jobs largely relied on withdrawing their accumulated 
contributions to provident funds.  
As Van der Berg (2002) argued, the late apartheid state had expanded 
especially those programmes, like the SOAP, that had a relatively small number 
of white beneficiaries, and therefore a more limited likely opposition to the 
reduction of white benefits, which was required to expand coverage to blacks in a 
context of shrinking public resources. Other factors, previously discussed, in 
limitating the decommodification of social provisions included the resistance of 
public providers, especially in healthcare, the absence of a labour’s 
comprehensive agenda on social security and the adoption by the government of 
free-market restructuring, which was compounded by the consolidation inside the 
ANC of a work-based approach to social inclusion that relegated public 
provisions to “safety nets” for targeted groups of the “very poor” population. 
 The post-1994 democratic government’s approach to the restructuring of 
the social security system was heavily conditioned by the above factors, whose 
 332
macroeconomic and fiscal stringency was tightened with the adoption of GEAR in 
1996. The task of redesigning the provision and  administration of social grants in 
a unified national system, bringing under the newly formed Department of 
Welfare and Population Development a host of formerly racially-based 
programmes and reincorporating the systems run by the “independent” TBVC 
(Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda, Ciskei) states, was a prime challenge 
confronting the ANC government (Louw, 1998). Programmes included means-
tested provisions (mainly SOAP, maintenance grants, family allowances, 
disability grants) usually addressed to permanently unemployed and extremely 
marginalized sectors, rather than to people in employment. The implications of 
their restructuring for the emerging government’s vision of the relationships 
between waged employment, decommodification and social provisions were, 
however, far-reaching.  
From the early stages after the 1994 elections, debates on reforming South 
Africa’s system of social grants had largely focused on how to insert welfare 
policy within strategies of growth and development framed within scarce state 
resources and the need to promote economic competitiveness and productive 
employment (Liffmann, Mlalazi, Moore, Ogunrobi and Olivier, 1999). Therefore, 
the government and the ANC started looking at ways in which the role of families 
and communities could be strengthened as the core of a welfare strategy which, by 
promoting “responsibility” and “self-empowerment”, could also reduce claims on 
the state as provider of grants. In this sense, the role of the family in post-1994 
social policy discourse came to resemble what Donzelot identifies as functions of 
“moralization”, “normalization” and “tutelage”. By making the “improvement of 
the family living conditions of the ‘disadvantaged’” (Donzelot, 1979: 69) the 
central goal of social policy, they allow to deflect criticism of structural 
inequalities and of  downsizing of the public sphere, while reproducing and 
monitoring wage labour’s discipline and ethics. 
Two immediate targets of early post-1994 policy debates were the financial 
“unsustainability” of the existing social grants in view of the elimination of racial 
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barriers to access (Van der Berg, 1998)206, and the associated danger of welfare 
“dependency”. This latter, in particular, by increasing pressure on state funds had 
also the purported effect of weakening work ethic and wage labour discipline. 
Along these lines, Servaas Van der Berg (1996: 13), for example, decried the 
danger that existing social programmes could cause “perverse incentives to work 
search behaviour”, whereby “laxitude” in the means test could lead to social 
grants “leaking” from the “poorest” to the “not-so-poor”.  
Other policy analysts argued for choices clearly orientated to a “workfare” 
model, where UIF and social grants are make explicitly “conditional on the work 
effort”, rather than compensating the “victims of circumstances” (Olivier, 2000b: 
29; Olivier, 2000d). The extent to which such “circumstances” include poverty 
wages, vulnerable occupations and unstable employment is, however, let 
unelaborated in this argument. Similarly, Minister of Labour Tito Mboweni 
advocated a closer link between UIF and employment services (Meth, Naidoo and 
Shipman, 1996: 37)207, a position that was rejected in the 1996 report of the 
Labour Market Commission appointed by Mboweni himself and which, based on 
substantial comparative evidence, rejected the idea of  “workfare” (Dept. of 
Labour, 1996).  
Mainstream intellectual and policy arguments revealed a fundamental, 
interlaced hostility of a “Malthusian” kind both to the poor, accused of parasitical 
scheming to distract scarce resources from productive activities, and to social 
programmes. Echoing Hirschman’s “perversity thesis” discussed in Chapter 1, 
these were often seen as encouraging moral and behavioural corruption by 
sapping work ethic and discipline. The 1996 Report of the Chikane Committee, 
                                                
206 In 1999 the SOAP covered 61.7% of all grants beneficiaries, and 70% of all grants 
expenditures. Disability grants stood at 21.6% of beneficiaries and 24.1% of expenditures, the 
parent allowance component of the State Maintenance Grant (phased out between 1998 and 2001) 
covered 5.8% of the beneficiaries and 4% of the expenditure, while child grants (including the 
child allowance component of the SMG) covered 7.8% of beneficiaries and 2.7% of the 
expenditures (SAIRR, 2000: 240). Grants and other social security expenditures covered almost 
90% of the Welfare Department’s budget (the SOAP alone was more than 60%), while 
approximately 3% was allocated to "social assistance”. 
207 In 1996 the job placement rate of UIF applicants via employment services was only 17%, while 
a mere one third of recipients voluntarily applied for placement (Meth, Naidoo and Shipman, 
1996: 39). It is indicative of the centrality of “job creation” discourse that COSATU supported the 
general thrust of Mboweni’s argument, even if it cautioned against using social benefits to “coerce 
people into low paid job” (COSATU, 1999c: 6-7). 
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responsible of devising a national system for the administration of social grants 
and the standardization of related procedures, suggested a whole set of techno-
scientific practices. Under the guise of improving systemic efficiency, the 
proposed procedures identified and constructed the welfare recipient as a subject 
of state knowledge and Foucauldian-type normalizing judgments with a strong 
moral connotation. For example, under the rubric of “prevention of fraud and 
corruption”, a task group chaired by Wim Trengove discussed mechanisms of 
beneficiaries’ identification and data storage. The task group started with the 
premise that “fraud” was not confined to intentional criminal behaviour but it 
meant all cases in which “money is paid to people who should not be in the 
system in the first place” (Dept. of Welfare, 1996a: Ann.C, 7.4). Incidentally, this 
raises the question of whether beneficiaries who failed the means test and, without 
their knowledge, were still “in the system” could be considered as “fraudsters”. 
Moreover, the task group expressed skepticism for an identification of 
beneficiaries that relied only on ID documents, expressing interest in the system 
of “biometric identification” (i.e. fingerprints) used in the NP-governed Western 
Cape, which was ultimately rejected only because of its lack of practicality208. In 
this particular instance, therefore, the state’s relation with poor people on welfare 
was clearly characterized by stigmatizing identification which bordered on 
criminalisation. 
Arguments that attached a stigma on the poor and welfare recipients based 
on their alleged “way of life”, for which wage labour was seen as a moral, apart 
from social, corrective greatly influenced  institutional debates. In an early speech, 
the first post-apaartheid Welfare minister, Abe Williams (National Party) raised 
the threat of “welfare dependency” by openly supporting the solution adopted in 
the USA with the “welfare to work” reform programme, which was explicitly 
aimed at making welfare grants temporally limited and conditional upon the 
recipient’s ability to enter productive employment: 
 
                                                
208 The introduction of a national system of biometric identification for grants beneficiaries was 
eventually in progress at the time of writing. South Africa is, in fact, one of very few countries in 
the world to have introduced such a national system which, as Breckenridge (2005) remarks, 
builds upon a long tradition of systematic personal identification and surveillance that dates back 
to apartheid’s counterinsurgency policies. 
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We must at all costs avoid a dependency syndrome. As President 
Bill Clinton said, ‘Social welfare must create a second opportunity, 
it must not be a way of living’209. 
 
The ANC, of which Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi was Williams’ Deputy Minister, 
did not dispute this point, but rather tried to frame the question of welfare reform 
in terms of “active labour market” policies, which were also encouraged by 
GEAR. A focus on reducing the “culture of entitlement” shifted financial 
burdens from the SOAP towards more targeted interventions for special needs. 
To this end, the ANC proposed fiscal measures and a relaxation of the means test 
to exempt income derived from retirement schemes and annuities in order to 
encourage retirement savings, minimize dependency on the SOAP -- whose real 
value had declined by 20% between 1993 and 1997 (Van der Berg, 2001c: 9) -- 
and “link social security grants to developmental programmes” so that recipients 
could be “empowered to become self-supporting”210. Arguing in 1995 for the 
need for a national contributory insurance scheme, the ANC chairman of the 
parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Welfare, Cas Salojee, added that the 
SOAP would have soon become “unsustainable”. He supported targeting the old-
age pension for “people who cannot fend for themselves”211, rather than having it 
accessible on a universal, albeit means tested, basis, which could replace 
retirement income, therefore “destabilizing” the welfare system212. In early 1995, 
Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Finance had recommended that “an 
active labour market policy (…) must replace pensions as the mainstay of social 
security for poor people”213. 
 It became therefore apparent that the emergent post-apartheid policy 
consensus on social citizenship did not support a move towards a more 
universalist direction of what was already a highly uneven, selective and targeted 
system. It rather promoted further selectivity in already existing means tested, 
highly residualist programmes. Waged employment was seen as alternative, 
rather than complementary, to the public provision of income grants, and 
                                                
209 Hansard, 19 October 1994, p.3297. 
210 Hansard, 16 May 1995, p.1215, G.Fraser-Moleketi (Minister of Welfare). 
211 Hansard, 20 June 1995, p.3028. 
212 Hansard, 28 March 1996, p.931. 
213 Hansard, 28 March 1995, p. 368. 
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“productive employment” was regarded as minimizing the impact of welfare 
services, rather than conceptualizing these latter as addressing areas of poverty 
and vulnerability inside wage labour. The emphasis on private retirement 
savings, moreover, further shifted financing responsibilities on the side of the 
individual, therefore increasing pressures for commodification. 
 Social insurance and unemployment benefits systems did not undergo 
fundamental changes under the ANC’s first term of government (1994-1999). 
Welfare services and social security grants were, however, the object of intense 
legislative and policy activity. A major preoccupation in such exercises 
concerned the possibility of escalating costs due to the equalisation of access in 
previously racialised programmes within a macroeconomic framework of self-
imposed resource scarcity. Similar considerations were prominent in the work of 
the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support, appointed by the Welfare 
MINMEC (the committee made of the national Minister and the nine provincial 
ministers). The Lund Committee was mandated to investigate the feasibility of 
social grants with particular regard to the State Maintenance Grant (SMG) 
established in terms of the 1992 Social Assistance Act (Dept. of Welfare, 1996b; 
Vorster and Roussow, 1997; Liebenberg, 1997; Zain, 2000). The SMG consisted 
in a means-tested allocation made of two components: a parent allowance of 
R430 per month (the same as the SOAP) and a child allowance of R135 per child 
per month up to a maximum of two children. Due to administrative inadequacies 
and the exclusion of TBVC states from the system, the SMG ended up benefiting 
largely “coloured” and Indian families, with only 2 African children out of 1,000 
receiving it by 1996.  
The Lund Committee, which released its report in August 1996 after an 
admittently non-consultative and non-participative process, recommended the 
elimination of the SMG and its replacement with a new Child Support Grant 
(CSG), initially set at a mere R75 per month for age groups from 0 to 6. The 
SMG was eventually scrapped by the Welfare Laws Amendment Act No. 106 of 
1997, which scheduled a gradual phase-out process due to take place between 
1998 and 2000 via three successive cuts. The new Child Support Grant which 
replaced the SMG was set to R100 per month, a level initially rejected by the 
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Lund Committee, and the eligible age was lowered from the SMG’s 16 to 4-to-9 
years. The parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Welfare, which was never 
consulted on the matter, had proposed a R135 grant for children aged 0 to 9 up to 
two per family. Even if this proposal was ultimately unheeded, it constituted the 
first time in which a parliamentary committee challenged an ANC minister, 
revealing deep tensions within the ruling party itself (Calland and Taylor, 1997: 
212).  
The government’s final decision to scrap the SMG and replace it with a 
much reduced CSG was the first major elimination of social benefits in South 
Africa’s social security history (Makino, 2003: 12). It also rebuffed research 
showing that a compromise solution of expanding the R135 child component of 
the SMG would have added limited financial costs while ensuring a far better 
coverage than the CSG214. Research conducted in 2000 revealed that, even before 
the third and final cut of what was left of it, the SMG provided an important 
source of support for households “on the brink of total collapse” and its 
elimination would have led to significant income reductions, growing inability to 
pay for basic necessities, housing evictions and the stretching of relatives’ SOAP 
income (Vorster, Roussow and Muller, 2000: iii, 64). As a result of deepening 
commodification of life, many former SMG recipients would be forced to look 
for low-wage or informal employment or even force children to enter the labour 
market (Vorster, Roussow and Muller, 2000: 69). An observer usually inclined to 
underline the generosity of South African social welfare grants, Servaas van der 
Berg (2001c: 9), commented:  
 
The savagery of the 1998 reform of public financial support for low-
income single parents suggests that the government is passing a 
significant portion of the burden of budgetary austerity onto the poor. 
 
Using arguments decrying the “racial bias” inherent in the SMG and lamenting 
the financial “unsustainability” of its extension to the whole population, the 
                                                
214 Initial international expert opinion required for the Report had recommended a universal benefit 
for children from 0 to 9 without means test, a proposal that the Lund Committee rejected. 
According to Lund, a R135 grant would have allowed to cover only 7-12% of children aged 0 to 9, 
while the proposed R75 allowed to cover 24-39% of children aged 0 to 4 (Haarmann and 
Haarmann, 1997: 16).  
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Committee promised  “bad consequences for some but good consequences for 
more” (Makino, 2003: 12) as an outcome of the cuts. The Lund report followed a 
vociferous ANC offensive in Parliament against the SMG, in which social 
welfare expenditures not directly related to productive employment were 
invariably presented as wasteful and parasitical (Vorster, Roussouw and Muller, 
2000). Moreover, arguments based on racial equality were explicitly used to 
justify a reduction of state social spending for the poor. Saloojee denounced the 
costs of the “racialised” SMG as being tantamount to “funding a tenth 
province”215, recommending as an alternative to “challenge the beneficiaries to 
participate and work in some socially needed project”216. The SMG, supported 
for political convenience by minister Williams, was also seen as a vehicle for 
National Party patronage (Lund, 1998: 14). 
 The Lund Report moved from a frank recognition of the policy 
underpinnings of the post-RDP scenario as essentially consisting in:  
 
Do not ask for too much more; save money through more effective 
management and through downsizing the bureaucracy; and 
redistribute within the present envelope (Dept. of Welfare, 1996b: 
2.7). 
In a later paper (Lund, 1998) Francie Lund, chair of the committee, contended that 
replacing the SMG with the CSG was the only way, given the impossibility of 
extending the SMG itself, to save that social grant allocation in the face of 
demands from within the government for its overall suppression. The Lund 
Committee, however, provided a broad ideological justification for its 
recommendation to eliminate the SMG as the need to promote individual 
responsibility, reduce dependence on government “handouts” and prioritise waged 
employment as a means of social insertion: 
A concern with social security benefits is that they may reduce the 
likelihood of people seeking jobs or other ways to provide for 
themselves. Does receiving an unemployment benefit make it less 
likely that a person will seek actively for further employment? Does 
receiving a State Maintenance Grant for herself and two children 
                                                
215 Hansard, 20 June 1995, p.3028. 
216 Hansard, 28 March 1996, p.1232. 
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make a woman less likely to take up work opportunities? In a country 
with such high unemployment rates, a simplistic answer to this 
question is: 'but there are no jobs to be had anyway'. This is so, but 
labour market patterns are changing internationally, with more and 
more people (especially poorer people) making their own jobs, or 
engaging in a range of productive activities, some waged and some 
unwaged, to put together a living. South African wages for women, 
and for women in small towns and rural areas, are so low that the 
value of the State Maintenance Grant may commonly be higher than 
the lowest local wage (Dept. of Welfare, 1996b: 3.5.4). 
 
The perceived threat of having social grants at a level higher than the lowest paid 
jobs conjured in this passage images of perverse incentives to lone motherhood and 
unregulated reproduction, which are akin to the “welfare queen” stereotype at the 
heart of the conservative anti-welfare backlash in the USA during the 1980s 
(Block, Cloward, Ehrenreich and Fox Piven, 1987). At the same time, the 
characterization of social grants as a direct threat to work ethic and wage discipline 
provided the Lund Report with its moral and pedagogical foundation. It is to be 
noticed from this point of view how hard work and users’ ability to pay for 
services are made to be self-reinforcing in shaping virtuous citizenship and 
responsible parenthood around a nexus that strictly links wage labour and 
commodification: 
In South Africa the new government instituted the Masakhane 
Campaign which aimed to instil in the general populace a culture and 
acceptance of paying rates and taxes in the areas in which they lived. 
The campaign has had to contend with years of conditions during 
which a culture of resistance to an illegitimate government condoned 
- and even lauded - non-payment. A similar campaign to build a 
culture in which parents accept their responsibility towards their 
children, and in which those who pay are regarded as responsible and 
laudable citizens rather than weak and silly fools, is urgently needed 
(Department of Welfare, 1996b: 5.3.2). 
 
The generalized civil society outrage that followed the publication of the Lund 
Report forced the convening of parliamentary public hearings in early 1997, even 
if Minister Fraser-Moleketi warned that “there is no turning back” (Calland and 
Taylor, 1997: 212). Labour expressed a particularly strong opposition in the 
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ultimately ill-fated hearings. The CWIU defined the impact of the Lund Report 
as "to perpetuate and intensify the effects of apartheid" (cit. in Zain 2000, 15). 
COSATU’s response rejected the subordination of social policy to self-imposed 
budget constraint. It also demanded a new system of parental support linked to 
social security interventions to address labour market vulnerability, without 
which a policy of piecemeal cutbacks was deemed to be “a recipe for disaster” 
(COSATU, 1997b). 
Central in the discourse of state withdrawal from the provision of social 
services became the emphasis on the role of families and communities that found 
a central place within the policy framework of “developmental social welfare”, 
which accompanied Fraser-Moleketi’s rise to the position of Minister of Welfare 
in 1996. The concept of “developmental social welfare” was inspired by the 
work of James Midgley, who defined it as “interventions that promote economic 
development”, linking therefore the welfare function to economic growth and 
competitiveness as a replacement of “maintenance-oriented social programs” 
(Midgley, 1997: 180). The author recognized, however, the colonial origins of 
the concept, which was transplanted in third world governments’ policy 
discourse to signify the reduction of social spending in “unproductive” 
programmes and the allocation of scarce resources to economic development. 
Lewis (2000) and Cooper (1989) argue, along these lines, that the rhetoric of 
individual empowerment and community development that link welfare and 
economic growth in colonial and postcolonial policy discourse acts as 
legitimation and rationalization of spending constraints, coercive inducements to 
wage employment and policies of structural adjustment.  
 The colonial origins of “developmental social welfare”, its focus on 
public sector withdrawal, its functionality to established social hierarchies and its 
subordination to market relations are, however, absent in South African 
elaborations of the concept. Leila Patel was the scholar and, as Director General 
of the Welfare Department from 1995 to 1999, the government official that most 
popularized “developmental social welfare” in the country, making it the 
cornerstone of the 1997 White Paper for Social Welfare. In her highly influential 
work “developmental social welfare” becomes the reclamation of an 
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authentically “African” mode of social assistance, where self-help, work ethic 
and community-based reciprocity are reinserted -- in ways highly reminiscent of 
Lewis’ (2000) analysis of colonial welfare discourse -- in the realm of local 
traditions and “indigenous knowledge”.  
Explicitly influenced by Midgley, Patel (1992: 34) claimed that “in pre-
colonial times, the welfare needs of individuals were met through the wider 
society, and communalism, co-operation and mutual support by individuals and 
the social group were highly developed”. She therefore regards the intervention 
of Western “institutional” welfare models, based on curative approaches, 
technological deployment and bureaucratic allocation of resources, as a 
“distortion” of such “authentic” indigenous roots. In this view, apartheid welfare 
policy was “biased” in privileging white urban workers by creating a close, 
“paternalist” link between benefits and formal employment. Late apartheid 
policies of privatization and market-based stabilization of the black population 
had, conversely, turned social policies into increasingly residual mechanisms 
(Patel, 1991: 104-108). As a response, post-Apartheid democracy would be 
required to develop a system based on “self-reliance, dignity and respect of 
tradition” (Patel, 1991: 105) to build an “alternative welfare delivery” model 
defined as “authentic development which has grown out of the real conditions 
and traditions of life in South Africa” (Patel, 1991: 124). Following the 1955 
Freedom Charter, the “right and duty to work” were reasserted as the basis of 
social inclusion and benefits.  
Rather than advocating a universalist expansion and decommodification 
of benefits previously related to waged employment and racial status, such a 
model recovered alleged customs of self-help and community support by 
positioning them in the context of self-imposed constraints in the allocation of 
state resources, shrinking public spending and reassertion of waged employment 
as the primary form of social inclusion. Moreover, rather than demanding a 
reversal of late apartheid privatization, Patel recommended a strengthening of 
partnerships between the state and the “progressive voluntary sector” based on 
principles of “participation”, “volunteerism”, “fees for services” and 
“reciprocity” (Patel, 1991: 109). It is to be incidentally noticed that the neo-
 342
traditionalist rehabilitation of communitarian spirit, self-help and ethics of 
responsibility in such a context carries an uncanny similarity with discourses, 
analysed in Chapter 3, used by Segregation and Apartheid governments to justify 
residualism, commodification and exclusion of the, especially rural, African 
majority from services. As a summation of the logics inspiring her framework, 
Patel recommended “affirmative action” policies, “which means that selective 
social policies, rather than universal social policies will need to be applied to 
achieve such social goals” (Patel, 1991: 260). In this sense, universalism was 
deemed unfeasible and undesirable in a context whereby scarce resources 
imposed cost containment “without sacrificing equity” (Patel, 1991: 286). 
 Patel’s analyses and recommendations decisively shaped the process that 
led to the formulation of the White Paper on Social Development, a process that 
she also coordinated in her institutional capacity as Director General in the 
Welfare Department. The White Paper was predominantly concerned with the 
rationalization of existing social grants, rather than with devising an overall 
restructuring of the social welfare system. Its elaboration was intended as the 
culmination of a broad consultative process which, by involving progressive 
organizations coming from the anti-apartheid mass democratic movement 
together with traditional welfare NGOs, presented itself as an alternative to the 
expert-based, technocratic policy-making of the previous regime217. After the 
Department issued a discussion document based on detailed situational analyses, 
a Draft White Paper was published and referred to a broad consultative process. 
This led in 1995 to a National Consultative Conference held in Bloemfontein, 
with the participation of a vast array of social welfare organizations that together 
with the national Welfare Department had started a consultative National 
Welfare Forum in September 1994 (Lund, 1998: 11). The “technical working 
group” emerged from the Bloemfontein conference finally produced the White 
Paper, which was published in February 1997. COSATU, however, did not take 
part in the consultative process because it rejected the Draft White Paper on 
account of its lack of vision on the government’s role in social provisions and 
expanding social security. At that stage, however, the federation was still framing 
                                                
217 Leila Patel, former Director General in the Department of Welfare and Population 
Development, Interview with the Author, 22 June 2000. 
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its demand for an extended social safety net in terms of means tested social 
assistance (Makino, 2003: 10), without a comprehensive view on the universal 
provision of decommodified social services.  
 The White Paper (RSA, 1997) reaffirmed the notion of “developmental 
social welfare” as geared towards providing citizens with an “opportunity to play 
an active role in promoting their own well-being”. The priority on individual 
self-activation, under the guise of “empowerment” discourse, was combined with 
a view of social security and social services as “investments which lead to 
tangible economic gains” (RSA, 1997: 1.8). Public spending expansion was seen 
as dependent on economic growth in a context where “the high expectations of 
many people for the new democratic government to deliver welfare services and 
programmes to address pressing needs cannot be fully met in the short-term” 
(RSA, 1997: 1.9). Market forces, productivism and individual responsibility 
came therefore to provide strict constraints to redistributive and decommodifying 
policy interventions. Equally important in justifying the reduction of 
governmental responsibilities was the emphasis on “community development” 
and the concept of ubuntu (RSA, 1997: 2.24) as a discourse of mutual support 
and care in providing for the communities’ basic needs. The use of ubuntu as an 
alternative to traditional welfarist approaches is by some regarded as functional 
to 
 
radical cuts in social assistance schemes for older people and a shift 
of responsibility from the government to the individual, family and 
community (Van Eeden, Ryke and De Necker, 2000: 18). 
 
Finally, the document’s constant insistence on the importance of the family as 
“the basic unit of society” recodified care in terms of caregiving within a private 
household sphere defined in “gender-neutral, functionalist and moral terms” 
(Sevenhuijsen, Bozalek, Gouws and Minnaar-McDonald, 2003: 306). Rather 
than focusing on household inequalities and disfunctionalities, the notion of 
“family” advanced in the White Paper was ideologically premised on the 
reproductive role of the woman as an enabling factor for the male breadwinner’s 
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earning a wage as the ultimate guarantor of “independence” and 
“empowerment”. 
The substantially residual role of public spending in the provision of social 
safety nets was frankly expressed in Chapter 8 (“Enhancing Social Integration”): 
 
Whilst welfare programmes should be available to all South Africans, the focus must be on the poor, 
those who are vulnerable and those who have special needs. Particular attention should also be paid to 
addressing the needs of people in rural areas, informal settlements and the parts of urban areas where 
people are not integrated into the mainstream of society (RSA, 1997: 8.4). 
 
Selectivity was, on the other hand, framed with a clear reference to the post-
apartheid macroeconomic policy framework: 
 
In view of fiscal constraints, it is not possible for the welfare function to grow in real terms in the 
medium term. Real growth will be accommodated by restructuring the welfare function. The Ministry for 
Welfare and Population Development will however continue to advocate increases in real terms in order 
to redress the underfunding of this component (RSA, 1997: 8.11). 
 
The White Paper’s residualist orientation accompanied its emphasis on reducing 
dependence on state social assistance and increased self-reliance (RSA, 1997: 
6.22). Means to achieve this included, among other things, “active labour market 
policies” to facilitate the employment of targeted groups, “more stringent and 
appropriate means testing and eligibility requirements” and targeted training 
programmes to “divert people from the welfare system”218. The centrality of 
wage labour was reasserted as the primary vehicle of social insertion and as a 
tool to reduce welfare “dependence”. The document does not, however, mention 
the possibility of expanding social security coverage for vulnerable employees 
                                                
218 More stringent definitions of the means test, finalized at reducing claimable benefits and 
pushing recipients onto the labour market, were actually introduced in 1996 and 1998. In the first 
occasion, the “clawback”, or the effective marginal tax rate (the percentage reduction of benefits 
per additional unit of income beyond a miminum “threshold” entitling to full benefits), was 
reduced to encourage recipients to accept low-wage jobs whose income was partially excluded 
from the means test. To avoid the unintended increase in benefits that such a change caused by 
raising “cut-off” levels (the levels at which benefits stop being paid), the 1998 amendment 
introduced exclusion levels for fixed assets, therefore making ownership of a dwelling a proof of 
means, and cut-off levels were lowered. These changes allowed to expand areas of exclusion from 
benefits, facing pensioners approaching cut-off levels with the prospect of a 21% average income 
cut in the event of loss of pension. The savings enabled by such a restrictive reconfiguration of 
grants eligibility were calculated in approximately R100 million, or 0.5% of the Welfare 
Department Budget (Van der Berg, 2001a). 
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and working poor. As a partial concession to COSATU’s concerns, the White 
Paper makes a reference, absent in the Draft White Paper, to a “comprehensive 
social assistance to those without other means of support, such as a general 
means tested social assistance scheme” (RSA, 1997: 7.26.b). 
 Commenting with hindsight on the White Paper’s significance and 
impact, Patel (2001) argued that the model it proposed -- revolving around 
“family centered and community-based programmes” to be contracted out, where 
desirable, to welfare NGOs219 (Department of Welfare, 1999: 19-25) – could 
respond to recipients’ “passivity” and “dependence” by encouraging  
entrepreneurial values specifically addressed to “disadvantaged groups”.  They 
would ultimately benefit from 
 
opportunities (…) to be empowerment partners in the privatization of 
state assets and through licensing of operators to run public services 
(…). Disadvantaged groups that are organized have been invited to 
participate as potential shareholders in commercial ventures without 
making capital contributions (Patel, 2001: 39, n.11) 
 
The argument went on by praising the potential for job creation in this approach, 
dubbed by some as “mixed economy of welfare” (Lund, 2001). While the crisis of 
waged employment does not figure as central in the White Paper’s construction of 
South Africa’s “social question”, its sub-text reveals a specific and quite 
significant orientation. The document ultimately and “programmatically” departs 
from approaches based on universalism of access and decommodification of 
provision, by promoting further selectivity and privatization. To reinforce the 
point, wage labour discipline is presented as a stark alternative to welfare 
“dependency”, while dependency, vulnerability and inequality caused by the wage 
relations are obscured (Smiley, 2001). In doing so, however, the White Paper 
refrains from coercive arguments and utilizes an empowerment discourse whereby 
“job creation” is combined to entrepreneurship, in an explicit endorsement of 
government sponsored policies of “black economic empowerment”. Ultimately, 
                                                
219 This approach was, for example, identified as a priority in the provision of disability grants. It 
was, in particular, contained in the Social Welfare Action Plan adopted to implement the White 
Paper’s recommendations. The Plan advocated solutions based on public-private partnerships to 
decrease welfare dependence and prepare recipients for productive employment (Van Eeden, Ryke 
and De Necker, 2000: 14). 
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entrepreneusrhip as a surrogate and substitute for redistributive social policy 
echoes workers’ strategies, discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, of market-based solutions 
to the crisis of waged employment. The policy discourse of the ANC itself was in 
the same period veering towards a marked condemnation of “entitlement culture”, 
whereby expecting “delivery from the high” was chastised as part of apartheid’s 
“psychological legacy”: 
 
The idea that ‘the world now owes me a favour because I was a 
victim of apartheid oppression’ may well be understandable, but it 
simply confirms and continues a cycle of dependency (ANC, 1997). 
 
At the same time, according to Patel, the emphasis on the functionality of the 
welfare system to economic growth within the GEAR framework responded to the 
need of rescuing the most advanced features of the existing system, like the SOAP 
and children grants, from pressures inside the government, especially the Finance 
Department, demanding more substantial cutbacks220.  
 Labour’s opposition to the framework and vision of the White Paper was 
especially voiced in a November 1996 submission to Parliament in which 
COSATU proposed amendments to the document. The federation’s criticism is 
summarized by Neil Coleman, according to which the White Paper amounted to 
the  
 
appropriation of a developmental discourse to serve conservative ends 
and legitimize the idea that social security depends on community 
self-help, which is ludicrous. The fact is that one of the tragedies of 
the first term of government was that people can be attracted by these 
discourses, it is an emperor with no clothes sort of phenomenon. And 
really, we saw that in the context of South Africa, which has extreme 
poverty and extreme dependency, with the majority of people who 
don’t have access to social welfare, they were trying somehow to pass 
the burden onto them to develop their own social security networks 
which was part of a broader economic package to divest the state of 
responsibility and to shift the burden from the state to poor 
communities221. 
 
                                                
220 Leila Patel, Interview with the Author, 22 June 2000. 
221 Neil Coleman, Head, COSATU Parliamentary Office, Interview with the Author, 24 October 
2000. 
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COSATU’s amendment, in particular, stressed that the White Paper did not address 
the fragmentation and unevenness characterizing the social security system, 
reasserting the primary responsibility of the state in meeting “basic needs” and 
providing a “security net”. It finally advocated “income support for the 
unemployed” and an integrated approach to link welfare policy to social security 
and to labour market measures strongly focused on job creation (COSATU, 1996). 
 COSATU’s amendment to the White Paper saw the emergence in the 
federation’s policy discourse of themes linking universalism and 
decommodification to miniminise labour market dependence. COSATU’s 
universalism was still tempered, however, by the acceptance of the means test, as 
reflected in the White Paper’s Section 7.26 (Makino, 2003: 11). The amendment, 
however, started to problematise the role of wage labour in social inclusion, which 
departed to some extent from the traditional primacy of job creation in COSATU’s 
discourse. For example, the initial joint response to GEAR by the union federations 
COSATU, NACTU and FEDSAL had focused its “social” component almost 
entirely on demands for employment creation policies (for example in public 
works and labour intensive housing development) and progressive taxation, while 
issues of social security, welfare and decommodification went entirely unnoticed 
(COSATU, FEDSAL, NACTU, 1996).  
Internal union debates had meanwhile emphasized the need to develop a 
concept of “social wage”, disentangling it from its “dangerous” (Lloyd and Rix, 
1996: 6; NUMSA, 1996: 14) conflation with the long-established demand for a 
“living wage”, considered as a mere monetary quantity that as such carried the 
unintended effect of further commodifying workers’ access to services. 
COSATU’s 1997 “September Commission” articulated a concept of “social wage” 
that was still framed in terms of countercyclical economic interventions -- 
including demand stimulation, reducing non-wage costs for employers and 
bringing the poor into the “mainstream of the economy” – to counter what was 
identified as a skorokoro scenario of low growth and modest social delivery 
(COSATU, 1997a). The Commission however defined “social wage” in a 
comprehensive way, which revealed the urgency of an autonomous social 
citizenship discourse, as: 
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an economic floor below which no South African should sink. The 
social wage comprises direct income transfers (such as social security 
and retirement benefits) and social subsidization of the costs of basic 
needs (such as housing and health) (COSATU, 1997a: 61-62). 
 
At the federation’s Policy Conference in May 1997, finally, the concept of social 
wage was further refined in ways that highlighted the uneasy coexistence of 
features from past and recent discussions. “Social wage” meant in fact “goods 
and services that would allow people to function effectively as part of society”, 
but also non-targeted, decommodified provisions independent from formal 
employment (COSATU, 1999b). Kumiko Makino (2003: 14) suggests that 
COSATU’s mode of institutional engagement could have played a role in the 
federation’s discursive shift. In particular, COSATU-aligned researchers and 
intellectuals took part in the government-appointed labour policy exercise that 
produced the 1996 report of the Labour Market Commission. While this latter 
did not specifically address issues of welfare policy apart from the UIF, it was 
nonetheless exposed to research produced through the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). In particular, Guy Standing and other economists were 
debating issues of decommodified income and universal income grants, which 
are dealt with specifically in the following sections as an original contribution to 
South African welfare debates. 
 
 
8.3 Comprehensive Social Security, Decommodification and the Crisis of 
Waged Employment 
 
COSATU’s reponse to the White Paper on Social Development marked the 
beginning of an engagement with the social security policy process out of which 
two concomitant trends emerged. First, trade union debates became more aware 
of a generalized crisis of waged employment, not only in terms of joblessness but 
of widespread vulnerability and poverty within formal occupations. Second, the 
vastness and the urgency of the crisis required new approaches to transcend 
former compartmentalized views of social welfare. Traditional labour discourse 
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and practices had in particular maintained a clear separation between state-
provided social assistance and social security for the poor, long-term 
unemployed and groups with special needs, and a realm of employment-based, 
employer-funded social insurance for the employed, mainly in the form of 
unemployment benefits, retirement and healthcare. During the ANC’s first term, 
however, union-based research had indicated that poverty and vulnerability 
extended well inside wage labour, determining exclusion of benefits especially 
for casual and atypical workers and stretching the limited resources made 
available through state grants for poor households222:  
 
Despite the propaganda that you see in the media about COSATU 
being a narrow, economistic worker elite blah-blah-blah, the reality is 
that we could have adopted a very different strategy, we could have 
negotiated with the private sector, for health care benefits, for housing 
benefits funds and retirement funds. But instead on all these issues we 
are not interested in private sector but in a public strategy which is 
based on employment, and in a policy position that social wage must 
extend across society and get to unemployment people, to the poor, 
etc. We have mobilized in support of social security, the social wage 
for unemployed as well as unorganized workers223. 
 
According to Coleman, COSATU’s amendments to the White Paper marked the 
beginning of a mode of engagement based on the attempt to activate 
parliamentary debate as a means to advocate policy change. The federation relied 
on the support of Portfolio Committee chair, Cas Saloojee whom, albeit cautious 
on the expansion of social grants, refused to see them as mere state “handouts”. 
Moreover, Parliament seemed to provide a promising avenue following 
opposition from the ranks of the ANC itself to the implementation of the Lund 
Report. The development of COSATU’s notion of “social wage” as a broad set 
                                                
222 Particularly influential was the research produced by Claudia Haarmann, which showed how 
the overall system of social assistance contributed to a very limited extent (less than 50%) to close 
the poverty gap for most of the poorest 40% of the population (Haarmann, 2000: 121), that the 
system of unemployment benefits heavily penalized casual workers and the working poor 
(Haarmann, 2000: 133), and that the only really effective mechanism of social protection was an 
increasingly embattled and overstretched SOAP. Her research, moreover, dispelled conventional 
wisdom on employment being per se a viable mode of social insertion emphasizing how up to 
60% of the South African population is “continuously deprived of the minimum standard of 
living” (Haarmann, 2000: 181). 
223 Neil Coleman, COSATU, Interview with the Author, 24 October 2000. 
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of state-funded contributory and non-contributory benefits tried to combine 
universalism and decommodification to respond to the crisis of wage labour. 
Elements of selectivism and support for means testing in the federation’s policies 
cam under critical scrutiny. In the final analysis, COSATU’s positions revealed a 
growing uneasiness with the persistent, decontextualised centrality of wage 
labour in the government’s social citizenship discourse, confronted as it was with 
the collapse of waged employment in the broader society.  
 Labour’s engagement in the policy process was also a prime determinant 
in the government’s reassessment of social security in ways that, especially after 
Zola Skweyiya replaced Fraser-Moleketi as Welfare Minister in 1999, opened a 
policy debate on decommodification, albeit within a programmatic and 
discursive framework that continued to regard employment as the primary form 
of social integration. An important development in this regard was the 
Presidential Jobs Summit convened at NEDLAC in October 1998, which saw the 
participation of representatives from the institution’s four constituencies, labour, 
business, the state and community organisations. For the government the summit 
was an attempt to 
 
maximize the application of financial and organizational resources to 
strengthen the employment impact of existing policy initiatives, 
introduce new feasible initiatives developed by the Social Partners 
and fast-track implementation (…). Buy-in from the Social Partners 
should encourage a higher success rate from any of the projects. (…) 
in regard to macro policy issues it is the governments (sic) view that 
that it is inappropriate for the Jobs Summit to be seen as a platform to 
try and bring about major changes to the governments (sic) policy. It 
would be equally inappropriate for government to try and bring about 
major changes to the basic policies of business and labour (RSA, 
1998b). 
 
Therefore the government’s position combined a minimalist approach to policy 
changes, a continuous adherence to resource constraints and a focus on 
employment creation within existing programmes. Part of this approach was the 
promotion of small-medium enterprises and active labour market policies, which 
included special employment programmes like “community-based public works”, 
job placements and advice. Among the contributions requested from labour was 
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“to organize members to pay for rents, services, etc.”, which reflected state 
attitudes clearly at odds with decommodification agendas. The three union 
federations, COSATU, NACTU and FEDSAL, jointly responded by submitting 
21 “programmes for job creation” for discussion at the summit. The 21 
programmes maintained a strong emphasis on waged employment as the core of 
labour’s response to poverty and inequality (COSATU, FEDSAL and NACTU, 
1998). They however demanded increasing funding from employers (in the form 
of prescribed pension funds’ assets and a “solidarity tax”) and from the 
government to finance such projects, a point that the government opposed.  
Moreover, three of the 21 programmes were not strictly employment 
related and directly addressed issues of decommodification. Programme No. 1 
demanded the development of public rental housing (COSATU, 1999d) to be 
driven by a new housing parastatal, even if that included a “considerable 
strengthening” of the Masakhane campaign for services payment. This latter point 
assuaged the concerns of the government, which however remained opposed to 
ideas of public housing and remained “focused on incentives which enable private 
sector delivery and private ownership”, being at most prepared to concede some 
public pilot projects without questioning its basic housing strategy (RSA, 1998b; 
Vlok, 1998). Programme No. 19 was dubbed “support measures for the 
unemployed”, which included strengthening the UIF also through an increase in 
state contributions. Programme No.20 recommended “to provide a basic income 
grant for poor South Africans, particularly for the unemployed”. Such a Basic 
Income Grant (BIG) was seen as part of a “comprehensive social security 
system”, in explicit reference to Section 7.26 of the Welfare White Paper. The 
demanded BIG was set to R100 per month to be provided on a universal, non-
means tested basis. Monthly incomes higher than R3000 would repay the BIG in 
the form of taxes, while incomes higher than R5000 would repay twice the BIG in 
the form of a “solidarity tax”.  
In this way, for the first time South African labour organizations 
explicitly advocated a universal income transfer not dependent on, or related to, 
individual positions in employment or on the labour market. Significantly, the 
BIG’s universalism was seen as separate from, and alternative to, a mere 
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expansion of the UIF on the basis of a “dole” system. The idea of the BIG 
remained however linked to the promotion of domestic demand and facilitating 
job seeking and employability for the long term unemployed, and the R100 
figure represented a prudent estimate of a “winnable” gain aimed at lifting 
recipients up from absolute poverty224. 
 Labour’s demands were strongly influenced by COSATU’s “social wage” 
notion, which had been adopted by the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance at its 
September 1997 Summit. It was there  agreed to push for a “comprehensive” 
approach to social security, even if no consensus was found  on the minimum 
standards that should define the social wage. It was also noted that the Finance 
Department would likely resist the most ambitious aspects of a comprehensive 
social security programme, like the unions’ demands for a single payer, publicly 
funded national health insurance (COSATU, 1997c). A further point of 
divergence between COSATU and the ANC government concerned the former’s 
rejection of “active labour market” policy programmes, especially when seen as 
an alternative to income support measures and social benefits (Coleman, 1999; 
Patel, 1999). The 1996 Labour Market Commission (Dept. of Labour, 1996) had 
expressed criticism towards active labour market policies, seen in principle as 
coercive measures of a “workfare” type aimed at redeploying labour and 
developing skills in ways that discouraged employees’ motivation. However, the 
Commission, reflecting the Labour Department’s strategy of “balancing security 
and flexibility” but also its lack of vision on decommodified protections for 
vulnerable employees225, encouraged active labour market measures as part of a 
comprehensive “social plan”. According to the Department such a plan had to be 
focused on protecting and re-training workers adversely affected by industrial 
restructuring so that they could find alternative jobs “albeit often at a lower pay” 
(Dept. of Labour, 1999: 33). Part of such measures were an enhanced linkage 
between UIF and employment services and measures facilitating re-employment, 
also in sectors where relaxations of collective bargaining coverage and statutory 
                                                
224 Fiona Tregenna, COSATU Parliamentary Office, personal communication, 27 March 2002. 
225 Cynthia Alvilar, Acting Chief Director, Labour Market Policy, Department of Labour, 
Interview with the Author, 13 June 2000. 
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working conditions in terms of working time, overtime pay and leaves could be 
contemplated (Jansen, 2001).  
 COSATU’s attempt to advance demands for decommodifying 
interventions both inside the ANC-led Alliance226 and in the Jobs Summit were 
part of what Coleman defines “mobilization of ideological support”227 for the 
“social wage” and “comprehensive social security”. NEDLAC played a decisive 
role in COSATU’s strategy, which aimed to combine civil society mobilization, 
parliamentary work and building consensus among social interests within 
corporatist bargaining. It was at NEDLAC that demands for a “comprehensive” 
restructuring of social security and for a decommodified BIG were particularly 
raised. On these issues, the government did not have a unified or substantial 
position at the time of the Jobs Summit. Such gaps, however, were used to 
forestall further NEDLAC negotiations on the proposed BIG, which were 
delayed to the process of reform of social security emanating from the Summit’s 
recommendations228. At the same time, NEDLAC’s division in four separate 
Chambers did not help efforts at coordinating negotiations on social security 
change in a “comprehensive” direction. At the time of the Jobs Summit the 
Labour Market Chamber was engaged in the negotiation process from which the 
amendments to the UIF described in Chapter 3 emerged.  
The bulk of negotiations on social security were, however, supposed to take 
place in the Development Chamber, with which the Labour Market one had 
feeble links, with the result that social security and labour market negotiations 
were scantily related229. Such disconnections probably facilitated COSATU’s 
focusing on its own constituency in the UIF negotiations, which could explain its 
relatively minor emphasis in NEDLAC negotiations on the question of 
                                                
226 The Alliance Summits held in 1997 and 1998 had separate commissions on labour market and 
social security. The 1997 summit agreed to submit the notion of “comprehensive social security” 
for discussion in the committee on social delivery of the ANC’s National Executive Committee. 
See Neil Coleman, interview with the Author, 24 October 2000. 
227 Interview with the Author, 24 October 2000. 
228 Ravi Naidoo, Director, National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), 
Interview with the Author, 15 October 2000. 
229 Bengeza Mthombeni, CEPPWAWU Deputy General Secretary and COSATU Representative in 
NEDLAC’s Labour Market Chamber and on the UIF Board, Interview with the Author, 12 June 
2000. 
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inclusivity of social security provisions230. Finally, representatives from the 
Department of Finance used their position in the Public Finances Chamber to 
stonewall proposed social policy on account of  financial sustainability 
considerations231. In many occasions conflicts between government’s 
representatives ensued, as in the case of the Department of Finance’s opposition 
to the Department of Labour’s demand to restore the role of the state as an 
underwriter of the UIF232. NEDLAC’s limitations in this regard were reinforced 
by the fact that, differently from proposed labour policies, negotiations within 
this institution on socio-economic policy are not mandatory. In the final analysis, 
NEDLAC’s inadequacies as a vehicle for structural policy change within a 
framework of stringent macroeconomic constraints were confirmed. So were the 
doubts on the institutional bias in COSATU’s approach expressed by the 
federation’s official Oupa Bodibe, according to which not enough attention was 
paid for the task of building “critical mass” through social mobilization and 
coalitions, while “we have relied too much on parliamentary work and 
NEDLAC”233.  
It could be reasonably assumed that the lack of broad social interactions, 
combined with the limitations and the compartmentalization of NEDLAC’s 
processes and COSATU’s own neglect of demands emanating from “atypical” 
and vulnerable sectors of the labour market impacted on labour’s BIG idea. In 
the end, the BIG emerged only with great uncertainty and timidity inside a 
framework that continued to privilege job creation and employment-based 
demands. For Bodibe the BIG is not so much a measure to provide 
decommodified income and reduce market dependency, but it is rather “about 
facilitating entry in the labour market and participation in the economy”234. 
Coleman admits that the BIG demand was not initially considered as a strategic 
terrain where advances were likely. COSATU itself was rather led to emphasise 
                                                
230 Michelle De Bruyn, NEDLAC Labour Market Chamber Co-ordinator, Interview with the 
Author, 7 November 2000. 
231 Neil Coleman, Interview with the Author, 1 December 2000. 
232 Anusha Makka, NEDLAC Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber Co-ordinator, 
Interview with the Author, 7 November 2000. 
233 Oupa Bodibe, COSATU Secretariat Co-ordinator, Interview with the Author, 5 December 
2001. 
234 Ibidem. 
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this issue by the depth of the employment crisis and by the tempo of public 
debates and civil society skepticism of the capacity of the labour market to 
advance viable solutions235. The view of BIG proposed by COSATU, in 
particular, strongly resounded with an approach that prioritized the grant’s 
importance in facilitating labour market participation, especially among 
discouraged long-term unemployed. In the federation’s documents the BIG’s 
main beneficiaries are often indicated as “the unemployed”, rather than South 
African citizens, which would include the working poor. COSATU, moreover, 
enunciated the BIG’s benefits as “reducing poverty, redistributing  resources   
within  the  country,  and  enhancing people’s employability and opportunities 
for self-employment” (COSATU, 2000: 9.5). COSATU also regarded the notion 
of “social wage” as rewarding household work, therefore reducing and 
“socializing” direct reproduction costs and encouraging employment at the lower 
end of the wages and skills ladder (COSATU, 1998: 38-40). 
Therefore, COSATU’s demand for a universal basic income was still 
framed within the discourse of “active labour market” measures. It was also 
largely ancillary to waged employment, whose centrality was not questioned. 
Labour’s interpretation of the BIG, combined with the pragmatism that shaped its 
modest proposed amount of R100 per month, was substantially at odds with most 
progressive positions emerging in international debates on universal citizenship 
income. Such positions, in fact, tended to claim decommodified forms of income 
in response to realities in which 
 
the centrality of the labour contract as the foundation of the social 
order shows signs of erosion. Or rather, it continues to be counted 
upon as central, but it fails to perform its function as the cornerstone 
of allocation and distribution and hence (by implication) of social 
order (Offe, 1997: 82). 
 
Therefore, in these views universal basic income, far from being finalized to 
labour market reinsertion, was motivated by the structural failure of wage labour 
to provide alternatives to poverty and marginality. Rather than confining the 
problem to unemployment only, such debates recognized the role of expanding 
                                                
235 Ibidem and J. Baskin, “Pay the Citizens of South Africa”, Mail & Guardian, 24 January 1997. 
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precarious employment in reproducing poverty from within the wage relation. 
Conversely, civil society’s critique of “developmental social welfare” expressed 
in the campaign, of which COSATU was part, against the Lund Report started 
developing a discourse of social rights and entitlements where the demand for a 
universal basic income rejected official arguments based on “dependency” and 
was not primarily focused on the labour market. For example, during 1998 the 
South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) convened “poverty hearings” across 
the country (Ray, 1998) that emphasized the vast areas of exclusion from 
existing social provisions and the vulnerability of low-skill employees, 
intermittent and informal sector  workers, especially women, which remained 
uncovered by both contributory insurance schemes and state-funded social 
security (Liebenberg and Tilley, 1998: 14, 16). As a result “all vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups” were indicated as the main beneficiaries of forms of basic 
income.  
The 1998 Jobs Summit had agreed to investigate the BIG proposal within 
the context of a comprehensive restructuring of South Africa’s social security 
system. For this purpose, in March 1999 a Task Team236, which heard 
submissions from the departments of Welfare, Labour, Finance, Transport and 
Health, was established in NEDLAC and mandated to give effect to the 
Summit’s recommendations and to investigate principles of a future system of 
“comprehensive social security”, including social provisions for people excluded 
from the labour market (NEDLAC, 1999a). Even if it was not in itself a tripartite 
institution, the Task Team was required to report to NEDLAC’s newly 
established Jobs Summit Supervisory Structure (JSSS). At the same time, the 
government had started at the end of 1998 its own consultative process aimed at 
devising options for a comprehensive system of social security by forming an 
“interdepartmental task team” with the aim of elaborating an integrated 
approach237. 
                                                
236 The membership of the Task Team mirrored NEDLAC’s structure of interest representation. 
The Team’s members were Kobus Kleyhans and Barry Shipman for Business, Fezile Makiwane 
and Shadrack Mkhonto for Government, Ravi Naidoo for Labour, Peter Matthews and Pat Horn 
for the Community constituency (NEDLAC, 1999). 
237 Members of the interdepartmental task team were Fezile Makiwane (Dept. of Welfare, Chair), 
Alex van den Heever and Patrick Masobe (Dept.of Health), John Kruger (Dept. of Finance), 
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 In its first deliberations the NEDLAC task team agreed, among other, to 
establish the state’s role as a contributor to the UIF and to a national retirement 
fund for all employees, with provisions for housing finance and healthcare. The 
implementation of the BIG was, however, initially not discussed (NEDLAC, 
1999a). The team had, in fact, focused on the limitations of the UIF, finding that 
it covered less than 40% of the economically active population and provided 
benefits to less than 6% of the unemployed. It therefore recommended an income 
grant for the structurally unemployed, which would have, however, worked on a 
“dole” basis, through a means test and rewarding the length of unemployment. In 
early 2000 the government’s thinking was that income grants had to be reserved 
only to beneficiaries living below the poverty line (Makino, 2003: 15). The 
“conceptual framework” drafted by the NEDLAC task team in July 1999 defined 
“comprehensive social security” as including: 
 
Social security benefits provided due to loss of income, non work-
related social security benefits for people outside the labour market, 
privately provided benefits, e.g. retirement and health schemes, public 
service delivery e.g. transport, housing, health care (NEDLAC, 
1999b). 
 
The basic principles of the system were identified in its being “affordable”, 
“sustainable”, conducive to economic development and to the “ability of the poor 
to improve their own conditions and to increase their economic activity”. 
Moreover, the public provision of social assistance was intended to “try to reduce 
dependency on the state through promoting self-sufficiency”. While labour 
demanded that social security had to contribute to the “redistribution of productive 
assets”, business’ position opposed an integrated administration of social security 
grants. It defended, instead, the existing three-tier system made of a means-tested, 
“pay as you go” social assistance, a contributory social insurance to be based on 
defined contributions, and privately provided benefits. Finally, business remained 
opposed to a universal BIG, preferring the European model of the “guaranteed 
minimum income”, means tested and conditional upon availability to work. Such a 
                                                                                                                                 
Sagren Govender (UIF), Fanie Kruger (COIDA), Lukas Bakkes (South African National Defence 
Force) and Annari Roux (Road Accidents Fund), see (RSA, 1999). 
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system was seen as more favourable to a “work orientated contributory system of 
social protection” where “great importance is attached to work generally for 
reintegration into society and economic independence”238. 
To confirm the technical and ideological constraints facing prospects of 
redistribution and decommodification within the emerging social security 
framework, the Director General of the Department of Social Development (former 
Welfare Department), Lucy Abrahams, remarked that social security “is more 
about economic realities than social realities” (NEDLAC, 1999c). Decrying the 
excessive amounts of money spent in state cash grants “which are neither 
necessarily developmental nor sustainable”, Abrahams concluded that “economic 
realities should be an important consideration”, whereby “one cannot talk about a 
comprehensive social security system outside the current macro-economic 
environment”. 
At the end of February 2000 NEDLAC disbanded the JSSS and its 
Management Committee took responsibility for monitoring the implementation of 
all Jobs Summit agreements. The following month the NEDLAC Task Team 
reported to the Management Committee that it had completed its task of drafting a 
term of reference that defined long and short term elements of a comprehensive 
social security system. Four short-term programmes were indicated as a priority: 
employment, retirement, safety nets (including the BIG and disability grants) and 
healthcare. A committee of experts was requested to present recommendations to 
the various ministries and to cabinet by mid-2000 (NEDLAC, 2000a).  
Meanwhile, in July 1999 also the government’s Interdepartmental Task Team 
on comprehensive social security had released its report (RSA, 1999). The 
document identified various problems with coverage and access to social 
provisions. Particularly emphasized was the crisis in the healthcare system, 
whereby a “negligible” proportion of incomes lower than R5,000 a year and only 
20% of incomes between R5,000 and 11,000 were covered by private medical 
schemes. On the contrary, public expenditure in hospital care had constantly 
declined in real terms between 1998 and 2000, down to approximately 50% of 
1990 levels, and the costs of private schemes, especially “open” ones, were 
                                                
238 Shipman to Koestlich, 29 February 2000, Author’s collection. 
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spiraling. It was noticed that the per-capita public health expenditures in 1999 were 
lower than in 1995, while 20% of privately insured claimants consumed 55% of 
the national healthcare expenditures. As a result, an increase in healthcare 
expenditure as a portion of the GDP was mirrored by a decrease in the quality of 
the service and levels of coverage, while the public sector was covering more 
recipients with less resources due to the private sector’s “dumping” of high risk 
claimants (RSA, 1999: 20-21). Committee member Van den Heever, in particular, 
harshly stigmatized such a scenario, encouraged by government policies aimed at 
“privatizing everything and pick up the pieces afterwards”239. As a result, the 
Council for Medical Schemes calculated that only the amount of tax cuts for 
private medical schemes which, as Van den Heever puts it, “refuse to cover bad 
risks to make a fast buck”, were four times higher than the total public healthcare 
expenditures. 
Finally, the government’s task team report emphasized the high level of 
commodification and selectivity in South Africa’s social security system, whereby 
the 22% of the GDP spent in social protection (including housing benefits) was 
largely directed to the private sector (13% of the GDP), while only 3% was spent 
on public pensions and grants, 3.5% in public healthcare and 1.5% in public 
housing. In the case of pensions, while private contributory schemes (covering one 
third of the pensionable population) represented 7% of the GDP (and 80% of all 
pension expenditures), the public SOAP stood at only 1.9% (RSA, 1999: 38-39). 
Finally, while the equivalent of 11.3% of the GDP funded social expenditures 
through private insurance contributions, the share of the general public revenues 
                                                
239 Alex van den Heever, Advisor to the Council for Medical Schemes and Co-ordinator of the 
Dept.of Social Development Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, 
Interview with the Author, 29 November 2000. According to van den Heever, in 2000 the private 
health sector, which covers 20% of the population, spent between R 5 and 8 billion only for 
administrative costs, while the entire public hospital system’s costs were R 4 to 5 billion. As 
evidence of the power of the private healthcare industry, “I’ll give you some examples of the kind 
of individuals and groups we are talking about. We had within 3 years in one company people 
developing personal assets of over R400-500 million, for one individual. You have got in another 
company of similar size virtually every single one of their senior managers arriving to meetings 
in Ferraris, two of their senior managers have their own private airplanes. We have another 
company whose person arrives at meetings in a helicopter. In these entities, their managers’ 
combined individual personal wealth exceeds the entire senior management expenditure in the 
entire public health system many times over, and they are probably 20 individuals!” 
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was only 8.2% (RSA, 1999: 22), which reduced the potential for redistribution and 
cross-subsidization. 
The interdepartmental task team concluded its report by discussing available 
policy options. Similarly to the NEDLAC process it recommended a restructuring 
of the UIF which included underwriting from state revenues, it proposed a 
universal social health insurance scheme with mandatory contributions, a 
minimum benefit package and exemptions for recipients below the poverty line. It 
also recommended to investigate changes to the pensions system. A mandatory, 
contributory, earnings-related defined benefits social insurance pension was 
proposed to provide flat rate benefits with replacement rates ranging from 50% of 
lifetime income up to a maximum of four times the median earnings. This 
proposed pension scheme could integrate the SOAP and coexist with defined 
contributions private pension schemes. While recipients who do not meet the 
means test would be exempted from contributing, the proposed social pension was 
aimed at encouraging savings for retirement, thereby reducing the pressure on the 
SOAP. This latter was suggested to be changed into a universal contributory 
scheme. Finally, a maximum monthly R320 benefit was proposed for households 
earning less than R520 per month  (RSA, 1999: 26-29).  
The rationale for the proposed changes confirmed the government’s 
allegiance to the GEAR framework, its reluctance to modify existing income 
distribution and its opposition to radically redistributive measures. The language of 
the task team’s proposals was couched in an overarching emphasis on social 
control and the prevention of “crime and unrest” (RSA, 1999: 30). Far from 
adopting a universalist orientation, they explicitly recommended the stratification 
of recipients in three target categories. The “poorest of the poor” would be 
exempted from contributions, “middle-income” recipients would be entitled to 
“moderate but reasonable benefits and services”, and “high-income” groups would 
afford to supplement public provision with “well regulated” private services. Once 
again, inequalities in individual market positions were objectified and 
“naturalized”, whereby the ability to purchase social provisions on a commodity 
basis and as an alternative to overcrowded public services remained a prerogative 
of affluent strata. 
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8.4 “The Wage-Income Relationship is Breaking Down”: The Taylor 
Committee’s Problematization of the Work-Citizenship Nexus 
 
After expert knowledge and societal consultation had run their course by outlining 
scenarios and proposals for future policy changes, the speed of social security 
reform saw an acceleration in early 2000. In January, Minister Skweyiya 
announced that the country was facing “a deep social crisis (…), a time bomb of 
poverty and social disintegration [which] has the potential to reverse the 
democratic gains made since 1994”. A “Ten Point Programme of Action” to be 
implemented over the five following years would therefore recommend ways to 
“correct the weaknesses in our welfare system”. The call for comprehensive social 
security was there combined, in stark departure from the developmental social 
welfare approach, with the recognition that 
 
our  social policies  assume  the ability  of families  and  communities 
to respond  to   the  crisis.  Welfare  has   proceeded  as  if  these  
social institutions  are fully  functional and  provide the  full range  of 
social support  that is  required  to restore  the well  being  of people.  
Such a "business as usual" approach cannot continue (Dept. of Social 
Development, 2000). 
 
In March, the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa, chaired by Prof. Viviene Taylor, was appointed by 
Cabinet. The composition of the 18-member Taylor Committee included 
academia-based experts, with a substantial predominance of jurists and 
economists, representatives from various government departments and labour-
aligned research organizations240. The lack of direct representation from organs 
                                                
240 Members of the committee were Viviene Taylor (Chair, special advisor for the Minister of 
Social Development), Fezile Makiwane (Dept. of Social Development), Pieter Le Roux 
(University of the Western Cape), Elias Masilela (Dept. of Finance), Alex van den Heever 
(Council for Medical Schemes), Charles Meth (University of Natal), Shadrack Mkhonto (UIF 
Commissioner), Guy Mhone (University of the Witwatersrand), Anthony Asher (University of the 
Witwatersrand), John Kruger (Dept. of Finance), Marius Olivier (Rand Afrikaans University), 
Ravi Naidoo (NALEDI), James Chiumya (Dept. of Transport), Patrick Masobe (Council for 
Medical Schemes), Nobayeni Dladla (Chief Director of the Presidency), Doris Sikhosana 
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of the civil society was compensated by a series of public hearings, following a 
model already used for the White Paper on Social Welfare, scheduled for the end 
of 2000241. Moreover, econometric research, scenarios and simulations were 
provided by various individuals and institutes, including labour-friendly 
Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), which had developed the model 
used for COSATU’s BIG proposal242, NALEDI, the National Institute for 
Economic Policy (NIEP), and researchers Claudia and Dirk Haarmann. Among 
the international experts who “shared valuable experience” (RSA, 2002: vii) with 
the Committee was ILO economist and BIG supporter, Guy Standing.  
 The mandate of the Taylor Committee included, for the first time in the 
history of South African social policy, investigation, policy recommendation and 
budgeting to cover an integrated set of  areas of intervention and government 
departments related to the provision of social security. It addressed in particular 
the national pension system, social assistance grants, social insurance schemes, 
unemployment insurance, health funding and insurance, but it did not specifically 
address housing policy and the provision of municipal services. Overcoming the 
fragmentation of South Africa’s social security system and addressing areas of 
exclusion and lack of coverage identified by the Interdepartmental Task Team 
were also part of the mandate of the Committee. 
 The expert knowledge and research provided to the Committee reflected 
to a large extent the problematization of the relationships between labour market 
and social exclusion that after the Jobs Summit had entered welfare policy 
debates. In particular, much research was sympathetic to the BIG concept, seen 
as addressing long term exclusion from waged employment and problems in 
labour market participation through means that are in principle universalistic and 
decommodified. Some researchers and the Democratic Alliance opposition, 
                                                                                                                                 
(University of Natal), Michael Masutha (MP) and Brenda Khunoane (Dept.of Health). Francie 
Lund, invited in the committee, declined due to other work commitments (RSA, 2002: v). 
241 Civil society organizations harshly criticized the composition of the committee during its public 
hearings. SANGOCO’s Abie Dithlake stigmatized in particular the committee’s bias in favour of 
academic experts, the exclusion of community representatives and the lack of community 
participation in a process that he saw as “distant from the daily lives of communities”. He then 
recommended SANGOCO’s “poverty hearings” as an example for the Committee to follow, see 
Oral Record of Hearings of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security, 
collected by the Author, Pretoria, 10 October 2000. 
242 Fiona Tregenna, personal communication, 27 March 2002. 
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however, supported the BIG from conservative positions, which reflected the 
controversies and ambiguities in international debates on the concept.  
Pieter Le Roux (2001, 2002, 2003), for example, proposed to fund the BIG 
through an increase in consumption taxes, in particular the Value Added Tax 
(VAT). He rejected alternative modes of funding based on the income tax 
because this latter is applied only to middle-to-high incomes and therefore the 
informal sector would be “unfairly advantaged”. Besides, taxing income and 
corporate profits, he argued, would increase overall tax burdens (regardless to the 
impact of such measures in reducing social inequality), which contravened the 
aims of a government intent in cutting corporate and high-incomes taxation243. 
With Le Roux’s VAT-based funding model, instead, it was up to the poor’s 
household expenses, rather than to fiscal redistribution, to pay for the basic 
income grant of the “very poor”, whose limited consumption would lead to a 
positive BIG-VAT trade-off.  
Opposition to redistribution was here combined to a view of the BIG as 
aimed essentially at labour market insertion, which meant that the grant had to be 
low enough to prevent recipients from refusing low-wage jobs under the familiar 
guise of avoiding “poverty traps” and “perverse incentives”. For Le Roux the 
BIG would also contribute in to entrepreneurialism among the “disadvantaged” 
by stimulating demand in the informal sector, which is excluded from the VAT, 
encouraging the poor to accept conservative economic policies if they gained the 
impression of benefiting from them (Le Roux, 2001: 28). Moreover, the BIG is 
seen as functional to introducing compulsory preservation of pension benefits, a 
long standing demand of insurance and finance capital, as an acceptable policy 
trade-off. Finally, Le Roux reassured possible concerns arising from the fact that 
with his model 80% of the population would still receive a net transfer of money 
by arguing that the net transfer for a nominal monthly R100 BIG directed at the 
“poorest of the poor” would be no more than R70244.  
                                                
243 To contextualise Le Roux’s claims, it is to be noticed that the government’s 2003 Budget 
provided to extend the CSG from age 7 to 14 by 2005-06, at a cost of R6.4 billion. Raising 
immediately the recipients’ age to 14 would have cost R9.8 billion, while with a further R5.7 
billion the grant could be extended to children up to age 18. To evaluate the fiscal impact of such 
an increase, the 2003 budget had decided for a R 13.4 billion cuts on income tax (IDASA, 2003). 
244 A more far-reaching conclusion in Le Roux’s (2001: 38-39) reasoning was that using the VAT 
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Another member of the Committee, Anthony Asher (2001: 64) presented an 
argument that bore striking resemblance to the “schooling the native body to hard 
work” line of thought discussed in Chapter 2. He decried as causes of South 
Africa’s social problems “sexual promiscuity”, “wasteful consumption” and 
“rampant crime” caused by “limited respect for the rule of law” by “young men 
(…) inadequately socialised as they have been brought up without role models or 
discipline – in their families, schools or at work”. He went on noticing that “even 
well-intentioned attempts by the non-poor” can lead to further problems, as in the 
case of means-tested state grants, which create poverty traps that “penalize 
formal jobs efforts” and “undermine production”. Poverty was therefore 
conceptualized as essentially a moral-psychological condition that “undermines 
ambition and wisdom” making people “wait for others to help and to lead them” 
and carries other forms of “self-destructive behaviour” as “the result of moral 
failure” (Asher, 2001: 66). Asher concluded by indicating the “way out” as 
reinforcing “people’s moral beliefs” that included privileging productive 
employment through a “job creation programme paying low wages”, deemed 
preferable to the BIG, and schooling aimed at encouraging “traditional family 
values and entrepreneurial aspirations” (Asher, 2001: 67-68). 
Conservative support for the BIG revealed the persistence in expert 
discourse of a modality of knowledge of the South African social question that 
identified the main cause of poverty in the specific attitudinal, moral and 
behavioural characteristics of groups variously designated as “poor”, “very poor” 
or “poorest of the poor”. While blaming and stigmatizing these latter for their 
socio-economic conditions, such analyses disabled critical reasoning on the role 
and failures of socio-economic institutions with regard to the perpetuation of 
structural conditions that reproduce and deepen poverty. Therefore, the solutions 
identified from this perspective invariably tend to verge on a pedagogical 
                                                                                                                                 
to fund the BIG would have allowed to eliminate the means test from the SOAP, which would 
become de facto universal (even if at lower benefit levels), allowing to introduce the compulsory 
preservation of private pensions for retired workers who could in this case count on SOAP as a 
partial retirement income. In this way, by encouraging a further erosion of the SOAP, which would 
also become funded through VAT (therefore through household expenses) the BIG would directly 
serve the purpose of privatization of old-age provisions. The author supports, on the other hand, 
the elimination of the means test because it promotes poverty traps that disable the development of 
productive assets and entrepreneurial spirit among the poor. Therefore the BIG is also functional in 
this view to the promotion of work ethic and entrepreneurialism. 
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discourse of individual ethics, responsibility and hard work which ennobles the 
imposition on the most vulnerable sectors of painful trade-offs between expenses 
on basic necessities and the access to meager monetary transfers presented as  
avenues to self-entrepreneurial salvation. 
 Compared to their conservative counterparts, more left-wing supporters 
of the BIG that provided research for the Committee emphasized the role of the 
grant in addressing structural socio-economic and labour market failures, and 
they therefore accentuated the importance of redistribution and 
decommodification for a universal BIG provision. For example, EPRI produced a 
bold report supporting the use of income and company taxes to fund the BIG on 
account of South Africa’s substantial “under-taxation” when compared to other 
developing economies. As a result a raise in total tax burden of 5 percentage 
points, or 50 billion Rand, was deemed sustainable to fund additional social 
expenditures (Van Niekerk, 2002). Conservative and progressive positions, 
however, shared a construct of social citizenship ultimately enabled by work not 
only as an income-earning activity but as a disciplinary and pedagogical ideal 
essentially averse to welfare “dependence”. Equally similar was the way in 
which both groups, reminding Ashforth’s (1990) critique of expert discourse, 
identify “poverty” and “exclusion” as attributes of social groups defined as 
“problems” for whose “solution” science has to be applied. Marius Olivier 
(2000c: 11-12), for example, invites to focus on the causes of social insecurity, 
which in the South African case disrupt the relations between work and social 
inclusion since they are related to mass unemployment and lack of benefits for 
“atypical” workers who do not fall within the UIF’s definition of “employees”.  
In contrast to Asher’s and Le Roux’s emphasis on the poor’s faults and 
responsibilities, he advocates redistributive social solidarity within a coherent 
approach to social security. He also concludes, however, that benefits must be 
“constructed in such a way as to “actually and actively encourage labour market 
participation”. The social security framework is then infused with “adherence to 
the work ethic imperative” and a “movement to active labour market policy 
measures” (Olivier, 2000c: 35, own emphasis). Moreover, Olivier envisages 
“new models of social security” for atypical and informal labour, to be delivered 
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through community-based projects like micro-lending, saving schemes, self-help 
organizations, stokvels and other forms of “mutuality” and “reciprocity” (Olivier, 
2000c: 36-38; Dekker, 2001; Lund and Srinivas, 1998). In this way, the concept 
of “informal social security” for atypical and informal workers recovers 
ideological themes related to “community development” as an enduring legacy in 
South African welfare discourse, turning them in the direction of a “two-tier” 
social security system where only formal workers continue to benefit from public 
spending on “risk-based” interventions. Even if they configure social 
marginalisation not as a “risk”, but as a normal existential condition, these 
arguments legitimize the abdication of public spending responsibilities that are 
“outsourced” to the poor’s survival strategies245. 
Writing from the standpoint of an imaginary future where South Africa has 
won the soccer world cup and the BIG has long been introduced, Guy Standing 
(2003) recounts his responses to arguments according to which the BIG “would 
induce laziness” being “a disincentive to labour”: 
 
Compared with means-tested schemes, a universal grant actually 
provided a greater incentive to search and to take jobs, particularly 
low-wage jobs or low-income, own-account activities. Since these 
were precisely the kind of new work opportunities that were 
emerging, this was crucially important (Standing, 2003: 13, own 
emphasis). 
 
Standing’s argument is ultimately rooted in a view of human nature where “the 
vast majority of people without work, and able to work, do in fact want work, 
since work provides at least part of an individual’s social and economic identity” 
(Standing, 2003: 16, own emphasis). In the context Ashforth (1990) discusses it 
was rural Africans that had to be put to work. In the above arguments, instead, 
the BIG is intended to perform the same function for new problem populations 
like the “lazy” poor, the low skill jobless workers, the structurally unemployed 
for which, to paraphrase Ashforth again, “social inclusion” is the star and “work” 
                                                
245 Inside the Committee, Olivier and Asher supported the concept of “informal social security” as 
a way to unlock the “under-utilised resources of the poor”, an argument that was rejected by Meth 
and Naidoo on account of its ideologically biased entrepreneurial rhetoric, see Transcripts of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 19 and 20 April 2001, 
Vol.2, pp.122-124. 
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is the compass. It is, finally, to be underlined that both conservative and left 
support for the BIG is expressed in opposition to the means test, which, acting as 
a “poverty trap”, discourages the search for waged employment and 
entrepreneurial activities. South African debates on the BIG indicate, therefore, 
that, once social grants are kept at appropriately low levels and 
decommodification is sidestepped, universalism can be more conducive than 
selectivity to the enforcement of wage labour discipline.  
Michael Samson et al.’s (2003) comprehensive survey, produced for the 
Taylor Committee, of the “social, economic and fiscal” impacts of the BIG 
refrains from mentioning the provision of decommodified income as an 
inherently desirable social policy objective, regardless to whether recipients are 
in waged employment or not, or to whether they are willing or unwilling to 
accept low-wage jobs. Rather, among BIG’s economic impact they cite 
increasing possibilities for training and education finalised to finding 
employment, providing “a social stake for the economically disadvantaged” 
(Samson, 2002; Samson et al. 2003: 28). The role of the BIG is further praised as 
improving employment chances and lowering pressures on workers’ wages 
(Samson et al. 2003: 29). In this view, in fact, the BIG would cushion 
reproduction costs of urban workers, especially for extended families in the rural 
areas. A “free labour” imagery is thereby restored where the wage returns to be a 
purely economic quantity and the price for a market transaction disentangled 
from household needs, community-based demands and “moral economy”.  
The radical separation between wage and assistance, and between 
production and reproduction, ultimately reintroduces a discursive dichotomy 
between urban economies driven by increasing productivity and rural societies 
characterized by backwardness and “dependence” on “handouts”. Research 
produced to explain high levels of unemployment in rural areas argued that 
access to social grants was a determining factor for the unemployed’s attachment 
to their household, which conversely “reduces their search activity and 
employment prospects” (Klasen and Woolard, 2000: 19). Therefore 
unemployment was seen as the product of individual “location decisions” 
accompanied to a general image of rural stagnation as opposed to the self-
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entrepreneurial dynamism and mobility of urban labour markets. As a 
consequence, the solution to the problem of unemployment could be inferred as a 
combination of unemployed people’s behavioural change and reduction in 
household-based social grants.  
Challenging methodological individualism, other members of the 
Committee tried to look at the potential of social transfers to decommodify 
community lives and reducing the dependence of non-income earning poor on 
market relations. For Ravi Naidoo, the 1998 Jobs Summit had been “largely a PR 
exercise”, which however inserted in the policy discourse the idea that in 
defining poverty the distinction between employed and unemployed was of 
limited usefulness, while access to a waged job per se insufficiently guarantees 
individual circumstances and abilities to stay out of poverty. As a result, concepts 
of “wage” and “income” had to be disentangled, and to “decent work” based on 
labour market transactions and monetary wage had to be added “decent income”, 
including social grants and transfers, as an independent policy priority246. 
 The chair of the Committee, Viviene Taylor, looked at the task of 
reforming social security  in ways that recalled the sense of urgency in Minister 
Skweyiya’s “social crisis” statement. In particular, in her view a shift from a 
system based on risk to one addressing the needs of poor communities was not 
intended as a way to valorize a “community survival and coping mechanism 
discourse” that, similarly to what the 1997 White Paper suggested, shifted on the 
poor the burden for their own upliftment. Rather, she privileged a notion of 
“income poverty” as a socio-systemic, needs-based, not risk-contingent concept 
that emphasized how also people in formal employment could be socially 
excluded and marginalized247. A focus on the needs of poor communities was 
therefore critical of “Eurocentric social security models based on full 
employment as a viable/realistic goal”, and identified wage labour as part of the 
causes of “chronic poverty”, not only as its main solution. Taylor’s opposition to 
means testing was, however, pragmatically phrased in terms of “selective 
                                                
246 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 19 and 
20 April 2001, Vol.2, p.230. 
247 Viviene Taylor, Special Advisor to the Minister for Social Development, Interview with the 
Author, 8 August 2001. 
 369
universalism”, or universal provision within clearly identified social problems, 
rather than universalism in the form of generalized decommodification. The 
discontinuities between the framework of the Taylor Committee and that of the 
White Paper’s “developmental social welfare” model are clearly expressed by 
Fezile Makiwane, Director for Social Security in the renamed Department for 
Social Development: 
 
Within the White Paper process social security was seen as a small 
residual programme whereby the poor had mainly to see for 
themselves and provide for themselves. Clearly what the government 
is saying is that it’s not a residual programme, it is an important part 
of a welfare state and there should be a comprehensive social security 
system248. 
 
In their opening remarks at the Committee’s public hearings, Taylor and Social 
Development Director General, Angela Bester, emphasized the uneven coverage 
of benefits in the existing system, which excluded vast areas of low-income 
workers, and the ways in which inequalities were perpetuated by the 
predominance of costly and discriminatory private forms of coverage and by the 
poor’s lack of visibility in policy-making and societal bargaining institutions249.  
 In the Committee’s discussions and deliberations, however, orientations 
that looked at the restructuring of South Africa’s social citizenship in the 
direction of universalism, redistribution and decommodification were fiercely 
contested. In the final analysis, the emphasis on social security as a mechanism 
orientated to job creation and wage labour discipline, rather than to the provision 
of decommodified forms of income as an autonomous policy objective, tended to 
prevail. The rhetorical question raised by ANC Member of Parliament, Michael 
Masutha, “If you have all these nice social benefits, where is the incentive to 
want to go back to work?”250, seemed to reflect the mode of the majority. In his 
case, the issue was raised to propose further cuts to state grants, for which a 
                                                
248 Fezile Makiwane, Director for Social Security, Department for Social Development, Interview 
with the Author, 16 October 2000. 
249 Oral record of Hearings of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, 
collected by the Author, Pretoria, 10 October 2000. 
250 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 6 
October 2000, p.17. 
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valuable juridical precedent was provided by the legal opinions supporting the 
1997 abolition of the SMG, according to which “the Constitutional Court will 
never give a grant the same level of protection it would give property”251. 
Charles Meth’s urgent plea for the Committee to “take a stand” against the 
“racist and sexist” concept of “workfare”252 encountered responses that in some 
cases argued for the use of grants as forms of coercion and inducement to 
perform low-wage jobs. Such arguments occasionally led to extreme suggestions. 
A submission from the Development Bank of Southern Africa, strongly criticized 
by Olivier and others, supported the partial adoption of de facto payments in kind 
in the form of food vouchers linked to a smart card as part of the pay package of 
low-wage workers253. On another occasion, Meth asked whether research was 
available on ways in which volunteer schemes or wage subsidies could provide 
incentives to socialize to work the “about a million and a half to three million” 
young “unsocialised, dangerous” male unemployed. Department of Finance’s 
John Kruger provided the following reply: 
 
I mean, the biggest thing in there is actually the American literature 
on the incarceration of that population [amused reaction]. I am, no, I 
am serious, I kid you not (…). The business of welfare to work as it is 
practiced in Britain [has] a much more integrated system, rather than 
the kind of fragmented thing that you have in the United States (…) 
so that incarceration for example in the United States varies very 
greatly from state to state (…). The point about that system is that it 
has coerced people into… it has done away with the entitlement 
system of benefits and it has coerced them into a system into which 
they only receive benefits if they enter and they go through the stages 
of the programmes. But the point about it is that it is hugely 
expensive. 
TAYLOR: And is it actually defensible? 
KRUGER: To attempt to introduce a system like that is actually, well, 
I do not know if it is affordable (…). All of the OECD countries for 
example have got programmes of one source or another designed to 
                                                
251 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 7 
October 2000, p.2. Masutha continued by arguing that while the SMG precedent “legally covered” 
future cutbacks on social grants, these should take place in a short period of time since 
constitutional jurisprudence was changing, giving socio-economic rights a “property right-kind of 
protection”. 
252 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 19 and 
20 April 2001, Vol.1, pp.93-94. 
253 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 19 and 
20 April 2001, Vol.2, p.196. 
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address those particularly unemployable males who seem to be more 
problematic254. 
 
Eventually Kruger conceded, faced with Taylor’s doubts on the “socializing” value 
of these practices, that the mass incarceration of “unemployable males” was not a 
viable policy option for South Africa, but only because of financial unaffordability 
and the fact that most South African unemployed are female. 
While entrenched ideological frameworks played an important part in 
shaping the Committee’s intellectual debate, further constraints on the range of 
available options emanated directly from its position in relation to policy processes 
and institutions. An overarching preoccupation was, in particular, to present the 
Committee’s possible recommendations as “sustainable” in light of the role of the 
Department of Finance as custodian of macroeconomic and fiscal discipline. 
According to Taylor255, the very publication of the Committee’s report, which was 
ready by July 2001, had to be delayed until November upon her insistence for the 
Department of Finance to provide a significant input and avoid an ex post veto on 
the Committee’s recommendations. For Makiwane, acceptance of the BIG idea by 
the Finance Department required presenting the grant as conducive to “reducing 
crime and increasing work-seeking behaviour”256, which for Asher included the 
BIG’s functionality in creating jobs “even if this has to take place at wages below 
the minimum”257. To these concerns Kruger, from Finance, replied that his 
department was specifically concerned not so much with the job creating impact of 
the BIG, but rather with its cost combined to that of other grants258. In relation to 
the Department’s alleged short-termism in its stance on costing, Meth observed “it 
bothers me very much, that is really a problem (…). It is such a gross issue that it 
stinks to the core”259.  
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255 Interview with the Author, 8 August 2001. 
256 Fezile Makiwane, Interview with the Author, 16 October 2000. 
257 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 19 and 
20 April 2001, Vol.2, p.216. 
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Similar problems were raised with regard to the relationships between the 
Taylor Committee’s process and the reform of the UIF, discussed in Chapter 3, 
which was simultaneously underway. The Unemployment Insurance Bill (UIB) 
that was negotiated at NEDLAC had left wide areas of exclusion from UIF 
coverage (domestic workers, public employees, atypical workers). The Committee 
was divided between those supporting the idea that the UIB process had to be 
delayed pending the Committee’s arguably more progressive recommendations, 
and those who wanted to push the UIB forward for approval not to jeopardize its 
financial coverage. UIF Commissioner Mkhonto, however, argued that detaching 
the UIB from the work of the Committee implied “a lot of compromises, some of 
them (…) very reactionary”260.  
The debates in the Taylor Committee revealed a discursive contestation of 
the linkage between work and social citizenship whereby the reassertion of wage 
labour discipline tended to prevail over alternatives based on the 
decommodification of income. Social policy solutions that were inspired by this 
latter, like the BIG, were eventually predominantly seen as tools to facilitate labour 
market insertion, rather than devices to minimize labour market dependency. Such 
outcomes reflect, on one hand, perceptions “from below” of the structural nature of 
the employment crisis in the country, as discussed in the previous chapters. On the 
other hand, however, the Committee’s solution to the gradual disappearance of 
decent, stable, well rewarded wage labour, with the associated imagery of 
emancipation and citizenship, reaffirmed wage labour as a disciplinary and moral 
device. While not addressing wage labour crisis in terms of identifiying structural 
alternatives, therefore, the Committee’s emerging social citizenship discourse 
connected at an ideological level with the job creation, self-entrepeneurial motifs 
arising from the grassroots responses to the crisis. 
The final report of the Taylor Committee reflected such tensions, ambiguities 
and contestations in the attempt to “resignify” the work-social citizenship nexus261. 
                                                
260 Transcripts of the Committee of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, Meeting of 19 and 
20 April 2001, Vol.2, p.246. At the same time, according to Mkhonto (Interview with the Author, 
2 October 2000), the Department of Finance and NEDLAC’s business constituency requested to 
wait for the conclusion of the Committee’s work as a delaying tactic to prevent the implementation 
of the financially onerous UIB agreed upon at NEDLAC. 
261 “Commodification” and “decommodification” are never mentioned in the report, while “social 
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The document recognized that “poverty and inequality in South Africa are rooted 
in the labour market” (RSA, 2002: 25), where “the wage-income relationship is 
breaking down” (RSA, 2002: 32) in terms both of unemployment and low-wage 
jobs. These latter were, however, identified within racial hierarchies (albeit with 
the recognition of widening disparities in African wages) and sectoral inequalities 
(with farmworkers and domestic workers being at the lower end of the spectrum), 
more than being related to differentiating typologies of labour contracts and to the 
emergence of “atypical” and flexible employment (RSA, 2002: 26). Manufacturing 
and public employees tended therefore to be represented as “relatively privileged”, 
even if the household-based statistical measurements that supported these 
conclusions did not address wage sharing across extended families. As a result 
“poor” and “informally employed” are identified as the target groups, each with 
specific needs produced by the “two-fold nature of the South African economy” 
(RSA, 2002: 35), of social security policy. In recognizing that the UIF covers only 
5% of the unemployed and that 60% of the poor have no social security coverage 
whatsoever, the report suggested that the growth of employment-linked benefits 
contributed to exclude the unemployed, informal and temporary workers.  
The growth of “chronic poverty” also among the formally employed, 
moreover, challenged a Western view of social security focused on the “deserving” 
unemployed, especially in its “workfare” variant (RSA, 2002: 39). The conclusion 
was, in any case, that widespread lack of coverage exerted an upward pressure on 
breadwinners’ wages, undermining “any worker support for labour flexibility” 
(RSA, 2002: 31). It seems therefore that the report actually regards social grants as 
facilitating the creation of low-wage, flexible jobs rather than reducing dependence 
upon them. The ability of informal sector employment alone to alleviate poverty 
and reduce inequality was, however, questioned, and the report’s defense of social 
grants eschewed a merely residualist discourse to advocate decided redistributive 
interventions. These were however coded in a language that, apart from poverty 
reduction, sought to “enable household members to engage in the risk-taking 
behaviour so necessary to the generation of additional income” (RSA, 2002: 28).  
The report defined “comprehensive social protection” as the provision of 
                                                                                                                                 
citizenship”, mentioned only once, is not one of its central concepts. 
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The basic means for all people living in the country to effectively 
participate and advance in social and economic life, and in turn to 
contribute to social and economic development. Comprehensive 
social protection is broader than the traditional concept of social 
security, and incorporates developmental strategies and programmes 
designed to ensure, collectively, at least a minimum acceptable living 
standard for all citizens. It embraces the traditional measures of social 
insurance, social assistance and social services, but goes beyond that 
to focus on causality through an integrated policy approach including 
many of the developmental initiatives taken by the state (RSA, 2002:  
41).  
 
Defining social protection in terms of a “package” of provisions to be available 
for all without requiring trade-offs among them addressed the Report’s three-
pronged conceptualization of poverty as involving “income”, “capabilities” (like 
health, housing and education) and “assets” (divided in “income-generating” and 
“social capital”), but it also emphasized the need to “avoid dependence on cash 
benefits”. The principles for administering such a social protection “package” 
were summarized as: “universal-as-possible” access, provided in a “non-work 
related manner and whose availability is not primarily dependent on an 
availability to pay” (RSA, 2002: 42). The universal components of the “package” 
were identified as the BIG, CSG and SOAP grants, free and adequate public 
healthcare, free primary and secondary education, and a lifeline of free water, 
electricity and sanitation.  
Such a stark departure, in the direction of decommodified provisions, from 
the “special needs” emphasis in the 1997 White Paper conferred to “income 
poverty” a de facto priority. At the same time, however, the report presented 
“income” as a flat set of basic provisions that, in accordance with constitutional 
jurisprudence, could allow the state to “buy time” (RSA, 2002: 43) and delay 
more far-reaching redistributive measures. The report’s criticism of public sector 
cutbacks and arguments that fiscal resources could be made available by 
reducing state support for private social security led it to reclaim a greater 
flexibility in macroeconomic and fiscal constraints, and a more progressive 
taxation which could enable, among other things, the total elimination of the 
means test (RSA, 2002: 47). The question of the BIG was discussed in the fifth 
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chapter of the report, which supported the idea of a monthly R100 basic income 
grant to address coverage gap and “encourage risk-taking and self-reliance” 
(RSA, 2002: 61). The report, however, acknowledged that “the conditions for an 
immediate implementation of the Basic Income Grant do not exist” (RSA, 2002: 
62-63). Even if this conclusion was motivated on the basis of institutional 
inadequacies, it nonetheless represented a capitulation to conservative concerns 
and to the discourse of fiscal discipline. To confirm this, the report also rejected 
EPRI’s “under-taxation” argument as the basis for an “immediate” 
implementation of comprehensive social protection (RSA, 2002: 64), opting 
instead for a “phased” approach (from 2004 to 2015), where due attention was 
paid to “issues of fiscal feasibility”. Over the implementation period, the share of 
the GDP in terms of funding for universal provisions was supposed to grow from 
6.5% in 2001 to 11.7% in 2015, while a strong expansion of mandatory 
contributions for insurance schemes should see the share of this kind of 
expenditure rise from 0.6% to 7% of the GDP over the same period (RSA, 2002: 
148). Conversely, a more immediate and “urgent social imperative” is job 
creation, for which the report endorses various active labour market policies, 
including labour-intensive public works programmes, for which however it 
cautions on their limited impact and their wages, as low as R300 per month 
(RSA, 2002: 73). 
By the end of 2004, the main recommendations of the Taylor Committee 
report had made limited and uneven inroads in fundamentally reshaping South 
Africa’s social security system and social citizenship arrangements. The most 
important area of substantive implementation is the institutional one, where a 
Social Security Agency in charge of the centralized administration of social 
grants has been introduced along the lines proposed by the Committee. Recent 
announcements of the government’s intention to introduce a social health 
insurance are also aimed at translating into practice Committee proposals. The 
Committee’s most ambitious suggestions for decommodification and 
redistribution have been, however, forestalled by the intense hostility of the 
government and the ANC. The BIG, in particular, has been at the centre of a 
resurgent civil society mobilization spearheaded by the “BIG coalition”, started 
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in 2001 with the participation of civil society organizations, academic entities 
and COSATU (Frye and Kallmann, 2003).  
COSATU’s support for the BIG allowed the issue to remain on the agenda 
of ANC policy debates and of the 2003 “Growth and Development Summit” 
(GDS) convened to identify programmes to address the unemployment crisis. 
The outcomes of such discussions, however, revealed a gradual foreclosure of 
spaces of political possibility for the basic income grant. The resolutions of the 
ANC’s 2002 National Policy Conference supported the implementation of the 
Taylor Committee’s comprehensive social security framework, but they never 
specifically mentioned the BIG. Rather, great emphasis was placed on the 
creation of short-term employment in the form of public works programmes for 
the sake of “pride and self-reliance of communities” (ANC, 2002). The final 
statement of the 2003 GDS commended once again public works and parsimony 
in limiting social grants to the non-working population. Reassertion of work ethic 
under the principle of letsema, intended as volunteerism and mobilization for 
development, in the government’s Vukuzenzele (“Arise and Act”) programme 
came to symbolise self-sacrifice, responsibility and renunciation of financial 
rewards in the ruling party’s public discourse (Twala, 2004).  
Conversely, in his 2003 “State of the Nation” address President Mbeki 
reaffirmed that the task of his government is to “reduce the number of people 
dependent on social welfare, increasing the numbers that rely for their livelihood 
on normal participation in the economy” (Mbeki, 2003). Few months after the 
publication of the Taylor Report, Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel had 
lambasted the BIG as an “unsustainable” and “populist” idea (Makino, 2003: 19). 
Subsequently, ANC ideologue and government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe 
agued for an emphasis on public works and volunteerism, adding that the best 
form of social inclusion for South Africans remains to “enjoy the opportunity, 
the dignity and the rewards of work”. COSATU’s Neil Coleman replied that in 
the country’s context of mass unemployment, “offering the ‘dignity of work’ as 
opposed to social grants” is tantamount to a “cruel illusion” (Coleman, 2003: 
122). The sidestepping of the BIG and of social policies of decommodification 
more generally, and the aggressive enforcement of work ethic and wage 
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discipline, lead Kumiko Makino (2003: 20) to conclude that the government and 
the ANC have ultimately preferred a “workfare” over a “basic income” response 
to the structural crisis of waged employment. The limitations, timidities and self-
restraint with which the issue of the BIG was discussed in the Taylor Committee 
and in its final report, however, authorize doubts on whether even such a 
measure, if actually adopted, would have effectively provided an alternative to 
dependence on increasingly unstable, exploitative and unrewarding waged 
occupations. 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
The elaboration in the post-apartheid social policy discourse of, and responses to, 
the decline of waged employment as a mode of social insertion relates to the 
scenario outlined in previous chapters in ways that reinforce substantial 
continuities with the past while opening new spaces of contestation. Commenting 
on the social welfare system defined by the 1997 White Paper, Sevenhujisen et 
al. (2003: 305) write: 
 
We may conclude that there are different normative vocabularies at 
play that do not always fit easily together. The overarching 
framework can certainly be characterized as neoliberal; this shows in 
the emphasis on (economic) self-reliance, the development of human 
capital and respect for human rights. The neoliberal vocabulary is 
joined, however, by the more social democratic-orientated values of 
need, equity and basic welfare rights. But there is also an outspoken 
communitarian influence at play, stressing the family and the 
community (read women) as the primary location of care, which is 
potentially reinforced by invoking the principle of Ubuntu. 
 
Such observations confirm the role of pragmatism and hybridity in the ideological 
and institutional practices that define South Africa’s post-apartheid social 
citizenship arrangement. At the same time, while the flexibility of the system 
allows to accommodate multiple constituencies, in particular the demands of 
organized labour, it also permits to articulate them around a hard core of 
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principles and discourses reproduced through expert knowledge, macroeconomic 
constraints and technocratic decision-making.  
A set of markers of continuity in the government’s post-apartheid 
discourse are particularly evident: the centrality of wage labour in promoting 
social inclusion; the residual role of social provisions reduced to ensuring safety 
nets for the non-working population rather than to reduce dependence on the 
labour market; the construction of “poverty” in behavioural and psychological 
terms functional to advocating the poor’s responsibility, initiative and sacrifice as 
primary modes of emancipation; the opposition to state “handouts” presented as 
perverted inducements to dependency and moral relaxation; the pre-eminence of 
work discipline and ethic as underlying conditions for effective citizenship; the 
use of community-based pseudo-traditional motifs to legitimize differential 
treatments between urban and rural areas, and between formal and informal 
economies. All these aspects, moreover, reveal the power and the importance, 
underlined in the Introduction, of morality and pedagogy in shaping scientific and 
policy elaborations of South Africa’s “social question”. In this regard, it has been 
noticed (Van Eeden, Ryke and De Necker, 2000: 22) how the welfare policy of 
late apartheid and of the ANC government share the view that autonomy and 
independence are essentially a prerogative of the individual and that upliftment 
from poverty is ultimately a matter of self-activation on the market, towards 
which public policies play an essentially supportive and remedial role. 
 The policy trajectory presented in this chapter, from the 1997 White Paper 
on Social Welfare to the 2001 report of the Taylor Committee of Inquiry into 
Comprehensive Social Security, has tended to reaffirm the role of wage labour as 
the main vehicle of social insertion even in a context of erosion, when not 
disappearance, of wage labour as an emancipatory force in workers’ daily lives, 
practices and imagination. In doing so, however, the signification of the wage 
labour-social citizenship nexus operated by the policy discourse “from above” has 
not been merely arbitrary or coercive. It has rather proved to be highly respondent 
to narratives and strategies that “from below” have tried to identify a way out of 
the jobs crisis in the form of individual entrepreneurialism and ethics. This 
convergence enabled a re-signification of South African social citizenship around 
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“job creation” discourses, where the government could present itself as committed 
to restore a social and moral order based on work, while eschewing 
responsibilities in the sphere of redistribution of resources, modification of social 
power relations, and reduction of dependency on the market. 
 The ANC’s mode of “regulating the social” is not, however, without 
ambiguities and contradictions. The process that from the 1998 Jobs Summit has 
led to the Taylor Committee has been marked by a growing social awareness of 
wage labour’s structural inadequacy to provide decent living standards. As a 
consequence, the simple equivalence between poverty and unemployment has 
been questioned even within official discourse. Moreover, expanding, 
predominantly African working class poverty has blurred the borders between 
employment and unemployment and widened the chasm between wage and 
income.  
As a result, the Taylor Committee has, in a contested and controversial 
way, inserted a visible decommofication element in policy discourse, aided by 
civil society mobilization and organized labour’s reorientation out of its 
traditional productivist paradigm. The most visible development in this sense has 
been the debate on the BIG as a measure potentially combining 
decommodification, universalism and redistribution. However, both the Taylor 
Committee and COSATU’s analyses have retained a strong “active labour 
market” understanding in their approach to BIG. As a result, the status of the BIG 
concept remains unclear and torn between the function of supporting job-seeking 
behaviours or providing an income that is independent from individual labour 
market positions and vicissitudes. The Taylor Committee’s obsequiousness 
towards fiscal sustainability and resource constraints, and its reluctance to back its 
BIG proposal with a strong implementation plan, did not help to steer the debate 
in the latter direction, nor did its prudence in determining the monetary amount of 
the proposed BIG. Under these conditions, the shift from selectivity to 
universalism heralded by the BIG idea can paradoxically become a reinforcement 
for wage discipline and commodification, by making the unemployed more ready 
to accept low wage jobs and provide for the retirement age with their own 
savings. 
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 Finally, the hostility encountered by the BIG, and by the idea of 
decommodified universal income more generally, within the government and the 
ANC reproduces the dilemmas and the political quandaries inherent in the 
reassertion of wage labour discipline in a social context of wage labour decline. 
Social inequality, decay and impoverishment in workers’ and communities’ lives, 
in fact, question wage labour’s “promise”, which remained largely unfulfilled in 
the dawn of the new democracy. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Writing at the end of the 1980s about his experience in the union movement, 
Alfred T. Qabula (1989: 68-69), imbongi poet and worker at Durban’s Dunlop 
plant, used the metaphor of a forest “full of wild fruit and dangers” to signify an 
imaginary place where “the homeless and the frightened”, the insurgent and the 
militant could express resistance through escape from oppressive factory routine, 
police brutality, managerial racism and corrupt “traditional” authorities. The forest 
was also a place for those who “refused to work for nothing”. Trade union 
organization is for him a road leading through that forest, where the black 
working class could regain fairness, dignity, just wages, citizenship: 
 
What we have made moves forward 
When its wheels wear out, our unity jolts it forward 
When they block it on its way to Capetown 
    it does not lose its power, it roars ahead 
    it grumbles on, with flames and fumes and anger (Qabula, 1989: 70) 
 
Qabula’s poem was published in 1989, the year before South Africa’s transition to 
democracy began. The aim of this dissertation was to provide some elements to 
evaluate what is the current state of that “forest”, or what has happened during 
democratic government’s first decade to the space of claims, expectations, 
collective power and citizenship imagery that wage labour built out of its 
constitutive exploitation during the struggle against the racial socio-political 
order.  
 The making of South African democracy has been a process whereby, for 
the first time in the country’s history, the languages and practice of state 
sovereignty have been geared towards equal citizenship rights and de-racialised 
social inclusion. An assumption underlying my research is that the use of 
sovereignty and governmentality for the purpose of social inclusion cannot be 
statically reduced to impersonal juridical formulations of rights, but as a dynamic 
process it is socially constructed and discursively mediated. Similarly to nation-
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states everywhere, the new South African democracy was faced with the 
challenge of balancing universal enunciations of rights with the need to build 
forms of social discipline and control allowing the management of claims, 
demands and expectations arising from an extremely peculiar and dramatic 
context of social inequality. As in Gilles Deleuze’s classical formulation, 
sovereignty cannot control what it cannot internalize, therefore discourse and 
ideology play a decisive role in translating the impersonality of the norm into 
languages that mirror grassroots desires. During the twentieth century expert 
knowledge at the service of the policy process refined statistical measurement as a 
tool that, by bridging the divide between the abstraction of the norm and the 
concreteness of social subjects, “invented” the economy and society “as part of 
the reconstruction of the effect of the state” (Mitchell, 1999: 93).   
My definition of wage labour, social citizenship and their interactions as 
“contested fields of signification” underlines the importance of such a 
“translation” of norms into subjectivity, whereby sovereignty turns identities 
forged in labour’s past struggles and demands into disciplinary icons, ethical 
obligations or, to recall Nelson Mandela’s argument cited in the Introduction, 
“patriotic” praise of sacrifice. Biersteker and Weber (1996: 11) contend that “the  
meaning of sovereignty is negotiated out of interactions within intersubjectively 
identifiable communities”. Here, competing state agencies and sovereignty 
discourses are in constant flux, constituting each other and both trying to 
articulate social subjects through rights, entitlements and responsibilities designed 
to elicit loyalty, predictability and rationality. The trajectory of the capitalist 
democratic-representative nation-state has framed a specific “intersubjectively 
identifiable community”, wage labour, into a “social question”, for whose solution 
the enunciation of social rights provided the trait d’union between state 
sovereignty and social inclusion.  
This process, structured by practices of “governmentality”, is characterized 
by recursive dynamics of mutual, non-reciprocal, often conflictual signification 
and re-signification. On one hand, social citizenship re-signifies wage labour, 
away from its possible radical claims, in the sense of work ethic, industriousness, 
parsimony and thrift. On the other hand, subjects emerging from wage labour and 
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its transformations try to signify abstract social citizenship discourse through 
changing and diversifying claims where, as Zizek would say, rights-based 
discourse never entirely suppresses a “leftover” of unspecified desire. From this 
perspective, the transition from state-driven welfarism to neoliberalism only 
changes the object of signification. Wage labour discipline becomes 
individualized, market-dependent and opposed to decommodification, which 
under the welfare state was, on the contrary, used as a tool to promote work ethic. 
Conversely, social citizenship claims are expressed by a broadening variety of 
subjects where the politics of identity and difference tends to supersede the 
homogeneity of class imageries, no matter how relevant class remains as a 
condition of legibility of structured oppression (Aronowitz, 2003). 
In the African transition to post-coloniality, of which post-apartheid South 
Africa is part, the contested signification of the nexus between wage labour and 
social citizenship acquired highly specific features related to the 
constitutionalisation of labour as “free” and formally disentangled from previous 
forms of extra-market coercion. Freedom meant for labour both the recognition of 
the legitimacy of its citizenship claims and their channeling within the new 
disciplinary counduits and forms of hierarchical control defined first by the 
nationalist-developmentalist state and then by structural adjustment. In this 
process postcolonial discourse based on the romanticisation of anti-colonial 
resistance floundered (Scott, 2004: 130-131), but at the same time wage labour 
started to be questioned as a mythical repository of dignity, freedom and 
citizenship. It became instead an arena of contestation where dignity, freedom and 
citizenship have to be claimed vis-à-vis former resistance leaders turned into 
political elites and “patriotic” entrepreneurs. 
The transformations of work in post-apartheid South Africa analysed in 
these pages reflect a similar trajectory. The promise of “free” wage labour in a 
democratic society came to emerge in black workers’ opposition to apartheid, 
which transcended conditions of oppression, vulnerability, precariousness, 
institutionalized racism, coerced migrancy, urban segregation, workplace 
despotism. Social movement unionism in the 1980s enriched labour’s imagery 
with a social citizenship discourse where, in response to the collapse of 
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livelihoods in the communities, issues of decommodification rose to prominence, 
albeit in uneven and contested ways. In their being re-signified as avenues to 
political freedom and social citizenship, the wage relation and the workplace were 
also criticized and transcended in workers’ imagery. The late apartheid state and 
the ANC government in the new South Africa, however, shared to a significant 
extent a view whereby free labour could contribute to social stability and self-
responsibility as an alternative to unruly social demands. The democratic 
government could accomplish this goal because it enjoyed the political legitimacy 
that the previous rulers, like colonial regimes in general as Frederick Cooper 
noticed, were lacking. The re-signification of the wage labour-social citizenship 
nexus in the new South Africa benefited from a legitimate constitutionalisation of 
wage labour, in the sense of work being regulated by the market and subtracted 
from despotic coercion. As a result the role of productive employment as the 
central vehicle of social participation, economic independence and political virtue 
was emphasised. The scenario defined by post-1994 neoliberal policy making 
allowed to reassert individual work ethic as an alternative to decommodified 
social provisions, rather than emphasizing these latter as an alternative to labour 
market dependence.  
Public spending curtailment strengthened the historically entrenched 
selective and residual patterns in South African welfare policy, while leaving to 
labour market and family mechanisms the burden of reproducing livelihoods 
within increasingly commodified social relations. The decline of wage labour in 
post-apartheid South African society, and the hollowing out of its emancipatory 
promises as discussed in chapters from 4 to 7, are not only the result of permanent 
mass unemployment, growing casualisation and impasses in trade union politics, 
exacerbated as these might be by economic restructuring and liberalization. 
Indeed, the voices that emerge from chapters 6 and 7 are those of formal, 
permanent, mostly unionized workers, many of whom with skilled grades and 
many others with an employment duration that makes them see the transition out 
of the apartheid workplace regime as an empowering experience. Yet, these 
voices tell stories in which socio-economic decline, impoverishment, lack of 
fulfillment, precariousness and financial inadequacy are primarily experienced 
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from within formal waged occupations. Continuities and changes in relation to the 
past play a decisive role in shaping workers’ discourse of wage labour crisis. The 
permanence of authoritarian, racialised practices in the workplace is compounded 
by deepening insecurity and, at the level of communities, increasingly 
commodified access to healthcare, housing, retirement income, transport and 
municipal services. Material realities of working class poverty and 
disempowerment emerging from my fieldwork findings roundly refute views that 
see waged workers as new “relatively privileged” middle class layers clearly 
separated from the poor and the unemployed. Instead, my rejection of binary, 
polarized categories as explanations for South Africa’s social question is also an 
urgent call for further research into the ways in which wage labour reproduces 
poverty and social marginalisation. 
Workers’ generalized awareness of the structural nature of the decline of 
wage labour are associated with patterns of response that, conversely, are far more 
complex, diversified and ambiguous. My findings do not authorize the conclusion 
that an alternative social citizenship imagery, let alone one premised on 
decommodification, is rising from the ashes of wage labour’s emancipatory 
project. Workers’ perceptions of stable waged employment’s generalized 
disappearance, heightened by the cataclysmic impact of unemployment in 
poverty-stricken townships, are associated with various strategies -- from attempts 
to reconfigure community lifeworlds to individualized self-activation -- that 
proactively and creatively express a growing indifference to wage labour as a 
material reality.  
From this point of view, my findings support the conclusion, which sits 
uncomfortably with those who argue that labour market exclusion nurtures 
attitudes to passivity and “dependency”, that agency and initiative are not 
thwarted by job insecurity and vulnerability. These may in many case indeed 
provide new opportunities, albeit at a largely survivalist level. When I moved 
from the level of strategies to that of discourse and signification, however, “job 
creation” remains the cornerstone of grassroots long-term responses to social 
crises. This apparently contradictory result is clarified by unpacking the meanings 
attached to the “job creation” demand, which to a large extent expresses not so 
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much a longing for factory work, but a nostalgic, and often quite conservatively-
phrased, evocation of a social order based on wage labour as a guarantor of 
established forms of authority and deference. 
The post-apartheid policy discourse has responded to the material collapse 
of wage labour as a condition for dignified existences with an aggressive 
reassertion of wage labour centrality as a mode of social inclusion. Instrumental to 
this development have been the use of expert knowledge in categorizing poverty 
as lack of employment, the recodification of poverty as a moral and behavioural 
construct in order to divide “deserving” and “undeserving” poor, the resumption 
of pseudo-traditionalist themes of colonial origins as a way to emphasise self-help 
and responsibility, and the stigmatization of welfare “dependency” as a 
justification for the withdrawal of decommodified social provisions. Out of this 
policy trajectory, wage labour emerge as a “master-signifier” of social existence. 
In a truly Lacanian sense, it in fact envisages an idealised social subject -- the 
patriotic, hard-working, law-abiding, family-responsible, morally frugal and 
politically moderate poor – whose very material absence reinforces its claim to 
discipline more “unruly” desires. The re-signification by the ANC government of 
wage labour as an ethical construct in direct opposition to claiming “handouts” 
responded to, and was influenced by, the permanence of “job creation” in rank-
and-file views as an imaginary solution to social problems.  
Crucial in this interaction is the role of trade union discourse which, after 
the decline of social movement unionism, is increasingly challenged to elaborate 
new languages and demands to address social constituencies beyond union 
members themselves. Indeed, the democratic transition has largely coincided with 
the strengthening of a mode of argumentation in trade union leadership that has 
marginalized social citizenship views based on decommodification. For example, 
while I was writing this conclusion, Neva Makgetla, COSATU’s most 
distinguished economic expert, expressed the opinion that the inadequacy of 
retirement benefits should be countered mainly through job creation policies262.  
Important shifts, discussed at the end of Chapter 8, in labour and scholarly 
consensus, and renewed contestations in South African policy discourse indicate 
                                                
262 N. Makgetla, “Best Retirement Policy for Workers is Job Creation”, Business Day, 29 July 
2005. 
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the emergence, albeit in controversial and often ambiguous ways, of innovative 
readings of the country’s “social question”. These provide a nuanced picture of 
modes of labour market insertion that generate poverty and social exclusion, and 
overtly advocate the provision of decommodified forms of universal income as an 
autonomous sphere of policy intervention. Further developments in these debates 
are open to  great uncertainty, as they remain hotly contested and will probably be 
affected by a global contestation of neoliberal discourse whose outcomes are as 
yet unpredictable.  
At the same time, a recent resurgence of radical social movement politics 
identifies commodification -- in the form, for example, of housing evictions, water 
and electricity cutoffs for rate defaulters, and access to treatment for HIV/AIDS – 
as a priority terrain of contestation. On the question of the basic income grant as 
well, civil society mobilization has played a crucial role, sometimes in alliance, 
sometimes in substitution of organized labour. Future research on conflicts over 
the meanings of social citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa, therefore, will 
require a close attention to identities and claims that, inhabiting the space of 
desires and claims “left over” by the decline of wage labour, could disclose new 
possibilities to re-signify the South African transition. 
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